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Preface some elements of foreign assistance can be phased out per-
haps from the mid-1990s on. 
In July 1989, the summit of the Arche in Paris declared its 
support for the process of political and economic reform 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Referring specifically to 
Hungary and Poland, the summit offered coordinated econ-
omic assistance designed to transform and open these econ-
omies. Particular emphasis was laid on supporting economic 
reform through investment, transfers of management skills 
and professional training. The summit invited the Com-
mission to coordinate assistance for economic reform in 
Hungary and Poland among the interested Western govern-
ments. The process of coordination (carried out by the so-
called 'Phare' Task Force) thus established is likely to be 
extended to other Central and Eastern European economies, 
in accordance with the willingness expressed by the 24 
Foreign Ministers on 13 December 1989. 
The Community, the Member States, the other members of 
the Group of 24, the European Investment Bank and, of 
course, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank are all involved in the Western assistance effort. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will, 
when established, also be an important source of financing 
for the economic development of the region. Coordination 
of Western assistance is thus a complex task, and continuing 
efforts are required to ensure its effectiveness. Operationally 
useful coordination depends on reaching a common view, as 
between the donors themselves and also with the beneficiary 
countries, on the forms and mix of assistance required in 
each individual case. 
There are two basic conditions attached to Western assist-
ance to Central and Eastern Europe. The first, stressed again 
by the 24 at the meeting of 16 February 1990, is the effective 
installation of democratic mechanisms, including multi-
party parliamentary systems, the rule of law and guarantees 
of basic liberties. The second, economic, precondition for 
Western help is the adoption of macroeconomic policies 
capable of avoiding inflationary excesses during this period 
of unprecedented structural change; such policies, in particu-
lar, include the reduction of budget deficits and sound gov-
ernment financing regimes. In these conditions, it may be 
expected that economic development in Central and Eastern 
Europe will gradually become more self-supporting, so that 
In its work of concertation in the Group of 24, the Com-
mission sought an effective exchange of information ón 
bilateral assistance activities and a pooling of information 
on the work of the relevant international organizations (In-
ternational Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and the Club of 
Paris). It also tried to ensure that the objectives and strategies 
of the 24 and of the international organizations are coherent 
and mutually reinforcing so as to avoid duplication, es-
pecially of research. As part of the 'Phare' operation, the 
Commission approved a Community action for cooperation 
in the field of economics (ACE) which adapts the selection 
procedure of the successful SPES (stimulation plan for 
economic science). The ACE programme commits ECU 
1 million for Poland and ECU 500 000 for Hungary in 1990. 
It will certainly foster economic research on the transitions 
from bureaucratic socialism and help broaden the pro-
fessional networks of European economists. This issue of 
European Economy dedicated to economic transformation 
in Hungary and Poland also attempts to contribute to a 
better knowledge of the specific problems of economic 
reform in these two countries. 
The issue contains a selection of studies submitted by a 
group of independent experts which were convened at the 
initiative of the Directorate-General for Economic and Fi-
nancial Affairs as part of the 'Phare' operation. The experts 
held four meetings in Brussels (on 21 September, 24 October, 
14 November 1989 and 6 and 7 February 1990). These 
meetings allowed the participants to comment on early drafts 
of their respective papers and exchange their views on current 
developments in Poland and Hungary. At its last meeting 
on 6 and 7 February, the experts' group met the Blue Ribbon 
Commission (which has produced in the mean time an action 
programme for the new Hungarian Government) and had a 
mutually useful exchange of views on the situation and the 
prospective developments in Hungary. 
The list of the experts and the papers submitted by them 
can be found below. The introduction by the coordinator 
reflects his personal views, as well as those of the other 
independent experts. Nevertheless, the introduction is con-
sistent with the chairman's conclusions of the meetings 
drawn by the representative of Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs in the 'Phare' Task Force. 
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Part I — Introduction 
The Paris summit meeting of the G7 countries in July 1989 
invited the Commission of the European Communities to 
coordinate Western assistance for economic reform in Hun-
gary and Poland. The Commission subsequently convened 
a meeting of those countries interested in participating in 
the effort, which became known as the Group of 24. Within 
the Commission, a corresponding structure was established 
under the leadership of Directorate-General I (External Re-
lations). This became known as the Phare Task Force (Po-
land and Hungary: aid for economic reconstruction). The 
Task Force includes representatives of different services, 
notably Directorate-General II (Economic and Financial 
Affairs), and encompasses a wide range of activities and 
substantial expenditure. 
Such a programme requires a background of economic 
analysis. Like all the international organizations that have 
become involved in the economic transformation of Eastern 
Europe, the EC had only limited internal staff resources for 
this analysis. To complement these resources, the Com-
mission convened a group of external advisers, drawn from 
several Community countries as well as from Hungary and 
Poland. The work of the advisers was coordinated by Rich-
ard Portes, Director of the Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, and the meetings in Brussels were chaired by Jorge 
Braga de Macedo, Director of National Economies and 
representative of DG II in the Task Force. 
This introduction sets out the main issues that featured in 
their discussions and highlights some of the findings con-
tained in the set of papers written by the advisers and 
presented in this volume. The views expressed in these papers 
are the responsibility of their authors alone. 
1. When does an economic regime change? 
An economic regime is a set of rules and institutions that 
embody the overall framework for economic activity and 
determine the behaviour patterns of economic agents. An 
economic reform sufficiently far-reaching to mark the rejec-
tion of bureaucratic socialism and the start of the transition 
to a new system would be a regime change. But it is not 
clear what set of measures is enough to define a regime 
change and bring about the desired change in expectations. 
Some advisers to Solidarity originally proposed 1 November 
1989 for a 'big bang' in Poland, rejecting the past 'cold 
turkey', with no opportunity for fallback. The government 
implemented a smaller bang on 1 January 1990, having 
reached agreement with the IMF on a macroeconomic stabi-
lization package. Even if this goes far enough to qualify as 
a regime change, it is difficult to judge whether it will prove 
to be irreversible. The 'new economic mechanism' introduced 
in Hungary on 1 January 1968 was supposed to bring an 
irreversible transformation, but it was not clear until (at 
least) late 1972 that it had not done so. 
Economic reforms in Eastern Europe now are much more 
fundamental than their predecessors. The Polish package of 
1 January was certainly designed to signify a 'regime change'. 
The ground had been prepared in the autumn, notably 
with significant fiscal consolidation (see the discussion by 
Stanislaw Gomulka). There was a substantial relative price 
adjustment for energy (with more to come), but the measures 
introduced were mainly those of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. The primary objective was to control inflation. Prelimi-
nary data indicate that prices initially increased more than 
expected, but there was nevertheless a clear deceleration, 
and the authorities maintain they are 'on course' for the 1 
to 2% monthly rate intended for the second half of 1990. 
Gomulka and Domenico Mario Nuti both analyse the Polish 
stabilization programme in detail. It is not yet clear that 
macroeconomic expectations have adjusted to the extent 
required for a regime change, although preliminary indi-
cations are favourable. There is certainly no regime change 
yet on the micro side; some argue that the supply response 
required for medium-term success in macro stabilization 
will not come without major microeconomic reforms. In 
Hungary, a strong current of opinion maintains that a decis-
ive regime change is essential in the form of an immediate 
'action programme' to be implemented in the three months 
following the elections of 25 March. 
2. The 'anchors' of a stabilization programme 
Previous stabilizations elsewhere give us a fairly good under-
standing of the nexus among excess demand, inflation, the 
real interest rate, the nominal and real exchange rates, in-
dexation, and a possible wage freeze. Pegging the nominal 
exchange rate is one signal of a change in the policy regime 
and can strongly influence behaviour. It can bring immediate 
benefits in terms of lower inflation but is costly if the attempt 
to reverse inflationary expectations fails. To make the regime 
change effective and credible requires other anchors and 
policies. 
The main issue is fundamentally political: the costs and 
benefits of immediate (perhaps severe) austerity or the op-
posing risks of hyperinflation; political catastrophe might 
ensue from either. A country in democratic transition will 
tend to delay adjusment. To counter this tendency, aid 
should be conditional on stabilization. 
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The Polish stabilization programme is not 'monetarist', if 
only because of the 'heterodox' element of incomes policy 
implemented through partial indexation of money wages. 
Without any way of financing deficits except monetization 
(government bond market being absent), the distinction be-
tween fiscal and monetary policies is in any event not clear. 
The nominal anchors for the programme appear to have 
been the exchange rate and money wages; while for real 
variables, policy focused on the real money supply and the 
real interest rate. Some regarded the initial exchange rate 
devaluation as excessive, but there has of course already 
been a substantial real appreciation since 1 January. 
3. The importance of 'robust sequencing' 
There is by now a conventionally preferred order for econ-
omic liberalization in LDCs: the current account of the 
balance of payments should normally precede the capital 
account, and removing distortions in goods markets should 
take priority over factor markets (in particular, capital mar-
kets). Liberalizing trade first avoids the danger that lifting 
capital controls before lowering trade barriers might lead to 
an inflow of capital and an undesirable appreciation of the 
real exchange rate, as occurred in some Latin American 
countries in the 1970s. 
There are specific issues that feature in the cases of Poland 
and Hungary. A key question, for example, is whether priv-
atization can accompany or should follow restoring macro-
economic equilibrium and (then) establishing reasonable 
relative prices. It is widely agreed that privatization is not a 
preferred instrument for absorbing household purchasing 
power, which in any case is not now a problem in Poland. 
There is also a consensus that the labour market, long 
characterized by excess demand side by side with underem-
ployment of workers in the factories, should be freed as 
much and as soon as possible. 
In Poland, price stabilization (with a 'phased liberalization') 
has been the authorities' top priority. The tools are fiscal 
consolidation (cutting subsidies to energy and interest rates, 
a new tax on enterprise assets, and broadening the enterprise 
tax base by eliminating exemptions); a tough incomes policy 
(more than intended, with inflation higher than expected 
and only partial indexation); and a 'managed float' of the 
exchange rate, with the intention to hold the 1 January peg 
against the dollar until May. The programme assumes no 
servicing of official external debt this year, but payment of 
15 % of interest due on medium- and long-term private debt 
as well as full servicing of trade credits. 
The paper by Nuti gives a thorough analysis of the problems 
of sequencing in Poland. As he indicates, major structural 
change will await the second stage of the reform programme. 
A new statute on privatization has just been put to parlia-
ment and has already provoked considerable debate and 
lobbying over the future ownership rights of the enterprise's 
workers. The authorities have begun to break up major 
monopolies, to allow some restructuring consequent on the 
financial squeeze hitting firms, and to introduce a compe-
tition policy. It is not clear how far all this will go before 
substantial privatization. 
This sequence may not be robust to Overshooting' on the 
macro side, of which there is already some evidence. The 
danger is that the incomes policy and enterprise cost-plus 
pricing will yield excessive real wage cuts and a fall in real 
demand, with enterprises reducing output and employment 
beyond the 5 to 10% expected. This would threaten fiscal 
imbalance as well as political instability. Fiscal imbalance 
would in turn undermine the key objective, the control of 
inflation. Moreover, an excessively tight squeeze, along with 
delay in adjusting relative prices, would distort the valuation 
of enterprises to be privatized. 
There is considerable debate over sequencing in regard to 
privatization in Hungary. Some see privatization as an ur-
gent means of eliminating State bureaucratic power once 
and for all; others stress the negative economic consequences 
of privatization without proper preconditions, macro and 
micro, as discussed below. 
4. Fiscal reform and budgetary consolidation 
Reform requires not only being able to budget in stable 
monetary magnitudes, but also transparency: the reduction 
of hidden subsidies and taxes that are much larger even than 
in Italy or Portugal. The intricacies and overall 'levelling' 
thrust of the tax-subsidy system that Mark Schaffer analyses 
for Poland are related to 'tutelage' of ministries over enter-
prises discussed by Paul Hare. 'Levelling' results from relat-
ing net tax (or subsidy) directly and more than pro-
portionally to net profits (or losses), so as to eliminate 
differences among the after-tax results of enterprises. Minis-
tries bargain with enterprises over taxes and subsidies and 
at the same time endeavour to negotiate favourable treat-
ment for the enterprises for which they are responsible. The 
paper by István Abel deals with bargaining over subsidies 
between enterprises and ministries and its redistributive and 
inflationary effects. 
The tutelage system is at the heart of the lack of competition 
in the bureaucratic economic system, so that attacking it 
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will generate considerable resistance from the nomenklatura. 
This is a major behavioural and institutional constraint 
limiting progress towards a market environment. 
Analytically, designing fiscal reform and understanding its 
effects require careful distinction among several important 
phenomena : tax revenue that arises from inflation; the im-
plicit intermediation tax (or subsidy) arising from unduly 
wide (or narrow) margins between banks' borrowing and 
lending rates; the Tanzi effect, whereby real tax revenue is 
lost in an inflation (and fiscal imbalance thus exacerbated) 
because taxpayers delay their payments so as to take advan-
tage of the declining value of the currency; and negative real 
interest rates (which need not be pathological). 
But the new position will still not be anywhere near equilib-
rium. In the ensuing adjustment, it is important to dis-
tinguish temporarily uneconomic from permanently unvi-
able activities, just as between illiquidity and insolvency. 
Moreover, price distortions are both cause and effect of 
baroque tax-subsidy systems, and simultaneous efforts to 
rationalize both will interact. 
Thus workers should not be sacked, capital stock scrapped, 
nor enterprises closed in the short run unless it is very clear 
that they are unviable in the long run. All this, as well as 
the inadequacy of accounting systems and data, indicate 
great difficulties for anyone (including 'the market') seeking 
to value the assets of firms to be privatized. 
In both countries there will be a major effort to broaden the 
tax base and cut subsidies. There has been substantial tax 
reform in Hungary over the past few years, and the budget 
deficit is already down to manageable levels, with a further 
significant cut expected for 1990. But there are still large 
subsidies to housing and serious problems with public debt 
management. The effective tax on trade with CMEA is an 
important source of budget revenue, which would thus lose 
from some proposals for CMEA reform. As Gomulka and 
Abel show, both Poland and Hungary have made consider-
able progress in fiscal consolidation, but there is still much 
to be done. 
The high rate of the new Polish tax on enterprise capital has 
been criticized, partly because it is fixed in nominal terms 
and hence will be a greater threat to enterprise solvency (and 
thus to output and employment) if inflation is brought under 
control. In this sense, the tax is pro-cyclical. New Polish 
statutes on personal income taxation are in process, but 
preparations for VAT are going more slowly. 
5. Microeconomic distortions, price 
liberalization, and restructuring 
It is essential to recognize the extent and long history of 
price distortions in these economies. Deeply irrational prices 
and investment allocation go back 40 years. The resulting 
patterns of production and capital stock are immeasurably 
further from an 'equilibrium' than in any middle-income 
developing country contemplating liberalization. 
Thus freeing prices and unifying the exchange rate will make 
many product lines, plants and enterprises appear hopelessly 
uneconomic. Simply bringing energy prices close to world 
prices, rationalizing the enterprise tax-subsidy system, and 
establishing a positive (low) real interest rate will do this. 
An independent 'receivership agency' could identify the 
hopeless cases and arrange temporary help for the rest. But 
this will be difficult to do without endangering the credibility 
of bankruptcy and perpetuating tutelage and financial indis-
cipline. Poland is creating a restructuring agency for enter-
prises in financial difficulty and beginning to train 'company 
doctors' to operate for it. The competence and independence 
of this agency would seem as important as that of the central 
bank in a market economy. Its rules governing permissible 
temporary financial assistance should be as unambiguous as 
possible. 
The key areas for price adjustment are energy prices in 
Poland and foreign trade prices (in CMEA trade) for Hun-
gary. Progress will be slow in both cases. Gordon Hughes 
discusses the extent of energy price adjustment required in 
Poland and recommends a phased approach, which the 
authorities appear to have taken. 
Labour market rigidities are a recognized problem, but the 
new unemployment benefit system in Poland is a major 
advance. Sixty thousand registered in January, and the path 
of this figure over the forthcoming months will be the best 
index of labour market tension (vacancies have already fallen 
sharply). Arye Hillman points out potential problems of 
unemployment in Hungary but argues for far-reaching de-
regulation of the labour market. 
6. Privatization 
Transferring most State industrial and service enterprises 
into private ownership is an essential element in breaking 
down tutelage relationships and creating a market environ-
ment. Irena Grosfeld's paper makes the case, and she and 
Hare discuss problems of implementation in Poland and 
Hungary respectively. There is no consensus on the appropri-
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ate form of privatization in Polish and Hungarian con-
ditions. There are, for example, potential advantages to 
(effective) bank ownership of a substantial part of industrial 
equity (see Germany and Japan). Jenny Corbett's paper 
makes it clear that an efficient capital market — an allo-
cation process in which capital goes to its most profitable 
uses — does not require that a market for equity shares play 
a major role in raising or allocating finance for investment. 
There are separate arguments for employee share ownership : 
democratization, incentives, and compensation for real wage 
cuts. But workers may be ungrateful if they are subsequently 
sacked or their enterprises prove unviable and are closed— 
especially if they have had to pay for their shares; this may 
in turn be an undesirable deterrent to such rationalizations. 
'Wild' or 'spontaneous' privatization has often been carried 
out by the managers (or nomenklatura) primarily for their 
own benefit, without even any compensation to the State 
for the assets. This has apparently occurred frequently in 
both countries. It appears inefficient, socially dangerous, 
and distributionally undesirable. 
This problem has arisen partly because the current owner-
ship status of 'State' firms is confused and controversial in 
both countries. The extent of self-management and workers' 
(or nomenklatura) control offered by existing legislation is 
related to pressures for substantial concessions to employee 
share ownership in new legislation for privatization. 
Market structure and ownership are the key issues. Some 
argue that the only prerequisite for privatization is to subject 
State enterprises to market discipline. Privatization should 
not be delayed any longer than necessary to avoid irreparable 
serious errors. Yet the danger of such errors is evident. 
Price distortions and the lack of transparency in tax-subsidy 
systems make it difficult to value assets; both countries 
lack appropriate regulatory structures, including not only 
competition policy but also basic requirements of disclosure, 
accounting and auditing, contract and bankruptcy law; and 
it would be much more difficult to break up monopolies 
after privatization than before. Competition from abroad 
will be necessary in establishing competitive markets, but 
it cannot be sufficient. Schaffer sets out the problems of 
competition policy and their relation to industrial restructur-
ing in Poland, and David Newbery deals with these issues 
in the Hungarian context. 
Ownership is equally difficult. Despite the (outdated) talk 
of 'monetary overhang', even in Hungary the population 
could not finance large-scale equity purchases. If the govern-
ment were willing to forego the revenue from State assets, 
it could give them away to the population or to the workers 
in the enterprises. But aside from the distortions created by 
having to find alternative sources of budgetary finance, 
the latter alternative raises difficult issues of equity and 
subsequent management of the firms, while the former might 
alienate the workers. Either is doubtless preferable to take-
over by the nomenklatura; a new law should stop this in 
Poland. 
A final possibility, which seems to be welcomed by some 
Hungarian opinion, is large-scale purchases by foreigners. 
The potential advantages of importing management, tech-
nology and markets are evident. The danger is that both 
price distortions and the lack of effective domestic demand 
for shares might allow foreign investors to acquire domestic 
assets very cheaply—there is indeed already talk of 'frontier 
booms', 'gold rushes', 'profiteering' and 'carpetbagging'. 
Privatization must go together with financial innovation, 
which is also required to develop intermediation and give a 
proper basis for monetary policy. As István Székely indi-
cates, restructuring and development of the financial system 
will also require careful sequencing in order to ensure stab-
ility. 
7. Trade, debt and aid 
The Comecon meeting in January was lively but inconclus-
ive. Some called in effect for immediate dissolution of the 
bilateral trade and payments system, with a switch to pay-
ment in convertible currency and the abolition of govern-
ment-level agreements on quantities to be traded. But even 
most of those who thought this was the appropriate long-
run objective argued for a transition period, whose nature 
and duration remains to be settled. Liberalization would 
confront all countries except the USSR with the double 
problem of financing the deterioration of their terms of 
trade and of their budgetary position (see the discussion 
by Hillman on the implications for Hungary). Meanwhile, 
industrial production is falling in most CMEA countries, 
which are therefore unable to meet their commitments to 
supply their partners. 
An East European Payments Union, analogous to the EPU 
that operated in Western Europe in 1950-59, is a potential 
mechanism to facilitate the transition. It is open to criticism 
on several grounds. First, the duplication of industrial ca-
pacities across the smaller countries may have made them 
inappropriate trade partners. On the other hand, much of 
industrial trade in the West is now intra-industry rather than 
inter-industry. Second, CMEA faces the special problem of 
bilateral relations between the smaller countries and the 
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USSR. This arose in a different form for the EPU, where 
the motivation was in part mutual protection against the 
'dollar shortage' associated with the large external partner. 
Third, perpetuation of a 'poor man's club' could hinder the 
urgent process of bringing these countries into the global 
economic system. 
One approach might be to make the analogy with the EPU 
even closer by creating an EEPU without the USSR. The 
United States welcomed the EPU, which was from the outset 
seen as a means of promoting the transition to multilateral-
ism and convertibility. 
Assessing the options is difficult, because there is no free-
trade reference point for these countries in recent history, 
and it is not clear that the first decade of the century 
is particularly relevant. Now that the range of countries 
intending to establish market economies extends well beyond 
Hungary and Poland, the transformation of East European 
trade and payments raises qualitatively new issues. These 
questions should be addressed urgently in the common 
framework of contemporary international macroeconomics 
and the economics of international trade, using the tools of 
quantitative comparative economics. 
The debt service burdens for both Hungary and Poland are 
extremely heavy, and Hungary has a serious balance of 
payments problem, which Istvan Szalkai discusses in detail. 
The composition of the debt differs significantly between 
them : most of the Polish obligations are to the Paris Club 
(i.e. government-guaranteed rather than commercial bank 
debt), while Hungary is mainly indebted to Western commer-
cial banks. As noted above, Poland is not offering significant 
debt service for 1990 and is seeking debt reduction. The 
Paris Club will, however, resist that on the grounds that 
outright reduction of official debt has so far been confined 
to very poor countries (and hence small amounts), and 
governments do not wish to set a precedent applicable to 
middle-income highly indebted countries. 
Unlike Poland, Hungary has so far avoided rescheduling, 
but it is clear that a new government could not implement 
major reforms without a very substantial reduction of debt 
service. Both countries are overindebted, and there must be 
considerable doubt over extending substantial new loans to 
them (as opposed to grants, foreign direct investment, etc.). 
Aid must in the first instance be conditional on macro-
economic stabilization, a process which it can indeed greatly 
assist. Hillman suggests detailed conditionality with regard 
to macroeconomic and budgetary policies, but this is of 
course the domain of the IMF. As Newbery proposes, the 
simplest 'conditionality' the EC could enforce would be to 
offer full access to our markets in exchange for meeting the 
conditions we would expect from all similarly privileged 
trade partners—e.g. current and capital account liberaliza-
tion, no State aids, adherence to GATT. 
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1. Introduction 
The Hungarian government has already set the pace for a 
significant reduction of subsidies for current production 
and for consumer goods by 1992. Eliminating or at least 
decreasing subsidies has always been seen as a necessary 
complementary measure to increase competitiveness and ad­
aptation to world market changes. 
However, in the past to go along this line has proved extra­
ordinarily difficult because financial regulation of com­
panies' incomes (all sorts of taxes and subsidies) is not 
only a channel of income redistribution but underlies and 
influences closely price behaviour and social welfare. This 
paper attempts to identify the factors of policy consider­
ations when authorities apply subsidies, and to assess the 
likely effects of a proposed subsidy reduction programme. 
The paper consists of two parts. First how income regulation 
influences firm behaviour is described and on the basis of 
this relationship a general framework to improve the tax­
subsidy policy mix is proposed. In the second part current 
production and consumption subsidies are analysed. A pro­
gramme for significant subsidy reduction is outlined and the 
prospects of its implementation are evaluated. 
2. Financial instruments of enterprise 
regulation in Hungary 
2.1. Preliminary remarks 
A major distortion in countries with sophisticated controls 
of enterprises is of course the existence of these controls. 
But second­best theory should make us cautious in rec­
ommending elimination of these distortions in a world where 
many market imperfections exist. 
In the current economic environment in Hungary, indirect 
financial regulation has replaced administrative directives as 
a means for influencing enterprise behaviour. However, the 
high degree of industrial concentration coupled with a scar­
city of convertible currency make it impossible to induce 
competitive behaviour. Hence, the market for many large 
enterprises in Hungary is best conceived as a regulated 
monopoly situation. Furthermore, the regulator (the govern­
ment authorities) has limited information about the actual 
financial conditions of the enterprise. 
Consequently, the economic environment in which large 
Hungarian enterprises operate exhibits all the characteristics 
of small group bargaining processes with limited infor­
mation.1 But it is hard to find any approach used in the 
extensive and rich literature on information and regulation 
that could be used to analyse the economic problems of the 
Hungarian income regulation.2 
2.2. Subsidy orientation in income regulation 
2.2.1. Bargaining and effective demand 
To evaluate the economic implications of subsidies in the 
Hungarian industrial sector a model3 which concentrates on 
a price­bargaining process is used assuming that under the 
administered price system the authorities influence price 
decisions in the following way. Having some rather limited 
background information about the market demand, they 
impose a pricing schedule on enterprises. The bargaining 
process is incorporated in this price schedule. A price limit, 
a, expresses the authorities' willingness to shut down the 
firm rather than allow its price to be set higher than a. If 
the actual price is close to this limit, a, then it is difficult for 
the enterprise to get permission for a price increase, while, 
if it is significantly lower than a, such permission is more 
likely to be obtainable. For simplicity the following form of 
the pricing schedule, E, is used: 
(1) £ = 
where 
q = output 
ρ = price 
a = price limit 
_ d3ll = 
dpjp 
Ρ 
a­ ρ 
Equation (1) expresses; if price: p, is close to limit, a, to get 
permission for a 1% price increase, dp/p, the firm has to 
threaten the authorities with a large relative drop in output, 
dqlq. 
Since the authorities are ultimately responsible for the supply 
of product to the economy, in the bargaining process, the 
enterprises threaten to reduce their output if they do not get 
permission to increase their price, p. In equation (1) we 
defined the elasticity of the implicit price schedule, resulting 
Some Hungarian economists rank bargaining even higher than shortage 
as the major characteristic of the economic system (Antal, 1985, Laky, 
1979). 
In Ábel­Bonin, 1989 a, the lessons provided in the standard literature for 
the Hungarian case are discussed. 
The model is developed in Ábel­Bonin, 1989 b. 
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from the bargaining process in this way.1 This is a price­
quantity relationship in an elasticity form that can be inte­
grated to an effective demand function. The adjective effec­
tive is used to indicate that this is not a market demand 
schedule but rather the result of a bargaining process be­
tween the regulator and the enterprise manager. Even if 
the authorities were able to impose on the enterprise their 
perception of market demand as the effective demand sched­
ule, any forecasting mistakes that make these estimates dif­
ferent from true market demand, would result in shortage 
or oversupply in the real market. Such shortage phenomena 
are discussed thoroughly in Kornai, 1980. 
2.2.2. Modified profit maximization 
To incorporate the institutional features of price bargaining 
into a positive theory of the Hungarian enterprise, we assume 
that all the constituent groups of enterprise are represented 
by the manager. The regulatory authorities specify the finan­
cial parameters and jointly determine the price schedule in 
bargaining with the enterprise manager. Then the manager 
chooses the decision variables to maximize a modified profit 
function. 
The general specification of the modified profit function 
corresponding to the entire range of fiscal regulators is given 
by: 
(2) Ρ = (1 ­ r)[(l ­ t)pq ­ c(q)] + spq + wq + vc(q) 
where 
ρ = price 
q = output 
c(q) = total costs 
r = rate of profit tax 
/ = turnover tax levied on revenue 
s = ad valorem subsidy (after­profit taxation) 
w = output­based subsidy (after­profit taxation) 
v = cost subsidy (after­profit taxation) 
Although the sign of the financial regulatory parameters will 
normally be positive corresponding to the interpretation 
given above of a tax or subsidy, we may leave open the 
possibility of changing the designation to represent certain 
particular situations. For example, sometimes an ad valorem 
' This is similar to the notion of the price elasticity of demand. The 
important distinction is that here the authorities play the price­setting 
role and not the market. 
subsidy is paid as a percentage of revenue but the subsidy 
is then considered to be paid to taxable profit. In this case, 
we would let / < 0 to represent such a taxable subsidy. 
The authorities might use the financial regulations to induce 
an efficient outcome in which price equals marginal cost. 
The enterprise manager chooses output to maximize the 
modified profit function (2) subject to the price schedule (1). 
Differentiating (2) with respect to q, and setting the deriva­
tive equal to zero (first order condition) we get: 
(3) (1 — r — v)c'(q) — w 
(1 ­ r) (1 ­ 0 + s 
where c'{q) is the marginal cost. 
If there are no direct output subsidies, w = 0, we can re­
arrange this form as follows. 
(4) Ρ c'(q) 
[1 ­ (r + v)]E 
[(1 ­ r ) ( l ­ t) + s](E­ 1) 
For price, p, to be well­defined, we notice that if 1 — (r+ v) 
> 0, E > 1 and if 1 ­ (/■ + v) < 0, E < 1. Since 1 ­ (r+ v) 
> 0 is the normal situation, we may take E > 1 and notice 
that£/(£ ­ 1) > 1. 
Then according to equation (4) 
1 ­ (r+v) < (1 ­ r)(l 
is a necessary condition for efficiency. 
t) + s 
Various scenarios are possible. Consider s — /(l — r) as a 
net ad valorem subsidy, sn: 
(5) s„ = s­ t(\­ r) 
With this notation the efficiency criterion is of the following 
form: 
0 < 1 ­ (r+v) < (1 ­ r) + sn 
which is equivalent to 
(6) ­ v < 5 „ 
This formula indicates, that if in the financial regulation 
there are no cost subsidies (v < 0) then a net ad valorem 
subsidy is a necessary condition for inducing efficiency. If 
the authorities choose to subsidize the enterprise based on 
costs incurred, the net ad valorem subsidy based on revenue 
and required for inducing efficiency may be reduced. Gener­
ally there is a wage bill tax (so­called social security contri­
bution) so sn > 0 is required for the financial regulation if 
it wishes to induce an efficient choice of output by the firm 
in a bargaining situation. 
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2.2.3. Redistribution of incomes 2.3. Inflationary implications of the regulation 
The importance of financial regulation (i.e. taxes and subsid-
ies) can be assessed by analysing the data given in Tables 1 
and 2. On aggregate level company and product taxes other 
than profit taxes1 constitute 37% of GDP, while subsidies 
before profit taxation make up 15% of GDP in 1988. As 
the aggregate profit itself is only 17% of GDP this fact 
indicates a massive redistribution of incomes. Although after 
tax, subsidies in Table 2 are only slightly more than 0,5% 
of enterprise gross income (0,7%), their existence gives 
reason not to delete them from the specification of modified 
profit function given by the form (2). 
The sum of rows 3 and 4 in Table 1. 
An enterprise applying for the authorities' permission for a 
price increase basically argues that its price calculation on 
the average cost plus a markup rate, A, would support the 
need for the targeted price rise. However, the essence of the 
regulatory environment is characterized by an informational 
asymmetry. Taking the simplest form, we can assume .that 
the regulator has no direct knowledge of the enterprise's 
actual cost of production. 
Consequently, the basis for price setting according to the 
markup formula is a report of unit cost by the enterprise 
manager. The true unit cost, c, is known only to the enter-
prise manager who also knows the markup rate followed by 
Table 1 
Incomes before profit taxes 
(current prices, billion forints) 
1988 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
GDP 
Personal incomes (gross) 
Taxes on goods and services 
Other taxes before profit taxes 
Price subsidies 
Other subsidies before profit taxes 
Enterprise incomes before profit taxes 
(7= 1-2-3-4+5 + 6) (7 = 8 + 9+10) 
Amortization 
Profit 
Other 
1 033,7 
473,3 
172,0 
184,0 
83,0 
104,6 
392,0 
108,3 
240,1 
43,6 
1 088,8 
515,5 
171,6 
193,5 
92,3 
127,3 
427,8 
117,0 
257,7 
53,1 
1 226,4 
561,2 
202,0 
213,8 
101,2 
137,6 
488,2 
124,8 
313,3 
50,1 
1411,3 
678,6 
280,8 
249,3 
94,4 
124,3 
421,3 
132,5 
241,5 
47,3 
Source: Fõbb nèpgazdasàgifoiyamatok, 1988, p. 61. 
Table 2 
Redistribution of incomes 
(current prices, billion forints ) 
1988 
1. Enterprise incomes 
2. Amortization and profits 
3. Taxes 
4. Subsidies 
5. Profit sharing 
6. Net enterprise incomes 
(6 = 2-3 + 4-5) 
392,0 
348,4 
209,4 
6,7 
13,7 
427,8 
374,7 
221,3 
7,4 
15,2 
488,2 
438,1 
267,1 
8,2 
16,3 
421,3 
374,0 
153,4 
2,9 
18,9 
132,0 145,6 162,9 204,6 
Source: Fõbb nèpgazdasàgi foiyamatok. 1988, p. 61. 
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the regulator. On the basis of this information and given the 
effective demand schedule—the elasticity of pricing schedule 
given by (1)—the manager reports unit cost to the regulator. 
To allow for the possibility of intentional misreporting, we 
denote the reported cost as c + χ so that the markup pricing 
rule is written as: 
(7) ρ = (1 + A) (c + x) 
where 
c = true unit cost 
χ = misrepresentation factor 
A = markup rate 
Deriving the optimal decisions for price, p* and the cost 
misrepresentation, x*, using comparative statics we can de­
rive how the different regulatory parameters affect the de­
cision variables of the model. To analyse the longer­run 
inflationary effect in Abel­Bonin, 1989 b, we introduced a 
cost pass­on parameter that defines what percentage of a 
price increase would follow 1 % increase in costs. This elas­
ticity is denoted by: 
η = $P*IP* ac/c 
effects' is summarized in Tables 3 and 4. Because of the 
assumed monopoly situation of the enterprise, it is reason­
able to take inflation to be the major concern of the regu­
lators. In Tables 3 and 4 the last two rows deal with inflation­
ary pressures. The second row, the effects of the parameters 
on />*, is concerned with static or one­shot inflationary 
pressures; i.e. the implications for the price chosen of a 
change in the financial regulations. 
The third row, the effects of the parameters on cost pass­
on, is concerned with dynamic inflationary pressures; i.e. the 
percentage of any unit cost increase that is passed on as a 
price increase. 
2.3.1. Short­run (direct) effects of changes in regulatory 
parameters 
Not surprisingly the increase of turnover tax rate, t, has an 
inflationary effect. Similarly, the decrease of ad valorem 
subsidy, s, and output­based subsidy, w, is inflationary too. 
It is already against the intuition that an increase in cost 
subsidy, v, has direct inflationary impact. The explanation 
relies on the fact that the subsidy is applied to the accounting 
profit (or reported profit) as the regulator does not know 
the true cost. So it provides the manager with an incentive 
Any change in the regulatory parameters would influence 
the decision variables and so inflation. The nature of these The details of the derivation are given in Ábel­Bonin, 1989 b. 
Table 3 
Sign determinate comparative statics 
Parameters 
Factors 
X 
Ρ 
η 
t 
+ 
+ 
+ 
s 
­
­
­
w 
­
­
+ 
v 
+ 
+ 
+ 
a 
+ 
'Λ 
­
A 
­
+ 
+ 
c 
­
+ 
+ 
Legend: 
χ 
Ρ 
η 
■ cost misrepresentation 
: price 
: elasticity of cost pass­on 
; turnover tax rate (value­added tax) 
' value­added based subsidy (after­profit tax) 
■ subsidy connected to output 
1 cost subsidy 
1 price limit (limit price to shutdown) 
1 markup rate 
■ unit cost (true) 
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Table 4 
Comparative statics: profit tax (r) 
Conditions 
Factors 
X 
Ρ 
η 
if[í ­ (1 ­ t)Ä\ < 0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
if [f ­ (1 ­ t)A] = 0 
0 
0 
0 
if [t ­ (1 ­ t)A] > 0 
­
­
­
Legend: 
χ = cost misrepresentation 
ρ = price 
η = elasticity of cost pass-on 
t = turnover tax rate 
Λ = markup rate 
to increase cost exaggeration, x*, to take advantage of this 
subsidy. The regulator would be better off taxing costs 
(v < 0) to provide the manager with a disincentive to misrep­
resent cost. However, such a tax should not be pursued too 
far. The requirement (6) that the net subsidy sn be greater 
than ­ v, places a limit on the magnitude of such a tax. 
The effect of profit tax depends on the other parameters. If 
[t­(l­t)A] > 0 then increasing profit tax rate would be 
deflationary. If the negotiated profit margin, A, was small 
enough and/or the turnover tax rate was large enough, then 
the comparative static sign would be negative.1 
2.3.2. Cost pass­on effects 
Taking the bargaining parameters first, we see from Table 3 
that an increase in the price limit, a, will decrease the elas­
ticity of cost pass­on or cost­push inflation, while a nego­
tiated increase in markup rate, A, has the expected immediate 
effect of increasing price and leads also to increase in the 
elasticity of cost­push inflation. Moreover, enterprises that 
have higher initial unit costs will also have higher elasticities 
of cost­push inflation. 
The effect of an increase in turnover tax rate and decrease 
in the ad valorem subsidy rate increases inflation not only 
directly but also indirectly as it implies an increase in cost­
push inflation too. The effect of the change in subsidy 
connected to output on cost pass­on is just the opposite of 
its direct price effect. Because of these conflicting effects2 it 
is better not to use this subsidy at all. 
2.4. Implications for tax and subsidy policy mix 
How can the regulator's indirect financial instruments be 
used as policy instruments to combat inflationary pressure? 
The answer in short is the following. The subsidies applied 
to costs and also those connected to output should be 
avoided. An increase in profit tax rate is positively advisable. 
To some extent taxation of costs (like wage tax) has a 
deflationary effect in the circumstances of monopolized mar­
ket structure and in bargaining with authorities. But some 
ad valorem subsidy might be required to induce efficiency in 
these circumstances. 
The only way to get rid of these subsidies is to change the 
market structure, to break the monopoly power and stop 
bargaining with authorities on financial regulation. 
3. Consumption and production subsidies 
After the introduction of the new economic mechanism in 
Hungary in 1968 there was no one year where the aim to 
reduce subsidization could not have maintained a leading 
position among the main policy targets. In a few years 
1 If A = 10%, the turnover tax rate must be greater than 9,09% to satisfy 
this constraint. This constraint seems to hold for Hungary. 
And also because it creates difficulties in the regulation in general—as is 
seen in equation (3)—making the regulatory tasks unsolvable if the 
regulator does not know the actual marginal cost. 
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there were partial successes in achieving these targets but 
policymakers cyclically had to give up the completion of 
these programmes. Bargaining and monopoly power of com­
panies and the regulators' price considerations described in 
part two of this paper explain that these cyclical movements 
are created by the regulators' inclination towards efficiency 
requirements—and not necessarily by their weakness of soft 
budget constraints. 
So the centralized and monopolized market structure alone 
guarantees the survival of subsidies. Increase in subsidies 
always means an increase in centralization and the resto­
ration of hierarchies. And it leads to severe distortions such 
as: 
(i) prices do not reflect cost changes; 
(ii) the income redistribution favours loss­making units; 
(iii) even subsidies lose their social functions and do not help 
to achieve social justice (benefits are greater for those 
who can afford to consume more of the subsidized 
goods). 
In this part of the paper we try to assess how the Hungarian 
situation in subsidization could be changed to: 
(i) improve the quality of price signals in demand and 
supply adjustments; 
(ii) promote competition; 
(iii) assist social justice. 
3.1. Impact of subsidies in Hungary, 1988 
Consumption and production subsidies in 1988 in Hungary 
are given in Table 5. The total 219 billion forints, an intoler­
ably high 15% of GDP was redistributed in this way. Mining 
and agriculture take the dominant part of current production 
subsidies. Consumption subsidies are concentrated in house­
hold energy use, public transport, milk and drinking water. 
The subsidies connected with rouble trade are even greater 
than those used by agricultural current production. How­
ever, in this fact the effects of distorted price structure used 
in non­convertible trade is reflected. 
The Hungarian statistical office and the Ministry of Finance 
with the initiative of the World Bank completed a project 
to assess the impact of various consumer and housing sub­
Table 5 
Consumption and production subsidies (1989 expected) 
(current prices, billion forints) 
Production Consumption subsidies Total 
1. Coalmining 
2. Other mining 
3. Household energy 
4. Other subsidies (culture) 
5. Agricultural subsidies 
6. — current production 
7. — market intervention 
8. — tax refunding 
9. Local transport 
10. Railways 
11. Other transport 
12. Milk 
13. Water 
14. State­owned flats 
15. Commercial policy fund 
6,2 
2,0 
2,0 
51,5 
24,1 
11,9 
15,5 
4,5 
0.6 
4,5 
20,3 
12,8 
1,5 
1,2 
5,2 
6,6 
11,4 
6,2 
2,0 
2,0 
51,5 
24,1 
11,9 
15,5 
12,8 
6,0 
1.8 
5,2 
6,6 
11,4 
4,5 
16. Current subsidies total 
17. Enterprise investment subsidies 
18. Medicine 
71,3 
15,4 
59,0 
15,8 
130,3 
15,4 
15,8 
19. 
20. 
Roubl 
Total 
e export 
Source: Ncgy cvre szolo lámogatás-leépilési 
28.10.1988. p. 3. 
programot fogadott cl ι TGB (Four- ycai 
55,0 
141,7 
' subsidy reduction programme. approved by the 
74,8 
Planning and Economic Committee 
55,0 
215,0 
,, ViiàggQzdasàg, 1988, 
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sidies on the standard of living of different income groups 
in Hungary.1 
The results are important not only for assessing the effects 
of subsidization but also for detecting the likely effects of 
the subsidy reduction programmes. The study shows, that 
subsidies were allocated in most cases proportionate to the 
expenditure on the subsidized items by income quantiles 
and demographic groups. So the subsidies did not have a 
dramatic impact on the income distribution. The distribution 
of subsidies is unequal as well; the higher the income, gener-
ally the higher the subsidy. As the inequality of subsidies is 
less than that of the income, subsidies have a moderate 
equalizing effect on the distribution of living standards. 
Graph 1 depicts the distribution of income and income plus 
subsidies according to income deciles of the families. 
The different types of subsidies have different effects on the 
distribution of living standards. This is evident from the 
relationships given in Graphs 2 and 3. While such subsidies 
as water, milk and transportation do not show correlations 
with income levels, rent and mortgage subsidies are in a 
1 Summary of the results of the projects is given in: Subsidy-income study, 
Ministry of Finance, 1989, mimeo. 
strong positive correlation with income. These types of sub-
sidies, instead of eliminating the differences in living stan-
dards highlight them even more than that observed in income 
inequalities. 
These results give some ground to propose prompt and 
significant reductions in these subsidies. 
3.2. Four-year programme for subsidy reduction 
The Hungarian government set up a plan to reduce subsidies 
from 215 billion forints in 1988 to 82 billion forints by 1993. 
The parliament has to approve annually the actual measures 
of the implementation. The speed and effectiveness of the 
implementation depend heavily on changes in price and 
wage regulation and social policy reform. Price liberalization 
accompanied by import liberalization and control of mon-
opolies is assumed to moderate inflationary pressures created 
by the subsidy reduction. 
There is a crucial necessity for a new impulse to take a 
significant step forward in the implementation of the pro-
gramme. Recent macro-policy outlooks imply that the re-
duction plan should be finalized in three years instead of 
GRAPH 1 : Distribution of income and income plus subsidy 
(by income deciles of the families in Hungary, 1988) 
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GRAPH 2 : Distribution of rent, water, mortgage and other housing subsidies 
(by income deciles of the families in Hungary, 1988) 
SÜ Rent 
■ Water 
Γ Ί Mortgage 
Q Other housing 
Source : Summary of the result of the project is given in : Subsidy-income study. Ministry of Finance. 1989. mimeo. 
GRAPH 3 : Distribution of subsidies on fuel, milk production, transportation and school supply 
(by income deciles of the families in Hungary, 1988) 
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four. The result mainly depends on the performance achieved 
in 1990.1 
3.3. Tensions in the first year of implementation 
1989 was the first year of the programme. In the first quarter 
according to the programme food subsidies decreased. Subsi-
dization of transport and agriculture was also reduced. As 
a result, prices of these goods have increased sharply. Under 
pressure from parliament, the government had to postpone 
the drastic changes in housing finance and the household 
energy sector as well as in water subsidies. Although new 
housing loans are issued at market interest rates, the subsidy 
on old loans is substantial.2 
The most serious defeat the programme suffered was in 
rouble export where not only the insufficient reduction cre-
ated problems but it was coupled with a decrease in export 
taxes of natural monopolies. A new approach is needed in 
this area. 
All in all, the budget ended up with a moderate deficit of 
50 billion forints (3% of GDP) which itself is not alarmingly 
high. Nevertheless, the tendencies behind the structure of 
this budget are frightening. 
3.3.1. Budget 
Although production and consumption subsidies went down 
in 1989 the budget balance is under immense pressure. The 
main pressure comes from housing finances. The budget 
subsidies to maintain 3% interest on the formerly issued 
housing loans became extremely difficult in a world of 20% 
interest rate. The banking system was decentralized in 1987 
and the government tried to maintain the competitiveness 
of the household savings bank (OTP), the issuer of the 
housing loans. A housing fund was created and its subsidy 
shows up in the row of subsidies to decentralized funds of 
the budget. At the same time the subsidies of the budgetary 
institutions and municipalities are remarkably high and in-
creasing against the painful reduction in some institutions. 
There were some minor attempts to reduce these subsidies 
too, but without a significant change in the fiscal system and 
the ownership structure these institutions have to rely on 
budget sources heavily. 
Consumption subsidies in line with the reduction of price 
subsidization of food went down as well. At the same time 
consumption tax revenues have increased. 
In January 1990, the government accepted a plan to reduce these subsidies 
to 5% of GDP by 1992, as a part of the agreement with the IMF. 
Starting in 1990, a surcharge was introduced on housing loans taken 
before 1985 to reduce this subsidy. 
But these changes are insufficient to stabilize the budget, 
which is in a very fragile state. As interest rates went up the 
debt service payments of internal debt went up significantly. 
This tendency alone creates difficulties in 1990 and just 
underlines the urgent need for the fiscal reform that will 
start in 1990. Debt service pre-empts a large portion of 
government resources. It is estimated that in 1989 interest 
payments—including interest subsidy on accumulated hous-
ing loans—on the public debt will absorb some 17% of 
taxation revenue. The large accumulated public debt is a 
major obstacle to providing the basis for economic growth. 
The budgetary imbalances which gave rise to this scale of 
indebtedness grew to their highest level in the beginning of 
the 1980s. The accumulated debt and its servicing costs 
require that much more be done. To pave the way for 
sustainable growth decisive action to check the growth of 
debt is an immediate requirement. One possible measure to 
reduce debt service payment is to reduce the debt itself 
by privatization of State-owned buildings and immovable 
property. 
The reduction of subsidies alone does not solve the problem 
as it creates new ones. There is a need for budget reform, 
which would: 
(i) review the government's economic, social and social-
policy commitments with the scope, level and financing 
of such commitments; 
(ii) reduce the excessive centralization and redistribution 
through the budget, primarily in respect of economic 
activity and in other areas as well (local authorities, non-
fundamental social-policy services, housing construc-
tion, etc.); 
(iii) develop an appropriate management for State financing 
and debt management; 
(iv) review the role and the functioning of national assets 
(property) in State enterprises, local governments and 
public bodies. 
3.3.2. Countervailing factors 
The unavoidable, although ambitious plan to reduce pro-
duction and consumption subsidies by more than 50% in 
four years did not get the necessary momentum in 1989. 
The government could not push through the price increase 
of household energy use in January 1989 and delayed the 
20% price increase to June 1989. Meanwhile prices of coal 
have increased (producer prices by 15%) so the consumer 
price change was not sufficient to make room to achieve the 
planned subsidy reduction. 
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The production subsidies of coalmining have been reduced 
in line with the coal price increase. Investment subsidies and 
the special subsidies for miners' housing have also been 
frozen. And further increase in costs not covered by price 
should reduce production. But restructuring employment 
and capacities is also costly. This increases subsidies in 
other entries of the budget as unemployment and forced 
mobilization goes on. Those workers who want to set up a 
private business and leave the mines are provided with a 
subsidized credit amounting to 350 000 forints (equivalent 
to the annual income of a well-paid miner). 
The reduction of water and draining subsidies has been 
postponed from January to June 1989 because of its cumulat-
ive effects on housing costs. In this way almost half of the 
planned reduction was lost and the gap has to be filled up 
in the coming year. 
The subsidy reduction in agriculture and rouble trade was 
planned to be achieved by changing the subsidy rates. This 
approach proved to be an ineffective way to get rid of 
subsidies, as enterprises adjusted their activities in a way 
that the actual reduction fell short of the planned one. In 
future we had better try instead of reducing rates to delete 
them—even if it can be done only gradually from one com-
modity group after the other. 
Finally, but perhaps the most important countervailing fac-
tor in subsidy reduction is the bargaining power of large 
enterprises in the monopolized sectors. The bulk of rouble 
trade is supplied by them. They formed an effective lobby 
to avoid the appreciation of the Hungarian currency against 
the rouble and/or decrease in export subsidies. To tackle 
this trap the Hungarian authorities proposed a switch in 
the currency regime to settle the accounts in convertible 
currencies instead of non-convertible roubles. 
3.3.3. Tensions and imbalances 
The transition of the political system from a monoparty 
system to a democracy does not give a stable background 
to support the peaceful and smooth development of a subsid-
ization-free entrepreneurial market system. The social strug-
gle adds new tensions and imbalances to the already existing 
social conflicts raised by subsidy reduction and inflation. 
There are two major economic problems of political rel-
evance today in Hungary: the rouble export subsidization 
and housing loan subsidies. 
The huge rouble export surplus has to be reduced concerning 
the internal demand and supply tensions. Large monopolies 
arguing with employment considerations strongly oppose 
any policy measure that would follow the macro-stabiliza-
tion policy requirements. In this situation it is crucial to 
find a political structure that can create and support a 
government strong enough to take the necessary actions. 
The price structure of non-convertible (rouble) trade differs 
to a large extent from the Hungarian and from the world 
market prices as well. An extensively used sophisticated 
export and import tax and subsidy system tries to bridge the 
gap. In transparent and stable economic circumstances such 
a system could help to achieve the social optimum of costs 
and benefits attributable to trade. In the Hungarian econ-
omy, however, market distortions and monopolies lead to 
misuse of the system, distortions and social losses. The 
elimination of export and import taxes and subsidies without 
changing the price structure evidently is not acceptable. It 
would immediately lead to large monopoly profit in some 
branches, while some others would go bankrupt. 
There is only one way to change the price structure used in 
the trade settlements, namely to switch from rouble accounts 
to convertible ones (dollar or ecus are the likely candidates). 
This accounting change would cost a lot for Hungary be-
cause the terms of trade would deteriorate sharply. Even the 
exchange of the 1989 trade surplus amounting to almost 
USD 1,6 billion (calculated on the basis of official Soviet 
rouble-dollar conversion rates) is questionable. Short-run 
costs of this change for Hungary are estimated around USD 
1 billion. The evident benefits would come later. Even this 
high price seems worth paying if this way we can : 
(i) break the lobbying power of large exporters who were 
until now able to sabotage the subsidy reduction at-
tempts; 
(ii) increase efficiency criteria in exporting and importing 
and reduce the overwhelming dominance of State-level 
bilateral trade negotiations; 
(iii) channel the rouble surplus to finance the convertible 
current account; 
(iv) make Hungary more attractive for foreign investments. 
Housing loan subsidies bring the government — no matter 
how weak or strong it is — into a tight corner. The solution 
would require several critically opposed measures, such as 
indexation of debt as well as a parallel rent increase. Such 
measures would hurt the population. On the other hand 
there is no way to avoid these harsh measures as otherwise 
the budget will end up with an unprecedented deficit. 
The introduction of surcharge on old housing loans in 1990 
is only a temporary solution that needs to be closely 
monitored and revised as appropriate. 
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3.3.4. Inflation 
Reduction of subsidies alone calls for price increases to cover 
producers' costs. In case of elastic demand, sudden price 
increase reduces the demand and this aggravates financial 
problems of enterprises. Many of them cannot survive the 
double burden of capacity underutilization and subsidy re­
duction without increasing their prices further. In the ab­
sence of macro-stabilization policy there is a danger of 
accelerating inflation. 
The effects on prices can be regrouped under three headings: 
commodity prices or sectorial price indexes; effects on the 
population in different income brackets; and effects on dif­
ferent social groups. 
Table 6 combines the second and the third aspects. Price 
increases in different commodity groups similarly without 
significant differences. Concerning the alterations in com­
modities the so-called 'other consumer goods' achieved the 
highest price increase. The results for different income 
brackets show that the poor—who would have really 
suffered from food price increases—were overcompensated 
while wage earners had to take a bigger sacrifice. 
There are two additional points having some importance for 
macro policy. 
First, if domestic prices are increasing faster than the prices 
of our trading partners, then domestic products will be 
replaced by foreign products both at home and abroad; a 
current account deficit develops and if no clear signals are 
given about the correction of the competitive loss, the market 
will expect devaluation. It is evident that any policy, fiscal 
or monetary, which affects prices is bound to fail in small 
countries aiming at maintaining fixed or pegged exchange 
rates.1 
As to fiscal policy, small countries—so Hungary as 
well—tend to satisfy a larger share of domestic demand 
through imports and aggregate demand management oper­
ates therefore with a smaller multiplier. 
Monetary policy in small countries with fixed exchange rates 
is ineffective as a demand policy tool, but it still remains a 
useful tool for managing foreign exchange reserves of the 
central bank. This may be of little social utility compared 
to the cost of maintaining central bank operations and 
compared to ambitions of central bank governors. 
1 Mundell, 
problem. 
1963, and Fleming, 1962, give the standard model for this 
Table 6 
Consumer price index in different social groups (1989.Q1 in % of 1988.Q1) 
Food 
Beverages 
Cloth 
Heating, households, energy use 
Durable goods 
Other consumer goods 
Services 
Total 114,1 113,8 115,0 114,4 
(%l 
Workers Agricultural 
workers 
in collective 
farms 
Intellectuals Others Population 
totals 
113,8 
110,9 
119,0 
100,8 
114,8 
119,9 
113,8 
114,2 
110,5 
119,4 
101,1 
115,5 
119,2 
113,1 
114,3 
109,9 
119,5 
100,5 
116,4 
119,7 
114,5 
113,9 
110,2 
118,9 
100,5 
115,8 
120,2 
114,3 
113,8 
110,3 
119,4 
100,8 
115,1 
120,4 
113,9 
114,2 
Source: Ar, piac, verseny (Price, market, competition) ΟΛΗ, 1989, No I, p. 11. 
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Introduction 
An important feature of any really effective, market-orien-
tated reform of the Hungarian economy must be a package 
of measures designed to break down the existing extensive 
network of vertical relationships between enterprises and 
a whole range of supervisory authorities. Many of these 
relationships can usefully be summed up in one word, 'tutel-
age'. My only hesitation about using such a word more 
widely is that it generally implies authority and subordi-
nation, whereas in the Hungarian case several of the import-
ant relationships that bind enterprises to the centre are 
voluntary. Enterprise behaviour in such instances can be 
characterized as rent seeking. Accordingly, suitable reforms 
would have to eliminate or substantially weaken existing 
tutelage relationships involving enterprises and central/ 
supervisory agencies, and also establish a policy/institutional 
framework that made rent-seeking behaviour less attractive 
for enterprises, preferably leaving them little option but to 
make their profits by competing actively in the market. 
In order to achieve this result, the Hungarian economy must, 
in effect, experience a change of (economic) 'regime', and 
one that should be seen by all relevant actors in the economy 
as irreversible. Such a change is sometimes referred to as 
'time zero'. Whether this transition should occur gradually, 
or as a result of a 'big bang' package of measures remains 
an open question, though Hungary at present seems to be 
pursuing a gradualist approach. 
The economies that we are concerned with here—notably 
Hungary and Poland, and specifically Hungary in this 
paper—fall somewhere between the two extremes of a very 
traditional centrally planned economy and a well-established 
market-type economy. Recent and ongoing reforms are mov-
ing Hungary to a position somewhat closer to the market 
economy end of the spectrum, though with important quali-
fications that we come to later. In the light of such reform 
intentions, it is important not only to consider the particular 
measures that have been taken or are envisaged for the 
future, but to examine them within a framework that helps 
to throw some light on the most effective sequencing/priority 
for economic reform. Since some reforms will, in the short 
term, be accompanied by highly unpopular outcomes for 
certain groups of the population (e.g. high unemployment 
for a time, increases in food and other consumer goods 
prices, etc.), it is clearly also important to examine future 
reforms in the context of the political/social environment 
within which they must take place; this necessarily includes 
taking account of Hungary's current economic situation, 
partly because it is one of the factors creating pressure for 
economic reforms, partly because present difficulties might 
constrain what reforms are actually feasible. 
Formally, of course, Hungary has already undergone con-
siderable decentralization of its economic management 
system, dating from the introduction of the so-called new 
economic mechanism in 1968. This first round of reforms 
abandoned compulsory annual planning for enterprises, 
introduced profits taxation and a somewhat more rational 
pricing structure, and began to liberalize foreign trade ar-
rangements; at the same time, it left in place numerous 
special taxes and subsidies (supposedly for transitional 
reasons), and these proliferated over time. During the 1970s, 
about 50 of the largest enterprises came under close central 
supervision, contrary to the original reform intentions. Cen-
tralized wage control remained quite strict, though detailed 
arrangements have varied both over time and between 
branches; the labour market continued to experience excess 
demand, and has functioned extremely poorly. Likewise, 
the capital market scarcely functioned before 1980, which 
created immense difficulties for the rational movement of 
investment resources across the economy. 
A further round of reforms commenced in 1979, which 
introduced 'competitive' pricing (an attempt to link domestic 
producer prices with export realizations, especially in hard 
currency markets) and also undertook, step by step, a series 
of institutional reforms. These have so far included relaxing 
the rules on setting up small firms, cooperatives and various 
forms of economic association; introducing enterprise 
councils in many firms; splitting up some large firms and 
trusts into smaller units; rearranging the structure of top-
level bodies controlling the economy (e.g. merging three 
ministries to form the Industry Ministry; merging two to 
form the Trade Ministry, etc.); opening a bond market; 
reforming the banking system; introducing income tax and 
VAT; legislation on bankruptcy and liquidation procedures; 
legislation on new forms of company, and on 'transform-
ation'. There is no doubt that this is a far-reaching package 
of measures; many of them are very much on the right lines 
if the intention is to create a competitive economy. But so 
far the net result has not been a great success, and it is 
apparent that the Hungarian economy faces very serious 
economic difficulties. Some of the discussion that follows 
attempts to explain why the reforms have been less effective 
than many reformers hoped, and thereby seeks to indicate 
other measures that seem to be needed to support what has 
already been achieved. 
1. Hungary : vertical relationships 
In order to gain a clear picture of the vertical relationships 
in the Hungarian economy, it is useful to start by examining 
data on the numbers of enterprises and other productive 
units by branch, as well as on the pattern of taxes and 
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Table la 
Organizational structure of Hungarian industry in 1987 
Branch/item 
Mining 
Electricity 
Metallurgy 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Electrical equipment 
Comm. equipment 
Instruments 
Mass prod, metalware 
Engineering R&D 
Engineering — total 
Building materials 
Chemicals industry 
Heavy industry — total 
Wood processing 
Paper 
Publishing 
Textiles 
Leather and furs 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Handicrafts, etc. 
Light industry R&D 
Light industry — total 
Food industry 
Other industry 
Industry — total 
28 
22 
40 
92 
100 
38 
102 
33 
35 
8 
408 
49 
66 
613 
44 
1 
34 
60 
10 
17 
30 
4 
1 
201 
184 
45 
1043 
2 
— 
7 
261 
62 
58 
33 
88 
116 
4 
622 
20 
98 
749 
109 
11 
37 
28 
33 
50 
139 
90 
2 
498 
33 
112 
1.392 
12,6 
10,5 
4,3 
5,5 
2,9 
6,1 
6,5 
14,2 
6,3 
3,2 
5,9 
6,8 
13,2 
7,1 
3,4 
36 
4,4 
6,7 
6,6 
5,9 
11,1 51 
1 
7,2 
23,8 
17,7 
10,5 
487 
354 
1 324 
298 
454 
329 
209 
164 
312 
95 
273 
248 
356 
329 
275 
603 
157 
402 
336 
427 
179 
72 
— 
273 
124 
45 
244 
1 003 
4 780 
1 089 
335 
539 
389 
287 
264 
341 
54 
368 
848 
1 458 
921 
304 
1434 
592 
378 
284 
146 
100 
143 
— 
368 
580 
292 
758 
99,9 
100 
99,4 
82,2 
97,1 
88,2 
95,3 
73,6 
80,8 
80,7 
88,3 
97,6 
96,7 
94,5 
75,7 
93,2 
97,1 
97,7 
81,9 
68,7 
54,7 
29,0 
75,8 
81,9 
96,9 
33,9 
92,7 
3,7 
0,2 
22,7 
38,6 
53,6 
23,2 
58,4 
51,8 
16,1 
23,4 
43,7 
9,3 
25,1 
26,3 
10,8 
8,1 
5,7 
27,4 
24,7 
46,3 
51,2 
36,7 
3,8 
24,0 
17,9 
5,5 
24,4 
Source: Iparstatisztikai Évkönyv, 1987 (Budapest, KSH), 1988, various tables (with some recalculation). 
Key: Column 1 —Number of State enterprises. 
Column 2 — Number of other units (cooperatives, etc.). 
Column 3 — Number of establishments per State enterprise. 
Column 4 — Employment per industrial establishment (State enterprises only). 
Column S — Fixed capital per worker (in State enterprises, 1 000 forints). 
Column 6 — Percentage of gross sales produced by State enterprises (based on gross output of each branch -
Column 7 — Percentage of sales by State enterprises that is exported. 
some output may belong to other branches). 
subsidies. Not surprisingly, the latter has some connection 
with the prevailing pricing rules applied to Hungarian indus-
try, including the rules for the disposition of profits and 
other forms of enterprise income. It is also of interest, from 
the point of view of assessing innovative performance, and 
the role of central programmes in promoting innovation, to 
consider the available data on the age structure of output by 
branch. In addition, management arrangements in different 
parts of industry (including the role of the party) need to 
be examined, as do other vertical channels operating, for 
instance, through the financial system. Finally, the impact 
of so-called 'responsibility to supply' and obligations to meet 
CMEA contracts are assessed. 
Table la presents data on the number and characteristics of 
productive units for about 20 branches of Hungarian indus-
try, using 1987 data. Column 1 in the table shows the number 
of State enterprises in each branch, while column 2 shows 
the number of other production units, mainly cooperatives.1 
1 In general, cooperatives have far fewer workers per establishment and 
much less capital per worker than State enterprises; they also achieve a 
far higher return on capital employed, as do small enterprises in general. 
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Formally, the difference between these is that for the former, 
the State is the legal owner of the assets (though the right 
to dispose of State assets appears to have been transferred 
to enterprise councils as a result of the 1984-85 management 
reforms—see the discussion of privatization in the next sec-
tion), while for the latter, ownership is vested in the collec-
tive; in practice, however, the property rights enjoyed by 
workers and managers in cooperatives have never been clear, 
and for much of the post-war period they have been managed 
in just the same way as State enterprises. Furthermore, it is 
clear from column 6 that in most branches the State enter-
prises produce the overwhelming proportion of total output, 
and in most of what follows we shall concentrate attention 
on these units. It should also be noted that the table excludes 
a number of new small production units, mostly formed 
since 1980, about which the available statistics are consider-
ably less detailed; but these produce a minute proportion of 
the economy's output (in most cases less than 2%), though 
they are growing rapidly. 
Even at the relatively high degree of aggregation represented 
in Table la, it can be seen just how few enterprises there 
were in each branch in 1987; this is even more apparent 
when some of the larger sectors are further subdivided, as 
shown for chemicals and the food industry in Table lb (using 
data for 1987 and 1988). Moreover, these enterprises are 
typically large, with heavy industrial enterprises having over 
seven establishments on average (column 3), each with 329 
workers (column 4). In light industry there were again over 
seven establishments per enterprise, though their average 
employment was somewhat smaller at about 273 workers. 
Other industry and the food industry had more establish-
ments per enterprise, but in terms of employment these 
establishments were very much smaller. 
The corresponding data on industrial structure for 1988 
show a substantial increase in the number of enterprises in 
a few branches, but overall reveal very little change (see 
Table lc). 
Table lb 
Industrial structure in greater detail, 1987 and 1988 
Branch/item 
Oil processing 
Gas manuf. and dist. 
Organic and inorganic chemicals 
Fertilizer and pesticides 
Plastics 
Plastics processing 
Rubber 
Pharmaceuticals 
Household chemicals and cosmetics 
Chemicals — total 
Meat 
Poultry and eggs 
Milk and milk products 
Storage (tartosito) . 
Milling 
Cakes, biscuits, bread 
Sugar 
Confectionery 
Vegetable oil 
Spirits 
Wine 
Beer 
Other drinks 
Smoking materials 
Food industry — total 
4 
6 
11 
7 
4 
11 
1 
15 
2 
61 
22 
11 
17 
17 
22 
38 
11 
4 
1 
7 
8 
6 
5 
6 
175 
4 
6 
14 
7 
5 
13 
2 
17 
4 
72 
23 
11 
17 
28 
22 
38 
11 
4 
1 
6 
8 
7 
5 
6 
187 
Source: Iparstatisztikai Évkönyv, 1987 and 1988, various tables. 
Key: Column I — Number of State enterprises in 1987, 
Column 2 - Number of State enterprises in 1988. 
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Table lc 
Organizational structure of Hungarian industry in 1988 
Branch/item 
Mining 
Electricity 
Metallurgy 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Electrical equipment 
Comm. equipment 
Instruments 
Mass prod, metalware 
Engineering R&D 
Engineering — total 
Building materials 
Chemicals industry 
Heavy industry — total 
Wood processing 
Paper 
Publishing 
Textiles 
Leather and furs 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Handicrafts, etc. 
Light industry R&D 
Light industry — total 
Food industry 
Other industry 
Industry — total 
23 
21 
43 
118 
104 
42 
106 
49 
51 
n.a. 
470 
58 
72 
687 
52 
2 
40 
59 
10 
18 
35 
4 
n.a. 
220 
187 
49 
1 143 
1 
— 
7 
309 
68 
68 
49 
116 
142 
n.a. 
752 
24 
111 
895 
126 
12 
83 
37 
41 
49 
154 
88 
n.a. 
550 
33 
104 
1 582 
13,3 
10,4 
4,1 
4,8 
2,7 
5,4 
5,6 
9,9 
4,7 
— 
5,1 
6,2 
11,7 
6,3 
3,1 
18,5 
4,0 
6,9 
6,6 
5,8 
10,0 
51,2 
— 
6,8 
23,0 
15,7 
9,5 
471 
344 
1 224 
251 
371 
311 
204 
156 
285 
— 
247 
219 
319 
298 
251 
534 
152 
382 
329 
408 
165 
72 
— 257 
123 
50 
230 
1 577 
5 346 
1 505 
470 
723 
517 
388 
355 
468 
— 494 
1 036 
2 091 
1 240 
404 
1 703 
723 
496 
334 
189 
125 
170 
— 
466 
751 
326 
1 005 
99,9 
100,0 
99,4 
80,2 
96,2 
86,4 
92,6 
67,6 
80,9 
— 
85,7 
97,0 
96,4 
93,6 
74,7 
93,2 
96,1 
97,5 
81,8 
67,5 
53,4 
29,9 
— 
81,8 
97,4 
34,9 
92,3 
3,8 
0,2 
25,7 
35,5 
53,5 
21,6 
54,8 
48,6 
13,3 
— 
40,5 
9,5 
23,1 
24,7 
12,0 
8,3 
6,3 
23,6 
24,1 
36,5 
40,5 
29,3 
— 
22,1 
16,6 
5,9 
22,4 
Sonne: Iparstatisztikai Évkönyv, 1988 (Budapest, KSH), 1989, various tables (with some recalculation). 
Key: Column 1 — Number of State enterprises. 
Column 2 — Number of other units (cooperatives, etc.). 
Column 3 — Number of establishments per State enterprise. 
Column 4 — Employment per industrial establishment (State enterprises only). 
Column 5 — Fixed capital per worker (in State enterprises. 1 000 forints). 
Column 6 — Percentage of gross sales produced by State enterprises (based on gross output of each branch — some output may belong to other branches). 
Column 7 — Percentage of sales by State enterprises that is exported. 
Although these enterprises are large compared to a typical 
cross section of Western firms, their organizational and 
financial structures are remarkably simple. It is hard to 
believe that an economy composed of so few, but mainly 
large enterprises, can be efficient, and it is certainly not 
conducive to competitive behaviour. As many observers 
have noted, Hungary lacks a well-developed medium and 
small-scale industrial sector which, in most developed 
countries would provide many of the inputs and services 
which Hungarian enterprises—partly in response to short-
age, partly for administrative convenience under the old 
planning system—usually provide internally. 
Several important observations can be made at this point. 
First, although permitted by recent legislation, there are still 
very few firms which are subsidiaries of others, or joint 
ventures of some sort. On joint ventures, it is worth noting 
that since the more relaxed enterprise legislation of 1988, 
the number of new joint ventures has been rising quite 
rapidly; thus in the first half of 1989 there were about 350 
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new ventures (bringing the total to more than 600), but the 
new capital raised was only about USD 70 million. 
Second, the capital structure of most firms reflects the usual 
100% State ownership (but with the right to dispose of State 
assets assigned in a very unsatisfactory way), with tradeable 
shares and long-term debt of the Western type only recently 
becoming possible (but for fuller consideration of these 
issues, see the discussion of privatization in the next section). 
Among other things, this implies that in order to acquire 
the finance needed to undertake significant investment, it is 
commonly necessary for an enterprise to satisfy certain cen-
tral development preferences (whether financially profitable 
or not). One implication of this is that the banks are likely 
to be carrying a large amount of non-performing or poorly 
performing debt, a situation which can, however, be masked 
by special subsidies or price allowances. 
innovation—essentially because, under normal conditions, 
they expect to be able to sell most of what they can produce, 
and their output is itself often constrained by supply limi-
tations. Hence, even in the absence of formal central plan-
ning, it becomes necessary for firms to ration their output 
among their various customers, a process which is open to 
central influence or 'guidance', albeit informally. 
An indication of the economy's weak performance in regard 
to innovation is provided by Table 2 which shows the pro-
portions of the output of each branch consisting of products 
first made at different dates.1 In most branches, really new 
products only constitute a tiny fraction of branch output. 
But in many cases the output which is exported has a 
more favourable (younger) age structure, with hard currency 
exports on average doing even better. Furthermore, although 
on average the figures do suggest a modest improvement in 
Third, the persistence of shortage on many domestic markets 
absolves firms of the need to think seriously either about 
marketing (except in the export market, of course) or 
1 Unfortunately, no comparable Western data to set alongside those pre-
sented in Table 2 are known; the judgements based on the table are 
therefore unavoidably subjective. 
Table 2 
Vintage of sales by State industrial enterprises 
Branch/vintage 
Metallurgy 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Electrical equipment 
Comm. equipment 
Instruments 
Mass prod, metalware 
Engineering — total 
Building materials 
Chemicals industry 
Wood processing 
Paper 
Textiles 
Food industry 
Industry — total 
66,1 11,3 9,9 9,1 1,8 1,9 0,8 
13,8 
14,3 
28,1 
3,8 
14,2 
31,3 
15,6 
51,9 
37,2 
16,9 
38,7 
20,9 
50,3 
35,8 
10,5 
34,0 
14,1 
11,0 
9,3 
13,7 
17,9 
11,2 
17,2 
5,9 
23,1 
9,8 
20,2 
16,0 
28,3 
11,7 
21,2 
24,1 
28,1 
16,3 
20,5 
15,0 
19,7 
14,5 
18,9 
22,2 
8,2 
16,8 
31,9 
25,6 
24,9 
30,5 
27,6 
27,0 
28,0 
15,3 
19,9 
42,3 
12,4 
32,6 
15,5 
21,1 
5,7 
7,6 
6,0 
15,6 
14,6 
5,5 
9,2 
4,0 
3,8 
12,6 
4,8 
9,5 
2,6 
5,6 
9,8 
6,7 
5,7 
15,0 
6,2 
6,2 
8,8 
2,7 
2,2 
7,9 
2,1 
5,0 
3,2 
4,6 
33,3 
21,2 
7,4 
8,2 
7,9 
7,8 
16,0 
0,3 
0,1 
1,3 
0,2 
— 
0,5 
5,0 
Source: Iparstatisztikai ÉvkÕnyv, 1987 (Budapest, KSH), 1988, Table 31 (converted lo percentages). 
Key: Column I — Products first produced no later than 1970. 
Column 2 — Products first produced 1971-75. 
Column 3 — Products fint produced 1976-80. 
Column 4 — Products first produced 1981-85. 
Column 5 — Products first produced in 1986. 
Column 6 — Products fint produced in 1987. 
Column 7 — Production for spare parts. 
Soie: Columns 1 to 6 are percentages of sales of finished products and sum to 100%, except for rounding errors; column 7 represents spare parts sales as a percentage of sales of finished products. 
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the rate of introduction of new products in the 1980s, the 
erratic pattern in the figures for many individual branches 
is best explained in terms of the State's role in promoting 
innovation through a variety of central development pro-
grammes; there is not much indication, as yet, that many 
firms are under great pressure from the market to engage in 
innovation (except, perhaps, in the hard currency export 
market). 
Lastly, while shortage (excess demand) in its product mar-
kets itself already confers a degree of monopoly on a firm, 
Hungarian enterprises have other means of reinforcing their 
positions and inhibiting competition. These include formal 
or informal agreements among the enterprises in a given 
branch to subdivide the product range into distinct product 
groups, each only being produced by a single firm (or at 
most a handful). This practice stems from the old days of 
central planning, under which part of the ministry's task, 
when establishing a new enterprise, was to determine its 
permitted production profile. Largely for administrative 
convenience, these profiles were almost invariably specified 
very narrowly, and proved hard to change. Even today, 
Hungarian firms are usually only active in a very narrow 
range of markets, though the formal regulations about pro-
file have been somewhat more relaxed since 1982-83. 
To the extent that they do act in several markets, this 
has often been a consequence of shortage—i.e. seeking to 
produce in-house those inputs which have proved difficult 
to obtain in the open market—and I imagine that much of 
this production must be highly inefficient. Its prevalence 
also helps to explain the almost complete absence from 
the Hungarian economy of small and medium-sized firms 
capable of supplying semi-finished, intermediate inputs and 
components to the larger firms. An important side-effect of 
enterprises' narrow production profiles has also been to 
make it very hard to push a firm into bankruptcy, for it has 
been all too easy to argue that the output was in some sense 
'essential' for the economy. 
Competition is also inhibited by those controls which still 
remain on imports. Although there has been some liberaliza-
tion recently, and the official policy envisages further relax-
ation, controls are still quite extensive. Thus, in the first 
eight months of 1989, import liberalization extended to 
about 39% of Hungary's hard currency imports (by value), 
as compared to 32% in 1988. The plan for 1989 actually 
envisages that liberalized imports should form about 40% 
of the total for the year, and should increase by about USD 
400 million as compared to 1988; on this basis, hard currency 
imports in 1989 are reasonably well under control (see Kop-
int-Datorg, 1989). 
Furthermore, for an enterprise to import something, es-
pecially from the West, which has not been imported before 
and is not already on the list of commodities whose import 
has been liberalized, entails a complex and often very slow 
licensing procedure. Though in the end licences are fre-
quently granted, there is considerable nervousness on the 
part of enterprises about the possibility of tighter controls 
in the future, which distorts the pattern of demand in the 
present. It is risky for an enterprise to undertake a develop-
ment based on the availability of a Western import unless 
much of the output will be exported for hard currency. In 
many cases, firms mainly supplying the domestic market, 
especially in view of Hungary's poor hard currency position, 
are reasonably confident that they will not have to face 
much competition from imports. 
In the trade with CMEA partners, the normal practice has 
been to base the trade flows on annual, government-to-
government agreements. For Hungary, however, it is already 
the case that about two-thirds of CMEA trade is based on 
agreements entered into by the enterprises concerned. Hence, 
though formally there may still be a governmental agree-
ment, the government normally takes the view that it is 
the enterprise which carries the responsibility for fulfilling 
particular contracts. This issue arose in concrete form earlier 
in 1989 when the Hungarian bus company, Ikarus, an-
nounced that it could not fulfil a major contract with the 
Soviet Union at the agreed terms, because of rising costs of 
certain components over which it had no control. Despite 
press demands for government intervention, the enterprise 
was left to find its own way out of the difficulty, by renego-
tiating some of the contract terms. In other cases, where the 
relevant enterprises are not involved right from the start, the 
agreed exports to CMEA partners become a government-
imposed obligation on those enterprises. For imports from 
CMEA countries, the picture is broadly similar, with a mix 
of enterprise agreements and government obligations. In 
practice, it should be added here that the above division 
between government and enterprise obligations is somewhat 
artificial, since the government can certainly amend financial 
regulators to make any given enterprise willing to fulfil 
whatever trade it wishes to see happen. 
For the government, one of the key issues in the CMEA 
trade negotiations concerns the price and availability of oil 
supplies from the Soviet Union; another issue, since Hungary 
currently runs a surplus with the Soviet Union, is how to 
scale down the trade to a level that is both more efficient 
for Hungary, and more in line with the Soviet Union's ability 
to supply acceptable goods and services to Hungary. 
CMEA trade also raises the whole problem of getting Hun-
garian enterprises to function properly in two totally differ-
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ent trading mechanisms. These issues will be addressed more 
fully in another paper, as will the question of shifting some 
or all of the CMEA trade onto a hard currency basis. In 
this connection, note that in July 1989, expert groups from 
Hungary and the Soviet Union, reached an agreement to 
conduct all their trade in dollars at the prevailing Western-
world market prices, with effect from January 1991 ; Hungary 
expects to lose out very substantially initially, but argues 
that the increased competition and more realistic and uni-
form prices will force enterprises to become more efficient 
—those which do not will see their Soviet trade decline, those 
which do will enjoy expansion; other similar agreements are 
apparently under discussion. At this stage, it should be 
emphasized that this agreement has not yet been accepted 
by the Hungarian Government. 
CMEA trade provides yet another channel through which 
the government (in this instance, the Trade Ministry) finds 
itself imposing non-market related obligations on certain 
enterprises. In addition, as Tables la and lc indicate, the 
importance of exports for different branches varies enor-
mously (column 7 shows exports in all markets as a percent-
age of total sales), with a few exporting more than half their 
output, others almost nothing. Except in the CMEA market 
that we have just discussed, this is not a matter for direct 
government intervention; the structure of hard currency 
exports, however, is likely to be influenced by the pattern of 
indirect taxes and subsidies, to which we now turn. 
Tables 3a and 3b show output, costs, taxes and subsidies, 
and profits, by branch of Hungarian industry, in 1987 and 
1988. It is interesting to note from the table that in 1987, 
the total indirect taxes paid by industry, at 106,7 billion 
forints, was almost the same as the industrial wage bill; 
in the same year, the total subsidy received by industry 
amounted to 90,6 billion forints, almost cancelling out the 
indirect taxes. The corresponding figures for 1988 were as 
follows: indirect taxes, 130,2 billion forints and subsidies, 
78,3 billion forints, indicating that some progress is being 
made in cutting back subsidies and raising taxes, though 
there is still a long way to go. Note also that after taxes and 
subsidies, the net return on capital earned by Hungary's 
State enterprises declined sharply between 1987 and 1988. 
However, not even to a first approximation could it be 
claimed that the resulting tax and subsidy rates were uniform 
across the whole of industry. Quite the contrary, just as 
Kornai and Matits, 1987, found in their more detailed study, 
the main effect of the prevailing tax and subsidy structure 
has been to redistribute incomes across the economy; the 
result is a price system completely lacking in transparency, 
and whose main effect is a levelling of incomes across the 
economy. While it could be argued that, in the absence of a 
properly developed capital market, this system is an effective 
means of shifting incomes to those branches/enterprises 
where investment is desired, this is not how the tax system 
has been used in Hungary. Instead, the system has been used 
to prop up many enterprises which should have been forced 
to operate more competitively long ago. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, investment in each branch (not 
shown in the table) is not especially well correlated with 
profits (column 6; after taxes and subsidies), largely because 
State grants and loans, and credits obtained through the 
banking system are so important for investment; thus the 
investment financing system itself establishes a number of 
linkages between the centre and enterprises, which we lack 
the space to explore fully. Suffice it to say that much of the 
available credit has been preallocated to branches/preferred 
activities (including activities designed to increase hard cur-
rency exports) by the sector ministries, hence reducing con-
siderably the autonomy of the emerging commercial banking 
system. The principal beneficiaries of this State largesse are 
the largest 50 to 100 enterprises, which raises a number of 
problems that we pursue in the next section. 
Moreover, without the subsidies they receive, certain 
branches would be making losses (and in a more detailed 
study, it would turn out that certain product groups/enter-
prises were accumulating huge losses). For instance, from 
Tables 3a and 3b it can be seen that such branches would 
include metallurgy, and the food industry, and a more de-
tailed study would add parts of chemicals, textiles and min-
ing to the list. Conversely, some branches would make com-
pletely unreasonable profits unless subject to high indirect 
taxes; for instance, electricity supply, and much of engineer-
ing. Even after this redistribution, the resulting return on 
capital, shown in column 7, varies a good deal between 
branches, though no doubt by much less than the original 
income in each branch, expressed as a return on capital. The 
most important economic effect of this tax/subsidy system 
is clearly to introduce some major distortions into Hungary's 
relative producer prices. Given these distortions, the 
published rates of profit by branch certainly do not corre-
spond to any satisfactory notion of social benefit, and in 
order to evaluate economic effectiveness by branch, recalcu-
lated producer prices are therefore needed. Such a recalcu-
lation would require a reasonably up-to-date and disaggre-
gated input-output table for the Hungarian economy.1 
Such a table, with over 40 sectors, is available for 1986, and a detailed 
model of the applied general equilibrium type has been constructed by a 
small research group based at the Budapest University of Economics. If 
the Commission wished to develop this aspect of their work on Hungary, 
it would be possible to set up research cooperation with the University. 
For an example of the use of the model (exploring the impact of trade 
liberalization, using a 10-sector version of the main model), see Zalai et 
al., 1989. 
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Table 3a 
Output, costs, indirect taxes, subsidies and profits by industry, 1987 
Branch/item 
Mining 
Electricity 
Metallurgy 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Electrical equipment 
Comm. equipment 
Instruments 
Mass prod, metalware 
Engineering R&D 
Engineering — total 
Building materials 
Chemicals industry 
Heavy industry — total 
Wood processing 
Paper 
Publishing 
Textiles 
Leather and furs 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Handicrafts, etc. 
Light industry R&D 
Light industry — total 
Food industry 
Other industry 
Industry — total 
97,9 
90,9 
115,5 
70,8 
95,3 
43,0 
63,4 
26,2 
28,4 
1,7 
328,8 
46,0 
257,9 
936,9 
19,7 
19,9 
15,9 
59,8 
10,4 
13,0 
11,9 
2,5 
— 
153,1 
233,3 
4,6 
1 327,9 
60,9 
65,1 
114,8 
53,8 
80,0 
35,0 
44,7 
18,4 
21,9 
1,3 
255,1 
35,6 
224,8 
756,3 
15,9 
17,1 
11,8 
52,7 
9,3 
12,7 
9,6 
1,9 
— 
131,1 
238,0 
3,1 
1 129,0 
13,1 
3,8 
7,6 
8,2 
7,5 
3,7 
7,3 
3,6 
3,1 
0,3 
33,8 
5,0 
9,7 
72,9 
1,9 
1,2 
1,6 
7,0 
0,94 
1,7 
2,1 
0,4 
— 
16,8 
15,9 
0,92 
106,1 
33,5 
14,7 
4,2 
5,0 
4,5 
2,3 
5,9 
2,9 
1,8 
0,1 
22,5 
2,6 
10,6 
88,2 
1,0 
1,6 
0,7 
3,5 
0,47 
0,8 
0,9 
0,1 
— 
9,1 
9,1 
0,4 
106,7 
33,6 
— 
14,2 
1,5 
2,8 
1,5 
1,9 
0,7 
0,7 
0,07 
9,1 
0,4 
10,5 
37,6 
0,3 
1,0 
0,1 
4,8 
0,53 
0,3 
1,3 
0,2 
— 
11,0 
42,0 
0,1 
90,6 
3,5 
3,6 
5,1 
7,8 
9,4 
4,8 
9,1 
3,1 
3,4 
0,1 
37,8 
4,9 
20,9 
75,7 
1,9 
1,6 
2,4 
3,7 
0,6 
1,1 
1,3 
0,2 
— 
12,8 
16,2 
0,7 
105,4 
4,2 
2,7 
6,2 
18,8 
17,2 
20,2 
21,5 
16,6 
21,3 
7,7 
19,0 
12,1 
15,8 
11,3 
20,6 
9,9 
26,2 
10,4 
10,1 
18,1 
24,0 
17,0 
38,3 
14,4 
10,6 
19,2 
11,5 
Source: Iparstatisztikai Évkönyv, 1987 (Budapest, KSH), 1988, various tables (with some recalculation). 
Key: Column 1 — Gross value of output (current prices, excluding turnover tax). 
Column 2 — Non-wage production costs (including depreciation and social security contributions). 
Column 3 — Wage costs. 
Column 4 — Indirect taxes. 
Column 5 — Subsidies. 
Column 6 — Profit (after indirect taxes and subsidies). 
Column 7 — Profit/unit of fixed capital. 
Note: All data refer to State enterprises; figures are in billions of forints in columns 1-6; column 7 is a percentage. 
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Table 3b 
Output, costs, indirect taxes, subsidies and profits by industry, 1988 
Branch/item 
Mining 
Electricity 
Metallurgy 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Electrical equipment 
Comm. equipment 
Instruments 
Mass prod, metalware 
Engineering R&D 
Engineering — total 
Building materials 
Chemicals industry 
Heavy industry — total 
Wood processing 
Paper 
Publishing 
Textiles 
Leather and furs 
Footwear 
Clothing 
Handicrafts, etc. 
Light industry R&D 
Light industry — total 
Food industry 
Other industry 
Industry — total 
94,1 
101,1 
158,0 
84,0 
92,1 
50,1 
68,7 
27,5 
38,0 
360,4 
54,9 
330,9 
1 099,4 
24,5 
25,1 
17,1 
73,3 
12,1 
13,7 
13,4 
2,9 
182,1 
306,4 
5,0 
1 592,9 
61,4 
66,2 
126,5 
57,9 
72,6 
36,0 
48,3 
19,3 
25,9 
260,1 
37,4 
237,4 
788,8 
17,1 
19,0 
12,7 
57,4 
9,7 
12,2 
10,1 
2,0 
140,2 
249,0 
3,3 
1 181,3 
17,2 
5,0 
9,9 
10,1 
8,0 
4,2 
8,9 
4,2 
4,0 
39,4 
6,0 
12,9 
90,5 
2,2 
1,6 
2,0 
8,1 
1,1 
1,8 
2,4 
0,47 
19,7 
20,7 
1,1 
131,9 
36,9 
24,4 
6,4 
6,7 
5,2 
2,6 
7,5 
3,1 
2,3 
27,4 
3,0 
13,4 
111,5 
1,1 
0,8 
0,9 
3,8 
0,5 
0,9 
1,0 
0,1 
9,2 
9,0 
0,5 
130,2 
8,1 
— 
11,5 
0,6 
1,6 
0,9 
0,5 
0,3 
0,4 
4,3 
0,2 
5,1 
29,2 
0,2 
0,02 
0,1 
3,7 
0,4 
1,7 
0,8 
0,2 
6,9 
42,0 
0,1 
78,3 
4,4 
2,2 
5,6 
2,5 
4,1 
2,1 
2,4 
0,2 
1,7 
13,1 
2,8 
17,9 
46,0 
1,1 
0,4 
1,0 
1,4 
-0,3 
-0 ,4 
0,6 
0,1 
4,0 
12,9 
0,4 
63,3 
4,9 
1,5 
6,9 
5,0 
8,4 
9,1 
5,4 
1,3 
9,4 
6,4 
6,4 
12,7 
6,5 
10,5 
2,6 
10,0 
3,8 
-4,6 
-5,7 
10,8 
9,3 
4,3 
8,2 
10,9 
6,6 
Source: Iparstatisztikai Évkönyv, 1988 (Budapest, KSH), 1989, various tables (with some recalculation). 
Key: Column 1 — Gross value of output (current prices, excluding turnover tax). 
Column 2 — Non-wage production costs (including depreciation and social security contributions). 
Column 3 — Wage costs. 
Column 4 — Indirect taxes. 
Column 5 — Subsidies. 
Column 6 — Profit (after indirect taxes and subsidies). 
Column 7 — Profit/unit of fixed capital. 
Note: All data refer to State enterprises; figures are in billions of forints in columns 1-6; column 7 is a percentage. 
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Nevertheless, it would be wrong to exaggerate the economic 
losses resulting from these distortions in the price system. 
Thus Zalai, 1984, using a model in the family referred to in 
the footnote on page 43, showed that the removal of 
distortions (with appropriate adjustments to foreign trade 
flows) would at most raise Hungary's GNP by a once and 
for all 2,7%, and that was based on rather optimistic as-
sumptions about export elasticities. His conclusion, there-
fore, was that the static allocative effects of even quite large 
distortions are surprisingly small; hence reforms are only 
likely to be beneficial if they stimulate significant improve-
ments in micro-level efficiency within most production units 
and/or if they result in superior investment decisions. 
The question of causality in relation to price, tax and subsidy 
relationships is an important one; in particular, how far can 
we say that subsidies give rise to price distortions, and how 
far the converse (and different answers might well have 
differing policy implications, so the issue is not merely one 
of semantics)? The way to approach this is to think in terms 
of State objectives. For instance, the State wishes to see 
increases in hard currency exports, but in some markets 
Hungary's export realizations are not high enough at the 
existing exchange rate to earn profits (presumably because 
costs are too high); hence if the State deems the exports to 
be 'necessary', a suitable subsidy will be paid to make the 
enterprise willing to carry out the required trade. Similarly, 
if a firm uses a protected market position to force up prices 
and hence earn very high profits, the State is likely to 
intervene by imposing a special tax to reduce the profits to 
a more normal and acceptable level. In both these cases, 
price is basically market determined, and the tax or subsidy 
is used to 'correct' enterprise income. 
In other instances, mainly in the sphere of consumption 
rather than in connection with intermediate transactions 
in production, taxes and subsidies have been applied to 
discourage or encourage different elements of consumption. 
That, at least, was the original logic of the system, though 
many consumer prices are what they are largely for historical 
reasons: 40 years ago there may have been a rationale for 
charging negligible rents and for heavily subsidizing other 
items of consumption, but under present conditions, with 
generally higher real incomes and basic needs on the whole 
provided for, the case is not very convincing. However, in 
terms of the practical politics of bringing about change, 
and achieving a closer correspondence between prices and 
(competitive) costs, it will obviously take some time to elim-
inate even the most glaring of these taxes and subsidies. 
Turning to enterprise management arrangements, the situ-
ation has changed in several respects during the 1980s. Some 
(but not enough) of the large enterprises and trusts were 
broken up into smaller units in the early 1980s, and in the 
mid-1980s enterprise management was put onto a new basis, 
at least formally. Traditionally, it had been the practice for 
an enterprise's supervisory ministry to appoint the manager, 
and whoever was appointed normally had to be approved 
by the party (though not necessarily be a party member; this 
nomenklatura system operated far less rigidly in Hungary 
than elsewhere in Eastern Europe). This system still exists 
for the very largest enterprises, especially those considered 
to have strategic importance for the economy, including the 
major public utilities. 
For most other enterprises, however, an elected enterprise 
council plays a part in choosing the manager. In smaller 
enterprises, the council (or workers' assembly) actually 
chooses the manager and determines the terms of reference 
of his/her appointment. But in medium and larger firms it 
is more usual for the council to be asked to approve a 
ministerial nominee, though the council does have the power 
of veto. Thus the new system is somewhat more flexible than 
the old, and gives somewhat more influence to enterprise-
level bodies, but substantial central intervention still takes 
place in the process of appointing enterprise managers. 
Interestingly, under the new, and supposedly more demo-
cratic arrangements for enterprise management, most of the 
incumbent managers were re-elected and confirmed in their 
posts. 
After a period of very slow turnover, Hungary's managers 
have experienced more rapid change in the 1980s, mainly 
due to the retirai of many managers dating from the 1950s. 
The new, and considerably better educated generation of 
managers now being appointed (or elected) offers the possi-
bility of more market-orientated economic behaviour by 
enterprises and hence, if supported by a suitable institutional 
framework, of a successful economic reform programme. 
The new managers are not mere party appointees wedded 
to the old ideas of central planning, though we should not 
forget the considerable influence still wielded by the party 
in every enterprise. On the other hand, they do have an 
almost exclusive engineering background and know hardly 
anything about accounting, finance and marketing: hence 
there is still scope for substantial retraining and, possibly, 
replacement of managers. 
It is still the case in Hungary that the HSWP (renamed 
the Socialist Party at the October party plenum) operates 
branches in every workplace in the country, including in 
every enterprise (with the probable exception of some of the 
small private and cooperative firms). The party secretary 
has been an exceptionally important figure in most enter-
prises, even in Hungary since the 1968 reforms. The sec-
retary's basic responsibility has been to ensure that the 
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enterprise to which he/she belongs should operate in accord-
ance with the prevailing party views about the economy; in 
practice, because of the failure to separate party and State 
in Hungary, this has also implied that the party secretary 
formed a channel through which government policy was 
implemented. From the enterprise's point of view, the party 
also serves as a convenient channel for seeking central sup-
port, either directly in the form of cash aid, or, more usually, 
indirectly in the form of agreement to certain subsidies or 
tax reliefs, or access to central investment and/or R&D 
programmes. These channels of influence, both upwards and 
downwards, are a significant factor inhibiting Hungarian 
enterprises from behaving competitively, and slowing down 
desirable and long overdue change. Hence the party's role 
at enterprise level needs a thorough review, and in my view 
it should simply be stopped from playing any role at all 
in factories and other workplaces. Interestingly, the new 
Socialist Party initially resisted demands that it should no 
longer operate in the workplace, but Hungary's parliament 
voted by an overwhelming majority on 19 October to end 
the practice (this was one element of a wider discussion 
about a new law on political parties) : party cells are to be 
withdrawn from the bureaucracy by the end of 1990, from 
the armed forces by the end of 1991, and from other work-
places (enterprises, etc.) at least 90 days prior to the next 
general election; this is expected to take place before the 
middle of 1990, so enterprise-based cells will be wound up 
very soon. I see this as an extremely important positive 
development for the Hungarian economy.' 
To sum up this section, then, it is evident that even after 
an extended and far-reaching programme of reforms the 
Hungarian economy still contains many features which pre-
vent it from behaving competitively : these include the con-
centration of production into very few units; the tax, subsidy 
and price systems; aspects of foreign trade management, 
especially in relation to the CMEA; and enterprise manage-
ment arrangements. The poor functioning of the economy 
in these areas is reinforced by the soft budget constraint/ 
shortage syndrome that we examine further below. 
2. The development of competition 
The basic problem facing Hungary, as Kornai, 1980, has 
analysed it, is the persistence of shortage conditions in the 
economy, which he regards as not (or, not only) a conse-
quence of excess demand in various markets but a conse-
quence of so-called soft budget constraints whereby enter-
prises know that in practice they will be able to negocíate 
their own special financial environment to keep them in 
business. While Nuti has described the soft budget constraint 
as a 'soft' concept, which, to a degree, it is (and I have also 
criticized some aspects of Kornai's approach; see Hare, 
1989), it nevertheless points to something real about the 
socialist economies in general, including Hungary. 
Accepting this broad line of argument, it follows that useful 
reform must contribute to removing shortage, thereby forc-
ing enterprises to seek markets, and improve their product 
quality and variety. One aspect of this process would be a 
substantial hardening of their budget constraints. This can 
be achieved by making the whole regulator system both 
normative and reasonably stable over time, for instance by 
eliminating special taxes and subsidies, especially within 
the enterprise sector. Another approach involves easing the 
conditions for entry into and exit from various markets. 
Some of the most recent reforms can best be understood in 
terms of one or other of these approaches. 
It is important to stress here that necessary reforms are 
likely to be very different for different parts of the economy 
(differentiation by sector, region, size/type of firm), depend-
ing on the already existing strength of market relationships, 
and the extent and role of relationships with the central 
authorities. In this section we focus on just two issues (which 
are partly inter-related), namely the problem of large enter-
prises, and the question of privatization, starting with the 
latter. 
Mainly as a consequence of the 1988 Enterprise Law, but 
also supported by some earlier legislation, the organizational 
structure of the Hungarian economy has started to change 
increasingly rapidly. Traditionally, the main forms of organ-
ization were State enterprises (under ministerial or council 
supervision) and cooperatives, but in recent years there has 
been some development of new forms of enterprise—such 
as subsidiaries (one enterprise supervised by another) and 
joint ventures (two or more enterprises operating another 
one); both of these forms can, and increasingly do, involve 
foreign participation. However, the most notable recent 
development has been the development of joint stock com-
panies (Reszvenytarsasag, or Rt) and limited liability com-
panies (Kft). Table 4 gives the most recently published data 
about the numbers of the different types of firm in Hungary.2 
Note, however, that the new HSP has not so far attracted many of the 
old HSWP members; there are indications that many members of the 
HSWP will seek to continue an old-style communist party. Hence politics 
in Hungary remain very fluid and, while I would expect an old-style 
communist party to be badly beaten in elections, the prospects for the 
HSP are still very unclear and one should not rule out an attempt by the 
communists to hold on to power. 
Since 1979-80 it has been possible for many forms of small economic 
unit to operate in Hungary, varying from small groups of workers 
using State assets outside normal working time (sometimes even within 
it)—used as a device to circumvent wage controls—to small enterprises; 
for details, see Hare, 1983. Under the new rules, I would except many 
of these units to become companies of one sort or another. 
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Table 4 
Different types of firm in the Hungarian 
Economic units 
State enterprises (including trusts) 
Subsidiaries 
Joint enterprises 
Union (cartel?) 
Rt 
Kit 
Agricultural cooperatives 
Other cooperatives 
Small cooperatives 
Company 
economy 
1985 
1910 
254 
251 
57 
62 
1 350 
2 735 
762 
435 
1986 
31 Dec. 
1 940 
345 
276 
61 
74 
1 340 
2 719 
1 278 
455 
1987 
1 955 
397 
302 
69 
137 
1 337 
2 658 
2 154 
498 
1988 
1 986 
391 
309 
78 
116 
415 
1 333 
2 439 
3 108 
534 
25 Feb. 
1999 
407 
306 
81 
170 
1 073 
1 331 
2 452 
3 164 
507 
1989 
21 April 
2 006 
415 
308 
83 
185 
1 708 
1 331 
2 462 
3 184 
474 
23 June 
2 002 
408 
307 
86 
210 
2 329 
1 332 
2 486 
3 185 
472 
Source: Kopint-Datorg, 1989. Table 16. 
Hungary's privatization is now proceeding very rapidly, 
mainly through the establishment of new joint stock com-
panies, but the present arrangements under which it is being 
carried out contain some astonishing, and highly undesirable 
features; these are listed and then discussed : 
(i) no return to the State on State-owned assets; 
(ii) the right to sell an enterprise is devolved to the enter-
prise councils; 
(ijii) normally, the State receives no revenue from the sale of 
an enterprise; 
(iv) there is no provision to require a privatizing enterprise 
to be properly valued; 
(v) the process of privatization takes place almost entirely 
behind closed doors, with no public supervision; man-
agers effectively choose their owners; 
(vi) existing legislative arrangements are weak, and al-
though new measures are in preparation, the weakness 
of the present government makes it unlikely that decis-
ive action will be taken prior to the election due in 1990; 
(vii) tax favours are awarded to joint Hungarian-foreign 
enterprises in return for very small capital inputs from 
the foreign firm. 
The first point is a general one, applying to all enterprises 
owned by the State (and also to cooperatives; the same issue 
arises because there, too, the State provided most of the 
capital). Under present rules enterprises pay profits taxation, 
but there is nothing in the system equivalent to any form of 
public dividend payment for the right to use State-owned 
capital. Previously, there was a capital charge (the so-called 
eszkozlekotesi jarulek) which was assessed at 5% of the 
book value of each enterprise's fixed assets, but this was 
abolished several years ago. The Finance Ministry is now 
drawing up proposals for a new contribution, but it is not 
expected to be related to capital directly; instead, it will 
probably be assessed at 20% of each enterprise's taxable 
profit, and will be additional to the normal profits tax. The 
tax will not, of course, be paid by privatized enterprises, but 
they would be expected to pay at least an equivalent amount 
in the form of dividends to their shareholders. 
The 1984-85 management reforms which established enter-
prise councils in all but the very largest of Hungarian firms 
also transferred ownership rights to the councils; at the time 
this was not clearly appreciated, either by outside observers, 
or by many Hungarian economists, and it was not immedi-
ately relevant because of the limitations on what firms could 
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do with their powers. Now, however, the councils are not 
only taking decisions about the form of privatization deemed 
to be best suited to each enterprise, but they are also 
empowered to retain any proceeds of privatization; hence in 
most cases, the State receives no revenue. ' 
A further consequence of the privatization arrangements is 
that, in most cases, it is not being used as an opportunity to 
bring in new management, despite the widely acknowledged 
weaknesses of Hungarian managers, especially their lack of 
marketing and financial skills. Indeed quite the contrary, the 
process of privatization is being used by existing managerial 
elite, many of whom (despite recent changes referred to 
above) were appointed for political reasons at least as much 
as for their management ability, to protect their positions 
(and/or their personal incomes) in the transition to a new 
economic environment. 
uals might have little or no claim; he uses this point to insist 
that privatization, however it is done, should always involve 
the transfer of shares at properly determined market prices; 
the assets should not, in effect, just be given away (and 
especially not to the undeserving elite who are turning out 
to be the main beneficiaries of the existing process). 
The privatization process in Hungary is motivated by a 
number of factors, including the desire on the part of certain 
managers to achieve large and rapid salary increases (allowed 
under the new structures, not under the old; a situation quite 
familiar from the experience of privatization in the UK); the 
desire to avoid a State-administered privatization or to be 
subject to further State controls in any form; the desire to 
escape from the rules and regulations of the old enterprise 
structures and operate in a more normal commercial en-
vironment; and the availability of tax concessions. 
This is facilitated by the lack of any requirement to ensure 
that privatizing enterprises are properly valued prior to 
privatization, and by the absence of any social control over 
the process. On both these issues, legislation is in preparation 
though controversy about the content of the required laws, 
together with the weakness of the government, may prevent 
early action. The question of social control is especially 
difficult at present, since there is substantial mistrust of the 
government and considerable popular reluctance to devise 
new arrangements that would merely hand over more money 
to the government (there is little awareness, even among 
professional economists, that the budget deficit needs to 
be contained and either properly financed or, preferably, 
reduced as a matter of priority). In informal discussions, the 
idea of some form of parliamentary commission to supervise 
the privatization process attracts greater support than a 
government agency, though it may amount to virtually the 
same in practice. Kornai, 1989, has argued forcefully that 
enterprise assets should be regarded as the whole nation's 
wealth, and not merely as State property over which individ-
in mid-1989, a transformation law was passed under which the State 
would receive some revenue and various other conditions of privatization 
were tightened. However, this law has not yet been used, apparently 
because, as a result of poor drafting, it does not actually supersede the 
earlier legislation; enterprises can and do choose to privatize under the 
old rules of the game. This is an instance of a more general problem in 
Hungary : in the past, laws could be quite brief and sketchy, since their 
implementation could always be ensured by numerous supplementary 
decrees dealing with unexpected problems. The move to a more law-
based society, while welcome as a general tendency, requires laws to be 
much more carefully drafted, partly so that they can withstand scrutiny 
by the courts (and I am sure this will soon become imporant in Hungary), 
partly because there will be far less use of supplementary decrees. 
The first factor is entirely understandable, especially in view 
of Hungary's very low managerial salaries (though I have 
already mentioned doubts about the competence of existing 
managers). The second results from managers' fears that the 
regulations surrounding privatization may in due course be 
tightened up considerably, most probably to their disadvan-
tage; the third factor is obviously more positive in that it 
offers the possibility that the newly formed enterprises—or 
at least many of them—might really strive to perform well 
in a market environment, and no longer expect/rely on 
regular doses of State aid in various forms. 
The fourth factor, tax concessions, gives more cause for 
concern. The main tax concessions are provided for joint 
ventures with foreign capital participation: what is quite 
surprising is the small amount of capital that has to be 
brought in in order to enjoy the concessions—5 million 
forints (about UKL 55 000) is sufficient at present. The joint 
enterprise then enjoys some relief from Hungarian profits' 
taxation for up to five years. Not only that, but unconfirmed 
reports indicate that some companies of this kind are being 
formed largely for asset-stripping reasons: some of the better 
Hungarian productive assets are simply being shipped out 
of the country. It seems to me that this is an area requiring 
further investigation, to check whether it is really happening, 
on what sort of scale, and to establish what methods of 
control are available. 
Let us now outline the mechanics of a typical privatization 
exercise in Hungary, under the prevailing arrangements. 
Consider a State enterprise (E) with, say, six plants (PI to 
P6). In the initial position, the consolidated balance sheet 
for the enterprise (including all the plants) looks as follows : 
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Balance sheet of E (initial position) 
Buildings 
Equipment 
Land 
Stocks 
Capital from the State 
Bank loans for inv. 
Bank loans for working capital 
Note that in the initial position, any land in the enterprise's 
possession is likely to be seriously undervalued, if valued at 
all; furthermore, of course, the value of remaining assets has 
not been subject to any market test (so that important items 
like 'goodwill' are usually absent), and the only available 
valuation is based on the book value of assets (either at 
historic cost or, possibly, with some adjustment for in-
flation). Furthermore, the prevailing prices have been so 
seriously distorted for so long that their use in arriving at 
valuations is itself likely to be very misleading. 
To privatize this business, the procedure is as follows : first, 
set up six new joint stock companies to carry on the activities 
of the original six plants. These companies issue share capital 
which is held by the parent company (E), and paid for by 
transfer of the real assets of the original enterprise to the 
plants. The result is to form six new private companies 
owning and controlling the main assets of the original com-
pany. The centre, E, formally remains a State enterprise but 
the assets side of its balance sheet now consists almost 
entirely of shares (of unknown value) in the new companies. 
In this situation, therefore, the State loses control over the 
productive assets and only 'owns' a bundle of shares. Since 
a stock exchange is due to open in Budapest from January 
1990, it may become clearer what value should be attached 
to these shares; the author's view, however, is that there will 
be little trade (because there are few potential buyers, unless 
foreign capital moves in a far larger scale than hitherto), 
and hence only a slow improvement in the information 
available about share values. 
Another approach to privatization (which has already given 
rise to controversy in the press, and promises of legal action 
from the government) is the following. The management/ 
enterprise council of an enterprise simply re-establish the 
whole enterprise as a joint stock company, perhaps with 
foreign participation, but since nothing needs to be paid to 
the State in respect of its contribution over the years to the 
enterprise's assets, it is not actually necessary to sell shares 
equal to the value of the company. In some reported in-
stances, something like 10% of the value of the company 
has been sold to outside shareholders such as other enter-
prises and a foreign partner, the remaining 90% of the shares 
in the company being retained by the company itself; even 
the 10% issued share capital represents a capital injection 
rather than a real payment for the existing assets. Yet after 
such a transaction, the State appears to have no further 
property rights in the enterprise. In yet other cases, banks 
have been 'persuaded' to convert outstanding poorly per-
forming loans into equity participation in these new firms; 
on paper, this has no effect on the value of the banks' 
balance sheets, but it obviously takes some of the pressure 
off enterprise cash flows and unless shares turn out to do 
very well must be very risky for the banks. 
A final issue to note about privatization is the following: 
once privatized, some of the existing firms will continue to 
enjoy a protected, near-monopoly position in one or more 
markets, and under the new conditions they can be expected 
to take advantage of their situation by charging monopoly 
prices wherever they can. For this reason, there is a need 
to develop adequate regulatory procedures to curtail the 
exploitation of monopoly power and actively to promote 
competitive behaviour. To date, this issue has received 
scarcely any attention at all, except from the head of the 
price office who is clearly (and rightly, in the author's view) 
concerned about the problem, and would like to see his 
authority become a competition authority in Hungary. 
Overall, then, various forms of privatization are proceeding 
quite rapidly in Hungary now. Some of the new companies 
will almost certainly perform much better in the market 
place than their predecessors, and some branches will operate 
more competitively as the number of firms increases; but I 
have also indicated a number of areas where the programme 
is seriously deficient—concerning revenue for the State, valu-
ation of assets, management arrangements, regulation of 
monopoly, and tax concessions. We return to some of these 
points in the final section of this paper; in the meantime, let 
us turn out attention to Hungary's larger enterprises. 
In a recent study, Szalai, 1989, analyses Hungary's large 
enterprises, their relationships with the central authorities in 
Hungary, and the ways in which their specific interests have 
prevented or slowed down the process of economic reform. 
She defines 'large' to refer to enterprises with more than 
1 000 employees, though within that group there is a subset 
of 'special' enterprises which were singled out for detailed 
State supervision in the early 1970s, when the first phase of 
Hungary's reforms gave way to a period of re-centralization. 
Within socialist industry, the number of large enterprises 
has slowly risen during the 1980s, from 259 (out of 1 157) 
in 1980, to 372 (out of 1 225) in 1987; in the same period, 
the number of special enterprises has declined slightly, from 
53 in 1980 to 45 in 1987. 
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The dominant position of these enterprises in Hungarian 
industry is easily illustrated. Thus over the period 1983-
87, the large enterprises accounted for 78% of industrial 
employment, 88,6% of the fixed capital, 83,5% of sales 
(further subdivided into: 81,8% of domestic sales, 92,3% of 
socialist exports, 90% of exports to capitalist countries), and 
80% of industry profits (after subsidies and taxes). The 
special enterprises provided 35,2% of the industrial employ-
ment, held 58,5% of the fixed capital, provided 62,2% of 
the sales (broken down as: 62,1% of the home market, 
57,4% of socialist exports, 67,4% of exports to capitalist 
countries) and earned 46,5% of the profits (again, after 
subsidies and taxes). The importance of these firms both in 
the domestic and export markets has enabled them to build 
up and exploit to their advantage various supportive re-
lationships with higher level authorities in Hungary (involv-
ing the price office, the finance ministry, the planning office, 
the national office for technological development, the trade 
ministry, etc.). Despite frequent calls for tougher financial 
discipline and 'normative' control, the authorities have not 
usually felt able to act against large firms even when they 
have performed very badly; rather, they have tended to 
provide support. While it is easy to see a short-term rationale 
for such timidity, it is in my view very damaging for the 
Hungarian economy in the longer term. This is particularly 
so in view of the fact that the dominant position of these 
firms in the economy is slowly being eroded as other sectors 
grow more rapidly, despite their lack of special support. 
The main areas in which large firms have enjoyed privileged 
access to resources are: foreign exchange; investment and 
new technology; credit; labour. In most individual cases, 
these firms have been able to argue that certain resources 
are essential for them to meet their perceived supply obli-
gations in the main markets—domestic, CMEA, and hard 
currency exports. Moreover, despite the passage of legis-
lation concerning bankruptcy and liquidation in 1986, the 
legislation has hardly ever been invoked, essentially due to 
fears of disrupting established market relationships and, to 
some extent, fears about unemployment. The net effect has 
been to provide an extremely protected environment for 
these enterprises in which, on average, they have performed 
less well than other parts of the economy. 
Many of these firms are now expecting that privatization is 
on the way, indeed some are already moving in the directions 
just discussed above. With that in mind, though, large firms 
are already trying to protect themselves, with an awareness 
that their links with the centre might no longer operate 
through so many channels as at present. Instead, it is per-
fectly possible that the main link between enterprises and 
the centre will very soon operate through the banking sys-
tem. Hence the way in which the new commercial banks 
function in relation to large firms is likely to be critical for 
improving the performance of this group of enterprises. At 
present, however, the signs are not good. 
First, although the normal, commercial interest rates are in 
the range 22 to 25% p.a. (as they should be with inflation 
approaching 20% p.a.), many transactions are highly subsi-
dized. For example, credits intended to support investment 
that will result in increases in hard currency exports receive 
a preferential rate of interest of 12 to 13%, and the large 
enterprises receive the bulk of such credits. Similarly, in 
areas where the State wishes to promote particular activities 
(e.g. biotechnology, electronics), much of the product devel-
opment and investment to support such activities can gain 
access to preferential credits; again, the large enterprises 
attract the lion's share of these credits. Overall, I suspect 
that a very high proportion of the available credit in the 
Hungarian economy either finances the government deficit 
(also at below-market interest rates), or provides preferential 
credits at the low rates of interest noted above. Only an 
unlucky few enterprises/projects end up having to pay the 
commercial interest rate. 
It is also clear that the banks are carrying what ought to be 
non-performing debt, mainly with the larger enterprises; it 
only manages to pay interest because of special taxes/ 
subsidies/price concessions which allow the enterprises con-
cerned to earn sufficient profit to satisfy the banks. In some 
cases (probably not very many), the banks are carrying 
genuinely non-performing debt. But in all cases, the banks 
have come under informal political and economic pressure 
not to initiate bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings against 
large enterprises. An important question for the reform 
process, then, is to consider how this situation could be 
changed. This is examined in the next section 
3. Supporting the reform process 
Perhaps the central issue for would-be reformers of the 
Hungarian economy is to understand why the economy has 
been so stagnant in the last few years, with industrial output 
barely increasing at all (and even declining in the first half 
of 1989); worryingly, this stagnation has not been ac-
companied by significant structural change of the sort that 
might be considered to be laying the groundwork for sus-
tained growth in the future. In an economy still experiencing 
fairly widespread and persistent shortages, the natural place 
to look for an answer is in the markets for inputs. The most 
important markets are those for labour, foreign exchange 
and credit, and there is no doubt that the activities of many 
firms have been significantly constrained by their inability 
to obtain these resources on any reasonable terms; at the 
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same time, and especially on the domestic consumption 
markets and in the CMEA markets, firms have been able to 
sell poor quality products without great difficulty, and so 
have often experienced quite weak incentives to engage in 
serious structural change. 
For the EC, therefore, it is relevant to identify areas for 
support which could help to relax some of these constraints 
on enterprises, while also stimulating better performance. In 
this short concluding section, I outline a few of the options 
which seem most likely to be beneficial to Hungary, as well 
as cost effective. On the latter, it is obviously relevant to 
think in terms of policies likely to strengthen Hungary's 
capacity to service and repay its hard currency debt. 
In relation to the privatization programme, which is un-
doubtedly an important part of any serious reform pro-
gramme, the most obvious and useful measures which Hun-
gary could take are as follows : 
(i) end the present situation where the State receives no 
revenue from the process; 
(ii) either establish a properly staffed State/parliamentary 
body to supervise the privatization process, including 
the preparation of adequate valuations of the relevant 
assets; or, preferably, transfer State assets to State-
owned holding companies, further decentralize enter-
prise management arrangements, but defer full privatiza-
tion until sufficient experience of operating in the market 
has been gained to enable valuation and the various 
important legal issues surrounding privatization to be 
conducted properly; 
(iii) establish an authority to promote competition and pre-
vent the abuse of monopoly power; 
(iv) restrict the tax concessions available to firms with for-
eign capital participation to those where capital injection 
is much larger; 
(v) with the expanding private ownership of shares and 
other assets whose values may fluctuate over time, it will 
become increasingly important for Hungary to establish 
some form of capital gains tax in addition to the existing 
income tax. 
courses could be provided in Hungary itself, using ex-
perienced EC business managers and teachers); 
(ii) provision of and training in various business-related 
services: this might cover business consultancy, the law 
related to business, accountancy services, and merchant 
banking; 
(iii) provision of funds to support the formation of new 
businesses in Hungary, especially businesses with an 
orientation towards hard currency export markets. 
In addition, to assist the process of modernization in Hun-
gary, the EC could permit Hungary to participate in certain 
of the existing and planned technology development pro-
grammes of the Community, e.g. the second phase of the 
Esprit programme might be suitable, especially as the EFTA 
countries are already allowed some participation. 
In relation to the large companies, the most important issue 
in my view is Hungary's evident unwillingness to permit 
any of them—even when performing and functioning very 
badly—to go bankrupt. There has been some State-
sponsored 'reorganization', but this usually takes the form 
of one large firm absorbing all or most of another, which 
merely serves to mask the poor performance within a larger 
unit. To improve the performance of these very large firms, 
therefore, it is impossible to avoid being financially tougher 
with them. Accordingly, suitable measures for Hungary are 
as follows : 
(i) over a short transitional period, eliminate the remaining 
special taxes and subsidies which at present mainly serve 
to 'prop up' the less efficient large enterprises; 
(ii) in the resulting financial environment, some firms will 
be able to improve their performance fast enough to 
survive, while others will not; the bankruptcy law should 
be strengthened to make it an offence for a firm to 
continue trading when it is clearly not economically 
viable (there are some questions of suitable definitions 
here which there is no need to elaborate in this paper); 
(iii) banks and other creditors of enterprises should be given 
stronger powers to pursue debts and, if necessary, en-
force liquidation of non-performing companies. 
Associated with such a programme, the EC could assist the 
process of transition to a market economy with substantial 
private ownership of capital, by providing modest amounts 
of support in a number of areas; these would include : 
(i) management training (e.g. by providing supported 
places at EC business schools, or periods of experience 
in Western companies, including participation in their 
management training programmes; alternatively, 
In the author's view, measures along these lines would have 
a number of advantages, as well as some, mainly short-term, 
costs. Among the advantages, could be included a rapid 
acceleration of structural change with the elimination of 
large amounts of old and highly inefficient capacity, and a 
long overdue shakeout of labour (however, it should be 
stressed that because of the history of price distortions, it 
will initially be far from clear which capital, and which jobs, 
will be viable in the longer term; hence it would not be wise 
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to scrap too much too quickly). The author does not share 
the worries of many Hungarian economists and policymak-
ers about unemployment, partly because the industrial sector 
in Hungary is already short of labour and the more dynamic 
firms will be able to absorb much of the labour released by 
a shakeout within a fairly short time. In addition, there is 
room for further expansion of service sector employment. 
The short-term costs are those associated with the tran-
sitional unemployment just mentioned. There is also some 
concern in Hungary that over-rapid change might cause 
difficulties for one or more of the commercial banks because 
of the poor quality of the loans currently in their portfolios. 
Whether this constitutes a good reason for slowing down 
reforms seems to me very doubtful, but a further investi-
gation is required to determine the best way of dealing with 
it. 
On the question of the unemployed, the EC may well be 
able to provide help in the following ways : 
(i) financial support for a retraining programme; 
(ii) possibly some support to maintain the income of the 
unemployed to mitigate the possible adverse political 
effects of unemployment, while not further burdening 
the government's budget; 
(iii) provision of temporary work for Hungarians in EC 
countries (this could also be seen as part of a retraining 
programme). 
Finally, it is impossible to conclude satisfactorily without 
making some reference to the present uncertain and fluid 
political situation in Hungary. The present government is a 
minority one in two senses : only three of its members now 
belong to the ruling party (the HSP), and only about 100 
members of parliament have so far chosen to join the HSP. 
A referendum in early December 1989 decided that the 
president should be elected by the new parliament, following 
the general election expected in spring 1990. It is looking 
increasingly unlikely that Pozsgay will become president. 
In the election, the socialists are expected to do very badly 
(as are the remaining communists), with the Democratic 
Forum, possibly in coalition with one or more of the other 
parties, expected to form the next government. While it 
supports a market economy in general terms, the forum does 
not yet have a fully worked out programme on many of the 
important issues now facing Hungary (nor, indeed, does the 
Socialist Party), but it will quickly have to confront some 
very delicate and urgent issues; to succeed, it will need 
competent advice, a coherent programme, and a good deal 
of external support. 
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Part II — Papers on Hungary 
This paper provides background and sets out issues concern-
ing the relationship between the pursuit of macroeconomic 
objectives and the microeconomic structure of the Hun-
garian economy. In principle, in a planned socialist economy, 
the plan ensures macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic 
stabilization policy is however central to a market capitalist 
economy, because of business cycles. Hungary departed from 
central planning in 1968, and the consequent economic sys-
tem of market socialism has combined elements of planned 
socialism and market capitalism. The means whereby the 
objectives of (1) full employment, (2) price stability, (3) 
balance of payments equilibrium and (4) economic growth 
have been sought under the Hungarian market socialism 
system are documented, and policy changes that are antici-
pated in the course of restructuring of the economy are 
considered. The final section sets out proposals for elements 
of policy conditionality to be associated with prospective 
Community assistance. Proposals are outlined as policy prin-
ciples which can be supplemented with more detailed quanti-
tative specifications. 
1. Unemployment 
1.1. The pre-eminence of full employment 
The new economic mechanism (NEM) which was introduced 
in Hungary in 1968 in principle substituted the decentralized 
market mechanism for the plan as an allocative mechanism. 
Whether for geopolitical or internal reasons, the NEM did 
not depart from the principle, associated with socialist sys-
tems, of assured job security for workers. Pre-eminence was 
assigned to the objective of sustained full employment, to 
confirm the superiority of market socialism over market 
capitalism which can disadvantage workers by employment 
instability. The labour market thus remained regulated to 
sustain full employment while other market-oriented reforms 
were pursued. However, the pre-eminence assigned to the 
full-employment objective limited the scope of possible econ-
omic change. 
1.2. The direct regulation of full employment 
Full employment has been sustained by direct regulation 
rather than indirect macroeconomic policies that affect ag-
gregate demand. Unemployment remains negligible, and is 
dominated by unfilled vacancies. The data for the third 
quarter of 1988 are representative: 0,3% of the workforce 
was registered as unemployed, and there were approximately 
five job vacancies for each unemployed worker. The work-
force participation rate was also high by international stan-
dards, at around 80%. Due to demographic trends, labour 
supply has been in decline throughout the 1980s (average of 
-0 ,5% per annum). 
The prominent employers of labour in Hungary have been 
and remain the large State and cooperative enterprises. The 
prominence of these enterprises as employers has continued 
since the NEM of 1968 as the consequence of administrative 
entry barriers that have protected the enterprises from dom-
estic and foreign competition. In the course of ensuring the 
job security of workers, the State has maintained the highly 
concentrated market structure that was the legacy of the 
planned economic system. Labour has remained in excess 
demand, because of constraints on dismissal of workers, and 
since enterprise managers have been assured of the wage bill 
necessary to sustain the enterprise employment level. 
Labour-market flexibility has been introduced via enterprise 
contract work associations that have facilitated after-hours 
employment by groups of workers using enterprises' prod-
uction facilities. This arrangement did not threaten job secur-
ity in regular employment. The development of a non-State 
second sector during the 1980s composed of numerous new 
small enterprises also provided options for employment out-
side the State sector, in general supplementing maintained 
official employment. However, these developments did not 
challenge the positions of the large State and cooperative 
enterprises as the dominant employers of labour. Private 
economic activity including the enterprise contract work 
associations accounted for 14,5% of employment in 1986, 
with a decline to 12,5% in 1987 and decline continuing 
thereafter. An element in the decline has been the introduc-
tion of the personal income tax, which because of high 
marginal tax rates on supplementary income has curtailed 
this type of labour supply. 
1.3. Structural adjustment and the labour market 
The cost of full employment has been an incentive structure 
in the State and cooperative enterprises that has discouraged 
efficient usage of labour. Labour productivity has been 
stagnant. There have been greater rewards to enterprise 
managers from evoking increased subsidies from the State 
than increasing labour productivity. While in principle there 
has been full employment in the sense that everyone has 
a job, in practice there has been hidden or 'on-the-job' 
unemployment. No estimates of the magnitude of hidden 
unemployment appear available: unofficial (and informal) 
estimates range from 10% to 30%. 
Changes in incentives that give enterprise managers reason 
to be concerned with efficiency and profitability will lead to 
explicit realization of the current hidden unemployment. 
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Indicative is the reduction in employment in some enterprises 
that has occurred as the response to a regulation that has 
permitted State enterprises to pay increased average wages 
contingent on declines in the workforce. As incentives change 
and restructuring occurs, unprofitable enterprises that were 
previously subsidized will lay off workers, or close down, 
but the enterprises whose output will expand will not im-
mediately hire new labour, because of the absence of com-
plementary investment. Thus, adjustment will be asymmet-
ric, the contracting enterprises laying off workers immedi-
ately, and the expanding enterprises employing new labour 
only in the longer run. 
Labour-market adjustment will be hindered by geographic 
concentration of industry and locational immobility of wor-
kers. In instances where the dominant employer in a town 
or region decreases employment or ceases production, the 
entry of new enterprises into the region, or geographic labour 
mobility, will be required to reduce unemployment. 
1.4. Unemployment as an impediment to change 
The unemployment associated with restructuring of the 
economy can be expected to be a source of resistance to 
change. Workers whose jobs are threatened will resist the 
implementation of efficiency-improving reforms. They will 
be joined in this resistance by enterprise managers. Workers 
will wish to know how long they can expect to remain 
unemployed, and under what conditions; enterprise man-
agers will wish to be assured that they can be reassigned to 
other enterprises without a loss in authority or income and 
benefits. 
In a capitalist economy, there would also be resistance to 
adjustment from the residual claimants to the capital, the 
value of which is reduced as the consequence of economic 
change. In the market socialist system of Hungary, the State 
which is seeking to implement the economic changes itself 
formally owns the capital. However, via the enterprise 
councils that have widely become governing bodies of State 
enterprises, management has effectively become the residual 
claimant. Workers are represented on the enterprise councils. 
Policies directed at ameliorating the problems associated 
with unemployment will have an important role in ensuring 
the success of a restructuring programme. Inappropriate 
demand management which permits the unemployment as-
sociated with adjustment to deteriorate into a full-scale re-
cession will strengthen the position of those resisting change, 
who will point to the instability of the reformed economic 
regime, in comparison with the employment stability offered 
by the regulated labour market of market socialism. Market 
socialism has provided job security, albeit with low prod-
uctivity and low real wages. High unemployment may evoke 
selective memories about the virtues and disadvantages of 
the past system. 
2. Inflation 
2.1. The trend of inflation 
Inflation rates, expressed via the official consumer price 
index, have been for the years 1985-89 respectively 5,3%, 
8,6%, 15,7% and 17%. A component of the jump in inflation 
between 1987 and 1988 is linked to tax reform and subsidy 
reductions. However, inflation further increased in 1989 
from the 1988 level. 
2.2. Price determination in product markets 
Under the Hungarian system of market socialism, product-
market prices have been regulated, to control consumer 
prices of necessities, and as the response to non-competitive 
domestic markets. Some prices have been strictly controlled, 
while others have been permitted to move within bounds. 
The process of decentralization and reform has over time 
resulted in substantial deregulation of prices. Given the 
highly concentrated structure of Hungarian industry, de-
regulation may not result in competitive pricing. Relaxation 
of barriers impeding entry into domestic industry and in-
creased import competition are required to enforce competi-
tive discipline. 
2.3. Wage determination 
Wage regulation in Hungary has been a principal means of 
controlling aggregate private consumption demand. Some 
three-quarters of workers have been subject to direct wage 
regulation, and the remainder to regulation of the average 
wage of the enterprise. Enterprises have in the past been 
subject to prohibitive penalties for wage increases over al-
lowed levels. 
Income payable to workers and management from after-tax 
profits has also been regulated, with penalties for excess 
payments. An incentive structure has however permitted 
successful enterprises latitude in payments to workers and 
management. The criteria for success have been moderation 
in price increases, the ability to do without State subsidies, 
maintenance of payments obligations to creditors, and hard-
currency exports. 
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The government has contained inflationary pressures that 
could derive from relaxation of discipline over nominal 
wages, although gross nominal wages increased in 1988 to 
compensate for the introduction of the personal income tax. 
In the period 1985-89 nominal average wages increased 
respectively by 8,3%, 7,4%, 8,1%, 10,3%, and 15,8%. The 
corresponding increases in average real wages were for the 
same years 1,3%, 1,9%, -0,4%, -4 ,9%, and -1 ,0%. 
Nominal wage discipline has therefore been sufficient to 
erode real wages. 
2.4. Fiscal discipline and the shortage economy 
Hungary has been characterized as a shortage economy; that 
is, resource availability rather than demand has constrained 
enterprises' output. Because of complementarities among 
inputs used in the production process, shortages are consist-
ent with excess capacity, or excess supply of some inputs 
(including hidden unemployment of labour). The shortages 
reflect inflexibilities in factor allocation that have limited 
opportunities for enterprises that seek to expand output to 
bid factors of production away from other enterprises. 
Inflationary pressures derive from the link between the short-
age economy and the soft budget constraint. Job security 
requires that enterprises be able to pay workers and remain 
financially viable, independently of other considerations. 
The subsidies that have assured job security underlie the soft 
budget. Where prices have remained regulated, the conse-
quence of the soft budget has been increases in administered 
prices. The administered price increases are directly in-
flationary; the subsidies are indirectly so, via the government 
budget. 
The distinction between hard and soft budget constraints is 
central to understanding the sources of inflationary pressures 
and the need for change in the fiscal relationship between 
the State and the State-owned enterprises. Hard budget 
constraints are effective in constraining enterprises' expendi-
tures, soft budgets are not so. The Hungarian economist 
János Kornai has described the soft budget constraint as 
reflected in the following managerial principles: 'Let it cost 
what it may', 'The main thing is to acquire material and 
capacity, and the money for it will be found in some way', 
'Once we have a contractor, we shall not stop the investment 
just because there is no money', 'If there is a loss, the 
State budget will take it over' (Contradictions and dilemmas, 
Corvina, Budapest, 1985, p. 14). Associated with the soft-
budget conceptions is therefore an incentive structure that 
compromises financial discipline in enterprises. The State 
budget as the source of the enterprises' soft budget is by 
implication also soft. Subsidies that underlie the soft budgets 
of the enterprises have been an important contributor to the 
budgetary deficit. 
2.5. Inflationary pressures in the course of restructuring 
Inflationary pressures can be expected to arise in the course 
of restructuring of the economy. These pressures have a 
number of sources. 
(i) At least in the short run, restructuring will reduce 
government revenue as a consequence of changes in 
the tax structure that provide incentives for profitable 
enterprises and eliminate cross-subsidization between 
successful and unsuccessful enterprises. At the same 
time, there will remain pressures to maintain subsidies 
for the less-efficient enterprises, or at least to phase 
these enterprises out gradually. The reduced government 
revenue will therefore not be balanced by a correspond-
ing decline in expenditures. 
(ii) Under central planning, retail consumer prices are deter-
mined by positive or negative turnover taxes applied to 
wholesale prices, the heritage of which under Hungarian 
market socialism has been subsidies on various essential 
consumer goods. An important component of change is 
the elimination or considerable reduction of consumer 
subsidies. In early 1990, as part of IMF conditionality, 
subsidies were reduced on rental payments for housing, 
transportation and utilities, and as a consequence con-
sumer prices increased sharply. The incumbent govern-
ment took upon itself the political cost of the price 
increases, before the elections of March 1990, thereby 
reducing the burdens on the new democratically elected 
government. Since voter dissatisfaction can be an im-
pediment to reform, it may be undesirable for the short-
run cost of adjustment to place an excessive burden on 
the local population via a reduction in living standards. 
Short-term political time horizons may impede the cul-
mination of the liberalization process. At least in the 
short term, there may accordingly be limitations on the 
extent to which budgetary balance can be sought by 
reduction in subsidies on consumer goods. 
(iii) Reform and structural change will require expenditures 
on infrastructure to improve communications and trans-
portation. Such public investment will impede budgetary 
balance. 
(iv) Some workers who find themselves unemployed as the 
consequence of restructuring may not return to the 
workforce. Hungary's high labour-force participation 
rate may accordingly decline, as workers are obliged to 
take early retirement. The associated increase in social 
security payments will add to the government's expendi-
ture obligations, so making for another source of in-
flationary pressure on the government budget in the 
course of restructuring. 
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2.6. Market structure and the transmission of inflationary 
pressures 
The highly concentrated structure of Hungarian industry has 
facilitated transmission of inflationary pressures. Enterprises 
have been able to claim the need for price or subsidy in-
creases on the grounds that their ability to supply goods has 
been compromised by increases in costs; but costs have 
themselves been endogenous via the soft-budget constraint. 
The concentrated structure of Hungarian industry will influ-
ence the effects of policies adopted to contain inflation. In 
this regard, the experience of Israel in 1985 in bringing the 
inflationary process to a sudden halt is of particular potential 
importance for Hungary, since Israel has in common with 
Hungary a very high concentration of industry. The anti-
inflationary steps taken in Israel included wage and price 
controls. If binding, price controls evoke excess demand in 
a competitive industry, since the regulated price is below the 
domestic market clearing level. However, if an enterprise 
has market power, price controls need not give rise to excess 
demand—if controlled prices exceed the competitive dom-
estic market clearing price. Since Israel's industries are highly 
concentrated, it was possible to implement a policy of price 
controls in 1985 without evoking excess market demand. 
Because of (i) socialist industry (25% of GNP in Israel in 
1988, but subsequently in decline), (ii) the commitment to 
sustained full employment (abandoned in the adjustment 
process that includes contraction and rationalization of 
socialist industry, with unemployment in excess of 9%), and 
(iii) high concentration of industry, the experience of Israel 
with macroeconomic adjustment and structural change may 
well be the most pertinent among cases that can be studied 
with a view to establishing insights pertinent to future Hun-
garian adjustment. 
3.2. The dichotomous international trading system 
Hungary's balance of payments is to be understood against 
the background of a dichotomous international trading sys-
tem. International trade has been conducted within the 
framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) in a manner that accords with a planned socialist 
economic system, while at the same time Hungary has traded 
with Western market economies. The distinction between 
soft and hard goods has been used to characterize the goods 
traded in the respective systems. Soft goods are those which, 
because of quality and appeal to consumers, are appropriate 
only for CMEA exchange in transferable roubles; the hard 
goods are those that require hard (i.e. convertible Western) 
currency for purchase, or can be sold for hard currency in 
Western markets. 
3.3. CMEA exchange 
CMEA exchange in principle should ensure balanced bilat-
eral trade. International trade is planned in advance, with 
State negotiators making commitments to deliver goods in 
the future in exchange for specified imports. The bilateral 
negotiations take place sequentially, with Hungary first 
negotiating exchange with the Soviet Union, and then with 
other CMEA members. In the past, the Soviet Union has 
not always supplied the goods to which it had committed 
itself in CMEA negotiations. In 1989 Hungary had a CMEA 
trade surplus of approximately 1,4 billion roubles. It is 
not evident whether under the conditions of CMEA trade 
Hungary can expect future offsetting imports. The transfer-
able rouble is non-convertible, and also non-transferable in 
that surpluses accumulated with one CMEA trading partner 
cannot be used to purchase goods from other CMEA mem-
bers. Hungary and the Soviet Union have agreed in principle 
to abandon the CMEA system of trade in 1991. 
3. The balance of payments 
3.1. Regulation of external balance 
From the vantage of the institutional framework for foreign 
transactions, the approach to external balance in the context 
of Hungarian market socialism has not been qualitatively 
different from that of a planned socialist system. Direct 
controls and non-convertibility of the forint have facilitated 
direct regulation of foreign transactions. Hence, there has 
been no need in the past for macroeconomic policy directed 
at external balance as understood in Western market econ-
omics. 
A macroeconomic policy perspective points to the links 
between CMEA exchange and fiscal discipline. International 
trade within CMEA is centralized, whereas production by 
the export enterprises is decentralized. The soft budget sup-
ports the enterprises, to ensure that the supply commitments 
made by the State negotiators can be met. 
There are also links between CMEA exchange and the full 
employment objective. The precommitted-CMEA exports 
that sustain domestic soft goods production allow the dom-
estic enterprises to continue to produce goods for CMEA 
markets without the associated need for competitiveness and 
marketing that arises in Western market exchange. CMEA 
trade has thereby contributed to the goal of employment 
security for enterprise managers and workers. It is the com-
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mitment to full employment that would appear to underlie 
Hungary's CMEA trade surplus, although enterprise incen-
tives are also to sustain the traditional CMEA export pat-
tern. 
Departure from CMEA will have macroeconomic conse-
quences, in unemployment of workers in the CMEA-export-
ing enterprises, and via the pattern of subsidies and taxes 
that equate CMEA prices with domestic prices. The terms 
of trade will deteriorate, but on the other hand trade 
surpluses will be matched by offsetting hard-currency pay-
ments. 
A central question is the extent to which the soft-good 
enterprises will be able to adjust to reorient themselves 
towards Western markets, and whether they will be able to 
withstand import competition under a liberalized trading 
regime. It would appear that the CMEA-exporting enter-
prises have been able to exert influence on the conduct of 
policy. In response to the trade surplus with the Soviet 
Union, the government in 1989 proposed an appreciation 
of the Hungarian forint against the rouble. Appreciation 
decreases the forint value of the Hungarian enterprises' 
receipts from CMEA exports, and hence was resisted by the 
exporting enterprises, resulting in a compromise in policy. 
assets. Under current circumstances there are accordingly 
limitations on the use of the interest rate as a policy 
instrument to achieve external balance. 
(ii) Devaluations increase the prices of Western imports in 
terms of forints; however, imports of consumer goods are 
constrained by a hard-currency foreign-exchange quota, 
and most Western imports have been necessary inter-
mediate goods. The crucial consideration in the success 
of a devaluation in improving the trade imbalance is 
therefore the anticipated response of hard-currency ex-
port proceeds: this is an empirical matter, but it should 
be noted that short-run export supply elasticities may 
be low since many domestic enterprises have not been 
accustomed in the past to selling in a Western market 
environment where quality and marketing skills are im-
portant. 
The Western foreign debt could become an impediment to 
reform. If the burden of the debt were to become unmanage-
able, Hungary might be tempted for want of an alternative to 
seek refuge in the negotiated international trade of CMEA, 
wherein the Soviet Union provides raw material in exchange 
for Hungary's soft goods, if the Soviet Union itself were 
prepared to continue with the present structure of CMEA 
international trade. 
3.4. International transactions with the West and the 
foreign debt 
In 1989 Hungary had international hard-currency denomi-
nated assets of approximately USD 6 billion, and a hard-
currency foreign debt that was revised upwards to USD 20 
billion, leaving a net debt of USD 14 billion. A substantial 
portion of the debt is composed of government bonds, which 
inhibits rescheduling possibilities of the type that might be 
arranged with banks and foreign governments. 
Debt repayment capabilities are being strained by hard cur-
rency export earnings, thereby suggesting impending prob-
lems of external balance. Policy instruments that can address 
the problem of external balance are (i) interest rate and (ii) 
exchange rates. 
(i) The use of the interest rate as a policy instrument is 
limited by the restricted supply of interest-bearing forint-
denominated monetary assets that might be offered to 
foreign investors. A domestic bond market in issues by 
State enterprises, cooperatives, financial institutions and 
local governments remains insufficiently broad to en-
compass significant foreign portfolio investment. 
Country risk may in any event inhibit foreigners from 
holding more Hungarian debt, even at substantial 
interest-rate differentials favouring forint-denominated 
3.5. The exchange-rate regime 
Hungary's non-CMEA fixed exchange rate is determined as 
a trade-weighted basket of 10 convertible currencies. The 
rate is adjusted from time to time against the basket. There 
have in recent years been periodic devaluations. There is 
also a forward market for some 20 convertible currencies. 
The CMEA/non-CMEA exchange-rate structure is not ra-
tionalized, but foreign-exchange controls impede arbitrage. 
A required reform is a unified convertible exchange-rate 
regime. Once the unified exchange rate is established, a 
decision will have to be made regarding flexibility of ex-
change rates. A flexible exchange rate can ameliorate some 
of the burdens of external balance, but in itself cannot 
ensure the real international transfers required to meet the 
obligations associated with the foreign debt. A flexible ex-
change rate also relieves the government of responsibility to 
maintain fiscal discipline, since domestic inflation can be 
accommodated by depreciation of the domestic currency. 
3.6. The sequencing of current and capital account 
liberalization 
The sequencing of liberalization of the capital and current 
accounts is of importance. Domestic relative prices remain 
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distorted in the absence of current account liberalization 
that exposes domestic markets to international prices. If the 
distorted domestic relative prices are used as the guide for 
foreign investors' allocation decisions, investment may not 
be consistent with Hungary's long-run comparative advan-
tage. 
The non-convertibility of the Hungarian forint and foreign-
exchange controls have constrained both current and capital 
account transactions. Since January 1988 individuals and 
enterprises have been permitted to engage in international 
trade in specified goods, subject to permission (obtained via 
registration) from the Ministry of Trade. Trade liberalization 
procedures that began in January 1989 eliminated licences 
and quotas for capital or producer goods that account for 
some 40% of non-rouble imports. Further liberalization is 
to proceed by stages. Imports of consumer goods remain 
subject to a global quota in convertible currency: licences 
are granted on a first-come basis and imports are subject to 
duties. Current-account liberalization proceeded in January 
1988 with relaxation of foreign travel restrictions; travel 
is permitted, subject to demonstrated availability of hard 
currency from legal sources (National Bank of Hungary 
allowances and residents' foreign currency accounts; attend-
antly, duties on personal imports were increased from 20% 
to 45% in April 1989, and the duty-free allowance reduced 
from 10 000 to 5 000 forints, with pooling among travellers 
no longer allowed). Capital-account transactions have been 
liberalized by elimination of domestic-participation restric-
tions on direct foreign investment. 
3.7. Policy substitutes for direct regulation 
As foreign-sector liberalization proceeds, policy substitutes 
will be required for direct means of regulating external 
balance. Questions will arise as to how external balance is 
to be assured in the absence of direct regulation of foreign 
transactions. Which type of exchange-rate system is to be 
adopted? What (if any) types of controls are to be retained on 
domestic access to foreign capital markets? With a liberalized 
domestic capital market, will the domestic real rate of 
interest be left to be determined by real rates of interest 
abroad? To what extent will a fixed exchange-rate regime 
compromise control by the domestic authorities over the 
domestic money supply? Will a fixed exchange-rate system 
be an effective budgetary discipline that will constrain the 
domestic rate of inflation? These questions are familiar in 
the context of Western macroeconomic policy decisions. 
Answers will have to be provided in terms of the Hungarian 
parameters. 
4. Economic growth 
4.1. Patterns of growth and investment 
Growth rates in Hungary in recent years have been low, in 
particular relative to investment. The ratio of investment of 
GDP has been stable in the second half of the 1980s in the 
neighbourhood of 23% to 24%. Growth in real GDP for 
the years 1984-88 has been respectively 2,7%, - 0,3%, 0,7%, 
3,9%, and 0,4%. Corresponding values in the same years 
for changes in real industrial output are 2,5%, - 2 , 1 % , 
-0 ,5%, 3,4%, and 1,9%. In a Western market economy 
solutions to low or negative growth rates can be sought 
in policies that encourage increased savings that can be 
channelled into increased investment. In Hungary the 
investment/GNP ratio has been high; but economic perform-
ance does not reflect the high investment. 
The low growth rates reflect systemic characteristics of the 
economy. Under market socialism, capital has remained 
State owned, and the State has regulated the domestic capital 
market. During the 1980s, some half of all investment de-
cisions remain centralized, with the government allocating 
substantial portions of total investment to construction of a 
dam that was in due course discontinued and to construction 
of natural gas pipelines in the Soviet Union. The regulated 
capital market can be attributed to ideological constraints 
on reform, via the restrictions on private ownership of capi-
tal. More pragmatically in relation to the full-employment 
objective, an unregulated capital market would have 
compromised the objective of sustained full employment, 
by facilitating investment competitive with the incumbent 
enterprises. 
4.2. The interest rate and economic activity 
Investment in a Western market economy is in general sensi-
tive to interest rates, thereby permitting governments to use 
interest rates as instruments of macroeconomic policy. In 
Hungary the regulated capital market and the associated 
soft budget confronting the enterprises have left little role 
for the interest rate as a means of influencing the level of 
economic activity. It is not at all clear how (if at all) interest 
rates influence decision-making in the context of soft 
budgets. The imposition of financial discipline on the enter-
prises will on the other hand introduce a macroeconomic 
policy role for the interest rate, and the term structure of 
such rates. 
4.3. The second sector 
The second sector of the economy has been the source of 
such growth as has occurred in Hungary in the 1980s. Some 
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10 000 new enterprises were established in the sector, in 
particular with a spurt of inceptions in the early 1980s, while 
the State sector remained composed of a stable number of 
approximately 1 000 enterprises. There has been exit as well 
as entry from the second sector. Unlike the State sector, 
there has not been a stable population of enterprises in 
the second sector. The second-sector enterprises have been 
supply constrained, via restrictions on access to inputs. Legal 
restrictions limited the number of employees, and the regu-
lated capital market limited access to credit. Because of 
these supply-side constraints, expansionary macroeconomic 
policy, with its presumption that absence of growth is at-
tributable to lack of effective demand, is not an appropriate 
means of stimulating growth in the second sector, as it is 
not in the shortage economy generally. 
objective. The bankruptcy of a monopolistic enterprise 
would further eliminate the sole source of domestic supply 
of the enterprise's output. The function of bankruptcy is to 
release resources from inefficient or non-profitable use, for 
allocation to higher-value use. The low growth rates that 
have been achieved in Hungary are a reflection of the absence 
of this break on the continuing resources flows to unprofit-
able enterprises. 
5. Proposals 
Current circumstances suggest a number of proposals for 
policy. 
4.4. The banking system and credit allocation 
The reform of the banking system in 1987 has implications 
for the conduct of macroeconomic policy, via the range of 
policy instruments potentially available to control domestic 
credit and liquidity. The reform of 1987 established a central 
bank and five State-owned large commercial banks, together 
with some smaller venture-capital financial institutions. For-
eign banks have also been permitted to open branches, and 
there are local branches of US and West European banks. 
Individual enterprises remain however linked to a particular 
large bank, and the maintained tie-ins between enterprises 
and banks have impeded the development of a competitive 
credit market. However, the increase in the number of com-
mercial banks and the separation between commercial bank-
ing and the central bank provide the basic elements for a 
more competitive banking system of the Western type. 
Under present circumstances, the State has the means of 
controlling domestic credit via the credit allocations of the 
large commercial banks (all State owned) to the State enter-
prises and cooperatives. Thus, the contemporary structure 
does not require macroeconomic policy instruments such as 
reserve-requirements to influence domestic liquidity, since 
liquidity objectives can be sought by direct control over 
credit rationing. Credit rationing further remains non-dis-
cretionary in so far as financial flows to the enterprises are 
determined by the needs of sustained full employment. 
4.5. Bankruptcy 
Proposal A: Labour employment 
(i) It is desirable that the labour market be deregulated, to 
permit wages and salaries to exhibit greater responsive-
ness to market forces, and thereby to impart greater 
flexibility to labour mobility. 
(ii) Greater flexibility in labour allocation can be achieved 
by acknowledging hidden unemployment which, subject 
to the constraints on manageable adjustment, should be 
permitted to be manifested as explicit unemployment. 
Incentive systems should accordingly be widely intro-
duced that reward managers and workers for increases 
in labour productivity, and the impediments to dismissal 
of labour via the authority of workers' committees 
should be diminished, maintaining, however, workers' 
protection against arbitrary dismissal. 
(iii) Large-scale unemployment should be avoided. It is desir-
able that change be gradual, so as not to strain the 
capabilities for labour adjustment, and to avoid social 
upheaval. Incentives rather than directives should under-
lie change. Enterprises should be encouraged to seek 
means other than dismissal of workers to increase labour 
productivity, for example, the opening of new product 
lines and the development of new markets. The internal 
transition of enterprises to a concern with profitability 
and efficiency rather than job security of employees can 
be facilitated by foreign investments and joint ventures 
that update the capital stock and introduce modern 
technologies, and allow enterprise managers to familiar-
ize themselves with the techniques of marketing in the 
face of competitive suppliers. 
Soft budgets imply immunity to bankruptcy. Although 
bankruptcy is legally possible, instances of enterprises suc-
cumbing to financial difficulties have, in accord with the 
soft-budget conception, been rare. Bankruptcy would be 
inconsistent with the pre-eminence of the full-employment 
There will be macroeconomic policy implications of labour-
market deregulation. Greater flexibility in wages and labour 
mobility will compromise direct control of aggregate demand 
via central wage determination. Aggregate demand manage-
ment will be necessary via the more indirect mechanisms of 
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monetary and fiscal policies that influence decentralized 
market behaviour. The rate of unemployment will become 
a target of macroeconomic policy, and it will be necessary 
to establish a conception of the natural rate of employment 
in Hungary. 
It is perhaps ironic that the required structural adjustments 
associated with ongoing liberalization of the economy will 
displace the system from the one macroeconomic objective 
that remains sustained, i.e. full employment. Transitional 
unemployment and deregulation of wages are however pre-
conditions for restructuring of the economy to move from 
regulated market socialism to a Western-type market econ-
omy. Full employment has meant structural rigidity. The 
abandonment of a policy of full employment will facilitate 
factor market liberalization, and will allow for elimination 
of administrative entry barriers (including constraints on 
imports) that have impeded more competitive product mar-
kets. 
Macroeconomic policy that focuses on aggregate demand 
may not be sufficiently discriminating to be the appropriate 
response to the unemployment associated with liberalization 
of the labour market. Policy approaches to unemployment 
will require responses that encompass awareness of the allo-
cative objectives of the programme of structural change. If 
the avoidance of unemployment were in itself a goal, then 
Hungarian market socialism has performed admirably. The 
requisite labour-market policies are those that facilitate re-
adjustment and increase labour demand by encouraging 
investment in line with Hungary's comparative advantage. 
In this regard, an essential role for Community aid is avoid-
ance of sustained structural unemployment, by facilitating 
the complementary investments that will reduce unemploy-
ment to levels consistent with the ongoing pursuit of econ-
omic restructuring. 
Deregulation of the labour market will facilitate deregulation 
of the capital market, by relief of the concern that competi-
tive entry will threaten workers' job security. 
Proposal B: Fiscal discipline and deregulation of the capital 
market 
The process of gradual deregulation of the capital and credit 
markets should proceed in line with stated policy intentions 
that reduce the role of the State in determining allocation 
of investment funds. In particular, competitive conditions 
should be fostered amongst the domestic banks, and foreign 
banks should be permitted and active domestic role; the 
institutional framework facilitating bond issues and equity 
trades should be developed; and enterprises should be free to 
use accumulated surpluses for other than internal expansion. 
Liberalization of capital market transactions raises property 
rights issues that are in themselves sources of complexity; it 
is difficult to liberalize capital markets without the right to 
own and trade capital. 
The inflationary pressures that are anticipated to arise in 
the course of restructuring are a source of potential insta-
bility that could impede the ongoing reform process. Excess-
ive inflation will be used by those resisting reform as confir-
mation along with unemployment of the inherent instability 
of the Western-type market economic system. Means must 
therefore be found of committing the government to fiscal 
discipline. This will require credible policy, which entails 
binding precommitment. Otherwise, the urge to resort to 
inflationary financing may prove irresistible, given short-run 
budgetary expenditure pressures. 
Proposal C: Fiscal discipline and policy credibility 
The Community should assist in the containment of in-
flationary pressures by imposing conditionality on aid that 
permits the government to precommit to fiscal discipline. 
Such precommitment is advantageous for all parties, since 
it is the absence of precommitment that can give rise to 
strategic responses that erode fiscal discipline. Conditional-
ity can provide precommitment via (i) a bound on the ratio 
of the budgetary deficit to GDP, (ii) continuing reforms that 
broaden and rationalize the tax base, (iii) commitment to a 
fixed or bounded exchange rate (see also proposal F) that 
provides for confidence in a stable forint and evokes fiscal 
discipline by removing depreciation of the exchange rate as 
a means of accommodating domestic inflationary financing, 
(iv) direct aid that reduces the budgetary burden of the 
adjustment process and moderates expectations of inflation-
ary financing. 
External balance is emerging as a problem for Hungary, 
notwithstanding relative export success in Western markets. 
A primary source of the problem of external balance is the 
foreign debt, for which repayment obligations have now 
come to strain Hungary's hard-currency earnings. A scenario 
to be avoided is one where the obligations associated with 
the foreign debt impede progress in integration with Western 
economies, such that Hungary is driven back to the planned 
socialist CMEA system of international transactions in 
search of stable and reliable trading partners — if this can 
be accommodated via the continued survival of the CMEA 
trading system. To avoid realization of this scenario, the 
success of ongoing reforms must not be compromised by the 
historical burden of the foreign debt. 
The need for Community assistance is most evident in the 
matter of external balance, in conjunction with World Bank 
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and IMF initiatives. The restructuring of the economy of 
Hungary to facilitate further substitution from CMEA to 
Western market oriented production will require new invest-
ment. Debt restructuring could change the timing of Hun-
garian payment obligations to permit resources to be 
diverted to domestic restructuring, thereby increasing future 
repayment capabilities. 
Proposal D: The foreign debt and external balance 
The Community can assist in facilitating a restructuring of 
the foreign debt, and by cooperating to provide an insti-
tutional framework for debt/equity swaps. The debt/equity 
swaps would permit Western corporations to finance invest-
ments or joint ventures in Hungary that provide access to 
Western technology. Models of debt restructuring and debt/ 
equity swaps are available from other countries that confront 
similar international debt problems. 
pressures that may arise favouring protection from foreign 
goods and foreign capital. The forint should be made con-
vertible and, to provide fiscal discipline, the exchange rate 
should be fixed or informally placed within the European 
flexible band. Because of implications for efficiency stem-
ming from the order of liberalization of the current and 
capital accounts, direct foreign investment that takes place 
before liberalization of the current account has been 
achieved should be scrutinized to ascertain whether the in-
vestment is not evidently inconsistent with Hungary's inter-
national comparative advantage. 
Under Hungarian market socialism, the objectives that are 
the targets of macroeconomic policy in Western market 
economies have been sought by direct regulatory means 
rather than policies that influence decentralized market be-
haviour by economic agents. Changes are required in the 
instruments of policy. 
The current Hungarian foreign debt was substantially in-
curred in the years 1973-78 in consequence of the very policy 
constraints of which Hungary is now seeking to free itself. 
The resources made available by foreign borrowing were 
used to sustain the stability of the economy system, by 
providing a non-inflationary means of financing the subsid-
ies or soft budgets that have facilitated sustained full employ-
ment. As a consequence, Hungary lacks productive assets 
that might provide a real offset for the foreign financial 
liabilities. This precedent is to be avoided in current aid 
initiatives. 
Proposal E: Community monitoring of uses of external 
assistance 
The allocation of resources made available via external as-
sistance should be subject to Community monitoring, to 
confirm that resources are used to facilitate adjustment, 
rather as in the past to sustain the existing economic struc-
ture. It is recommended that monitoring of the disposition 
of resources made available via Community assistance be 
undertaken by a committee composed of Hungarian econ-
omists and economists nominated by the Community. 
If the foreign debt does not impede liberalization of foreign 
transactions, the sequencing and means of liberalization of 
the current and capital accounts become issues. 
Proposal G: Indirect policy means to replace direct regulation 
As the liberalization proceeds, direct regulation that has been 
aimed at the macroeconomic objectives of full employment, 
price stability, balance of payments equilibrium, and growth 
should be increasingly replaced by indirect regulation via 
the instruments of fiscal and monetary policy. In particular, 
tax instruments should become means of regulating aggre-
gate consumption demand rather than direct regulation of 
wages that enterprises can pay to workers. Interest rates 
should be used to influence investment demand rather than 
direct regulation of allocation of credit. 
The persistence of soft budgets and individualistic subsidies 
for different enterprises is inconsistent with a uniform cor-
porate tax as a policy instrument to regulate the liquidity of 
enterprises. For although the corporate tax may be applied 
uniformly, the subsidies are not. The current system thus 
constrains the flexibility of fiscal policy. When the State is 
no longer committed (and perceived to be so) to sustain the 
financial viability of enterprises, fiscal policy will become 
discretionary. Discretionary expenditures will also facilitate 
control over the monetary base — such control is lacking 
when there is an open-ended commitment to job security of 
workers. 
Proposal H: Macroeconomic policy and restructuring 
Proposal F: Liberalization of foreign transactions 
The announced policies that will liberalize foreign trans-
actions in stages should proceed notwithstanding domestic 
In policy discussions associated with conditionality, policy 
options should not be presented in terms of macroeconomic 
objectives without due regard for the underlying structure 
of and need for changes in the economic system. 
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Macroeconomic policies formulated in terms of broad econ- the government budgetary deficit and the balance of pay-
omic aggregates that do not reflect cognizance of the under- ments, should be recognized. It is in assisting in alleviating 
lying structure of the economy and the requirements of the burdens of these constraints that the Community can 
restructuring may not be successful in facilitating adjust- encourage restructuring and increased market orientation of 
ment, and may be counterproductive. At the same time, the Hungarian economy, subject to conditionality relating 
macroeconomic constraints on adjustment, in particular via to requisite institutional and policy changes. 
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Introduction 
The events in Eastern Europe at the end of 1989 were truly 
revolutionary. Hungary's economic reform programme in 
contrast had been evolutionary and gradual, but is increas-
ingly affected by the spirit of the times. This will undoubtedly 
affect the agenda and priorities of the reform process. The 
tension between the evolutionary and revolutionary process 
in part reflects the normal tension between efficiency and 
equity. Most reforms have an efficiency effect and a distri-
butional impact. Redistributions are zero sum games, but 
increasing efficiency is a positive sum game—all can in 
principle benefit. Not surprisingly, the most persuasive argu-
ment for reform is that it improves efficiency, and this is 
frequently the framework within which the argument is 
conducted. Unfortunately, for most reforms the efficiency 
gains are much smaller than the distributional impacts. It 
is an impressive reform that increases efficiency by 
5%—several years' growth. Few tax reforms reduce dead-
weight losses by that amount, and the economic case for 
creating the European common market, or the single market 
of 1992, typically came up with smaller gains. On the other 
hand, redistributions of income of this magnitude are en-
tirely unsurprising. Put another way, although in principle 
all may gain from an increase in efficiency, it is rarely the 
case that all do in fact gain, and frequently the case that 
some gain a lot, while others lose, possibly significantly. 
An evolutionary reform requires consensus, which is easier 
if the efficiency gains can be realized without major redistri-
butions which create losers as well as winners. As only 
the government has the necessary tax and redistributional 
powers to offset the potential redistributions attendant on 
reforms, consensus requires confidence in the government's 
ability and willingness to ensure fairness. 
The rervolutionary fervour sweeping through Eastern Eu-
rope has a wider agenda. In large part it is impelled by the 
attempt to obtain control over individual destiny, and to 
reduce the overpowerful role of what is often perceived as 
an alien State. To be effective, the reforms have to be 
irreversible, or at least hard to reverse. A movement which 
owes much of its current momentum to populist sentiment 
faces the risk that current political groupings are fragile, 
that factions may emerge and consensus may be hard to 
preserve. 
The old guard might, if it maintains a power base, be able 
to rapidly reverse any progress and return to the former 
style of central control, perhaps cloaked in new institutional 
forms. This can be seen most clearly in the debate over the 
place and timing of privatization in the reform programme. 
The great political appeal of privatization, especially where 
it results in the wide dispersion of asset ownership, is that it 
is difficult to restore the ownership powers of the State 
without strong resistance from those who stand to suffer a 
first-order loss. Not a small part of the logic of the British 
privatization programme was this desire to roll.back the 
frontiers of the State in an irreversible way, even if it meant 
selling assets at below their maximum value. From a purely 
efficiency point of view, privatization is less urgent than 
many other reforms, and is probably best managed by cre-
ating a government agency entrusted with restructuring en-
terprises, and valuing their assets as a prelude to an orderly 
transfer of ownership claims. From a political point of view, 
if the State machinery is not trusted, and the aim is to make 
irreversible reforms, privatization, even at the risk of major 
inequities and inefficiencies, may have higher priority. 
This paper concentrates on the economic issues raised by 
the reform process, and does not address these political 
concerns. It aims to identify the constraints on economic 
performance, the logic of proposed reforms, and where poss-
ible, the appropriate sequencing of reforms for the best 
realization of the potential gains. As remarked, reform pri-
orities and sequencing depend on political objectives, as well 
as these simple efficiency gains. This qualification needs to 
be borne clearly in mind in what follows. 
The two central economic problems facing Hungary are its 
large foreign debt and its relatively poor rate of growth over 
the 1980s. These are connected, in that the debt would not 
be so troublesome if the rate of growth could be accelerated, 
for then, providing its real size did not grow as fast as GNP, 
the ratio of debt to GNP would fall. This would reduce the 
burden of the debt and relax the borrowing constraints 
which are beginning to press. On the other hand, the debt 
may be a constraint on growth by lowering the investible 
surplus. If so, then a temporary suspension or reduction of 
debt-servicing obligations might enable the economy to 
move to a higher, sustainable growth path which would 
make subsequent servicing less onerous. The reform pro-
gramme can be seen in this light—if it succeeds it will yield 
a higher growth rate. 
The first question to address is the extent to which the 
reform might enable the rate of growth to be raised, and, 
more fundamentally, to examine the constraints which have 
limited economic growth, to see how far they continue to 
apply or might be relaxed by economic reform. The second 
question to ask is how far debt constrains performance and 
how far reform would improve the ability of the economy 
to service the debt. The third question is to ask what steps 
might be taken to assist reform, restructuring, repayment, 
and a move to a more dynamic economy. To the extent that 
additional funds are unlikely to be forthcoming without 
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assurances that appropriate reforms be undertaken, it then 
becomes important to identify the critical elements in the 
reform programme, and cases where one choice rather than 
another might make a significant difference to the success 
of the reform. This is turn often involves determining the 
appropriate sequencing of the various components in the 
programme, and deciding which elements are critical for 
success, and which are of lesser importance. Again, the 
qualification that sequencing depend on priorities, which are 
not solely economic, qualifies this aim. 
With this structure in mind the first issue to address is the 
role of debt and the long-run growth prospects of Hungary. 
Here it is useful to stand back and take a comparative look, 
necessarily at a somewhat superficial level, mainly to give 
an overall perspective. If Hungary is to successfully reform 
its economy into a market or market socialist economy 
similar to those of Western Europe, then we should ask what 
its economic structure might then look like, and how far it 
is from an 'equilibrium market structure'. 
It is notoriously difficult to estimate the real per capita 
income in Hungary. The World Bank World development 
report 1989 provides useful comparative data which is sum-
marized in Table 1. We know from the work of Kuznets 
and Chenery and Syrquin that the economic structure of a 
country depends upon its population, its per capita income, 
and its resource base (including climate, access to various 
markets, etc.). This suggests looking at countries of a similar 
population to Hungary, and preferably a similar level of 
income. The World development report 1989 gives two esti-
mates of per capita income: an estimate based on the UN 
international comparison programme (ICP), Phase V, for 
1985 which attempts to estimate the purchasing power of 
the national incomes; and the ordinary estimates of GNP, 
which the Bank recognizes have severe limitations, especially 
for socialist economies using different national accounting 
conventions and insulated from world prices. 
Table 1 identifies Portugal and Greece as being the countries 
of similar population with the closest standard of living 
measured by ICP per capita GDP. On that score Yugoslavia 
is slightly poorer, and nearly three times as populous. Spain 
is 50% richer, and has nearly four times the population. 
Belgium has a similar population but is more than twice as 
rich, while Austria is slightly smaller and even richer than 
Belgium. The standard measures of GDP per capita shows 
that while the ratio of ICP to normal income is 2,2 for 
Portugal and Yugoslavia, it is only 1,6 for Greece, and lower 
for richer countries. The ratio for Hungary is 2,6 which 
suggests that Hungary's conventionally measured GDP is 
probably somewhat understated for a country at its level of 
development. One crude way of correcting the figure is to 
divide the ICP estimate by 2,2 and where this is done it is 
referred to as the corrected estimate of GNP. However, 
this procedure is dangerous without an explanation for the 
apparently discrepant ICP estimate. One such explanation 
is that consumer prices were artificially lowered in Hungary 
by heavy consumer subsidies when the estimate was made. 
Now that these have been largely removed, the discrepancy 
may well have disappeared, and the next set of calculations 
should be more accurate. 
Graph 1 shows GDP per head of population at constant 
prices for Hungary and the three comparison southern Euro-
pean countries, so scaled that in 1985 their levels correspond 
to the ICP estimates given in Table 1. 
The next set of figures gives data on economic and trade 
structure. Hungary has the same share of industry to GDP 
as Portugal, higher than Greece, and slightly higher than 
Austria and Spain. Graph 2 shows this. One expects this 
share to fall with development, and to be artificially elevated 
in a centrally planned economy which is biased towards 
industry and away from parts of the service sector such as 
retailing. Consequently, Hungary's industrial structure is not 
unusually high, and would probably fall upon liberalization 
with the expansion of the retailing and other service sectors. 
To the extent that labour will have to move out of unprofit-
able industries, there might even be scope for increasing 
employment in other industries, as well as the service sector. 
What is striking about Hungary is the high ratio of the 
production of machinery and transport equipment to total 
manufacturing compared to all other comparator countries, 
illustrated in Graph 3. It might be that this is large because 
Hungary has a natural comparative advantage here, or be-
cause it has been unduly protected. If the latter is the case, 
then the degree of restructuring required could be large. One 
would like to know whether these are industries which might 
form partnerships with Western firms that could revitalize 
the industries and take advantage of the resources already 
deployed, or whether they would be rapidly bankrupted 
once trade is fully liberalized. 
The trade stucture data is central and revealing. Had the 
share of exports to GNP been low, then, liberalization might 
have a dramatic effect on the ability of the country to service 
its debt and the extent to which the domestic economy might 
need to re-orient and restructure. What comes as a surprise 
to the standard view of the centrally planned countries as 
inward looking and autarkic is the high ratio of trade to 
GDP of 38% for Hungary—higher than any country in 
the set except Belgium. One explanation is that GDP is 
understated, and if the ratio of ICP to properly measured 
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Table 1 
Comparative data, 1987 
ICP GDP per capita (1985) index 
ICP GDP per capita (1985) USD 
Population (1000) 
GNP per capita USD 
Ratio ICP/GNP 
Services/GDP 
Industry/GDP 
Machinery/manufacturing 
Urbanization 
Exports goods, NFS/GDP 
Manufacturing/exports 
Machinery and transport equipment/ 
exports 
Long­term debt/GNP 
Source: World Bank World Development Report 1989. 
Hungary 
31,2 
5 780 
10,6 
2 240 
2,58 
44 
40 
37 
59 
38 
71 
34 
64 
Portugal 
33,8 
6 260 
10,2 
2 830 
2,21 
Greece 
35,5 
6 580 
10,0 
4 020 
1,64 
Yugoslavia 
29,2 
6 410 
23,4 
2 480 
2,18 
Economic structure (%) 
51 
40 
16 
32 
56 
29 
14 
61 
Trade structure 
34 
80 
16 
45 
21 
54 
3 
40 
45 
43 
25 
48 
24 
78 
30 
32 
Spain 
46,0 
8 520 
38,8 
6 010 
1,42 
57 
37 
22 
77 
20 
71 
31 
Belgium 
64,7 
12 000 
9,9 
11 480 
1,04 
67 
31 
23 
97 
63 
81 
27 
Austria 
66,1 
12 250 
7,6 
11 980 
1,02 
60 
37 
25 
57 
21 
87 
33 
H 2 : Structure of production 
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GRAPH 3: Share of machinery in manufacturing 
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GDP is 2,2 instead of 2,6, then the trade ratio drops to 34%, 
the same as Portugal. An alternative way of looking at the 
figures is to take the share of exports to hard currency 
markets in GDP, which is only half as high at 19%. Hunga-
ry's share of manufactures in exports at 71% is not particu-
larly high, and is the counterpart to its quite large share of 
agricultural goods (22%, compared to 20% for Spain and 
16% for Portugal). If these ratios are not unusual for a 
country of its size and wealth, then the share of machinery 
and transport equipment is high at 34%—almost as high as 
countries like Austria, Italy, France and the United 
Kingdom. Graph 4 illustrates the export structures of the 
various countries. 
The Bank data does not give the commodity composition 
of trade to CMEA and Western countries, but this is avail-
able from Hungarian statistical sources and is reproduced 
in Table 2. The commodity classifications may differ from 
conventional Western accounting, but it is clear that the large 
share of transport equipment and machinery in Hungary's 
exports arise from their dominance in exports to socialist 
and developing countries, as Graph 5 shows. The share of 
total exports going to Western market economies is recorded 
as 31%, and of these exports, only 6% are of machinery, 
etc. Thus the explanation for the surprisingly high share of 
this category is that Hungary is exporting to either protected 
markets (socialist markets) or to markets where lower quality 
and price may not be a disadvantage. This suggests that if 
CMEA trade becomes liberalized and integrated with West-
ern trade, then this sector may experience tough competition. 
According to a Radio Free Europe background report on 
Hungary (No 175 of 18 September 1989) Hungary and 
Russia have signed an agreement that from 1991 their trade 
should take place in US dollars at world prices. The initiative 
for this drastic step appears to have come from Hungary 
which ran a trade surplus of 800 million roubles in the first 
half of 1989. Despite the recognition that Hungary's trade 
with CMEA countries is more profitable at rouble than 
world prices, the feeling is that industrial restructuring is 
being hampered by the ability of firms which are unprofitable 
at world market prices to survive and even prosper by trading 
with CMEA countries. While the long-run consequences of 
this reform are almost certainly likely to be beneficial, the 
short-run impact on trade, the budget and unemployment 
may be serious. Given that the USSR may well benefit in 
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the short run, they may be willing to provide compensating 
transfers or loans during the transitional period. 
Table 2 shows that over half Hungary's exports went to 
socialist countries in 1985. By 1988 the share had fallen by 
eight percentage points, and the share of trade to developed 
market economies had increased by one-third from 30% to 
40%. This ability to reorient the pattern of exports is, on 
the face of it, reassuring, given the heavy dependence of 
some industrial sectors on exports to CMEA countries. What 
is not clear is how far the change in proportions reflects 
relative exchange rate movements, and how far they reveal 
a real change in trade orientation. 
The last two lines of Table 1 give estimates of the debt 
burden and show Hungary to be a significantly more in-
debted relative to GDP than Portugal and Greece. Even 
correcting for a possible underestimate of GNP only reduces 
the ratio of long debt to GNP to 54%, which is still high. 
At a real rate of interest of 5%, Hungary must run a surplus 
of 3% of GNP on trade just to maintain interest payments, 
without reducing the real value of the debt. The Unece 
documents give alternative measures of the degree of indebt-
edness for 1988. They show gross debt as USD 17,3 billion 
and net debt (to BIS reporting banks) to be USD 16,1 
billion, and allowing for all assets, foreign exchange, gold 
reserves, and trade credits as USD 11,1 billion. The ratio of 
net debt (to BIS banks) to receipts from exports and invis-
ibles to (hard-currency) market economies is 217% in 1988, 
down from about 240% in each of the previous two years. 
Again, if one takes a real rate of return of 5%, then this 
implies a hard-currency trade surplus of over 10% or about 
USD 600 million of hard-currency exports for the real value 
of debt not to increase. Graph 6 illustrates the trend over 
time of the hard-currency debt. 
It is instructive to compare Hungary with the southern EC 
countries of Portugal, Greece, and, to a lesser extent Spain, 
not only because of similarities in level of development, but 
also because of some similarities in their economic mechan-
isms. Greece in particular has been described by Katseli, 
1989, as a 'State corporatist' economy with many of the 
same features as a State socialist economy like Hungary. 
The larger enterprises face a soft budget constraint in that 
they can negotiate soft loans, protection, favourable subsid-
ies and tax treatment, while the small firms run by individ-
uals inhabit the other sector in a dual economy with little 
access to capital and subsidies. The government is anxious 
to increase employment (much of which is disguised unem-
ployment) in the State sector, thereby creating labour market 
rigidities, though not to the same extent of creating overfull 
employment as in State socialist economies. 
The private, dual, or informal sector in Greece is relatively 
more important than the private sector in Hungary, but the 
parallels are close enough to make it clear that it is not 
sufficient to move to an apparently private enterprise market 
economy in order to eliminate the rigidities and deep-seated 
dependencies with their associated lack of incentives—it is 
necessary to create a climate of competition. 
1. Long-term growth prospects and constraints 
Hungary has experienced sluggish growth for most of the 
1980s, and as a result its debt burden has risen relative to 
GNP. There is no doubt that further borrowing and more 
specifically foreign direct investment would be desirable to 
facilitate the reform programme, for reasons discussed more 
fully below. Hungary's ability to convince bankers of its 
Table 2 
Exports by Hungary 
Raw materials, semi-finished products, spare parts 
Machinery, transport equipment, other capital goods 
Industrial consumer goods 
Share of total exports 
going to country group (1988) 
(%) 
Socialist countries 
1985 1988 
23,7 22,5 
i 40,1 47,5 
14,8 16,6 
58,6 50,6 
) (50,6) 
Developed 
capitalist 
countries 
1985 
39,0 
5,8 
18,0 
30,8 
(40,5) 
Developing 
countries 
1985 
40,2 
33,3 
8,4 
10,6 
(8,9) 
Non-socialist 
countries 
1988 
46,3 
12,5 
15,5 
49,4 
(49,4) 
Source: Statistical Yearbook I9SS. p. 270; CSO Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
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GRAPH 5 : Exports by market and year 
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creditworthiness therefore critically depends on its ability to 
raise its trend rate of growth significantly, not least as 
equilibrium world real interest rates appear to have moved 
on to a higher plane than in earlier decades. Hungary is 
striking in two respects here—it has a declining work-force, 
and a high participation rate. Graph 7 illustrates this. The 
old Verdoom law relationships, and the more recent growth 
externality literature both suggest that a high rate-of-growth 
of demand, which in turn requires a high rate-of-growth 
of labour supply, will lead to a higher rate-of-growth of 
productivity, and conversely. Hungary, rather like Britain, 
is constrained on two fronts—it must worry about the trade 
deficit induced by high demand growth, and it has little 
apparent surplus labour which can be transferred to the 
dynamic sectors. Many European countries achieved high 
rates of growth either by shifting labour from agriculture, 
or by immigration, and elastic supplies of labour appear to 
have played an important role in enabling sustained high 
rates of growth without running into supply bottlenecks. 
One might argue that the appropriate source of surplus 
labour in Hungary is to be found in the widespread overman-
ning in many sectors. The problem is that the government 
has a natural worry about precipitating wide-scale unem-
ployment, especially during a period of political reform and 
a move to participatory party politics, so that this labour 
may not be so readily released. 
The obvious solution is to attempt to create a pool of surplus, 
available, preferably skilled and mobile labour, while at 
the same time paying an adequate wage/training allowance 
to prevent social unrest. Two recent examples spring to 
mind—that of post-1982 Britain, which achieved high rates-
of-growth of output, employment and productivity starting 
from its deepest post-war recession, and Spain, which, again 
starting from an extraordinarily high level of unemployment 
in the mid-1980s has been able to sustain a rapid growth 
rate. The problem in each case is that of the high social 
cost of the unemployment from which the rapid expansion/ 
recovery is made. One option which might bear more 
thought would be to offer workers who are willing to be 
deployed access for strictly limited periods to work in the 
EC. This might have the dual advantage of providing the 
retraining on the job in a competitive market environment 
and make it sufficiently attractive to relinquish former long-
term employment contracts. This solution would have two 
advantages. First, the ability of enterprises to shed surplus 
labour would enable them to increase their productivity and 
profit, and/or lower prices and compete more effectively on 
the export market. Given the overwhelming need to increase 
exports relative to imports preferably without an inflationary 
series of exchange-rate devaluations, this is an important 
goal in its own right. Secondly, the ability of the economy 
to move to a sustained growth path with a higher growth 
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rate will be enhanced by an elastic supply of labour to the 
dynamic sectors. 
The main problem with domestic unemployment payments 
is the obvious budgetary cost. Put another way, exports 
can only increase relative to imports if consumption or 
investment falls. While there may be some scope for reducing 
investment by increasing the efficiency with which it is allo-
cated, there is a limit to which this is compatible with moving 
to a higher rate of growth. So consumption must fall—and 
that means that the unemployed should receive a substan-
tially lower income, or that the employed should suffer a 
fall in real wages. The first is politically costly and socially 
undesirable, the second undermines the attempt to motivate 
workers to become more productive, and, coming after a 
series of such moves, is likely to undermine support for the 
reform process. The huge advantage of exporting unem-
ployed workers is that it avoids these macro-costs at rela-
tively low cost to the countries assisting. The obvious prob-
lem is that the most energetic and entrepreneurial are those 
most likely to take advantage of the option. 
The other alternative is for Western countries to invest 
directly in Hungary and create employment directly while 
alleviating the balance of payments constraint. This has 
some of the desirable properties of exporting workers, but 
it does not facilitate the creation of a pool of mobile labour, 
and might exacerbate the problem of overfull employment. 
2. Soft budget constraints in centrally planned and 
corporatist economies 
Kornai, 1986, has argued that the distinctive features of 
centrally planned economies is the soft budget constraint 
facing enterprises, and perhaps individuals. One interpret-
ation is that this reduces the incentives facing enterprises to 
increase efficiency, for if they make losses, then they will not 
be bankrupted, but will be granted subsidies or loans which 
allow them to continue much as before. Katseli, 1989, has 
argued that the southern EC economies of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain are characterized by State corporatism, under 
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which the favoured enterprises also face a soft budget con-
straint in that these enterprises will be protected from adverse 
shocks. What exactly is this soft budget constraint, why does 
it arise, and how can it be reformed? 
First, note that quoted companies in capitalist economies 
also face a soft budget constraint in that they can reduce 
dividend payments or borrow from banks in adverse circum-
stances. Even if technically bankrupt, a firm may be able to 
persuade a bank to rollover its debt, for the losses of immedi-
ate liquidation may exceed the expected value of continuing 
the operation, even if the bank must write down the firm's 
debt. The fact that enterprises in countries like Hungary, 
Greece and Portugal can continue to borrow when they 
make negative profits is not in itself a defining characteristic 
of the system. 
Another interpretation is that the government cannot com-
mit itself to act toughly in the future and credibly threaten to 
allow the enterprise to fail unless it improves its performance. 
Softness here is equated to always taking past decisions as 
given and attempting to make the best of a bad job from 
here on. The problem here is the lack of a 'normative' or 
legally binding set of rules, and the consequent need to 
consider each case on its merits and engage in bilateral 
bargaining. 
This is, however, still too superficial. One needs to ask what 
the objectives of the players are, and how they have evolved 
rules of conduct, or equilibria in the repeated game. One 
plausible interpretation is that the objecives are to ensure 
full employment output, on the assumption that this will be 
maximal output, most equitably distributed. The implicit 
contract is that full employment will be assured, by ensuring 
the survival of the employing institutions. This is a self-
reinforcing objective, in that if there is little unemployment, 
there is no need for a labour market to reallocate labour. If 
there is no labour market, then it is important to maintain 
the continued existence of the employing institutions. Given 
this, detailed bargaining between the centre and the enter-
prise is required to ensure efficiency, access to resources (for 
investment), and to collect taxes, required to finance other 
enterprises and the whole State apparatus. 
The problem is that such a system removes many of the 
incentives for efficiency. There are few penalties for poor 
performance, and few rewards for good performance. These 
can only be created by allowing bankruptcy, unemployment, 
or success and higher wages. The irony is that once the 
implicit contract for continued employment has been estab-
lished by creating a reputation for not allowing firms to 
become bankrupt, then it becomes hard to change that 
reputation. The problem is that the system has committed 
itself to a different equilibrium than that now desired, not 
that it cannot commit its future actions. 
A refinement of this interpretation is that the control system 
facing enterprises is inherently unpredictable. Firms are sub-
ject to a sophisticated battery of incentives and penalties for 
achieving the plan, not raising wages excessively, etc., but 
these are adjusted each year to maintain balance, full em-
ployment, adequate production of CMEA goods and con-
sumption goods, low inflation, etc. Excess profits are 
recouped, excess wage increases are penalized, often in a 
very progressive fashion. The unpredictability of future con-
straints and incentives, and the high penalties attached to 
an inability to meet physical targets, or the need to hire in 
labour at above average wages, makes for an endemic excess 
supply of labour paid a rather low wage, which gives the 
enterprise the flexibility to meet the expected demands laid 
upon it. The excess labour demand in turn causes the labour 
market to atrophy and reinforces the need for labour hoard-
ing as a defence mechanism against being caught short. The 
low risk of unemployment then lowers the incentive to work 
productively, while the high rate of excess profits' taxation 
reduces the incentives to innovate or adapt. 
The 'State corporatist' economies like Greece are argued to 
have similar rigidities and inefficiencies because the objective 
of minimizing unemployment is met by ensuring labour 
tenure in the State corporatist sector—much of which is in 
fact private enterprise which is granted preferential access 
to subsidized funds, subsidies and other forms of protection 
that are the counterpart to the soft budget constraint of the 
State socialist economies. 
3. The reform programme 
The objective of the reform programme is to improve the 
functioning of the economy by using markets rather than 
central control. It is vital to understand that what is needed 
is competitive pressure coupled with a predictable regulatory 
and fiscal regime, which may be provided by markets under 
certain circumstances, but which are not automatically pro-
vided with the creation of markets and the creation of 
market-oriented institutions. To put it crudely, it would be 
possible for Hungary to move from a State socialist economy 
to monopoly capitalism in short order if the necessity of 
effective competition and freedom from arbitrary govern-
ment intervention were not assured. An alternative, possibly 
less dynamic outcome could be to move to a corporatist 
economy such as Katseli, 1989, has argued Greece approxi-
mates. To take one scenario, if the assets of the enterprises 
are vested in the newly created commercial banks, then huge 
concentrations of power are transferred from ministries and 
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the party to other agents, arguably less numerous and ac-
countable than their predecessors. If the banks are partly 
owned by the enterprises, and in turn are the sole source of 
loan finance, then two serious threats face the economy. 
The banks may have sufficient direct influence over the 
productive economy that they are able to influence monetary 
and fiscal policy to ensure the financial viability and profita-
bility of their enterprises, without the need to restructure 
and reform the firms. Given the small number of banks, the 
fact that each firm is totally dependent on only one bank, 
and the prevailing ethos of cartelization, the banks need not 
fear competition from each other. Given their access to 
funds, and their ability to finance various activities, the 
banks might be tempted to assist various political groups 
who could be counted on to manage the economy and the 
allocation of subsidies, etc. for the benefit of the banks. 
Given that banks are partly owned by enterprises, those 
enterprises might be tempted to use the banks to acquire 
other enterprises and create larger firms—the Chilean exam-
ple stands as an awful warning. 
In short, handing over power to banks from the government 
may well create no new competitive pressures for efficiency, 
but merely remove the constraints on the concentration of 
wealth. Markets can be subverted, and monopolies created, 
either by exploiting privileged access to information (es-
pecially likely in financial markets), or by subverting the 
political process and gaining access to the power to allocate 
subsidies, negotiate tax regimes, and the like. Perpetuating 
an atmosphere of unpredictability accentuates the need to 
obtain access to political power in order to control one's 
destiny, or at least to avert catastrophe, and weakens any 
market signals. Conversely, creating stable expectations 
about future market conditions, at least to the extent that 
they are subject to government intervention, reduces the 
need to divert resources to obtaining political control and 
increases the value of improving efficiency. 
A critical first step in the reform programme was therefore 
the reform of the tax system, large parts of which were 
implemented in January 1988, and continued with additional 
reforms in January 1989. The next section explains why this 
reform was so important as a first step in creating a stable 
economic environment, what problems are likely to be 
encountered during the reform, and what issues remain to 
be dealt with. 
enterprises and other institutions in accordance with their 
needs, and the State budget is regarded as an integral part 
of the annual economic plan. Indirect or turnover taxes 
are not intended to redistribute purchasing power amongst 
consumers, but are a convenient way of raising revenue 
whilst controlling the receipts of individual enterprises. Thus 
prior to the introduction of the new economic mechanism 
in 1968 there were about 2 500 individual turnover tax/ 
subsidy rates, and even after that reform the number 
remained at about 1 000. In addition to these tax and subsidy 
rates on turnover, enterprises were subject to a wide variety 
of transfers, confiscations, levies, or subventions, often nego-
tiated ex-post on a case-by-case basis. In such a system, the 
distinction between different types of taxes and transfers is 
primarily of accounting rather than economic significance, 
and the enterprises effectively operate under a soft budget 
constraint—if they are not efficient enough to meet their 
targets, then they receive the necessary resources to make 
up the shortfall. 
The remnants of this system are still visible, notably in the 
system of fiscal accounting followed by the Hungarians, 
which differs from standard GFS or Western accounting. 
Thus the budget distinguishes taxes by source of origin— 
payments by enterprise-like economic organizations, by the 
population, and by budgetary institutions. In turn, many of 
the enterprise taxes are shown as coming out of profits, 
when their base is quite different—the wage bill, net assets, 
investment expenditure, etc. and not necessarily net profit. 
The logic appears to be that because they constitute a claim 
on the surplus of the enterprise they are thus to be treated as 
taxes on (i.e. paid out of) profits. In the statistical yearbook 
indirect taxes on enterprises include as one of their major 
items the social security contributions paid by the enterprise, 
which under no stretch of the imagination can be thought 
of as a conventional indirect tax. 
In a centrally planned economy, taxes are not used to redis-
tribute income. Individuals receive wages at rates deemed 
appropriate for their needs, and a large fraction of their 
needs are met by direct provision (free education, health, 
etc.) or at subsidized, below market-clearing rates (housing) 
by direct allocation. In such a system income taxes on 
individuals are not needed, since their take-home pay is 
controlled. This continued to be the case in the reformed 
market socialism of post-1968 Hungary. 
4. The role of taxes in a semi-command economy 
In a centrally planned economy enterprises are instructed 
what to produce and in what lines to invest. The tax system 
is primarily a mechanism for reallocating revenues to the 
The plan thus fulfils the allocative and distributional roles 
played by the market and the tax system in a capitalist 
economy, and the plan allocation is the benchmark against 
which the outcome is to be judged. Contrast this with West-
ern thinking which argues that the competitive market will 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources, but is unlikely 
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to achieve a just distribution of income, nor is it likely to 
provide an adequate supply of public (or collective) goods 
such as defence, environmental services, and the like. The 
benchmark is thus taken as the competitive market allo-
cation (more accurately, as the efficient allocation which 
such an ideal market would achieve), and taxes are judged 
by the efficiency with which they achieve their objectives. 
Taxes create distortions, and the fall in the value of the 
output compared with the undistorted equilibrium is a meas-
ure of the cost of raising revenue—and is usually termed the 
deadweight cost of the tax, or the excess burden. Taxes are 
justified if the value of the revenue raised is greater than the 
cost of raising the revenue, including this extra deadweight 
cost. The revenue may be required to pay for infrastructure 
or other public or non-marketed goods, or to transfer income 
to poorer or more deserving recipients. In a planned econ-
omy a tax is judged by the success with which it steers 
decisions towards those planned. In a market economy a tax 
is usually judged by the extent to which it is a costly way of 
raising revenue (to be used for a whole variety of purposes), 
though some taxes are specifically designed to correct a 
market failure—such as the damage caused by lead in petrol, 
for example. 
Current economic analysis emphasizes the desirability of 
aiming at efficiency in production, confining the inevitable 
distortions to the consumption side of the economy as far 
as possible. Provided that firms in the economy are competi-
tive and are exposed to foreign competition, this will be 
achieved by taxes which are neutral to firms, such as value-
added taxes and (properly designed) profit taxes. The main 
emphasis is then placed on income taxes and commodity 
taxes designed to raise the required amount of revenue for 
public expenditure and redistributive transfers, whilst best 
meeting distributional objectives. Taxes and expenditures 
are then adjusted in the budget primarily to achieve macro-
economic stability and to adjust the tax structure where 
improvements are identified. 
One other important difference between a socialist economy 
and a capitalist economy should be noted as it affects the 
interpretation of the tax system. In a socialist society the 
entreprises are State owned, and therefore in some sense 
collectively owned by the whole society. In a capitalist econ-
omy firms are owned by individuals, either directly or more 
usually as shareholders. These shareholders are entitled to 
the profits of the firm, and receive a dividend, leaving the 
balance to be retained and reinvested. The counterpart to 
the dividend in a socialist economy would be the amounts 
transferred, either by taxes or direct transfers, to the central 
government. In mixed economies the State may own enter-
prises (and typically does own utilities). In the United 
Kingdom, all firms are subject to corporation tax on profits, 
but State-owned enterprises are required to make additional 
transfers to the Treasury, which are equivalent to dividends. 
These are typically specified as a required rate of return 
(RRR) on the current cost replacement value of assets, 
and are intended to encourage the enterprises to earn an 
appropriate return on their investments. The actual transfer 
to the Treasury is determined by the amount of finance 
required for investment which is deducted from the RRR to 
give the external financial limit (EFL). This corresponds 
closely to the notion of a dividend paid by a private limited 
company, which is equal to earnings less retentions for 
further investment. 
If the government decides to increase the autonomy of these 
enterprises, it normally does so by privatizing them. When 
the government takes the decision to privatize an enterprise, 
it must choose the appropriate balance between equity and 
debt finance for the assets, and the equity is then sold to the 
private sector. In so doing it recoups the value of its owner-
ship claim in the form of the sales receipts, and these replace 
the flow of dividends which otherwise would have been 
received by the Treasury. The government then ceases to 
have a claim on the returns to these assets, and the RRR 
and EFL are replaced by their private sector equivalents of 
the rate of profit (earnings to net asset value) and the 
dividend. 
If a socialist economy such as Hungary decides to move 
to a mixed economy in which private enterprises can be 
established and co-exist with State-owned enterprises (SOE), 
then it needs to clarify the nature of its claim on the assets 
of the SOE, both to ensure consistency in tax treatment and 
to guide any transfers of assets from the government. The 
situation in 1987 was that SO Es were subject to a 3% wealth 
tax on net asset value (at historic cost). Some Hungarian 
economists argue that logically this is best seen as the State's 
claim on those assets—the equivalent of the RRR in the 
UK. An alternative view is that some part of the old profit 
tax represents the State's claim. It is of course vital to clarify 
the nature of State claims on the returns to the assets if 
equitable tax treatment of State-owned and private enter-
prises is to be achieved, and if the integrity of the budget is 
to be preserved. Some of these issues will be addressed below 
in the discussion of property rights and control over assets. 
5. The tax system during the transition to a 
market-guided economy 
Since 1968 the Hungarian economy has been engaged upon 
a major reform of the economic system (or mechanism), the 
main feature of which is to shift away from central planning 
to a more decentralized form of market socialism, in which 
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market prices play a more important role in allocating goods 
and services. This immediately raises the question of the 
proper role of tax system, or equivalently, of the benchmark 
against which the performance or the economy is to be 
judged. Is the benchmark the plan, with its emphasis primar-
ily on production, or is it the market, with the emphasis on 
what the system is able to deliver to final consumers? The 
answer seems to be that Hungary is in a process of transition 
from the first to the second. Until the early 1980s, the 
Hungarian approach appeared to take the plan as the bench-
mark,1 and taxes together with subsidies were designed first 
to achieve the necessary financing, and second to provide 
incentives for achieving the plan objectives (or to offset 
adverse incentives which might encourage departures from 
these objectives). 
The resulting tax system reflected an uneasy balance between 
two conflicting forces—the old system of taxes as a system 
of financial allocation, and the more recent recognition that 
taxes (and prices) provide incentives which need to be made 
consistent with the objectives of the government. One exam-
ple of this tension is the role played by differential pro-
duction taxes. Under the old system, enterprises were restric-
ted to their line of activity under their founding charter 
(profile restrictions). Different sectors of the economy were 
subject to different tax schedules (for wages tax, social secur-
ity contributions, etc.) and each enterprise belonged unam-
biguously to one or other of these sectors. Since 1982-83 
these restrictions have gradually been eased, and it has thus 
become profitable for an enterprise in a lightly taxed sector 
to engage in activities which would be more heavily taxed 
in its main sector. To achieve equality of tax treatment 
for the same production activity undertaken in different 
enterprises allocated to differing tax regimes, differential 
taxes on the outputs are levied. In a somewhat similar vein 
(and classified under the same set of tax receipts in the fiscal 
accounts) domestically produced oil and gas, which are 
priced in Hungary at world market prices (in principle, 
for producers), are taxed so that the net price received is 
appropriate, given domestic production costs.2 
A somewhat similar system of corrective taxes is used for 
CMEA exports and imports, where the prevailing CMEA 
prices provide misleading signals to the enterprises viewed 
from the perspective of the plan objectives. The taxation of 
CMEA trade is designed to direct or encourage the enter-
prises to engage in trade to the extent that it is deemed 
profitable to the Hungarian economy by the CPO. The 
problem here is that CMEA prices bear little relationship to 
current world prices (i.e. prices obtaining on convertible 
currency markets), and little relationship to costs or oppor-
tunity costs. At the present exchange rate of the forint 
against the rouble it is necessary to subsidize some (but not 
all) exports and to tax imports. The guiding principle is that 
enterprises trading with the CMEA should be no worse or 
better off than if they had bought or sold on the domestic 
or hard-currency market, though they are given mild incen-
tives to strike an advantageous bargain with their CMEA 
partners. The natural question to ask is why the government 
does not set the forint/rouble rate at a market clearing 
level, whilst leaving the enterprises free to strike the most 
advantageous bargains. Briefly, the answer is that those 
goods which are comparatively advantageous for Hungary 
to buy are rationed (being 'hard' goods in the eyes of the 
other CMEA exporters), and hence carry a shadow price 
which the CPO presumably believes is effectively the differ-
ence between the nominal price and the world price. (The 
principle is that domestic prices are linked to world prices 
for traded goods). The goods which the CMEA partners 
wish to buy in return are similarly 'hard' and underpriced 
(at the current exchange rate), so that enterprises need to be 
compensated to be willing to sell them. The claim is that 
the current exchange rate represents the best compromise 
between a market clearing rate and that rate which minimizes 
the incentives for enterprises to manipulate the terms of 
trade, since the CPO is dependent on the enterprises for 
much of the information needed to establish the appropriate 
level of subsidy. 
5.1. Enterprise taxation 
Actually, not all items in the plan had equal status—some targets were 
'harder' and others 'softer' or less essential. As a rough approximation, 
CMEA trade was predetermined by treaty obligations, consumption was 
stabilized while investment and hard-currency foreign trade were allowed 
to absorb fluctuations. Taxes were adjusted with a view to achieving the 
harder targets with less concern over these balancing items. 
This last example demonstrates the potential inefficiency involved in this 
system of taxes. On theoretical grounds a rent tax or profits tax would 
be superior to an output tax or royalty, though it has to be admitted 
that many Western governments nevertheless adopt the same approach. 
Similarly, one would suspect that corrective output taxes on 'non-profile 
activities' would similarly introduce distortions between enterprises in 
different sectors. Although nominally it might appear that different 
enterprises were paying similar amounts of tax, the incentive effects could 
be rather different. 
The remnants of the old plan-based system of enterprise 
taxation survived during the early stages of the reform pro-
cess in the differing tax treatments of different sectors. More 
to the point, they continue to survive through the system of 
transfers and subsidies, and access to borrowing. Here it is 
worth noting that there appears to be an inverse relationship 
between company size and profitability. Balassa, 1986 notes 
that during the 1981-84 period, the State provided 24% of 
investment funds for low profitability firms, which had an 
average profit rate of 1,2%, whilst providing only 4% of 
investment funds of high profitability firms, which had an 
average profit rate of 16,3%. As a result the rate of invest-
ment by the two groups of firms was almost the same, despite 
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the large differences in their ability to finance investment out 
of their own resources. This suggests that funds are allocated 
on other than grounds of strict profitability. 
An analysis of the relationship between the gross rate of 
return on net assets (at historic cost) and the proportion of 
gross investment financed by borrowing for 1985 at the 
branch level shows a very low correlation (though it must 
also be said that there is no apparent relationship between 
the ratio of net taxes actually paid to tax liability and the 
borrowing share, so that it cannot be maintained that taxes 
and borrowing are being coordinated to achieve a target 
rate of investment). 
It is clear that the Hungarians are aware of this tension 
between the desire to control from the centre and the recog-
nition that the plan office lacks the detailed information 
required for this centralization to be effective. The spirit of 
the new economic mechanism is to allow decisions to be 
taken at the level of availability of the relevant information, 
most of which is supplied by the market directly to the 
participants. This implies in turn that taxes on enterprises 
should be uniformly applied (or 'normative', as opposed to 
discretionary, in the Hungarian vocabulary). Discretionary 
taxes reintroduce the element of bargaining between centre 
and enterprise, or require the planners to have access to 
specialized information which is largely controlled by the 
enterprise, and hence fall foul of the same problems which 
prompted the move away from centralized planning in the 
first place. Once central direction is relaxed, and enterprises 
are free to respond to market signals, then it becomes more 
important to ensure that the tax system provides consistent 
signals, provides appropriate incentives, and does not intro-
duce costly distortions. Much of the impetus behind the tax 
reform consists of choosing the basis on which to levy taxes 
more carefully to encourage efficiency in resource use, since 
decisions over resource allocation are to be left in the hands 
of the enterprise management. 
5.2. Economic stabilization 
Under planned economy the budget was effectively sub-
sumed into the plan, and the incomes of the enterprises, the 
individuals, and the government were all determined. As 
enterprises have increasing autonomy to set prices and 
wages, so the levels of incomes and prices cease to be so 
tightly controlled by the government. The increasing access 
to foreign trade leaves the balance of payments more vulner-
able to changes in terms of trade and comparative advantage, 
and increasingly the government must draw up its annual 
budget with a view to achieving a desired level of aggregate 
demand and balance of trade. The prime instruments for 
both tasks are now taxes. 
Aggregate demand has in the past been restrained by reduc-
ing investment, and the instrument for this purpose was the 
accumulation tax, typically at rates of between 15% and 
18% on gross investment. With greater autonomy firms have 
tended to increase wages, and hence to increase consumption 
and prices. The instrument used to restrain wages was a 
complex system of earnings regulation, which penalizes firms 
for granting excessive wage increases. This system of wage 
taxation appears to be still in place and provides yet another 
unpredictable or negotiated component of the tax system. It 
reflects a tension which will be discussed further below 
between the aim of moving to a normative system and the 
need felt to compensate for market failures which assert 
themselves more forcefully with the move to a market-guided 
economy. 
The problem of achieving fiscal balance may have been 
aggravated by the reform. Under the old system, profits 
were retrospectively taxed (or clawed back) and thus became 
available for reallocation to finance new investment. Firms 
were not left with discretionary balances, and there was a 
tight match between the overall surplus generated and the 
finance of new investment. Under a normative system of 
taxes this close link is severed. Profitable firms may choose 
to accumulate financial reserves, or may borrow to invest in 
excess of their current earmings. Unprofitable firms may 
seek subventions, access to loans, or other means to avoid 
bankruptcy. If the government feels forced to continue to 
subsidize such firms (in forms which are now explicit whereas 
previously they amounted to cross-subsidization within the 
enterprise sector), but no longer have the power to transfer 
the profits of the profitable enterprises, then there is a danger 
either of running a deficit or of having to increase taxes on 
consumers or workers. In the medium run this is inevitable 
given the desire to shift the balance of taxation away from 
production and towards consumption or away from enter-
prises and towards workers and consumers, but in the short 
run it may make fiscal management more difficult. It also 
highlights the need to clarify the nature of the various 
government claims on the profits of enterprises, so that 
the reduction of profits taxation does not simultaneously 
liquidate the legitimate claims of the State to the returns on 
its owned assets. 
5.3. Constraints impeding the move to a market economy 
A centrally planned economy is conventionally argued to 
require a high degree of industrial concentration, to facilitate 
the task of coordination and to reduce the amount of infor-
mation that needs to flow from the enterprise to the centre 
and vice versa. A market economy requires a high degree of 
competition if it is to work efficiently, and this is normally 
understood to require a lower degree of industrial concen-
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tration.1 More to the point, it requires enterprises producing 
the same goods to act competitively, not collusively, in 
determining the price and quality of the goods. Graph 8 
contrasts the size distribution of firms in market economies 
and the two socialist economies of Hungary and Yugoslavia. 
The overwhelming dominance of the largest size group in 
Hungary is striking as is the virtual absence of small firms, 
in contrast to market economies. 
The major problem facing the Hungarian reformers in their 
move from a centrally planned economy to a market econ-
omy is to reduce the degree of industrial concentration, 
increase the extent to which firms compete with each other, 
and to erode the tacit collusion and cooperation that are 
likely to have developed during the process of central plan-
ning and coordination. It will always be desirable to the 
firms to collude rather than compete, and in capitalist econ-
omies this continual drive towards monopolization, cartel-
ization, and tacit or explicit agreements has constantly to be 
resisted by exposing the firms to international competition 
(which is more resistant to collusive behaviour) or subjecting 
them to anti-trust legislation. The Hungarian reformers in-
herited a highly concentrated industrial structure with a 
relatively small number of large enterprises. Few of these 
have been broken up into competing units—to the extent 
that they have been broken up, it has usually been along 
functional or product lines, so that the number of competi-
tors within any one product line has not been increased. 
In the fewer cases (mainly in light manufacturing) where 
enterprises have been subdivided into potentially competing 
units, they have often set up joint marketing arrangements 
which will facilitate collusion and essentially allow the old 
system of organization to continue. This makes the proposed 
law on competition, which is to be introduced in 1990, 
of great importance. The proposal involves setting up a 
competition office to regulate abuses of market power. Given 
the growing expertise that the Commission is acquiring in 
this area, there is an obvious role for technical assistance 
and guidance in this area. 
It is not clear how low a degree of concentration is optimal, especially 
given the potential importance of scale economies in an economy of 
modest size like Hungary. It can be argued that duopoly in the presence of 
significant economies of scale (or opportunities for 'learning-by-doing') is 
potentially more competitive than lower degrees of concentration. Per-
haps the best example is Japan where MITI has been anxious to create 
a small number of large enterprises which compete vigorously both 
domestically and abroad. Germany appears to follow a similar policy. 
What is clear is that the step from monopoly or a collusive cartel to a 
competitive duopoly is the most significant step in introducing competi-
tive pressure (provided the duopoly does not collude). Collusion is 
probably best weakened by facilitating domestic entry and foreign compe-
tition. 
The most obvious alternative method of increasing the de-
gree of competition if the number of competing firms cannot 
be increased by fragmentation is to open the economy to 
international competition, but this immediately runs into the 
difficulty that the balance of payments is precarious. Large 
increase in imports would be damaging, whilst the size of 
the devaluation required to equilibrate trade is both un-
known, and likely to be large enough to cause serious adjust-
ment and inflationary problems. Not surprisingly, the Hun-
garians wish to proceed cautiously in liberalizing imports. 
To the extent that they are encouraged to liberalize imports, 
they will reasonably ask that they be able to subsidize (as 
an alternative to protection) firms which are adversely affec-
ted by trade. There is evidence that exports continue to be 
subsidized, though as this is in violation of the GATT, 
such subsidies are kept secret. Given that firms know that 
subsidies are still being used to reward various activities, 
their trust in relying on the market is again subverted and 
trade liberalization is weakened. For example, devaluations 
are likely to have a quite different effect, and may well be 
purely inflationary without achieving any supply response. 
The reason is simple. If firms know that their exports will 
be subsidized to ensure adequate profitability, a devaluation 
which makes exports more profitable can be expected to be 
matched by a corresponding withdrawal of subsidies, so the 
firm will not make any increased profits. Certainly one 
should be rather wary of simplistic I MF-type advocacy for 
devaluation in such an environment without adequate con-
trol over subsidies. 
There is a perfectly legitimate case for delaying the bank-
ruptcy of firms which can be successfully restructured by 
providing subsidies under the guise of adjustment assistance 
or the like. Of course, it may be hard to distinguish that 
case from the old protectionist argument that firms and their 
employees should survive no matter what. The solution is to 
allow the restructuring to be financed by banks or industrial 
finance corporations, who would assume ownership of the 
assets of firms in difficulties. There are two problems with 
this solution. One is to place a satisfactory residual value on 
the break-up value of the assets which represents the State's 
legitimate claim on the enterprise's assets. Without this, 
there is a danger that assets could be effectively transferred 
to private ownership at knockdown values by simulating 
financial difficulties. This fear is particularly serious given 
the oligopolistic nature of the banking system, and their very 
substantial power over the policy process. One envisages an 
unholy alliance between, say, the firm in difficulties, the 
bank, and a potential foreign buyer, whose end result is 
to transfer assets accumulated effectively created from the 
taxation of the population to a small number of beneficiaries. 
The other problem is that enterprises in difficulties are likely 
to be riskier portfolio investments for banks than the aver-
age, and without adequate provisions, might create severe 
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difficulties for the banking sector—especially one that is not 
highly developed or experienced. Again this may have the 
adverse effect that the central bank is blackmailed into 
rescuing the financial system, and is thus subverted from its 
controlling role. 
Meanwhile the enterprises are not adequately constrained 
by market forces in setting their prices (or wages) and need 
to be subject to price controls. Price and wage controls 
potentially conflict with taxes, and certainly complicate the 
analysis of how the taxes will in fact work. To a very 
considerable extent the tax reforms should be judged by 
the extent to which they create a satisfactory long-term 
environment in which the economy would be able to operate 
satisfactorily once the problems of market concentration 
and price control have been overcome. They may also allevi-
ate some of the short-term adverse effects of the present 
system, but it would be a mistake to see the tax reform 
as restructuring the economy so that it can operate in a 
decentralized way with minimal government intervention. 
For that, major industrial and trade liberalization will be 
needed, together with a major reorganization of the labour 
market. 
6. The logic of recent tax changes 
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, the 1988 
and 1989 tax reforms together constitute one, admittedly 
important, step in the overall economic reform process which 
has been under way since the early 1980s. As the economy 
becomes more decentralized, less subject to detailed central 
planning, and more subject to market forces, so the thrust 
has been to confront different organizations and individuals 
with a unified tax system, rather than with a set of taxes 
which is determined by the form of organization or sector 
of main operation. As has also been pointed out, the tran-
sition from a centrally planned to a decentralized market 
economy is fraught with difficulties, produced by the concen-
trated economic structure, by the unfamiliarity of managers 
and workers with the market system, and by the resistance 
of those groups whose power derived from the former system 
of central control. There is a tension between the objective 
of moving to an impersonal market system characterized by 
universal taxes, and the desire to retain some form of central 
guidance at the sectoral level by the use of discriminatory 
taxes. A charitable interpretation would be that the planners 
are aware of imbalances and market failures in the tran-
sitional stages which will require corrective taxes. Indeed, 
there seems to be a tradition of designing a set of sectorially 
specific taxes as part of the overall plan, and then devising 
a corresponding set of corrective taxes to offset the more 
obvious distorting features of these taxes. Many of the taxes 
on production can be seen in this light. 
The first guiding principle has been to unify the tax treatment 
of different branches of the economy, to make taxes univer-
sal in application, or 'normative' in Hungarian parlance. It 
seems to be the case that firms do not bargain over tax 
liabilities, so much as over which taxes they are subject to, 
and whether they are eligible for various subsidies. For 
example, enterprises can argue to be placed in a less rigorous 
earnings scheme, in which they may be liable for a reduced 
total tax bill. The budget constraint facing firms remains 
'soft', because there is so much scope for bargaining over 
transfers, subsidies, subventions, and the writing-off of past 
debts (which may have arisen because of tax liabilities). 
The second principle has been that labour has in the past 
appeared too cheap to enterprises, as it did not reflect the 
high cost to the government of providing the social income. 
One aspect of this was the excess demand for labour, the 
tightness of the labour market, and the reluctance of firms 
to reduce overmanning, given that labour costs could be 
recouped in the cost-based prices charged. As a counterpart 
capital was relatively heavily taxed, though it should be 
borne in mind that at least part of this tax on profits or 
capital could properly be seen as the dividend to society for 
the provision of the capital. Certainly it is reasonable to see 
the wealth tax of 3 % on net assets in this light. 
The resolution of this potential conflict has been to move 
towards the uniform tax treatment of different enterprises 
and individuals, whilst retaining the system of subsidies, 
subventions, transfers and the like to offset the undesired 
consequences of the uniformity of tax treatment during 
the transition process. The eventual success of the reform 
programme will be judged by how far the special treatment of 
ailing enterprises via subsidies and bail-outs can be limited, 
thereby hardening the 'soft' budget constraint that firms 
currently face. The success of the tax reform cannot therefore 
be judged independently of movements towards reducing 
the discretionary element in other transfers and concessions. 
What is encouraging is that the initial reforms introduced 
on 1 January 1988 have been succeeded by a second set of 
returns introduced on 1 January 1989 and which make 
further steps towards a unified system of taxes. The reform 
programme is not yet complete, but the agenda appears to 
contain most items which need further change or study. 
Another important argument for the tax reform is the at-
tempt to create stable, statutory tax structures, and to div-
orce the fiscal process from its past associations of arbitrari-
ness, instability, and negotiability. The success of both taxes 
will depend in considerable measure upon the compliance 
of the population, and this will in turn require them to have 
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confidence in the equity, impartiality and certainty of the 
new taxes. 
6.1. The income tax 
Under the old system of taxation not only did the various 
taxes have multiple and often conflicting aims, but there 
were a multiplicity of taxes on similar bases, so that the 
resulting tax structure was both complex and inequitable. 
The new personal income tax (PIT) was introduced in 1988 
and further modified in 1989. It has the following features. 
The base will be individual earnings form work of all forms, 
though interest income will be taxed at a flat schedular rate 
(currently 20%) and the tax withheld at source to preserve 
the confidentiality of bank accounts. In the event the income 
raised from this tax in the first year exceeded estimates by 
6%. The top marginal rate in 1988 was 60%, cut to 56% 
in 1989. In addition to the PIT, a rather complex system of 
taxing individually-owned enterprises under an entreprene-
urial tax was introduced in 1988 for one year as a transitional 
step towards a uniform treatment of enterprises. 
The major change in 1989 was the replacement of the various 
profit and sector-specific taxes with a single corporate in-
come tax (CIT). This replaces among other taxes the entre-
preneurial tax. The rate is 50 % on profits exceeding 3 million 
forints (about USD 50 000), and 40% on profits below this 
limit, with a surtax of 4% in 1989. A number of exemptions 
and allowances reduce the average rate to 44%. Under 
certain conditions foreign joint ventures receive a tax holiday 
for five years and are taxed on 40 % of profits thereafter. 
Compared with PITs in other countries, several features of 
the Hungarian proposal stand out. First, it is not strictly a 
global income tax, as interest income is subject to a schedular 
rate. This is not necessarily a strong objection, since the 
present system avoids the problems faced by the high mar-
ginal tax rates on nominal interest income which bedevil 
global income taxes during periods of inflation. If it is 
thought desirable that the real after-tax interest rate should 
be say, 3 %, and if the rate of inflation is a modest 7 %, then 
the after-tax nominal interest rate must be 10%. If marginal 
tax rates are 60 % for higher income earners (who might be 
expected to do the bulk of private saving), then to achieve 
this the bef ore-tax nominal rate must be 25 %, or 18 % real 
— an unreasonably high rate for enterprises to pay. On the 
other hand, if enterprises borrow at 5% real, i.e. 12% 
nominal, then the after-tax interest rate payable to such 
people will be 4,8 % nominal, — 2,2 % real, which might be 
thought rather unsatisfactory. Of course, these problems 
could be avoided by indexing, though few countries have 
actually chosen this route. Instead, most Western countries 
have introduced a plethora of tax-exempt or preferentially-
treated savings schemes, which is almost certainly worse 
than taxing all interest income at the same schedular rate. 
(The great advantage of the schedular rate is that it could 
in principle be adjusted each year in line with expected 
inflation, to yield the same tax revenue per forint of savings. 
Alternatively, it might prove simpler to make the tax a tax 
on the average value of the deposit. A wealth tax of this sort 
might encounter problems if shares become an important 
form of wealth, as it might be difficult to value them. The 
obvious solution would be to tax the dividend at a schedular 
rate, since the capital value and the dividends would be 
effectively indexed already.) 
Second, the treatment of income from farming, artistic and 
sporting activities has more than generous implicit allow-
ances for costs, so that effectively such income is less heavily 
taxed than other forms of income. One suspects that es-
pecially with farming that the solution represents a compro-
mise designed to avoid alienating a large fraction of the 
population, since at the moment farmers effectively pay no 
taxes on their household plots. The government appears to 
be aware that they are an important component of domestic 
food supply, accounting for up to half the total production 
of poultry and livestock, and is concerned that the gradual 
ageing of the farm population may make this work less 
attractive unless it is given preferential tax treatment. Cer-
tainly the present system is likely to encourage the present 
dual pattern of agriculture, in which farm workers work 
both on State farms or State cooperatives, and on their own 
plots, for aggregating the true income and taxing it globally 
would probably make part-time farming on the household 
plot relatively less attractive. The present system tends to 
keep rural-urban migration low and to that extent it reduces 
pressure on urban accommodation (whilst at the same time 
reducing the flow of potential urban workers). It is certainly 
not immediately obvious that a more equitable or uniform 
treatment of farm and non-farm income would lead to 
desirable structural changes, and though the subject is obvi-
ously worth closer study, politically it seems most unlikely 
that farmers will lose their tax privileges. ' 
Finally, the Hungarians have, possibly for reasons of admin-
istrative simplicity, opted for a system of individual rather 
than family-based income taxes. The main problem with this 
is that families in which one partner looks after the children, 
and the other takes on an extra job to replace the lost 
earnings, will be subject to heavier taxation than two earners 
who together earn the same total. The Hungarian response 
is that such matters are best dealt with through the system 
of family allowances, crèches, and kindergartens. Cynics 
might argue that the effect will be to discourage private 
1 And Western societies are hardly models of virtue in the rational treat-
ment of agriculture, for similar political reasons. 
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enterprise, much of which is conducted as a secondary source 
of income, and which has been one of the few dynamic 
features of Hungarian economic performance over the past 
few years. 
7. Initial impacts of the tax reform 
The impacts and comparisons between planned and out-
turn receipts are available from the IMF, and are largely 
unsurprising. The main distributional impacts were expected 
to fall on incomes earned outside the enterprise sector, 
especially for second incomes earned by those whose main 
source of income is the enterprise sector. Individuals who 
earn all their income outside the enterprise sector are already 
subject to an individual income tax, and for these persons 
there should have been no great change. For rural workers 
operating household plots it seems unlikely that there would 
be much change, since the proposed treatment of agricultural 
income was at least as generous as the old system, except 
that it is now taxed (if it is taxed at all) at marginal tax rates 
determined by the main source of income. It is possible that 
some subset of the 50 000 farmers formerly subject to tax 
on their household plots or auxiliary farms may pay some-
what more in tax, though these are likely to earn above-
average real income. 
The impact of the tax reform on secondary incomes was 
expected to be two-fold. First, the income will be taxed at 
marginal rates determined by the first income, rather than 
being taxed at a schedular rate. This is likely to be at a 
higher rate of tax for those of above-average total income, 
and in this sense the tax reform will be progressive, and 
more equitable as between those whose income is derived 
solely within an enterprise, and those with multiple sources 
of income. As such it may provide greater relative rewards 
to managers, on the assumption that managers are less well 
placed to take on additional work. The second effect is 
harder to predict, since it will depend on general equilibrium 
responses in the labour market. Only first incomes will be 
grossed up by enterprises, and there is no guarantee that 
the gross income of second incomes will rise enough to 
compensate for the additional tax (especially at the higher 
marginal rates). On the other hand, an enterprise with a 
choice between hiring full-time workers and paying the 
grossed-up wage, and employing contract labour (perhaps 
through a VGMK), would be willing to pay a proportion-
ately higher wage to the contract labour. If the worker did 
not change his tax bracket by taking on the extra VGMK 
work, and if the enterprise maintained the same relation 
between total unit wage costs in both the VGMK and 
enterprise as before the reform, then the worker would be 
no worse off after the tax reform. In fact, the attractiveness 
of subcontracting may even increase, because workers will 
not need to pay social security contributions on their second 
income. ' It appears that there has been a reduction in the 
contribution of auxiliary economic activities, which include 
VGMKs, from 5,8% in 1987 to 5,5% of GDP in 1988, and 
this may have been due to the tax reform. 
Whether this reflects uncertainties about the operation of 
the tax system, or a lag in making the necessary adjustments 
to gross pay, or a permanent change in the relative attractive-
ness of secondary work, remains unclear. 
8. Possible effects of the tax reform on 
behaviour, incentives and production 
The Hungarians hope that by transferring the tax burden 
from profits to wages, they will encourage firms to econom-
ize on labour and thereby increase labour productivity and 
hence, in a tight labour market, increase output. In addition, 
to the extent that managers and workers are increasingly 
motivated by profits (either directly, through profit-sharing 
bonuses, or indirectly, if the firms issue share certificates) 
they might then work harder. 
Several qualifications to this rather optimistic picture need 
to be made. First, for some firms the cost of labour may go 
down rather than up, so they may have less incentive to 
economize on labour. Second, to the extent that the man-
agers are appointed by the workers or their representatives, 
there may be difficulties in reducing the labour force, and 
in relating bonuses closely to profits earned or to effort 
supplied. Third, if subsidies are adjusted to prevent firms 
going bankrupt, the soft budget constraint will remove any 
necessity to improve productivity. In the short run, the fact 
that prices will continue to be controlled and will of necessity 
have to be based on costs in many cases will tend to reduce 
the incentive effects of the tax reform. Much will therefore 
depend on whether the Hungarians are able to improve on 
their system of price control and competition policy. Finally, 
again as part of the anti-inflation strategy, a fairly draconian 
system of earnings regulation will be required and this will 
penalize the increasing of above-average wage rates, and 
hence of widening differentials and creating more incentives 
to workers. Much will depend not only on whether this 
system can be replaced in the near future, but whether 
managers and workers believe that it will be replaced. 
1 It is not clear whether the VGMK will have to pay social security 
contributions for its employees—if not, then the advantage of subcon-
tracting will be even greater. 
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To repeat a theme that should be familiar, the success of the 
tax reform depends more on the success of other parts of 
the reform programme—on the liquidation of companies, on 
the decentralization of decision-making, on labour mobility, 
and on competition and entry policy. The tax reform is an 
enabling step in this larger programme. 
As far as the possible effect on individuals is concerned, the 
most worrying feature is that to the extent that the more 
dynamic private sector is dependent on second jobs, these 
may be more heavily taxed under the global PIT, and this 
may discourage production. On the other hand, complete 
dependence on private-sector employment should not be 
discouraged (and may be positively encouraged with the 
introduction of limited liability status for individual enter-
prises). To the extent that private firms previously paid 
income tax which other enterprises avoided, they should 
also be placed in a better and more equitable competitive 
position. As far as private agricultural production goes there 
is unlikely to be much effect (at least as a result of the VAT 
and PIT), since there seems to be no prospect of allowing 
large private farms to emerge, and the tax treatment of 
household plots and auxiliary farms will hardly change. 
9. The problems of transition and the possible 
long-term effects of tax reform 
Several of the transitional problems have already been 
mentioned—the need to ensure that prices respond to 
changes in tax burdens, the continuing problem of control-
ling inflationary wage settlements in the more autonomous 
and worker-controlled (or influenced) enterprises, and the 
need to realign the forint/rouble exchange rate (and presum-
ably many of the differential turnover taxes and price equali-
zation subsidies on CMEA trade). 
The likely long-term effects of the tax reform should be more 
favourable than the short-term effects, for structural changes 
take a fair while to work through the system. If the economy 
can successfully close down loss-making enterprises and 
redeploy workers and managers to profitable enterprises, 
then the effects on productivity and output should be very 
favourable, but the experience of Western Europe over the 
past decade suggests that such redeployment is difficult, 
slow, and costly. The new tax structure should be more 
elastic than the old, and to that extent better able to deal 
with short-term fluctuations. The fear is that unemployment 
resulting from increased labour mobility and restructuring 
will have a deflationary impact on the economy whilst the 
increased autonomy and profit motivation of the more suc-
cessful enterprises will generate cost-push inflation, leading 
to problems of stagflation. Whether inflation is likely to be 
more of a problem in the future than in the past does not 
in itself depend on the tax reform, but on the increasing 
decentralization of the economy, on the degree of tightness 
of the labour market, on the mobility of labour (and hence 
on the housing market), and the external environment. 
Nevertheless, inflation will create problems for the PIT, 
unless the brackets are indexed and a satisfactory resolution 
for the interest income tax is found. 
The Hungarians will have at some stage to decide how the 
claims of the State on the capital operated by socialist 
enterprises are to be rewarded. Under the new corporate 
income tax of 1989, all enterprises, whether State or private, 
are taxed on their profits at the same rate. This is equivalent 
to having a capital structure in the State-owned sector of 
zero debt or 100% equity, though of course if firms borrow 
in the future their debt/equity ratio might rise. Zero debt 
might seem rather unbalanced given the large fixed-interest 
foreign debt that the government has outstanding. Nor is it 
clear what happens to the equivalent of dividends—i.e. that 
part of after-tax profits which are not retained for invest-
ment. Logically they should be paid to the owners of the 
enterprises—either the State or its designated proxy. If in-
stead they are retained through lack of clear ownership 
rights or expectations on those who have the rights, then 
there is no guarantee that the allocation of investment funds 
will be efficient. 
The tax reform is part of the wider process of economic 
reform, and has a crucial enabling role to play in transform-
ing Hungary into a more dynamic and responsive economy. 
Its main purpose is to create a stable, statutory and uniform 
fiscal environment which will allow enterprises greater free-
dom to succeed or fail by their own efforts. As the degree 
of discretion in the fiscal system is reduced, so special inter-
ventions will need to be defended and justified, and this 
should help to clarify objectives and perhaps focus attention 
on the best way of achieving them. 
The tax reform will increase the cost of labour in some 
enterprises, notably those in sectors which are currently 
offered special privileged tax rates. Since these are often 
sectors in difficulties, the likely impact will be to increase 
the number of bankruptcies and level of labour lay-offs in 
the period of transition, while raising the average level of 
labour productivity. If the labour can be redeployed, then 
output should increase, though the process of transition may 
be uncomfortable. The reform should also increase the after-
tax rate of profit in the more efficient enterprises, and this 
should allow them to grow at the expense of less efficient 
firms, especially if banks lend on commercial rather than 
political criteria. The higher profits may provide incentives 
to workers and managers to work harder and more ef-
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ficiently, but this will require a radical change of attitudes 
and may take some time to have effect. Here again the tax 
reform plays a complementary role to other reforms in the 
capital market. 
The difficulties which may be encountered over the next few 
years have more to do with the difficulties of transition 
from a socialist economy to a competitive market-oriented 
economy, than from the tax reform itself. These difficulties 
primarily stem from the low degree of competition and the 
high degree of concentration which are the legacy of a 
planned economy. This creates a tension between the desire 
to reward efficiency by higher earnings and a fear that higher 
earnings may be granted more as a result of monopoly 
power, with consequent inflationary effects. 
Nevertheless, the commitment of the Hungarian authorities 
to tax reform, despite the adverse macroeconomic circum-
stances which surround its introduction, are a measure of 
their commitment to the wider reform programme, and the 
tax reform should help lay the foundations on which market 
socialism can be securely built. The fact that the reform of 
the corporate income tax has followed so swiftly on the heels 
of the PIT and VAT reforms of 1988, and the evidence that 
other parts of the tax system and social security system 
are being actively examined with a view to further reform 
considerably adds to the credibility of the reforms made so 
far, as does the proposed liberalization of Hungary-USSR 
trade, with the attendant dismantling of the complex system 
of taxes and subsidies associated with CMEA trade. 
10. Priorities in restructuring industry 
Under central planning and the new economic mechanism 
prices were controlled, or price rises were subject to scrutiny. 
Complex incentive mechanisms were imposed to reduce in-
flationary wage pressures and to encourage efficiency in 
labour use, though their full impact was probably under-
mined by the soft budget constraints under which enterprises 
believed they were operating. Central planning also favours 
industrial concentration, both because planning is predicated 
on the existence of economies of scale and resulting market 
failures, and to simplify the task of coordination. Hungary 
thus inherited a highly-concentrated industrial structure, 
which gave individual enterprises considerable market power 
within Hungary. In the absence of a full-scale trade liberal-
ization, the government recognized that price controls would 
be needed to prevent the exercise of this market power when 
enterprises were encouraged to pursue and retain profits. At 
the same time it was recognized that it would be desirable 
to break large enterprises up into their constituent more 
specialized branches. Nevertheless, the experiences of plan-
ning and the perceived advantages of exercising collusive 
market power has lead in many cases to the emergence of 
product specific cartels reducing price competition. 
It is still the case that dismantling multi-product and multi-
plant enterprises is highly desirable, for a variety of reasons. 
First, it makes the exercise of market power more difficult. 
Second, it makes cross-subsidization very difficult, and for-
ces more effective cost accounting, without which there is 
little chance of restructuring industry towards more efficient 
combinations. Third, it begins the process of allowing the 
factor markets (for both labour and capital) to work. Once 
each sub-enterprise has to either generate profits for invest-
ment or bid for loans from banks, its underlying profitability 
will become an important determinant of success. Until then, 
it might be able to survive as a part of a larger conglomerate 
by concealing its profitability under the primitive system of 
accounts employed. Even if it belongs to a cartel, its relative 
performance within the cartel will be a measure of its ef-
ficiency, even if its absolute level of profits is a poor guide 
to its comparative advantage relative to other producers 
outside the cartel. Finally, increasing the number of firms 
increases the number of opportunities for managers to dem-
onstrate their managerial and entrepreneurial prowess, and 
makes entry and exit from that critical role easier. A man-
ager's success can be evaluated even within a cartel by 
benchmark comparisons with his rivals within the cartel. 
Does this mean that one should be content with a reform 
process which goes as far as dismantling enterprises to a 
level where each is primarily undertaking its core business, 
but which does not outlaw cartels or implement a strong 
competition policy? Much depends on developments in three 
other markets. The first and central question is whether 
international trade is liberalized, so that firms are free to 
import components whenever they are unsatisfied with local 
suppliers (either over quality or delivery terms). But this is 
not enough. If the cartel is working collusively then firms 
will know that failure to place orders with other members 
and instead seeking supplies from abroad will result in retali-
ation—other firms will not buy from them. This might 
precipitate a collapse of the cartel for sourcing, and hence 
increase competition. But the fear of cartel collapse might 
deter members from allowing effective competition from 
abroad. International trade is necessary but not sufficient to 
ensure competitive behaviour within Hungarian industry. 
Ironically, the more effective the reform process and the 
more responsive domestic suppliers become, the lower the 
cost of sourcing domestically rather than importing, and 
hence the weaker will be international competitive pressure. 
This suggests that the priorities for sequencing the reform 
are to genuinely liberalize trade first, either before or concur-
rently with the dismantling of enterprises, and then to worry 
about competition policy. This seems to be the chosen se-
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quence, for trade liberalization for firms seems to have been 
largely implemented already, while the competition office is 
scheduled to be set up in 1990. 
then the benefits of competition rather than collusion are 
enhanced. Given the central role of these three markets they 
will now be discussed in more detail. 
The second critical market is the labour market. Firms will 
become more efficient if they reallocate labour (and other 
factors), and reduce labour inputs per unit output. They also 
need to reduce the real labour cost per unit of output in 
order to compete effectively on the international market, 
and to generate the surplus to finance the debt. This means 
reducing the number of workers (at least in some plants) 
and avoiding rapid rises in wages. If all plants producing 
the same good collusively set prices, their resistance to wage 
demands will be greatly reduced, as common wage costs can 
readily be passed on. Only if wage bargaining is genuinely 
decentralized to the plant level will there be serious down-
ward pressure on wages. The pressure to decentralize will 
depend very much on the state of the labour market. If there 
is excess demand for labour and a tight labour market, then 
unions will have greater power to set industry-wide wage 
agreements, whether or not there is a product cartel. If there 
is considerable unemployment and high labour mobility, 
then unions may be unable to ensure uniform wages even 
with a cartel, for the temptations to gain an advantage by 
paying lower wages may then be too great for cartel members 
to resist. 
The labour market is critical for a wider range of reasons 
than this, and the introduction pointed to the importance 
of creating an elastic supply of labour to the dynamic sectors, 
so that they may be able to maintain a high rate of growth 
without running into labour shortages. The most challenging 
task, and perhaps the one which the EC may be best placed 
to assist in, is to create such circumstances at least social 
cost. The tough-minded solution is to argue that high unem-
ployment for a transition period is the necessary price to 
pay for effective restructuring, but there is no doubt that 
it requires considerable political will to implement such a 
strategy, or widespread popular recognition that any other 
alternative would be even costlier. Any solution which lowers 
the social costs of freeing up the labour market whilst making 
it adequately competitive would therefore have high value. 
It may make the difference between success or failure of the 
reform in transforming the economy from its sluggish recent 
growth experience, which in turn is a precondition for con-
tinued credit worthiness and access to foreign capital. 
Finally, of course, the capital market is critical in encourag-
ing successful firms to expand and unsuccessful firms to be 
replaced. If the cartel members know that their success 
in attracting investment funds depends on their relative 
performance, and if they know that their performance is 
being closely monitored by the providers of new capital, 
11. Labour market 
Despite attempts to reform the labour market it remains 
very rigid, with recorded unemployment in the third quarter 
of 1988 at only 0,3%. Perhaps the major new step in the 
labour market reform process is the introduction of an 
unemployment benefit scheme at the beginning of 1989. This 
will be funded from 1990 by contributions from employers 
and employees. It provides 70 % of the most recent wage 
for six months, reduced by 10% for the second six months. 
Eligibility requires that the worker be willing to work at a 
wage not lower than the current unemployment benefit. The 
critical issue here is how to free the labour market at least 
social cost. Fortunately, Hungary, like other Eastern Euro-
pean economies, starts with a considerable advantage. The 
retail sector, which is the easiest to enter, is the most under-
developed, and might be expected to absorb substantial 
numbers of workers. According to the Unece Economic 
survey of Europe in 1988-89 38,5% of retail trade was in the 
private sector in 1950, but officially only 2,3% in 1987 
(Unece, p. 168), though a better estimate is nearer 10%. 
Hungary has about 4 % of total employment in retail trade, 
while Portugal had 2,8 % in 1980, and most other European 
market economies have more than 7%. The obvious con-
clusion is that privatization can proceed rapidly in this 
sector, which should be able to absorb substantial numbers 
of workers. The difficulty will be to persuade workers made 
redundant of the attraction of these future prospects. The 
alternative of allowing demand for new retail workers to 
develop before workers in unprofitable industries are made 
redundant would lead to excess demand and possibly wage 
inflation. Again there is a dilemma—periods of high con-
sumer spending are good for retail expansion, but consumer 
spending will be under pressure from the need to finance 
investment and service the debt. 
There is another interesting dimension to the problem of 
reallocating labour, which again highlights the problems of 
transition between socialist and market economic structures. 
In the absence of a well-functioning external labour market, 
large conglomerates can reallocate labour to a certain extent 
by creating an internal labour market. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that firms in Hungary have even merged in order 
for one firm to gain access to surplus labour held by the 
other firm. The Japanese model of large-scale enterprises 
with life employment guarantees provides an interesting 
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market economy counterpart to the use of internal labour 
markets as methods of reallocating labour which apparently 
avoid open unemployment. But this idealistic view conceals 
the reality of a dualist labour market in Japanese industry. 
By relying heavily on contracted out work, labour market 
adjustments can be shifted onto the subcontracting firms, 
whose workers enjoy far less privileged security of employ-
ment. It is conceivable that as an intermediate or transitional 
stage large conglomerate enterprises might function in a 
market economy and substitute for the absent labour mar-
ket, but it is more likely that without the fringe of the 
secondary economy the fundamental problems of labour 
market rigidity would be sidestepped by this approach. 
One of the main impediments to labour mobility is likely to 
be the thinness of the housing rental market—a problem 
which is pervasive in much of the EC. Once the housing 
market and its finance have been reformed, this may cease 
to be a problem, provided house owners are allowed to offer 
short-term rental contracts. Indeed, the fact that housing 
finance is being reformed may provide the opportunity to 
tackle a problem which has proven so intractable elsewhere. 
12. International trade and liberalization 
Hungary has pursued an active export promotion scheme to 
Western markets through various subsidies or tax con-
cessions, such as exemption from the investment tax, rebates 
on interest payments, and freedom from the wage regulation 
tax. Some of these have been replaced by the more standard 
exemption from VAT on inputs with the recent tax reform, 
though in 1988, 398 enterprises had access to the export 
subsidy scheme for investments amounting to 16,7 billion 
forints (i.e. about 6 % of gross fixed investment). The Na-
tional Bank of Hungary provides forward market cover for 
enterprises engaged in hard-currency trade, and it is planned 
to decentralize this activity to commercial banks in 1990. 
The aim is to liberalize hard-currency trade, starting first 
with enterprises, but eventually moving to all consumer 
goods. Hungary has encouraged foreign direct investment 
in joint ventures, and the cumulative sum of foreign capital 
inflows rose from USD 44,1 to USD 263,3 million between 
1985 and 1989, with the Republic of Korea as the largest 
partner at USD 95 million. Inflows in 1988 were USD 164 
million compared to a current account deficit of USD 390 
million, and a forecast deficit of USD 650 million for 1989. 
The main impediment to further rapid liberalization of trade 
is the huge hard-currency debt, the interest on which will be 
about USD 500 million per year—large compared to foreign 
direct investment. There is no doubt that the single most 
important improvement in Hungary's position would be 
improved access to EC markets, which would probably allow 
a large increase in direct foreign investment designed to take 
account of Hungary's favourable wage costs arid existing 
capital stock. This would relax the borrowing constraint 
through the inflows while increasing exports and relaxing 
the constraint on the balance of payments. This is discussed 
below. 
Trade liberalization for hard-currency goods consists largely 
in replacing the battery of sector-specific taxes and subsidies 
and quota allocations as the new system of taxes is intro-
duced. Reforming the rouble or CMEA trade is far more 
difficult, as the next section suggests, but also critical for the 
success of the reform process. 
12.1. The CMEA trade and payments system ' 
Socialist theory stresses the importance of economies of scale 
and the irrelevance of comparative advantage for produced 
goods—production can be located in any of the CMEA 
countries with equal ease, but to achieve economies of scale 
there should be specialization and hence trade between 
CMEA members. Bilateral negotiations over supplies of 
these specialized final goods are conducted as part of the 
five-year planning exercise, and are treaty obligations which 
thus have the highest priority in the supplying countries. 
Given the primacy of quantity decisions in the planning 
process, and the lack of an external world price for most 
manufactured goods, the prices for any particular export 
good may have little meaning except in the context of ensur-
ing bilateral balance for the whole basket of goods to be 
exchanged. This in turn means that a complex set of taxes 
and subsidies are required to mediate between the CMEA 
prices of goods and the domestic prices, which each country 
views as having primacy and which can therefore diverge 
widely between CMEA partners. Even the exchange rate is 
largely formal, as currencies are not convertible, and bal-
ances or debts are discouraged. As CMEA prices for individ-
ual goods are not subject to a market test, but may signal 
relative bargaining strength or weakness in the bilateral 
negotiations, they are sensitive and hence opaque. 
Although apparently irrational at the level of individual 
goods and enterprises, the CMEA has an internal logic. In 
principle, extensive bilateral bargaining over all aspects of 
trade should enable partner countries to realize all the gains 
from trade. In practice, this cannot be done as the nego-
tiators do not have adequate information about production 
This draws heavily on Schrenk, 1989. 
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possibilities, nor are they able to provide adequate incentives 
to enterprises to reveal and exploit profitable opportunities. 
The system is thus inherently conservative—it deals best 
with repeated bargaining over static opportunities where 
reputation allows options to be explored. It is ill-suited to 
handle change and new information. 
The main disincentive to reform on the part of the peripheral 
members of the CMEA is their perception that they currently 
gain from the terms of trade. They import 'hard' goods, 
primarily oil, in exchange for 'soft' goods whose quality is 
such that they would be hard to sell profitably on hard-
currency markets. This benefit is visible, while the cost of 
being locked into a rigid system is less apparent. 
If the proposed switch to a system of convertible currency 
accounts with its main CMEA partners does actually take 
place as planned in 1991, then many of the impediments 
created by the opacity and opportunity for manipulation 
may begin to be eroded. The main problem will be the 
possibly adverse terms of trade shock implied by such a 
move, and it would clearly be desirable for Hungary to 
negotiate short-term balance of payments support from its 
major CMEA partners to facilitate this reform. 
in new institutional forms. The great political appeal of 
privatization, especially where it results in the wide disper-
sion of asset ownership, is that it is difficult to restore the 
ownership powers of the State without strong resistance 
from those who stand to suffer a first-order loss. 
Given this perspective, a number of options change their 
priority. From an efficient point of view, the object should 
be to liberalize markets first in order to establish equilibrium 
prices on the basis of which to establish the market value of 
the assets with low uncertainty, and hence higher value, and 
then privatize. Similarly, there is a good case for restructur-
ing and rationalizing the firms before privatization to in-
crease their value. The argument that if the State were able 
to do this it would already have done so is not persuasive 
because of the problem of credibility or dynamic consistency. 
If the planners play a repeated game with the enterprises, 
then they find it hard to commit themselves to punish deviant 
behaviour. But privatization is not a repeated game and the 
threat of sale can be made credible by establishing a repu-
tation for privatization, as the UK Government rapidly did. 
The only remaining question is in what shape the privatized 
company will reach the market—rationalized and viable, or 
not. Faced with that ultimatum it may be easier to achieve 
compliance. 
13. Privatization and asset ownership 
The reform of capital markets, the clarification of ownership 
rights and their allocation creates a nexus of problems which 
is arguably the most contentious and least well-thought-out 
part of the reform programme. At times the participants to 
the debate seem to be talking at cross-purposes, pursuing 
different concepts of privatization and of the role of the 
State and having entirely different objectives in mind. The 
reasons for the divergence of views are not hard to identify, 
but need to be kept in mind. As remarked in the Introduc-
tion, reforms have an efficiency effect and a distributional 
impact. In most cases, and certainly in the case of privatiza-
tion, the efficiency gains are likely to be much smaller than 
the distributional impacts. The emotional appeal of privati-
zation owes something to this perception—some will gain 
(workers? managers? possibly individuals?) at the expense 
of 'the State'. Different schemes for privatization tend to 
favour different groups, and arouse strong passions. The 
same is true of tax reform, but in the case of privatization 
there is an additional political element that may be domi-
nant. The reform process is only partly about economics, 
and is increasingly seen as a way to reduce the overpowerful 
role of the State. To be effective, the process should be 
irreversible. The fear is that the old guard might, if it main-
tains a power base, be able to rapidly reverse any progress 
and return to the former style of control, perhaps cloaked 
If the main object is to remove enterprises from the State 
which is perceived as being, if not the enemy of the reform 
process, then not wholly untainted by the previous authori-
tarian regime, then this natural sequencing looks less attract-
ive. If the State cannot be entrusted with the rationalization 
process, and if liberalization may take too long, then perhaps 
it is better to privatize first, even if the result is chaotic, not 
value maximizing, and inequitable. Much of the present 
divergence of views arises between those who wish to divest 
the State of its power and influence as fast as possible, and 
those who see a continued active role for a reformed State 
in the management and guidance of a market economy. 
From a West European perspective, this latter standpoint is 
natural, and is the working assumption of the present paper, 
though the alternative viewpoint should be recognized as a 
consistent, if pessimistic one. 
The following arguments are thus largely addressed to the 
issue of improving the efficiency of the economy without 
necessarily changing the distribution of wealth and power, 
at least in the short term. The conclusions derive from that 
premise, and could readily be reversed given alternative 
objectives. If the objective is that of improving efficiency, 
then it is not necessary to have an active stock market on 
the London or New York model together with widely-held 
shares in order to liberalize the finance, ownership and 
accountability of firms. Nor is it necessary that managers 
own or even have large shares in the ownership of the firm 
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as part of the liberalization process. That may be desirable 
in some sectors, and it makes a great deal of sense for it to 
be legal to set up limited liability companies, but it does 
not follow that existing firms can only be restructured by 
privatizing them and selling shares to managers, workers, or 
the wider public. 
The two key problems in improving the performance of the 
Hungarian economy are, first, to ensure that existing factors 
of production are used in the most efficient way possible, 
and second, that the government receives an adequate return 
on assets to finance and ideally liquidate its debt. These twin 
objectives are in tension, for generating a surplus through 
high rates of taxation discourages efficiency, but lowering 
tax rates may make the debt-servicing problem intractable. 
An important part of recognizing the two-fold nature of the 
problem is to distinguish between the return on the assets 
of the firm, which is the counterpart to dividends or interest 
in a private ownership economy, and the taxation of profits, 
which, as in other economies, is required to finance the 
various activities of government. If assets are sold to private 
individuals, then the State will be able to use the proceeds 
to reduce its debt, and thus reduce its interest payments. 
Instead of receiving notional interest income on its State-
owned assets, which are transferred to the holders of govern-
ment debt, it will liquidate these claims on it by the sale of 
its assets. The important fiscal dimension of privatization or 
equivalent asset transfers from the public sector is that the 
earlier flow of returns to these assets must be matched by a 
corresponding flow after the asset transfer. 
It is worth labouring this point, for many might argue 
that there is no difference between allocating free shares in 
previously State-owned enterprises to taxpayers, and selling 
the same shares to the same taxpayers. The argument is that 
as the State is the people, they already own the assets, and 
the transfer merely makes this explicit. But this ignores the 
distortionary cost of taxation. In order to accumulate the 
capital distortionary taxes were required. Some estimates 
suggest that at high levels of taxation (when over half na-
tional income passes through the public sector) the marginal 
cost of taxation may be as high as 1,5. That is, for the 
last USD 1 transferred through taxes to the public sector, 
consumer welfare falls by USD 1,50. If so, and if consumers 
are willing to buy the State assets, then every USD 1 they 
pay allows the government to reduce the present discounted 
value of interest payments on the national debt by USD 1, 
and consequently to reduce taxes needed to meet these 
interest obligations by USD 1 (in PDV), which is worth 
USD 1,50 to society. Handing over the assets without rec-
ompense means foregoing this extra USD 0,50 of consumer 
benefit, as taxes must remain as distortionary as before. 
If we turn to the first objective of increasing efficiency, then 
we can ask whether privatization is well suited to this end. 
Under individual private ownership, the owner has every 
incentive to produce efficiently as he keeps the entire pro-
ceeds of his skilful management. Modern industrial and 
financial enterprises require the mobilization of more re-
sources than it would be prudent for a single individual, 
unless exceptionally wealthy, to hazard in one line of oper-
ation. The manager can thus no longer be the single owner, 
and means must be found to solve the principal-agent prob-
lem that arises whenever the scale of operation requires a 
separation between ownership and management. The social-
ist solution was for the State to mobilize such resources 
through taxation or its counterpart, and to hire and direct 
managers to produce the desired goods. Managers were 
subject to a variety of incentives, but as workers were rarely 
sacked, there was every incentive to collude with workers to 
misrepresent the opportunities available. Typically such 
firms performed well below the level that was technically 
and economically feasible. 
At this point it is important to examine the various elements 
of the principal-agent relationship to see where the most 
urgent changes lie. The first and most essential element is 
information—the principal must be able to monitor the 
performance of the agent or enterprise and detect departures 
from efficiency. The best way is to receive accurate infor-
mation and to have some standard of comparison against 
which to measure performance. If the firm is competing with 
similar firms in a competitive product market and if those 
firms are earning observable profits (perhaps indirectly ob-
servable in that they reveal that they are making satisfactory 
profits by continuing to be able to borrow), then such a 
standard of comparison is available. Thus the overwhelming 
importance for monitoring performance of creating viable 
competition, preferably within Hungary, but, failing that, 
certainly with international competition. 
The next requirement is that it should be possible to reward 
the agent for good performance and/or punish for poor 
performance, which in turn requires that the agent should 
have control over the performance of the enterprise. The 
latter means that managers must have power to manage (i.e. 
to hire and fire workers, to select investments, etc.). The 
former means that managers in turn need to be rewarded or 
replaced as appropriate. 
The joint stock company was evolved to mobilize resources 
while providing a solution to the principal-agent problem. 
Share ownership gives share owners an incentive to monitor 
performance as they have a stake in the success of the 
enterprise. Shareholders elect the board of directors which 
can replace incompetent management. The market for shares 
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provides another avenue for change of management through 
a change of ownership. But there are problems when large 
firms are widely held. It will not be in any individual small 
share owners interest to devote much effort to monitoring 
the performance of the firm and identifying profitable oppor-
tunities which were not exploited. Takeover raiders have 
such an incentive, but, as Hart and Grossman have pointed 
out, there are problems with this mechanism—why should 
any shareholder sell the firm at its current value if it will 
become more profitable after the takeover, and if the firm 
has to pay what it will become worth then the raider will 
not be able to cover the costs of the raid. 
An alternative structure which is widely used by small and 
medium-size companies in the UK, and larger firms else-
where, is that the firm is owned jointly by management, 
possibly also by workers, but primarily by some financial 
institution, which may have a sizeable equity stake as well 
as holding the bulk of the fixed interest debt. Concentrated 
ownership and sourcing of finance can overcome the prob-
lems of monitoring. These are likely to be more serious 
where there is no tradition of stockbroker research, where 
accounting conventions are unsatisfactory and evolving, and 
where individuals and institutions are unsure of the possi-
bilities and difficulties attendant on major structural reform. 
The obvious intermediaries are either life insurance com-
panies (perhaps assuming the liabilities of State pensions), 
or merchant banks acting on their behalf (i.e. investing their 
assets). The main worry with this solution is that the banks 
themselves may not be subject to adequate competition, and 
may thus evolve into the corporatist model of southern 
Europe. Hence the critical importance of allowing entry by 
foreign banks which are free to lend to local companies (and 
not just to joint ventures). 
The missing element in this alternative to a fully-fledged 
stock market is a market for corporate contre!. As pointed 
out, there are difficulties in the operation of such markets, 
and in addition they provide methods for reassembling car-
tels into monopolies and subverting the goal of market 
liberalization. There is nothing to stop financiers searching 
for alternative owners and selling out when this seems oppor-
tune. 
One possible sequencing for liberalizing industry is first to 
transfer asset ownership to holding corporations, which 
draw up an appropriate capital structure for the firm, com-
bining fixed interest long-term bonds, variable rate short-
term finance, and equity claims. As experience grows with 
valuing assets, and as the value of the assets becomes better 
defined with the stabilization of the product market and tax 
system, then the holding corporations will be better placed 
to define the market value of the equity. It may be that a 
sufficient diversity of holding corporations acting to maxi-
mize their portfolio value will be an adequate first step. The 
next step would be for the holding corporations to sell 
the enterprises, either to insurance companies, individuals, 
managers (perhaps in conjunction with workers), investment 
banks, foreign companies or banks. There may be consider-
able advantages in selling a large shareholding to a major 
finance company, and the balance to a range of alternative 
shareholders. The attraction of also selling to the public are 
obvious—it creates an additional financial instrument that 
makes retaining private funds within Hungary more attract-
ive, and encourages higher domestic private saving. It pro-
vides an inflation hedge and may have a variety of political 
attractions (and drawbacks). But it would be unrealistic to 
expect private direct share ownership to become widespread, 
judging from the experiences elsewhere. 
One argument for creating an active stock market is that it 
allows firms to raise capital to finance new investment, and 
that this is a necessary next step now that central allocation 
of funds is to be abolished. This argument is quite unconvinc-
ing in most capitalist economies. The US and the UK have 
experienced a decrease in the real asset backing of equities, 
implying that there have been negative flows of new finance 
into the equity market—instead firms have bought out share-
holders, often with junk bonds. Most new investment is 
financed by a mixture of retentions and debt, and it is rare 
for new equity to be issued. The main function of the 
stock exchange is not to finance investment but to provide 
incentives for existing stocks of assets to be properly man-
aged, and to provide a market for corporate control. Banks 
play a far more important role in the finance of investments. 
Nor would a stock market be required to allow a restructur-
ing of external debt by selling assets to foreign companies 
(either directly or via banks). The main advantage of a 
stock market is that it provides a method of valuation of 
companies, though even here without a track record in the 
market it is hard to see on what basis firms would be valued 
if they were now to be floated. Careful accounting, which 
may be a scarce local resource, is almost certainly more 
important in the early stages of liberalization. It may well 
be that one of the most useful contributions by the 24 would 
be the provision of good accounting audits by management 
consulting/accounting firms. 
If it is felt important to divest the State and its organs (the 
banks, a privatization corporation, or whatever) of any stake 
in ownership as fast as possible, preferably with the widest 
possible degree of ownership diffusion, then there are two 
alternative models which have some attraction. The first is 
to ask what widely-held assets held by the population could 
be exchanged for these productive assets. The obvious 
answer is the population's claims on pension income (and 
possibly 'social income' from health care, education and the 
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like). If the State transferred assets to a variety of life 
insurance companies which assumed the responsibility of 
paying pensions, then the expenditure side of the State 
budget would be reduced, releasing funds to repay the na-
tional debt. The standard argument against this is that the 
pension fund managers would not have the incentive to 
ensure the proper management of the assets as their perform-
ance would be hard to monitor. This might cease to be a 
problem if the population had the right to transfer each 
current year's contributions to a different fund, for then 
managers would face the need to sustain good performance. 
Another alternative is to finance higher education through 
asset transfers, thus privatizing the universities and the State 
enterprises at the same time. Again, current government 
expenditure would be reduced, and the universities would 
have every incentive to monitor their investments closely, to 
husband their resources and to improve their efficiency. In 
both cases one wishes to ensure that the obligations on the 
State budget (foreign debt, domestic expenditure) can be 
discharged at least cost by ensuring the most valuable use 
of State assets. At the same time the objective of ensuring 
more efficient management, monitoring and resource allo-
cation can be achieved by giving the asset holders a direct 
stake in performance and the opportunity to punish inef-
ficiency through a market for control, through some control 
over access to investment funds, and by other means avail-
able to large voting shareholders. Finally, the objective of 
distancing the enterprises from State ownership as far as 
possible, and perhaps maximizing the dispersion in owner-
ship, may be achieved by these alternative intermediaries. 
14. Capital market reform 
Structural adjustment is often associated with high rates 
of inflation, and compared to its historical experience of 
negligible inflation, Hungary is no exception. Given the 
attempt to liberalize the capital market and force firms to 
borrow on market terms, it is important to explore possible 
constraints inflation creates to this part of the reform pro-
cess. There are two obvious problems which may create 
serious difficulties if not tackled, both dealing with rates 
of interest facing consumers. The first has already been 
mentioned, and concerns the tax treatment of interest income 
in periods of high inflation. If Hungarians can, legally or 
covertly, hold German marks instead of forints, and if the 
rate of interest in Hungary payable on savings deposits at a 
rate equal to the German mark rate plus the differential rate 
of inflation, (plus probably a risk premium for currency 
instability), then money rates of interest before tax will be 
appropriately higher in Hungary than Germany (or Austria). 
For example, suppose the Austrian interest rate is 8 %, and 
the excess rate of inflation in Hungary is expected to be 
10%, and the Hungarian deposit rate is 20% (i.e. a risk 
premium of 2%). Suppose that the Austrian inflation rate 
is 4%, so the real rate of interest is 4% in Austria, 6% in 
Hungary. At a 30% tax rate, Hungarians pay'6% in tax 
and earn a zero real interest rate. Even if they paid 30 % on 
their Austrian account, their real interest would still be 
1,6%, and if they avoided paying tax they would enjoy 4% 
real. Thus there must be a real danger that the tax system 
will encourage capital flight, the more so as there are now 
restrictions on 'tourism' i.e. shopping trips to Vienna. 
There are various solutions, amounting to various forms of 
only taxing the real interest income. One is to issue tax-free 
savings certificates with a lower nominal rate than taxable 
accounts, but nevertheless yielding a satisfactory positive 
rate. Another is to tax the current market value of the asset. 
Another is to issue indexed bonds, as in the UK. A close 
substitute might be to allow holdings denominated in 
deutschmarks or yen or some other low inflation currency 
(though not necessarily with any implied convertibility into 
that currency). The least satisfactory is to increase the pre-
tax rate of interest to the point at which the post-tax real 
rate of interest is positive. This would have a severe impact 
on the real cost of borrowing by enterprises. It is possible 
that this problem has already been addressed, but it is likely 
to be a sensitive issue in negotiations between Hungary and 
the IMF if not. 
The other related problem is that of mortgage finance in 
periods of inflation. The old system was that mortgages were 
available at 3% nominal, which, with zero inflation, is a 
defensible if low real rate of interest. It appears that old 
mortgages are to be frozen at this level, but new mortgages 
are to be issued at market rates of interest, with various 
subsidies which depend on family circumstances. This im-
plies Jhat huge windfall transfers will be made to existing 
mortgage holders as a result of inflation—their real debts 
will be rapidly liquidated in a period when the government 
faces a large foreign debt burden. Again the answer is simple 
in principle—existing mortgages could be indexed to the 
price level or an index of house prices, so that the 3% 
becomes a real rate of interest. The immediate impact would 
be negligible, but mortgage payments would then rise at the 
rate of inflation and the real debt would only be reduced by 
real repayment over the 3 % borrowing rate. 
A failure to make the cost of borrowing for housing at least 
as high as the return to lending is likely to mean that there 
is excess demand for mortgages and arbitraging between the 
two markets by wealthier Hungarians. Financial market 
reforms are arguably the most important to get right before 
these markets are liberalized, because of the ease of arbitrage 
in liberalized markets, and hence the speed with which finan-
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cial instability might arise. Given the relative immaturity of 
financial institutions, and the previously fragmented nature 
of the capital markets, these reforms need the most careful 
planning. 
It is therefore reassuring to see that the Hungarians attach 
importance to further careful study of the system of housing 
subsidies and insurance contributions, both of which raise 
tricky problems both on the tax side and on the financial 
side. Creating a satisfactory market in rented property must 
be a critical component of labour market reform, and this 
will require the equal tax treatment of rental income for 
home owners and tenants. Financing local government is 
traditionally done through property taxes in many countries, 
and there are powerful arguments why this is so. Again, 
careful design of the system of housing and property taxation 
is required. 
15. A strategy for policy 
The success of Hungary's reform process largely depends on 
the degree of commitment of the authorities to introducing 
predictable competitive pressures. This in turn means a com-
mitment to a normative, non-discretionary tax system, a 
liberal trade regime, the absence of discretionary subsidies, 
with the consequent risk of liquidation, and free entry into 
production. The Hungarian reformers appear to accept this 
diagnosis, but will be under continued local pressure to 
depart from it, to rescue firms where local employment is 
jeopardized, to protect inefficient production, and to main-
tain full employment and hence the existing labour market 
rigidities. The problem facing aid donors is that they are 
frequently ill-placed to assist the credibility of government 
commitment to structural adjustment, because of the prob-
lem of the 'obsolescing contract'. The government agrees to 
a reform programme, receives the loan, and then has less 
incentive to carry through the reforms. 
The overwhelming advantage which the EC has lies in the 
credibility of its future offers of market access. It would be 
unreasonable for the EC to offer market access to Hungary 
unless its traded goods production were free of subsidies 
(State aids), were open to competition, and were embedded 
in a normative, liberalized, market regime. It would be 
entirely reasonable of the EC to withdraw access if Hungary 
departed significantly from these standard conditions. The 
contract is thus self-enforcing: remove subsidies, liberalize 
and stabilize, in exchange not just for a once-off grant, but 
for continued access. 
It might be that this is all that is required, and that the IMF, 
acting on behalf of Hungarian creditors, can be left to 
enforce macro-stabilization in order to improve credit-
worthiness. If, as seems reasonable, the EIB gradually takes 
over from the IBRD the role of supplies of investment 
funds, then the EC would have a more direct interest in 
macrostabilization and structural adjustment, since it would 
have to worry about the creditworthiness of the Hungarian 
economy. But if the IBRD is willing to continue to treat 
Hungary as a sufficiently poor LDC to qualify for loans, 
then such a move is not essential. Looking to the future, 
Hungary will, if successful, graduate, and then the EIB will 
have an obvious role to play. 
Would insisting on a satisfactory trading regime be suf-
ficient? One should not underestimate the extent to which 
reform would have to go in order to meet these conditions. 
It may require the complete reform of CMEA trade, steps 
towards which are already being taken. It will certainly 
require an active policy on bankruptcy, as this will be a 
probable consequence of no subsidies. This in turn will 
precipitate an active labour market, and a mechanism or 
market for redeploying assets. No subsidies, strictly inter-
preted, will have profound implications for the banking 
system. If banks must worry about non-performing loans, 
because they do not themselves have access to subsidized 
credit, then they will be swifter to insist on restructuring, 
managerial changes, and other measures to improve profita-
bility. 
Doubtless there will be many other features of the Hungarian 
economy which require reform, but would not be covered 
by this set of policies. But does this matter? Many of them 
are matters of social policy, income distribution, or other 
legitimate domestic concerns which are of no direct concern 
to external governments. Unless Hungary is fully absorbed 
into a post-1992 single market with claims on structural 
Funds, they should be left to the Hungarians to choose. 
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1. Summary of recent trends in the balance of 
payments 
1.1. Background, 1986-88 
After 1984, the performance of the Hungarian economy 
worsened significantly. Expansionary demand management 
policies, sizeable losses in the terms of trade and some 
special factors (like poor crops, the effects of the Chernobyl 
accident), led to a sharp deterioration of the external current 
account. The external current account in convertible cur-
rencies recorded a deficit of USD 1,5 billion (about 6% of 
GDP) in 1986, compared to a surplus of USD 70 million 
(0,3 % of GDP) in 1984. By contrast, the current account in 
non-convertible currencies turned into surplus during this 
period. With external financing more easily available, Hun-
gary could finance its convertible current deficit and concur-
rently improve the maturity structure of its foreign debt. 
International reserves increased markedly. But as a result of 
the heavy borrowing and valuation changes, the gross debt 
in convertible currencies jumped from USD 11 billion (54% 
of GDP) at the end of 1984 to USD 16,9 billion (71 % of 
GDP) by the end of 1986. 
The Hungarian authorities responded with corrective 
measures during the course of 1987. Financial policies were 
tightened and the national currency was allowed to de-
preciate in real effective terms. The government presented 
a medium-term programme of economic stabilization and 
reform to the parliament in September 1987. The main 
objective of this medium-term programme was the elimin-
ation of the current account deficit by 1990-91. 
The implementation of corrective policies resulted in a sharp 
improvement in the convertible current account. The trade 
deficit was eliminated and the current account deficit was 
reduced to USD 876 million (3,3 % of GDP) by the end of 
1987. 
The medium-term programme of the government and the 
sound short-term demand management policies were sup-
ported by a one-year stand-by arrangement of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (for a period ending 15 May 1989). 
The trade balance in convertible currencies continued to 
improve during the course of 1988. However, this improve-
ment was offset in part by an increase in the deficit on the 
service account. Travel expenditures (including purchases 
abroad of consumer durables) increased to a level of USD 
629 million, more than three times the amount of expendi-
tures in the previous year. As a result, the traditional signifi-
cant surplus on the travel account nearly disappeared. Due 
to this unfavourable change the external current account 
deficit in convertible currencies recorded a deficit of USD 
807 million (2,9% of GDP) in 1988, which was about USD 
300 million higher than the current account target of the 
IMF programme. 
Favourable access to financing from the international capital 
markets enabled Hungary to finance this current account 
deficit without excessive drawdown on its holdings of inter-
national reserves. 
1.2. Developments in the current account in the first nine 
months of 1989 
(a) Convertible currencies 
Basic features of the convertible balance of payments, which 
became apparent in 1988, persisted during 1989, too. The 
unfavourable factors, however, intensified in 1989. The con-
vertible trade balance continued to register a strong improve-
ment. Which was more than offset by a sharp widening of 
the deficit on the service account. 
Export volumes expanded by 8,4% in the first half of 1989, 
reflecting mainly favourable market conditions for tra-
ditional products, and increased profitability resulting from 
two subsequent devaluations of the forint. Due to the abol-
ition of licensing and quota requirements on products rep-
resenting about 40% of the value of non-rouble imports 
in 1988, boosted also by stronger than expected domestic 
demand, imports increased by 8,2 % in volume terms. Hun-
gary's terms of trade improved by 2,5%. As a result, the 
convertible trade surplus increased to USD 195 million in 
the first half of 1989, from USD 92 million in the same 
period of 1988. 
The widely anticipated depreciation of the forint and perma-
nent expectations relating to the tightening of the customs 
treatment of private imports and/or to restrictions on the 
foreign currency allowance for tourists, coupled with higher 
than planned household incomes, led to a sharp increase in 
travel spending in convertible currencies. Travel outlays 
jumped to USD 644 million in the first half of 1989 from 
USD 146 million in the corresponding period of 1988. Mean-
while the balance of the travel account swung from a surplus 
of USD 77 million to a deficit of USD 348 million. The 
deficit from investment incomes increased also significantly, 
reflecting mainly changes in interest rates on Hungary's 
foreign debt. 
The current account deficit in convertible currencies nearly 
doubled, recording a deficit of USD 986 million in the first 
half of 1989. 
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Preliminary estimates for the third quarter indicate a further 
considerable worsening in the convertible current account 
balance, which stemmed mainly from a marked increase in 
expenditures on foreign investments in Hungary (reflecting 
higher market rates, profit transfers and fees on capital 
market transactions). The deterioration of the balance on the 
travel account—during the main season for foreign tourists 
visiting Hungary—slightly slowed down (under this cover 
however certain signs of capital flight also became apparent). 
As a result of the substantial liquidity which accumulated 
in the first half of the year in the enterprise sector, the real 
growth rate of imports in convertible currencies accelerated 
in the third quarter of 1989. The estimated deficit on the 
external current account in convertible currencies in the first 
nine months of 1989 reached USD 1,3 billion. 
(b) Non-convertible currencies 
As regards the non-convertible current account, the recorded 
surplus in the first half of 1989 was USD 466 million, which 
meant a six-fold increase relative to the January to June 
period of 1988. The level of this surplus was also nearly 
double that planned for the year as a whole. Because of the 
liberalization of Western imports, imports from the CMEA 
area declined both in volume and value terms. Hungarian 
enterprises, however, made efforts to stabilize their exports 
to CMEA countries. Exports to the CMEA area are regarded 
as the cheapest source of liquidity, since CMEA settlements 
are based on a prompt collection system. Hungary's rouble 
terms of trade improved by 4 % during this period. Higher 
revenues from tourism and increased contributions to 
CMEA projects also had a share in the remarkable increase 
of the current account surplus. 
Preliminary estimates for the third quarter suggest a further 
increase in the surplus on the non-convertible current ac-
count. The estimated surplus in the first nine months of 1989 
reached USD 640 million. 
Table 1 
Balance of payments in convertible currencies, 1986-89 
(million USD) 
Prog. 
-482 
4 186 
4 668 
1 087 
-237 
199 
-963 
1 215 
-32 
-54 
74 
1 495 
1 107 
-79 
1 186 
4 105 
2919 
493 
298 
195 
36 
5 050 
-5 014 
-1 014 
-308 
368 
-986 
-1 222 
-52 
-36 
102 
-876 
1 109 
-84 
1 193 
3 364 
-2 171 
-778 
-177 
-601 
489 
5 505 
-5016 
-1410 
-300 
41 
-1 076 
-1 307 
-76 
1 
114 
-807 
689 
-27 
716 
2 566 
-1 850 
288 
-3 
291 
31 
2 906 
-2 875 
-789 
-149 
28 
-602 
-716 
-46 
-20 
62 
-696 
400 
-20 
420 
1 137 
-717 
85 
-15 
100 
January-June 
1989 
195 
3 132 
-2 937 
-1 229 
-172 
-348 
-648 
-776 
-34 
-27 
48 
-986 
690 
11 
679 
1 578 
899 
53 
6 
47 
Trade balance 
Exports 
Imports 
Services 
Freight and insurance (net) 
Travel (net) 
Investment income (net) 
of which : interest payments 
Government expenditure (net) 
Other (net) 
Unrequited transfers (net) 
Current account 
Medium- and long-term capital 
Assets 
Liabilities 
Inflow' 
Outflow' 
Short-term capital 
Assets 
Liabilities 
Errors and omissions 
Overall balance 105 -545 170 -211 -243 
1 Excluding IMF purchases and repurchases. 
IMF 
Purchases 
Repurchases 48 353 
221 
355 
134 
134 
66 
112 
100 
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Table 2 
Balance of payments in non-convertible currencies, 1986-89 
(million USD) 
1989 
Jan..June 
Exports 
Imports 
Trade balance 
Freight and insurance (net) 
Travel (net) 
Investment income (net) 
Government expenditure (net) 
Other current receipts (net) 
Unrequited transfers (net) 
Current balance 
Medium- and long-term capital 
Assets 
Liabilities 
Inflows 
Outflows 
Short-term capital 
Assets 
Liabilities 
Overall balance 
5 012 
4 995 
17 
-76 
167 
-28 
4 
45 
4 
133 
-48 
-167 
66 
-233 
9 
-7 
-80 
4915 
-4 874 
41 
-81 
170 
-39 
6 
101 
3 
201 
-70 
-107 
60 
-167 
11 
69 
104 
4 484 
-4 390 
94 
-77 
113 
-17 
21 
96 
3 
233 
-69 
-198 
44 
-242 
3 
-45 
-76 
2 139 
-1 847 
292 
-30 
59 
-12 
14 
143 
— 
466 
-97 
-94 
17 
-111 
-2 
26 
299 
1.3. Developments in the capital account in the first nine 
months of 1989 
ounted to USD 633 million; these were some USD 400 
million larger than in the same period of the previous year. 
The large increase in the deficit on the convertible current 
account was financed partly by higher than planned medium-
and long-term capital inflows in the first half of 1989. Of 
the total gross borrowing of USD 1,6 billion (USD 1,4 
billion in the first half of 1988), USD 500 million was 
available from placements of notes and bonds (denominated 
in yen and Deutschmark), USD 278 million from syndicated 
loans and about USD 200 million from bank-to-bank cre-
dits. From the sale of shares of a Hungarian enterprise a 
further USD 110 million was secured. Principal repayments 
declined. Net medium- and long-term borrowings1 am-
There was a small inflow of short-term capital net, reflecting 
reduced resort to short-term borrowing. In the first half of 
1988 short-term liabilities rose by USD 424 million. 
The larger medium- and long-term borrowings and the 
change in the short-term position could not offset the higher 
current account deficit fully. The drawdown of international 
reserves reached USD 325 million in the fitst half of year. 
Including IMF purchases and repurchases. 
During the third quarter Hungary continued to enjoy orderly 
access to medium- and long-term capital and discovered new 
segments of foreign bond markets (issues denominated in 
Austrian schillings and ecus). In spite of the further increase 
101 
The elements of policy for rapidly redressing the Hungarian balance of payments 
in the convertible current account deficit, the level of inter-
national reserves declined modestly compared to the end of 
June 1989. 
1.4. Compliance with IMF performance criteria 
A one-year stand-by arrangement for the period ending 
15 May 1989 was approved for Hungary in May 1988 and 
the Hungarian authorities requested an extension of this 
arrangement through early 1990. Since several performance 
criteria proposed for the end of March 1989 were not fulfil-
led, technical extension of the stand-by arrangement through 
end-June 1989 was approved to allow time for discussions 
of possible corrective measures. Agreement was not reached 
on corrective measures, however; consequently the stand-by 
arrangement expired on 30 June 1989. 
In the first quarter of 1989 the deficit of the consolidated 
budgetary sector was 27 billion forints, about 22 billion 
forints above the target. Reflecting primarily this overrun, 
performance criteria were not met for end-March 1989 for 
net domestic assets of monetary institutions and bank credit 
to the State budget and State development institution. The 
counterpart to higher net domestic assets was the higher than 
programmed level of broad money (mainly liquid balances of 
enterprises). There was no significant deviation compared 
with the target on net foreign liabilities, since offsetting 
changes occurred in the convertible and non-convertible 
current accounts. 
The current account deficit in convertible currencies in the 
first quarter of 1989 amounted to USD 669 million and 
exceeded the programme target by USD 280 million. The 
overrun compared to original projections remained the same 
by the end of the second quarter and increased to about 
USD 600 million by the end of the third quarter, on cumulat-
ive basis. The trade surplus in convertible currencies was 
larger than the programme projections both in the first half 
and in the first nine months of the year. The overrun on the 
current account deficit resulted fully from the larger than 
expected travel and interest expenditures on the service ac-
count. 
By contrast, the non-convertible current account registered 
an increasing excess surplus during this period, compared 
with the programme projections. 
take out a so-called world passport, which is valid for all 
countries for a five-year period. During the validity of pass-
ports the frequency of travel is not restricted. At the begin-
ning of 1988, travellers to countries outside the CMEA were 
required to have foreign currency equivalent to 3 000 forints 
from legal sources. Later on, this requirement was abolished. 
Although the basic framework of foreign exchange allow-
ances for private travel purposes remained the same, new 
passport regulations were supplemented by other measures 
to increase residents' access to convertible currency. Resi-
dents travelling abroad for family reasons or tourism were 
entitled before 1988 to (or the equivalent of) about USD 
350 to 400 once in a three-year period. Beginning in 1988, a 
new regulation enabled residents to request foreign exchange 
allowance in instalments from the National Bank of Hun-
gary. Separate allowances were identified for ticket and 
fuel purchase for a three-year period, too. A temporary 
allowance of a small amount for those who exhausted their 
allowance prior to 1988 was also introduced. 
New rules on passports and foreign exchange allowances 
were complemented by relaxation of customs regulations for 
private imports. The duty-free allowance was increased from 
6 000 to 10 000 forints in the second half of 1987, with a 
continued option to pool it on family members. Customs 
duties on personal cars were reduced from 30 to 10% in the 
case of private imports of personal cars. Customs valuation 
procedures for imported used cars were simplified. 
During the course of 1988 measures were also taken to relax 
certain rules relating to residents' foreign currency accounts. 
In the first quarter of 1988 residents were allowed to declare 
convertible currency holdings from non-specified sources, 
without legal sanctions. Twenty-five per cent of these am-
ounts was required to be converted into forints, while the 
remaining part was allowed to be deposited into a special 
travel account in foreign exchange. 
The above measures, together with rapidly growing personal 
incomes in 1989, necessarily resulted in a sharp increase in 
travel expenditures of Hungarian citizens. Measures related 
to foreign currency accounts of residents ' gave an incentive 
to currency substitution and facilitated financial arrange-
ments for private imports and capital flight. 
Factors contributing to the sharp 
deterioration of the balance on the 
travel account in convertible currencies 
Beginning in 1988, Hungarian travel regulations were mark-
edly liberalized. Hungarian citizens have been entitled to 
' Since September 1989 the regulation on foreign exchange accounts of 
Hungarian residents has been further simplified and liberalized. 
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3. The real effective exchange rate and parallel 
market rates 
The real effective rate of the forint depreciated by 15 % in 
1987 and a further 6,7% in 1988. 
The forint was depreciated by 5% on 21 March 1989 and 
by an additional 6% on 14 April 1989, compared to the 
basket of convertible currencies to which it is pegged. The 
continuous strengthening of the US dollar (with a large 
weight in the basket) and accelerating domestic inflation 
during the first half of the year, however, largely counterbal-
anced effects of these official devaluations on the real effec-
tive exchange rate. 
The real effective rate of the forint, adjusted for changes in 
producer prices, registered only a very modest depreciation 
at the end of August 1989 compared to its beginning-1988 
level. 
Change in the real effective exchange rate of the forint during 1989 
(January 1988 = 100) 
April May July Aug. 
Nominal effective rate of the forint 
Relative producer price index 
Real effective rate of the forint 
103,3 
97,3 
100,5 
103 
95,8 
98,7 
104 
96,4 
100,7 
111,3 
94,9 
105,7 
112,1 
94,7 
106,2 
111,7 
94,8 
105,9 
113,2 
93,9 
106,3 
111,8 
92,1 
103,0 
The parallel market rate in Hungary—reflecting demand 
pressures and also some risk premium—was about 30 to 
40 % higher than the official rate until the end of September 
1989. In unofficial bank market trading in Vienna, the forint 
had a 30 % disagio compared to its official rate. 
4. External debt and external reserves 
As of 31 August, the US dollar value of convertible currency 
indebtedness amounted to USD 19 billion. There was no 
increase in gross foreign debt compared to the end of 1988. 
Since net borrowings were positive, the level of gross foreign 
debt reflected also valuation adjustments stemming from 
developments in international currency markets. As a per-
centage of the estimated 1989 GDP, the gross external debt 
in convertible currencies was nearly 70%. 
There was a significant decline in Hungary's external reserves 
during 1989. The total stock of reserves in convertible cur-
rencies amounted to USD 1,5 billion at the end of August 
1989, which was equivalent to 3,1 months of merchandise 
imports. 
5. Short-term external outlook 
In response to unfavourable developments in the internal 
and external balance, the Hungarian Government took sev-
eral corrective measures during 1989: 
(i) in May 1989 the parliament approved measures to 
strengthen the fiscal position (as net effect, these 
measures were expected to improve the consolidated 
budget position by 20 billion forints, which corresponds 
to about 1,2% of the projected GDP in 1989); 
(ii) the National Bank of Hungary made significant efforts 
to tighten liquidity. It pushed up interest rates (increased 
basic and marginal rates on its refinancing credits and 
its money market certificates, accelerated treasury bill 
auctions and raised the limit on the yield of discount 
treasury bills and on the interest rates of household 
deposits). Refinancing quotas of commercial banks were 
reduced and the compulsory reserve ratio was raised by 
three percentage points; 
(iii) to limit the increase in surplus of the balance of pay-
ments in non-convertible currencies, the forint was ap-
preciated by 5,5 % against the transferable rouble. Some 
administrative measures were also taken to curb growth 
in exports to CMEA countries. A new auction system 
was introduced for the trade in transferable roubles 
obtained from deliveries above the mutually agreed 
quotas; 
(iv) import duties on private imports (except personal cars) 
were increased to 45 % from 30 %. The duty-free allow-
ance was reduced from 10 000 to 5 000 forints (with the 
termination of pooling possibilities to family members). 
Customs duty was introduced on private imports below 
the value óf 5 000 forints, if the reason for imports was 
not the private use, but the commercial resale; 
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Table 3 
External debt in convertible currencies, 1986-89 
(million USD at end of period) 
1988 1989 
August 
External debt in convertible currencies 
By original maturity: 
Short term 
Long term 
By type of credit: 
Financial loans 
Trade-related credits 
Intergovernmental credit 
Other 
16 907 
389 
19 584 
423 
19 603 
508 
18 998 
3 494 
13413 
15 084 
1433 
1 
3 103 
16 481 
17 509 
1 652 
— 
3 363 
16 240 
17 469 
1 626 
— 
3 247 
15 751 
16 745 
1 739 
— 
514 
Source: National Bank of Hungary. 
Table 4 
External reserves and other foreign assets in convertible currencies, 1986-89 
(million USD at end of period) 
1988 1989 
August 
International reserves 
Convertible currencies 
Gold1 
Foreign exchange 
Other foreign assets 
Convertible currencies 
Short term 
Long term 
Total 
Total international reserves and 
other foreign assets in convertible currencies 
751 
2 302 
3 053 
6 239 
525 
1 694 
2 159 
5 901 
510 
1467 
1977 
5 636 
513 
I 014 
1 527 
3 186 
1 854 
1 332 
3 742 
2 277 
1 465 
3 659 
2 201 
1458 
3 710 
2316 
1 394 
5 237 
Source: National Bank of Hungary. 
1 In the official reserve statistics, gold is valued at USD 320 per ounce from March 1986. 
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(v) as of 3 November 1989, official foreign exchange allow-
ances for travel purposes were suspended until 
20 November 1989. Subsequently a new system of for-
eign exchange allocation has been introduced. Hunga-
rian residents are entitled to a foreign exchange allow-
ance of USD 300 for a four-year period, but the annual 
allowance can be only USD 50 per person. (Residents 
who will not take out the allowance in 1990-91, will be 
entitled to additional USD 50 in 1992 and 1993.) 
Based on the above measures, a further worsening of the 
convertible current account position compared to the end 
of September 1989 can be avoided. Consequently the con-
vertible current account deficit in 1989 will be as high as 
USD 1,3 billion (4,7% of GDP). By contrast, the non-
convertible current account surplus can be estimated in the 
range of USD 600 to 700 million (2,2 to 2,5 % of GDP). 
imports in 1989). The rate of economic growth is assumed 
to remain sluggish. The foreign exchange allowance regime 
introduced in November 1989 is supposed to remain in force 
during the course of 1990. 
Under these assumptions the current account deficit in con-
vertible currencies declines to USD 800 million (2,5% of 
GDP). The level of international reserves increases modestly. 
The gross medium- and long-term borrowing requirement 
corresponds to the 1989 level. It remains uncertain, however, 
whether it is possible for Hungary to meet this requirement 
through continued voluntary lending by banks and financial 
institutions in 1990. It is also uncertain how long the recently 
introduced restrictive measures on foreign exchange allow-
ance can be maintained without very serious economic dis-
tortions. 
Table 5 
Short-term outlook for the Hungarian balance of payments in 
convertible currencies, 1989-90 
(million USD) 
Trade balance 
Services and transfers (net) 
of which: Investment income 
Current account 
Medium- and long-term capital (net) 
Gross borrowing 
Amortization 
Short-term capital 
Overall balance 
Memorandum items: 
GDP growth 
Export volume growth 
Import volume growth 
Change in terms of trade 
Current account/GDP 
Reserves 
(in months of merchandise imports) 
1 Including IMF purchases and repurchases. 
2 Official projections assume significantly higher growth 
current account deficit (USD. 550 million for 1990). 
1989 
831 
- 2 146 
- 1 290 
- 1 315 
1 042 
2 852' 
1 810' 
- 3 3 
-306 
1 5 
7,5 
9,5 
1,5 
4.7 
3,5 
I9902 
966 
- 1 766 
- 1 370 
-800 
917 
2 600' 
1 683' 
— 
117 
0,8 
5,0 
4,0 
-0,5 
2,5 
3,6 
rate of exports, resulting in a lower 
The main assumptions for the projection of the convertible 
balance of payments in 1990 include a growth of non-rouble 
export markets by 5 % in 1990, a Libor of 9 % and a small 
deterioration in terms of trade. Structural reform measures, 
including further liberalization of the import regime, are 
envisaged to continue (the share of liberalized imports is 
expected to increase to 60% of the value of non-rouble 
6. Policy recommendations 
The rapid deterioration in Hungary's convertible balance of 
payments position in 1989 stemmed from excessive domestic 
demand, boosted mainly by slippages in the implementation 
of fiscal policy and by the larger than planned surplus 
on the non-convertible current account. The income and 
liquidity positions of enterprises improved, which contrib-
uted to a considerable increase in household cash incomes. 
Jointly with the liberalization of travel and the relaxation 
of customs and foreign exchange regulations, higher cash 
incomes resulted in a sharp increase in travel spending in 
convertible currencies. 
The improvement of the convertible balance of payments 
position, therefore, assumes first of all supporting demand 
management policies. Only a further sizeable reduction in 
the consolidated budget deficit and tightening credit can 
enhance the credibility of the adjustment efforts and reduce 
emerging distrust from domestic transactors and the inter-
national financial community. 
Exchange rate and interest rate policies need to be adjusted 
regularly, without delay, to bolster the improvement of the 
convertible current account and to help the avoidance of 
new current account and trade restrictions. 
Measures reducing the foreign exchange allowance for resi-
dents travelling abroad, although they can be justified in 
the case of emergency, will prove to be counterproductive 
shortly. First, these measures shift demand to the parallel 
market and push up parallel market rates, which will attract 
supply from official conversion channels. This will reduce 
officially recorded receipts from international tourism and 
can offset the effect of lower allowances to residents on the 
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convertible balance of payments. Reduced allowances will 
also force residents to draw on their balances on foreign 
exchange accounts. Finally, administrative measures like 
these destroy confidence and can bring about expectations 
of new, more rigorous administrative rules. 
Devaluation of the forint is warranted, on the one hand, 
considering the large excess demand for foreign exchange 
on the 'household' market. On the other hand, the high rate 
of producer price inflation foreshadows the appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate of the forint for the future, 
with a danger of the deterioration of international competi-
tiveness of the enterprise sector. The introduction of a modi-
fied, market-type exchange rate determination regime can 
only be a second-best option compared to regular discretion-
ary exchange rate measures, since it would add to the prevail-
ing high economic uncertainties. 
Although there have been efforts to push up market interest 
rates, the present level of real interest rates does not provide 
adequate saving incentive to support the balance of pay-
ments improvement. Deposit rates for one-year bank deposit 
hardly provide a real return after inflation and tax adjust-
ment and some rates on short-term deposits are negative 
in real terms. In the light of the tendencies for currency 
substitution, the need for higher real rates is more pro-
nounced. Monetary assets in national currency at present 
are not competitive with foreign currency assets. 
Postponement of an expected increase in customs duties for 
automobiles had set off anticipatory imports of personal 
cars, which contributed to a high level of travel outflows 
even during the last quarter of the year. A transparent system 
of customs duties and VAT needs to be established on 
private imports, where rates are set to exclude the possibility 
for a widespread merchandise arbitrage between domestic 
and foreign markets. 
The recently introduced severe administrative restrictions on 
access to foreign exchange cannot be maintained for very 
long. In the absence of an appropriate exchange rate adjust-
ment, or the introduction of a modified, market-type ex-
change rate regime, a temporary asymmetrical fiscal proxy 
for devaluation, i.e. a tax applied to outbound travellers 
(used for instance in Turkey or Israel) would be less disrup-
tive than the present administrative measures. 
There is also an urgent need for measures moderating the 
accumulation of current account surplus in non-convertible 
currencies. The final solution for this problem would be a 
transition to a new, possibly convertible, settlement system 
with the CMEA countries. Until this new settlement system 
has been established, Hungarian authorities need to use an 
efficient combination of market (auctioning of transferable 
rouble receipts) and administrative rules in order to achieve 
appropriate results. 
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Summary 
The paper is concerned with the reform of the Hungarian 
financial system. The first part briefly summarizes the results 
of earlier reform programmes and also points out the ten-
sions created by them. In the second part, the general prob-
lems future reforms face are discussed together with the likely 
directions of future developments. Besides the discussion of 
general issues, the particular problems of the banking sys-
tem, the capital and money markets and the insurance system 
are also pinpointed. Competitiveness of financial institutions 
is found to be the central issue future reforms should address 
but it is also stressed that it can only be achieved if stability 
and safety of the financial system is preserved. 
1. The financial system of traditional CPEs 
The financial system of a traditional CPE mirrors the owner-
ship structure and the system of economic control and re-
source allocation. The allocation of raw materials, intermedi-
ates, to a certain extent labour, investment goods and output 
in the enterprise sphere is controlled through the national 
plan setting compulsory physical targets for enterprises. 
Consequently, only the primary functions of money are 
needed in the enterprise sphere and even these functions, 
due to the lack of the others, are formal, bearing no relation 
to individuals' preferences, scarcity, effective demand or any 
other factor mentioned in economic theory. Prices are more 
or less arbitrarily set and kept unchanged by central price 
control. The use of enterprise revenues is strictly controlled 
through the monobank system creating subcircuits in the 
enterprise money circuit. Money and credit are earmarked 
in accordance with plan targets and credit supply passively 
accommodates these targets. If money played the same role 
in the household money circuit and autarky was perfect, the 
system would be fully consistent, and, as long as people 
accept it, could function. 
Although there were several attempts to achieve such a 
system, it never existed in reality. Money in the household 
(cash) money circuit, although subject to several restrictions, 
always had all its usual functions. This discrepancy in the 
system created a need for strict control over the flows be-
tween the two money circuits and the financial system was 
designed in line with this need. 
One of the natural connections between household and en-
terprise money circuits is the banking system, which in a 
competitive market economy, on the one hand, collects and 
pools private (and other) investments in the deposit market 
and on the other hand, channels to the most efficient uses 
through the asset market. The banks are not the only insti-
tutions performing this task, but they have certain compara-
tive advantages in this activity. In a traditional CPE, as 
mentioned above, resources are allocated in a rather different 
way and the necessary intermediation is through the State 
budget. Consequently, this function of the banking system 
is not needed and, in fact, is regarded to be a potential 
source of danger to the proper functioning of the system. 
To eliminate this danger, the banking system is perfectly 
segmented. Household banks deal only with households. In 
the deposit market, they supply time and saving deposits 
with centrally fixed interest rates which bear no relation to 
supply and demand for savings. Although time and savings 
deposits are not the only financial assets available to house-
holds, in practice households hold their financial wealth 
almost entirely in these forms. It is due to the fact that 
institutions offering other types of financial assets are also 
centrally controlled. 
Households' portfolios consist of cash, demand, time and 
saving deposits, insurances, State bonds and lottery tickets, 
but as mentioned above, the last four items are of negligible 
importance. Households may borrow but only from the 
centrally controlled household bank. Consequently, house-
hold loans are also centrally controlled. Plan targets in this 
respect are set in accordance with the plan targets for the 
supply of consumption goods. Consumption credit is strictly 
controlled and the outstanding amount is negligible. The 
same applies to housing credit. In general, the essence of 
the system is to rule out the existence of any autonomous 
component of money supply in the household money circuit. 
The other main goal is to keep households in the position 
of net savers. Net private savings, which are of small amount 
if compared to other forms of savings, are channelled directly 
to the National Bank, which has direct administrative con-
trol over the household bank. The National Bank unifies 
the functions of commercial and central banking and exerts 
a direct control over other existing enterprise banks (e.g. 
State Investment Bank, Foreign Trade Bank) which are 
formally separate units but which, in practice, can be re-
garded as subsidiaries of the National Bank performing 
certain specific functions. The concept of monobank reflects 
this institutional setting. 
The portfolios of enterprises consist almost entirely of de-
mand deposit. There are some cash and special types of 
mainly compulsory deposits and bonds but their share is 
negligible. The deposit market is monopolized by the mono-
bank and enterprise accounts are tools for central control 
over enterprise activities. The monobank strictly monitors 
enterprise expenses and checks whether they are in accord-
ance with plan targets and purposes derived from them. The 
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only loan the monobank provides is working capital loan 
and the amount of outstanding loans is also derived from 
the plan targets. 
The investment projects are centrally decided and financed 
directly by the State budget through the monobank. Interest 
rates, similarly to the household sector, bear no relation to 
supply and demand and consequently have no regulatory 
role. The missing store-of-value function of money is taken 
up by real items, mainly by input inventories and investment 
goods. This fact explains the observed hoarding of inven-
tories and investment goods (Allen, 1982). The labour force, 
to a certain extent, plays a similar role creating incentives 
for overmanning. 
The other point where passive money of the enterprise sphere 
might connect with active money is through foreign trade 
and payments. As a consequence, enterprises are discon-
nected from this point and foreign trade is performed 
through specialized foreign trade companies. These com-
panies are very closely and administratively controlled by the 
centre. Banking services for these companies are provided by 
the Foreign Trade Bank. Foreign payments not related to 
foreign trade are serviced by the National Bank, which has 
a monopoly of foreign exchange. Foreign financial assets 
are not available to any unit but the National Bank and the 
Foreign Trade Bank and only these banks can issue debt 
instruments to foreigners. Foreign trade is also centrally 
planned in accordance with general plan targets. 
The financial system is almost identical to the banking sys-
tem. Direct finance is not available to enterprises and the 
usual institutional investors of a market economy are also 
missing. Insurance companies formally exist but they offer 
only elementary forms of policies mainly for households. 
Any savings accumulated by insurance companies is directly 
channelled to the State budget. There are no pension funds 
as pensions are paid from the State budget. 
2. The financial system of Hungary after 1968 
This pure form of a traditional CPE has never existed in 
Hungary though for the period before 1956, the description 
given above is sufficiently accurate to characterize the Hun-
garian financial system. Although it was only a short period 
of central planning in Hungary, the detailed description 
given above is necessary to understand most of the changes 
since then. In fact, while the other parts of the economy 
underwent substantial reforms starting as early as 1957, the 
financial system remained almost untouched. The gradual 
reforms gave more and more functions to money in each 
money circuit creating increasing tension in the financial 
system. As a result of this process, the financial system 
became inadequate to the changed economy. 
The main reforms took place in 1968 by the introduction of 
the so-called new economic mechanism (NEM). It abolished 
compulsory plan targets for enterprises and formally made 
enterprises independent profit-oriented units. The idea be-
hind NEM was to introduce market forces in the allocation 
of resources related to current production but retain central 
control over investment activities. Firms became free to 
choose domestic suppliers and also to find domestic markets 
for their production. 
As a consequence of the changes, working-capital credit 
became an active monetary policy tool and so did investment 
credit. The main tools of control over money supply in 
the enterprise money circuit were credit ceilings and the 
confiscatory practice of fiscal policy. As the empirical evi-
dence presented later shows, control over the money supply 
was very important for money had very strong and immedi-
ate impacts on prices and imports, and excess liquidity 
tended to overflow to the household money circuit. How-
ever, due to monetary laxness in the State-budget-related 
component of money supply, money supply targets were 
mainly reached by non-monetary policy tools, namely by 
fiscal policy tools and in the case of the household money 
circuit, by wage regulations and taxation. 
While the institutional structure of the financial system and 
the forms of existing financial instruments remained practi-
cally unchanged until 1983, the accumulated tension en-
forced several changes in practice. 
For firms, central planning was replaced by fiscal terror and 
discriminatory credit policy (Tardos, 1987). Fiscal terror, 
beside heavy taxation, took the form of frequent and sud-
denly-performed confiscation of certain enterprise deposits 
(Asztalos, 1987). The consequence of this practice was that 
money lost its store-of-value function and money holding 
was motivated only by transactions demand. Savings were 
immediately transformed into either inventories or invest-
ments (Abel and Szalkai, 1987; Nadrai et al., 1985). Since 
the latter was subject to complicated and frequently changing 
regulations the former way was more frequently used. 
In the period of tight-money policy, firms could issue a 
special liability in the form of overdue payments. Although 
it was legally penalized, suppliers, due to the market power 
of purchasers, were not in a position to either cut the supply 
or take legal action. In fact, it was a form of involuntary 
trade credit between firms and neither suffering firms nor 
the National Bank could do anything against it. 
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Due to the lack of legal regulations and the deep concern of 
economic management for stability and full employment, 
financial indiscipline was to a greater or lesser extent con-
tinuously present in the enterprise sphere. A part of it orig-
inated from the growing discrepancy between the actual and 
desired level of development of the financial system. 
In the household money circuit, the main development'was 
the gradual increase in the importance of household credits. 
The ratio between household credits and personal incomes 
tripled between 1960 and 1985, with most of the changes 
after 1968. This development was due to the increasing role 
of credit in housing as consumer credit remained unimport-
ant (Király, 1988). Concerning financial assets, the only 
development was a substantial increase in financial wealth 
of households, but there is no sign that it was a result 
of forced savings (Portes, 1978; Portes-Winter, 1978, 1980; 
Pindak, 1983). 
The range of available financial assets remained unchanged 
until 1984, when the first bonds were issued to households. 
The portfolio composition of households underwent a re-
markable change between 1960 and 1970 and remained very 
stable afterwards. With the exception of 1961, households 
were net savers throughout the whole period until 1985. The 
ratio of net savings to personal incomes showed remarkable 
volatility and remained fairly low by international standards. 
This also shows that household savings were not the. main 
source of finance for enterprises. 
forms had the advantage of being legal. Tax regulations 
caused lock-in effects in the case of real estate. Later these 
regulations, especially for flats, were substantially relaxed. 
The legal regulations on the other hand, did their best to 
increase search and transaction costs and capital risk and to 
decrease liquidity of these portfolio items. Markets were 
kept in an underdeveloped state and private enterprises were 
not allowed to enter any of these markets until quite recently. 
In general, the State tried to minimize the room available 
for private arbitrage and this was explained by ideological 
arguments declaring any form of private arbitrage speculat-
ive income (which was contrasted to incomes originating 
from work). 
In spite of the fact that legal regulations were very restrictive 
in this regard, foreign exchange became an important item 
in households' portfolios. Although it is hardly detectable 
by official figures, it is widely felt that households gradually 
increased their holdings of foreign exchange. The disadvan-
tage of this asset was its illegal nature and limited liquidity 
(at non-official rates) due to the thinness of the markets. 
Since personal income tax was introduce only in 1987, tax 
arbitrage was not a dominant force in portfolio allocation. 
3. The recent reforms of the financial system 
3.1. Bond financing 
Average nominal interest rates on deposits show a slightly 
and very smoothly increasing trend (increasing from 4% in 
1960 to 5% in 1985) bearing no relation to consumer price 
changes or to supply and demand for savings. The same is 
true for household credits, especially for housing credits. 
The interest rate charged on housing credit has been subsi-
dized by the State budget and kept at an artificially low level 
(1-3%) until recently. 
The increased supply of consumer goods, especially that of 
durables and housing made real items attractive alternatives 
to financial instruments in the portfolio allocation of house-
holds. The importance of this became clear when inflation 
and consequently inflationary expectations became high and 
excessively volatile in the second half of the 1980s. Earlier, 
mainly supply deficiencies strengthened this impact. 
Real estate was another very important form of real invest-
ment. Some of the real items (mainly car, art treasures, and 
real estate) were fairly liquid and safe giving room for 
private arbitrage and in the inflationary period, for curtailing 
seigniorage income of the State. (Seigniorage has become an 
important source of income for the State budget.) All these 
The first financial innovation was the (re)introduction of 
bonds in 1983. (There were also bonds issued by the State 
but they were mainly tools of confiscation.) First, bonds 
were issued only to. enterprises, but by 1984, bonds issued 
to households were also permitted. The primary issue was 
followed by secondary trade in 1984. 
Until the reform of the banking system in 1987, the bond 
market was organized by the State Development Bank, 
which has underwritten the majority of issues. The introduc-
tion of bonds followed the segmented pattern of the financial 
sector. The bond market for households and for corporate 
investors developed in different ways. Until 1985, bonds 
issued to households could finance only community invest-
ment projects and they rather embodied contributions to 
these projects than financial investments. Accordingly, the 
amount of bonds of this sort was negligible (1,1% of total 
household deposits). 
In 1986, this restriction was lifted and bonds became finan-
cial assets heavily demanded by private investors. Until the 
end of 1987, the market grew very fast and there was excess 
demand on the market. Bonds issued in 1987 totalled 
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12,7 billion forints (108,5% of the increase in private de-
posits) and the value of bonds in circulation reached 19,6 
billion forints (6,8% of private deposits). The fast-growing 
popularity of bonds was due to several factors. Firstly, rates 
on bonds issued by enterprises were around 11 %—far above 
rates on time deposits (8% in 1986 and 9,5% in 1987 for 
three-year time deposit) and the inflation rate (5,3% in 1986 
and 8,6% in 1987). Secondly, bonds issued to households 
enjoyed full guarantee provided by the State and, due to the 
excess demand, they were very liquid. In fact, bonds issued to 
private investors were rationed by the Ministry of Finance. 
Lastly, yields on bonds, similarly to other incomes on finan-
cial assets, were not subject to tax. 
The situation changed dramatically in 1988 and there are 
several very important conclusions to be drawn from what 
happened. Bonds issued to households lost all their advan-
tages, while the risk attached to them became clear. Rates 
on household deposits were increased by 3% in October 
1987 and by a further 2,5% in June 1988 (including pre-
mium). Interest rates on one-year deposits reached 13,5% 
net of tax. The State guarantee on bonds issued to house-
holds was terminated and as a consequence of interest rate 
increases, the bond market collapsed. Although due to the 
repurchase by underwriting banks (mainly Budapest Bank) 
the liquidity of bonds was preserved, the capital loss am-
ounted to 10%. Lastly, with the introduction of personal 
income tax, bond yields, similarly to yields on other financial 
assets, became subject to a 20% withholding tax, while 
the risk attached to the bond was not recognized by tax 
regulations. 
As a consequence, the amount of new issues returned to the 
level of 1984 and secondary trading was almost exclusively 
confined to the repurchase by underwriting banks (holding 
25% of bonds of this sort by the end of 1988). Commercial 
banks took several actions to keep the secondary market 
alive but the inflationary expectations were (are) too high 
and volatile and yields on alternative short-term financial 
assets too high to make bonds competitive. 
Enterprise bonds were issued on an evaluation of credit-
worthiness by the underwriting bank and enjoyed no State 
guarantee. The yield was subject to corporate tax (40 to 
50%) and the first issues offered rates around 12 to 13% 
(pre-tax). Later the increasing demand created shortage on 
the market resulting in falling yields. The issue of bonds 
increased substantially first in 1986 and peaked in 1987 
(4,6 billion forints, 1,8% of total investments in the socialist 
sector and 12,1% of net retained earnings of enterprises). 
Similarly to household bonds, issues in 1988 fell to the level 
of 1984 (0,3 billion forints). The collapse of the market 
can be explained by interest rate increases and by sharply 
decreasing enterprise profits on the one hand, and by high 
inflationary expectations pushing up bond rates, on the other 
hand. 
In 1988, an additional very important change was made in 
bond financing. By terminating State guarantees and licens-
ing on household bonds, it became possible to start to 
integrate the two bond markets. It was essential to the 
development of an efficient and competitive financial system. 
In 1988, more than 70% of new issues was without restriction 
on the purchaser. 
The appearance of alternative financial assets (equity shares, 
treasury bills, negotiable bills, State bonds) and the reform 
of the banking system also had strong impacts on the bond 
market, which we will discuss later. 
3.2. The banking system 
The second important step of reform was the establishment 
of a two-tier banking system. The implementation of the 
reform started in 1986 by gradually separating commercial 
and central banking activities inside the National Bank of 
Hungary (NBH). In January 1987, the credit sections to-
gether with a subsidiary of the NBH were converted into 
three commercial banks (Hungarian Credit Bank (HCB), 
National Commercial and Credit Bank (NCCB) and Budap-
est Bank (BB)), which, together with two formerly existing 
banks (Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank (HFTB) and General 
Banking and Trust Company (GBTC)) receiving commercial 
bank charters, constituted the commercial banks in the new 
banking system. Beside them, two joint-ventures (Citibank 
Budapest and Unicbank), one off-shore bank (Central Euro-
pean International Bank) founded earlier (in 1986 and 1979 
respectively) and nine specialized financial institutions (SFIs) 
founded mainly by the State Development Bank, govern-
ment bodies and subsidiaries of the NBH formed the banking 
system dealing with enterprises. In the first phase of the 
reform, the segmentation of the banking system was pre-
served. As a consequence, financial institutions for house-
holds (National Savings Bank (NSB) and saving cooperat-
ives (SCs) and for private enterprises (Small Venture Bank, 
daughterbank of NSB) were practically untouched by the 
changes. 
The establishment of the two-tier banking system was of 
great potential importance for the efficiency of the financial 
system and through this, of the whole economy. However, 
the remaining restrictions, the structure of the banking sys-
tem and as a consequence of these factors, the actual func-
tioning of the financial system left most of this potential 
unutilized. The way the new commercial banks were created 
and controlled, the very high level of concentration in enter-
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prise banking, the fact that household banks remained un-
touched and segmented from enterprise financial insti-
tutions, the strong dependence of commercial banks on 
central bank refinancing, the inherited fragile investment 
portfolios of commercial banks, the lack of competition 
induced by money and security markets, the prudential regu-
lations and the high level of seigniorage realized on reserves, 
the unfavourable macroeconomic environment and the fact 
that the State Development Institute (SDI) practically 
crowded out any enterprise-initiated investment project not 
complying with World Bank initiatives resulted in the appar-
ent lack of competitiveness in the financial system and in 
particular in the banking system. The only unquestionably 
successful element of the new system was that its establish-
ment caused no serious disturbances in the economy. 
As mentioned earlier, the new commercial banks were cre-
ated by separating the commercial banking activities of the 
NBH and State Development Bank (SDB). As a conse-
quence, the initial portfolios of these banks were created 
by dividing the enterprise-related items of investment and 
deposit portfolios of NBH and SDB. This top-down way of 
creating banks applied to the infrastructure and staffs of the 
new banks. The inherited investment portfolios of the new 
banks were (and still are) very fragile and mirrored the 
discriminatory credit policy of the former regime bearing a 
loose relation if any to profitability and creditworthiness. 
For the first six months, firms were not allowed to change 
banks as far as current accounts were concerned. The asset 
market was opened up from the beginning but it remained 
an almost unused opportunity for competition. After lifting 
the restriction on the choice of bank some, but not a signifi-
cant number of enterprises changed banks. Due to the re-
maining restriction on multiple accounts, the asset market 
lacked any sign of competition. The restriction on multiple 
accounts also hindered joint financing. 
Although the splitting up of commercial bank activities of 
the monobank was undoubtedly a great step forward, the 
created structure remained highly concentrated by any stan-
dard. The three newly created commercial banks accounted 
for 87% of deposits and 76% of gross assets of all financial 
institutions dealing with enterprises. Taking into account 
seven commercial banks (excluding CIB) and the SFIs, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann H index was 0,29 for deposits and 
0,23 for assets. 
The lack of competitiveness was shown by the fairly high 
interest-rate margins (1,5 to 2%) and by the very high pre-
tax profits-to-assets (3,2 to 3,8%) and to capital ratios (61,1 
to 72,2%) never experienced in other sectors of the economy. 
The dividends shares of the commercial banks yielded (12 
to 14% net) also showed the very high profitability of bank-
ing as compared to other sectors and the lack of real compe-
tition. 
High profitability was a general phenomenon in the financial 
system. The other financial institutions showed similar or 
even higher pre-tax profits-to-assets ratios (for SFIs it was 
4,8%) but the extremely high pre-tax profits-to-capital ratios 
for the new commercial banks were due to the fact that they 
were undercapitalized. The ratios of paid-in capital-to-gross 
assets were around 4,5%, which should be interpreted in the 
light of the unknown (but certainly not unquestionable) 
quality of investment portfolio. 
Competition was also hindered by the segmentation of the 
banking system. Although the charters of the new commer-
cial banks allowed them to service the household sector, this 
right was temporarily suspended. Accordingly, household 
banking was not influenced by the first phase of the reform 
of the banking system. Households were serviced by the 
same financial institutions (NSB and SCs) under almost 
unchanged conditions. The preserved segmentation was 
partly explained by the unsettled problem of concessional 
housing loans. These loans with long maturity and low and 
fixed interest rate constituted a considerable part of NSB 
and SCs investment portfolios. The low level of its capital 
and reserves also prevented NSB from becoming a full-
service commercial bank without further substantial capital 
injection. The SCs also needed some kind of reorganization 
in order to be able to enter interbank markets and other 
financial markets. 
The structure of liabilities of the new commercial banks 
and prudential and other bank regulations also gave an 
explanation to the lack of competitiveness. Central bank 
refinance was the most important source for the new com-
mercial banks (constituting 37 to 54% of liabilities). Compe-
tition for deposits, due to several reasons, was not a real 
alternative. NBH refinancing comprised both, refinancing 
of long-term (investment) and medium- and short-term 
(working capital) loans extended by commercial banks. The 
refinancing of investment loans was practically limited to 
World Bank investment projects and investment loans ex-
tended by commercial banks to long-term refinancing (for 
the first period even long-term time deposits were not eligible 
sources). Long-term refinance was provided on a case-by-
case basis. Medium- and short-term refinance windows were 
set proportionally to State shares in banks equities (norma-
tive overdraft facility) and provided an automatic access. 
An additional gradually-decreasing amount of refinance was 
provided for the transition period (1987) with access limits 
being proportional to normative overdraft limits. The bank-
ing system as a whole had a financing gap of 67% 
(1 - deposits/assets ratio) that had to be financed this way. 
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Reserve requirements and remuneration of them made the 
relative price of loanable funds from refinancing (which were 
subject only to liquid assets requirements being additional to 
reserve requirements) low and discouraged competition for 
deposits. The discriminatory prudential and non-prudential 
(portfolio and activity) regulations also hindered compe-
tition in enterprise banking. Due to the regulations, commer-
cial banks were practically prohibited from maturity conver-
sion. 
To sum up, the system was clearly designed to enhance 
control over the banking system and to facilitate credit 
allocation according to government's priorities. Efficiency 
and flexibility were of secondary importance. Banking regu-
lations and supervision were in line with this intention. In 
return for limited autonomy, commercial banks enjoyed 
almost perfect monopoly and consequently were not exposed 
to serious competition of any sort. 
The second phase of the reform starting in 1988, partly 
remedied the problems mentioned above and relaxed control 
over the banking system. Viewed in large, the introduced 
changes helped to increase the degree of competitiveness in 
the financial system and the autonomy enjoyed by financial 
institutions. 
Further steps were taken in the integration of enterprise and 
household banking. As a first step, commercial banks were 
allowed to issue certificates of deposits (CDs) to households 
and by the end of 1988, the value of CDs in circulation 
reached 5,6 billion forints (almost seven times as much as 
the value of bonds issued to households and 28,6% of the 
increase in household deposits at savings institutions in 
1988). This development should be viewed in the light of the 
fact that new popular financial assets issued to households 
emerged (e.g. treasury bills) and that households' propensity 
to save in domestic financial assets declined. In 1989, the 
value of new issues increased dynamically (by the end of 
April 4 billion forints), while household deposits decreased. 
Interest rates on household deposits were, in several steps 
starting in October 1987, increased and tended to merge with 
rates on enterprise deposits and with the costs of alternative 
sources of liquidity. 
The problem of concessional housing loans was also tackled 
in the sense that NSB and SCs portfolios were freed from 
this item by setting up a separate agency (Lakásalap) dealing 
with these loans. Unfortunately, the solution found to the 
problem still makes the investment portfolios of NSB and 
SCs dependent on the State budget for bonds issued by 
this agency which partly replaced housing loans. (Other 
commercial banks and the social security fund were also 
ordered to buy certain amounts of this bond). The rate on 
this bond (17% in 1989) is set by the State budget (probably 
as a result of bargaining) giving only moderate incentives 
for competition. 
The most important step was to lift the restriction on com-
mercial banks dealing with households. It was taken in 
January 1989 together with the measure giving a commercial 
bank charter to NSB. This step did not mean that interest 
rate ceilings on household deposits were abolished. They 
remained policy tools (the ceilings for 1990 are 14% for sight, 
22% for short-term and 26% for long-term time deposits). 
The number of commercial banks and joint-venture banks 
increased. As mentioned earlier, NSB became a full-service 
commercial bank and in the near future, it is expected to be 
converted into a joint-stock company. This conversion will 
have to be accompanied by a substantial increase in the 
share capital. (At present, NSB does not comply with the 
prudential regulations as its capital-to-assets ratio is about 
2,5%.) In addition, some SFIs got commercial bank charters. 
A new domestic commercial bank was founded (Postabank 
es Takarékpénztár) in 1988 which later in 1989 incorporated 
the deposit-collecting activity of post offices. This made it 
an important bank in the household deposit market since 
post offices offer a well-developed branch network. In 1989, 
the SCs formed a cooperative bank (Magyar Takarékszövet-
kezeti Bank) and a new joint-venture bank, the largest one, 
was founded (Interbank). In January 1990, the Central Eu-
rope Development Corporation purchased half of the shares 
of the General Banking and Trust Company for USD 
10 million creating a new joint-venture bank. While the 
increasing number of commercial banks undoubtedly con-
tributed to the increase in the degree of competitiveness, due 
to the relatively small capital of the newly established banks, 
the level of concentration of the banking system remained 
fairly high. The three largest commercial banks increased 
their capitals by issuing new shares. The highest increase 
was achieved by HCB (65,6%) strengthening its leading 
position. At the end of 1989, the NCCB started to issue 
shares to households as part of its share-capital increase. 
A further very important step in establishing a more compre-
hensive banking system was to relax the restriction on fee-
based and capital transactions of commercial banks in 
foreign exchange. As mentioned earlier, after the establish-
ment of a two-tier banking system in 1987, the NBH retained 
its monopolistic position as the borrower and holder of 
foreign exchange. In January 1989, commercial banks could 
start to collect deposits in foreign exchange from domestic 
and foreign enterprises and individuals (with the exception 
of foreign banks) and also to handle foreign-exchange ac-
counts. In March, a limited foreign-exchange market was 
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created where commercial banks could buy and sell foreign 
exchange at centrally­fixed rates to service their clients' ex­
port and import activities. The commercial banks also 
started to provide services related to foreign payments for­
merly provided by the NBH. 
In July, the restrictions were further relaxed. Commercial 
banks can now extend loans in foreign exchange to enter­
prises provided that the purposes of the loans comply with 
the preferential goals set by the NBH (increase in export 
capacities, participation in foreign ventures, etc.). The bor­
rowing enterprise should still apply for a special permission 
from the NBH although in principle, the NBH might issue 
a lump sum permission to banks (HFTB and CI Β got such 
permission). As a consequence of these changes, the regu­
lation forcing commercial banks to exchange all their 
foreign­exchange deposits into domestic currency with the 
NBH was lifted. Reserve requirements (15%) are compar­
able to those on forint deposits and reserves are remunerated 
at internationally prevailing short­term rates. In return for 
the restriction on foreign­exchange cash holding, the liquid­
ity management of commercial banks is backed up by the 
NBH. Commercial banks, differently from joint­venture 
banks, are still not allowed to borrow abroad and this 
restriction is not envisaged to be relaxed in the near future. 
3.3. Money and capital markets 
The money market was open for households with the im­
plementation of the treasury bill (TB) in March 1988. Due 
to its liquidity and competitive rates (8%, 9% and 10% for 
three, six and nine month TBs), it became quite popular. By 
the end of 1988, the value of TBs in circulation reached 4 
billion forints (15% of accumulation of financial assets in 
1988) and by July 1989, 24 billion forints. By that time, 
interest rates on TBs had been substantially increased (16%, 
17,5% and 19%) keeping the competitiveness of this form 
of investment. (This tendency was preserved later on and 
the corresponding figures for 1990 are 22%, 23% and 24%). 
In December 1988, the NBH started to auction three month 
TBs using price auction technique. All non­private investors 
are eligible bidders and the bills are fully transferable instru­
ments. Non­competitive bids are also accepted. The TBs are 
redeemable at any time under fixed rules on yields. For 
banks, TBs have the advantage that they are regarded as 
eligible liquid assets by prudential regulations. 
Taking into account the first six auctions, the average yield 
was 18,4% and the price limit was effective only at the first 
two auctions. The total amount of issues was 4,6 billion 
forints (in five months). After the starting period, auctions 
will be held fortnightly and six month TBs will also be 
auctioned. 
These two forms of TBs are very important to establish 
open­market operations giving much more room for man­
oeuvring in conducting monetary policies. 
By enacting a new law on business corporations (1988/VI) 
and on the conversion of business corporations (1989/XIII) 
the legal regulations paved the way for a functioning capital 
market. Equity shares started to be issued earlier (by the 
end of 1988, the value of tradeable shares reached 48 billion 
forints) but the conversion of State enterprises into joint­
stock companies will increase the value of primary issues 
and secondary trade of shares substantially. The former 
issues lacked any kind of regulation concerning transparency 
and protection of investors. A new law on securities expected 
to be enacted in the near future will regulate these aspects. 
An embryonic stock exchange (Értékpapir­kereskedelmi Tit­
kárság) has already started to operate and has worked out 
a sort of internal regulation on quoting and trading shares 
at the new stock exchange expected to be opened in 1990. 
The intention was to fill the gaps in legal regulations and to 
provide a minimal level of tranparency and protection of 
investors. (The Radius Hungaricus case has already shown 
that worries in this respect are not exaggerated.) 
Shares of some Hungarian firms have been introduced in 
foreign stock exchanges and some foreign corporations have 
been founded to invest in shares of Hungarian companies. 
Purchase of Hungarian shares is promoted by a new law on 
investment by foreigners in Hungary (1988/XXIV) enacted 
in 1988 and allowing the repatriation of profit and capital 
upon selling shares or liquidating the company without any 
restriction (provided that no liability remains). The work to 
bring the Hungarian accounting system into harmony with 
international standards has already been started and a lead­
ing auditing company (Price Waterhouse) was contracted to 
advise the work. 
The actual secondary trade of equity shares shows that at 
the moment, it is a very thin market with high volatility and 
with a very small number of marketable shares (which are 
rarely supplied). The marketable shares are those of the 
commercial banks, some widely known non­financial com­
panies (e.g. Skala) and firms quoted at foreign stock ex­
changes (e.g. Novotrade). Small investors are pratically ex­
cluded from the market because of the high face values 
of shares being above 0,5 million forints (approximately 
USD 8 000). At present, the commercial banks and four 
broker companies operate on the floor. This is quite a recent 
development for earlier commercial banks acted as dealers 
and concentrated their activities on the over­the­counter 
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market. The new law on securities is expected to exclude 
commercial banks from the members of the stock exchange 
and to allow only their specialized and institutionally separ-
ated units to trade on the floor. Commercial banks are still 
partly acting as dealers for most of the bonds (approximately 
250), which would be marketable only with a substantial 
loss of their principal values. The marketable bonds (ap-
proximately 100) are traded on the floor and banks act as 
brokers. The bonds are exclusively underwritten by commer-
cial banks. 
3.4. The insurance market 
The reform of the insurance system proceeded in tandem 
with the reform of the banking system. In July 1986, the 
mono-insurance organization (Aliami Biztosito — State In-
surance Company) was split up into two parts. The division 
of the portfolio was along business lines giving monopoly 
to the one which got that line of business. Later, the two 
new companies (one inheriting the old name and Hungaria) 
were assumed to compete in each market but the inherited 
market powers, staff and infrastructure made this assump-
tion an illusion. The insurance companies remained State-
owned with no shake-up change in management. 
The first new entry into the market was in 1988, when Atlasz 
Insurance Company was incorporated by SIC and Ibusz, 
the largest Hungarian travel company. Later in 1989, 12% 
(120 million forints) of the equity shares were purchased by 
Colonia. The next step was taken in January 1990, when 
Hungaria was converted into a joint-stock company and 
49 % of its shares were purchased by Allianz for DM 80 
million. The shares of this company will not be traded. Since 
these changes are very recent there are, of cource, no tangible 
impacts of them on the market. 
4. Future reforms of the financial system 
Although the financial system of the Hungarian economy, 
as a result of the reforms described above, resembles more 
closely those of the market economies than any of the other 
East European countries, it still seems to be underdeveloped 
being not in full harmony with present changes in the econ-
omy and with future reform ideas. The experiences of other 
countries in the past and a closer examination of the pre-
sently existing forms of financial systems in market econom-
ies show that there is no one particular form of financial 
system which could be regarded as the most efficient one. An 
efficient, innovative flexible financial system should reflect 
historical development, traditions, social attitudes, economic 
and social structures, prevailing preferences of investors and 
several other important economic and social factors. The 
need for harmony between the financial system and the real 
side of the economy, between the financial system (or rather 
the economy) and the real society stems from the nature of 
money and monetary flows. Since it is very hard to foresee 
with perfect certainty the way the Hungarian economy and 
society will develop in the future, it is also very hard to 
define precisely the way the financial system will and should 
develop. However, there are some basic problems of the 
development any future reform programme should consider. 
The development of the financial system should serve and 
promote the restructing of the economy which is the key to 
any recovery. Restructuring will require increased invest-
ment activities. The role of the financial system in this respect 
is to raise the necessary finance, to pool it and to allocate 
it. For the financial system to do this, financial institutions 
should be innovative, flexible and market-responsive. They 
should offer a wide range of financial instruments to meet 
the demands of lenders and borrowers. The only way to 
achieve this goal is to increase the degree of competitiveness 
in the economy in general and in the financial system in 
particular. As the description of the Hungarian financial 
system given above shows, at present it lacks strong compe-
tition and consequently the desirable properties mentioned 
here. 
Beside competitiveness and efficiency, there is another very 
important condition for any future development, namely 
stability and safety. Unadvised economic policies and reform 
steps, accelerating inflation and hectic expectations have 
already created instability in the Hungarian economy. The 
restructuring of the economy, hoping that it finally takes 
place, will certainly create some additional sources of uncer-
tainty and instability. A massive restructuring of production, 
distribution, destinations of exports and imports, income 
distribution and redistribution, and ownership rights will all 
contribute to this process and it will have severe reper-
cussions on the whole economy and in particular, on the 
financial system. Financial markets in general tend to pro-
duce excess volatility and to transmit it to other markets. 
This is especially so, if financial deregulation is taken 
seriously. Consequently, any reform of the financial system 
in Hungary should be concerned with this problem and 
should set targets and sequence them in a way which keeps 
instability within tolerable limits. 
In preparing a reform programme, the present state of the 
economy and the legacy of the old regime should also be 
taken into account. In the financial system, this legacy ap-
pears in the portfolios of most of the existing financial 
institutions. This is a consequence of the way these insti-
tutions functioned in the old regime and the way some of 
the new institutions were created. The quality of a substantial 
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part of the financial assets is dubious, if not inferior. The 
ultimate reason for it is that the physical assets behind 
financial assets are old-fashioned and badly managed. It is, 
perhaps, worth emphasizing that it is not only the productive 
assets but also the management that makes the quality of 
financial assets questionable. In the portfolio of the NBH, 
the extremely high amount of foreign debt liabilities and the 
almost equally large amount of government-related assets 
constitute the legacy of the old regime. Writing off assets 
(and consequently liabilities) does not seem to be a feasible 
solution here. 
Regarding the portfolios of commercial banks, the legacy 
takes the form of bad or dubious enterprise loans. Writing 
them off appears to be a formally possible solution but it 
would either simply transfer them into the investment port-
folio of the central bank (NBH) in forms of government-
related loans or paralyse the banking system by decreasing 
its capital and/or profits both required for the healthy func-
tioning of the banking system. 
A third form of the legacy is related to the newly-created 
government agency, the housing loans fund (Lakásalap) 
which took over the concessional housing loans from NSB 
and SCs. Writing off these loans would have exactly the 
same effects described above. 
The institutional structure, market powers and asymmetries, 
non-competitive managements, very important gaps in the 
financial institutions, and unnatural structure of ownership 
rights are also results of the past development and are 
obstacles to future reforms. 
The basic questions to be answered are: what to do with 
this legacy and how to share its burden? No reform can 
proceed without giving clear-cut answers to these questions. 
Another basic question is how to finance the restructuring 
which is, as discussed earlier, an inevitable and urgent task. 
Before thinking about further far-reaching reforms this ques-
tion should also be given a clear-cut answer. 
In designing reform programmes of the financial system one 
should also consider what can and cannot be solved by such 
a programme. Although a flexible and efficient financial 
system can help in remedying strucural problems of the 
economy, it in itself cannot solve this sort of problem. 
Moreover, if other necessary actions aiming at restructuring 
production are not taken, structural problems might even 
paralyse the financial system. By elaborating the quality of 
debt instruments of enterprises, banks and underwriting 
institutions engage in extensive examination and supervision 
putting competitive pressure on management. But again, if 
it is the only mechanism transmitting competitive pressure 
to enterprise management then its impact is very likely to 
be limited in extent. 
The problem of non-competitive and incapable management 
is another part of the heritage. Unfortunately, present devel-
opment seems to preserve them giving them several chances 
to survive. The financial institutions are not exceptions in 
this regard for shake-up changes in managements are un-
heard of in the financial system, too. This is a key point any 
reform programme should pay attention to. 
Unadvised economic policy and reform steps, loss of credi-
bility, accelerating inflation, distorted and hectic expec-
tations, massive State budget deficit and intermediation 
through State agencies in non-competitive ways and other 
symptoms of the Hungarian economy are also partly or fully 
out of the scope of reforms of the financial system. However, 
these factors have strong repercussions on the sucess of these 
reforms. Consequently, reforms of the other parts of the 
economy should proceed hand-in-hand with reforms of the 
financial system keeping the internal consistency of reform 
programmes. 
Although the problems of the financial system clearly point 
to the direction of financial deregulation the monetary 
authorities should retain some power to reach certain macro-
economic targets provided that there are well-established 
relations among their operative, intermediate and ultimate 
targets. This is, however, by no means an argument against 
a high level of autonomy of financial institutions, which is 
a pre-condition for efficiency. To reach sensible macro-
economic targets, monetary authorities need a highly ef-
ficient, flexible and market-responsive financial system. In 
the case of macrotargets too, it should be borne in mind 
that nothing is costless in an economy. On the contrary, 
economic and monetary policies are quite expensive and 
there is no reason why the cost minimization principle should 
not apply to them. An efficient financial system can help in 
this respect. If financial institutions are all reluctant to pur-
sue certain desired actions, the government and/or monetary 
authorities should reconsider (but, of course, not necessarily 
change) their policies. 
The same principle applies to the regulatory framework of 
the financial system. Agencies pursuing regulation should 
have enough power to stop abuses in the financial system 
and to intervene at any point of the system if it is really 
necessary. This right, however, should be limited to well-
defined cases and any sort of discriminatory practice should 
be prohibited. 
Any reform of the financial system is subject to political 
influences and causes political concern. This is one of the 
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places where extremely high profits (mainly capital gains) 
may emerge rather soon (or have already done so) and where 
large investors have clearly larger room for manoeuvring. 
There are already clear signs showing that people are not 
prepared to accept large changes in income and wealth 
distribution. Neither are people prepared for failures and 
massive losses which are also bound to happen in financial 
markets. These factors together with excess volatility of 
financial markets might induce antipathy against financial 
instruments, institutions and markets and ultimately against 
the market economy. 
Due to the nature and extent of changes, both sides, financial 
institutions (and their managements) and monetary and 
supervising authorities have to learn how to operate a sophis-
ticated financial system. Since there is no generally good and 
efficient system to follow and since these economies are 
under-researched, the only available strategy is trial and 
error. This inevitably leads to mistakes on both sides creating 
additional sources of instability. 
Increasing the degree of competitiveness is undoubtedly the 
main issue. To this end, reforms should concentrate on 
widening the range of available financial instruments and 
increasing the number and types of competing financial 
institutions. Numbers alone, of course, do not ensure compe-
tition but the number and types of financial institutions in 
the Hungarian economy are too low by any standard. There 
is a wide range of non-bank financial institutions simply 
missing from the system (savings and loans associations, 
investment banks, credit unions, building societies, pension 
funds) and money and capital markets are not well organ-
ized, having few participants. 
Competition in the financial system should lead to a situation 
in which financial instruments depend on the demands of 
lenders and borrowers. The institutional structure should 
follow the developments on the financial markets and the 
types and number of financial institutions should also be 
determined by the markets. Only efficient and flexible insti-
tutions should survive. Regulations should enforce financial 
institutions to take only prudential risk and that investors 
are in a position to judge the quality of financial assets and 
compare their yields. For this to come about, any financial 
and non-financial institution or individual investor seeking 
to acquire earning assets or to issue debt instruments should 
meet competition from a wide array of institutions. Regu-
lations, government interventions and inherited market pow-
ers should not be allowed to favour any particular type of 
institution leading to the dominance of it. Monopoly power, 
be it of any origin, hinders competition and innovation in 
the financial system and ultimately results in a less efficient 
economy. Due to the vital role the financial system plays in 
the process of structural change and economic growth, the 
elimination of monopoly power on financial markets is of 
particular importance to any further reforms. 
Full integration of the financial system is another important 
task. As described in the previous section, the integration of 
the household and enterprise money circuits has almost 
been completed. The integration of operations in domestic 
currency and in foreign exchange has been started although 
not yet completed. The integration of the Hungarian finan-
cial system into the international financial system is hindered 
by the lack of convertibility of the forint and by the foreign-
exchange monopoly of the NBH. To achieve convertibility, 
domestic markets should be opened up leading to massive 
restructuring of relative prices and a market-based exchange-
rate mechanism should be established. 
The degree of competitiveness is not likely to be uniform 
across financial markets in the future. Segmentation in this 
sense is bound to occur. The upper end of consumer retail 
market (provided that financial deregulation takes place) 
and servicing large firms are likely to develop into highly 
competitive submarkets, while mass retail banking or servi-
cing small firms are not likely to follow this pattern. The 
different markets will also have different degrees of sophisti-
cation. Degrees of competitiveness will also differ across 
regions hindering geographical mobility of funds. Further 
reforms should try to narrow these differences. 
Autonomy of financial institutions is also an important 
aspect. Only autonomous institutions can be expected to 
assume prudential risk and achieve efficiency. To increase 
the degree of autonomy financial institutions enjoy, a mass-
ive deregulation is needed mainly in banking. Financial 
deregulation might have adverse effects (e.g. excess volatility 
of interest rates) especially if not accompanied by similar 
deregulation in the other segments of the economy. A cau-
tious sequencing might, however, overcome these problems. 
In this respect too, it should be borne in mind that stability 
is also not without costs. Sometimes it might cost much 
more than excess volatility caused by financial markets. 
An increased transparency to the system should also be 
an important element of reforms. Together with improved 
information flows, it would lower transaction costs substan-
tially and increase the protection investors enjoy. High trans-
action costs lead to lock-in effects and thus hinder competi-
tiveness. Tax regulations should also avoid increasing trans-
action costs. 
Restructuring of the economy requires productive invest-
ment on a large scale. This leads to the issue of long-term 
debt instruments. Ultimate savers are not likely to demand 
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long-term assets in this amount and especially not in a hectic 
and inflationary period. Consequently, there will be a need 
for financial intermediaries performing maturity conversion. 
The increased risk investments assume during a massive 
restructuring will also increase the importance of indirect 
financing and institutional investors. Most of the individual 
investors will not be in a position to judge the quality of 
debt instruments and consequently will not want to hold 
them. 
inability in this regard also stems from the low level of risk 
funds as compared to the expected losses. Their unwilling-
ness stems from the expectation that the present government 
is too weak to carry through bankruptcy and in the future 
they might get a much more generous offer from the govern-
ment. (The present offer consists of a conversion of 20% of 
such a loan into bonds issued by the housing loans fund 
(Lakásalap) and yielding 17% at present and a conversion of 
50% of losses into the same type of bonds after settlement.) 
On the other hand, it would be necessary to promote long-
term contractual savings. The establishment of financial 
institutions servicing this market (life-insurance companies, 
pension funds, etc.) should be encouraged by tax and other 
regulations. Personal income tax regulations could also en-
courage long-term contractual savings. 
Competitiveness of the financial system does not automati-
cally result from a proper institutional structure, a suf-
ficiently wide range of financial assets and a suitably de-
signed legal and regulatory environment. Ultimately, it is an 
attitude of people managing financial institutions. If they do 
not want to or simply cannot be competitive, competition is 
not likely to come about. Newly emerging institutions are 
more likely to have proper management but the most influen-
tial ones have not undergone substantial changes in this 
respect. The present legal and regulatory environment tends 
to preserve inefficient management. Future reforms should 
change this situation and encourage takeovers and other 
management changes. 
4.1. The banking system 
In the banking system safety is perhaps the most important 
aspect. In spite of the outstanding profitability of the newly 
incorporated large commercial banks (HCB, NCCB, BB) in 
the first two years of their operations, the quality of their 
investment portfolios is still questionable, if not dubious. 
The recently announced plan of the government to liquidate 
41 notoriously loss-making enterprises with overdue liab-
ilities is already a serious threat to these banks (having 
10 billion forints of the debts of these companies in their 
investment portfolios). The domino effect the liquidation of 
these firms might have and the fact that there is a much 
larger number of loss-making enterprises (about 200 with 
debts of 100 billion forints) makes this problem critical for 
the banking system and the whole economy. 
This problem clearly constitutes a part of the legacy of the 
old regime and it would be unfair to blame the commercial 
banks for it. They simply inherited their investment port-
folios. On the other hand, they also enjoyed considerable 
market power resulting in high profits. Consequently, to 
the extent their profits exceeded the level they could have 
achieved without having market power, these profits can be 
involved in a fair solution. One solution could be to write 
off bad loans at the expense of the State's shares in the 
capital of the commercial banks. This solution would have 
several advantages. Firstly, the level of concentration in the 
banking system, which is much too high, would decrease 
giving more room for competition. The capital the banking 
system would lose this way would be reinvested in a competi-
tive way very soon. Secondly, the practice of involuntary 
purchase of financial assets could be stopped. Lastly, there 
would be no further increase in State budget debts which 
have already reached a critical level. The obvious disadvan-
tage of this solution is the massive loss of future income 
stream for the State budget. But any other solution such as 
subsidy would have a similar effect although not necessarily 
on the revenue side. 
The ownership structure is a critical point of the banking 
system requiring some reconciliation independently from the 
problems of bad loans. During the last four decades, the 
State proved to be a very bad owner in each part of the 
economy. It did not pay any serious attention to the value 
of its assets and preserved the weakness of its firms by 
sheltering them from any sort of competition and by pursu-
ing a massive redistribution of corporate incomes. With 
respect to the newly-incorporated commercial banks, the 
State continued this practice. Taking this into account and 
the plans for massive privatization in the economy, there is 
no reason for excluding the banking system from privatiza-
tion. It could also increase foreign participation in banking 
which would bring in modern business technology and 
methods resulting in increased efficiency. 
The present regulations do not give any incentive to commer-
cial banks or to the other creditors of these firms to initiate 
the resolution of this problem and in practice, commercial 
banks are not in the position to write off these loans. Their 
The other problem of the banking system is the very high 
level of concentration. There is no clear-cut evidence in 
favour of economies of scale in banking and after all, the 
large commercial banks in Hungary did not achieve their 
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size in a natural (competitive) way by absorbing inefficient 
units with competitive bids or by capitalizing on their ef-
ficient operations. They were simply born large and they 
based their highly profitable activities on market power. It 
is, however, not the intention of the paper to suggest any 
artificial and consequently ad hoc split-up of commercial 
banks. This would be unreasonable and would reflect the 
attitudes of the former regime. In addition it would be a 
source of instability, the last thing needed in banking. How-
ever, the further reforms should use all the available tools 
to diminish existing monopoly power in the financial system. 
A special aspect of market power is the market power on 
local markets. While banking has undoubtedly changed in 
Budapest, banking in other towns, especially in small towns 
has not changed substantially. The fact that NSB became a 
full-service commercial bank and that the newly-incorpor-
ated Postbank also has a commercial bank charter might 
change the situation. However, due to the relatively small 
capital of these banks, the impacts of these changes are likely 
to be limited in extent. This problem is closely related to the 
geographic mobility of funds which is a rather neglected 
aspect of reforms. Restructuring of the economy will also 
imply changes in the regional structure of production. At 
the moment, the banking system does not seem to be able 
to assist this process. A solution to the problem is to encour-
age the import of modern banking and information tech-
nology making extensive branching, which is not likely to 
happen in the foreseeable future, unnecessary. A foreign-aid 
programme clearly has a role to play here. 
The problem of bad debts calls the attention to another 
very important issue of the banking system, namely to the 
problem of deposit insurance. If competition is to be taken 
seriously, bank failures are bound to happen. Although this 
word has an evil ring, it should be borne in mind that there 
is a very important distinction between protecting a bank's 
depositors and protecting the bank itself, which means pro-
tecting its management and stockholders. At the moment, 
any bank failure would be a disastrous event for there is 
no deposit insurance in Hungary. Considering the present 
situation, it would be advisable to make deposit insurance 
obligatory. What is not clear is the institutional form of it. 
One way would be to have a government agency performing 
the task but this would almost certainly imply a premium 
system quite independent from the risk individual banks 
assume. The other problem of this solution is that it is hard 
to believe that this agency would engage in an extensive 
programme of bank examination and supervision and would 
foster sound management in banking. The State bank inspec-
tion could have done this before as it had the necessary legal 
and regulatory power to do so but there is no sign that it 
did so. Another possibility would be to leave this task to 
profit-oriented deposit insurance firms but the question is 
whether there would be adequate competition on this 
market. 
Banking regulations play, perhaps, the most important role 
in providing safety in the banking system. Until the enact-
ment of a comprehensive antitrust law and the establishment 
of a practice of antitrust regulation, they should also have an 
antitrust nature concerning allowable bank-related activities, 
bank mergers, and restrictions on assets. Fostering compe-
tition should be in the focus of these regulations. Commercial 
banks tended to be non-competitive and this was also due 
to banking regulations. From this point of view, interest-
rate ceilings on private deposits do not seem to be sensible 
tools. On the other hand, prevailing rates on TBs and the 
yields on auctioned TBs (which are transferable instruments) 
make this regulation discriminatory. The only clear advan-
tage of interest-rate ceilings is that it makes commercial 
banks very innovative in getting around them. 
4.2. The money market 
The establishment of a well-organized and sophisticated 
money market could, perhaps, be the first step towards a 
full-fledged financial system. The importance of this step 
stems from several factors. Firstly, it would create strong 
competition to commercial banks, badly needed in the Hun-
garian financial system. Secondly, it would give more flexi-
bility in conducting monetary policies. Thirdly, it could 
measure short-term inflationary expectations, a piece of in-
formation monetary policy undoubtedly needs and has been 
lacking. Lastly, it would induce a higher degree of competi-
tiveness in other financial markets and would increase geo-
graphic mobility of funds. 
The money market is the place where the integration of the 
Hungarian financial system into the international financial 
system could be started. This would, however, need a mar-
ket-based exchange rate mechanism. Foreign portfolio in-
vestments, especially short-run ones might transmit excess 
volatility to the Hungarian financial markets but it should 
be borne in mind that the reactions of the foreign investors 
are mainly responses to their expectations about the overall 
economic performance of the country and to particular 
developments in economic indicators. These factors exert 
their impacts even if the financial system is perfectly isolated 
from international financial markets. What a developed and 
internationally integrated financial system does is that it 
makes these impacts and their costs more immediate and 
visible. Without a developed financial system the costs would 
probably be much higher and adverse effects would last 
longer. 
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To establish a fully-fledged money market, the number and 
types of debt issuers should be increased and the range of 
available instruments should be widened. Commercial paper 
issued by large and widely known enterprises and financial 
institutions play, for example, an important role in money 
markets. The range of available instruments should also 
include short-term (one month) securities and instruments 
serving hedging operations. A modern trading system based 
on computerized (book-entry) transactions is also of import-
ance. It could also help international integration and geo-
graphical mobility. The underdevelopment in this respect 
might even be an advantage for the most modern technology 
can be introduced from the beginning. Joint ventures 
(dealers, brokers, etc.) could greatly contribute to this pro-
cess and also to the training of the specialists. Training is a 
point where international aid programmes have a role to 
Play-
High profits realized on financial markets can induce intro-
duction of special taxes on incomes from financial market 
operations. If these taxes are based on transactions—a case, 
due to the simplicity of such a method, likely to happen—it 
is the money market, which is subject to the strongest reper-
cussions resulting in fast decreasing amounts of transactions. 
The experiences of other countries (see e.g. Englund, 1989) 
show that, on the one hand, this sort of tax leads to a lower 
degree of competitiveness in the whole financial system and 
to lock-in effects on portfolios of investors and on the other 
hand, due to the high elasticity of the tax base, does not 
bring the desired tax revenue. Consequently, it is advisable 
not to tax transactions directly and to choose other ways to 
tackle the problem. 
4.3. The capital market 
Restructuring of the economy entails high risk and it is not 
clear that entrepreneurs are willing or able to assume it. In 
the absence of a well-functioning capital market, risk leads 
to underinvestment and consequently to a lower rate of 
economic growth. From the viewpoint of financial investors, 
instruments traded on capital markets are attractive alterna-
tives to those traded on money markets and to deposits if 
they are liquid and offer yields which reflect the assumed 
risk. As far as risk is concerned, the most important thing 
is accurate, transparent and up-to-date assessment of bor-
rowing companies and their securities. In the case of primary 
distribution, it is the underwriting institution which does 
this job. Until now in Hungary, only commercial banks acted 
as underwriters. While in traditional lending the comparative 
advantages of commercial banks seem to exist, the same is 
not true for direct finance. The reforms should encourage 
and help other institutions (e.g. insurance companies, invest-
ments banks) to enter this market. 
The Hungarian capital market is likely to remain thin with 
only a small number of actually traded securities. Conse-
quently, liquidity and safety of principal will not be guaran-
teed for a wide range of securities. In such a, situation, 
institutional investors, as ultimate holders of securities, 
might play an important role. For this to come about, a 
larger number of them is first of all needed. 
In spite of the legal regulations, insider trading is bound to 
occur. This is partly a consequence of the fact that infor-
mation flows were highly centralized and monopolized in 
the past. Insider trading is dangerous not only because it is 
unfair but also because of the lemon effect. It might easily 
lead to underinvestment and lower degree of competitiveness 
in the financial system. To avoid this, an efficient monitoring 
body is needed. It would also be sensible to learn from the 
experiences of other countries in this respect. 
Another aspect of competitiveness is the nature and number 
of brokers and dealers. The recently enacted legal regulations 
rightly excluded commercial banks from this market (after 
a transitory period). The remaining brokers and dealers are, 
however, too few in number to be able to service this market 
properly, especially after the beginning of massive privatiza-
tion. Regulations should encourage the incorporation of 
such firms and monetary authorities should help their work 
(e.g. with facilities and training). The application of modern 
trading methods mentioned in connection with money mar-
kets is of the same importance here. 
The fact that shares of some Hungarian companies are 
already quoted in foreign stock exchanges (e.g. Novotrade) 
and that the most successful and dynamic companies will 
certainly follow them show that the integration of the Hun-
garian financial system into the international financial sys-
tem at this point is also possible. The legal regulations are 
supportive in this respect for they provide free repatriation. 
This process, of course, will divert trade to foreign stock 
exchanges and will have impacts on the stock exchange in 
Budapest. For competitive and profitable firms it can be 
a way to achieve marketability of their shares. Financial 
deregulation ultimately should open up the way for trans-
actions in the other direction too, although it is not likely 
that Hungary will produce a massive foreign investment in 
the near future. International transactions on capital mar-
kets, of course, also necessitate a market-based exchange 
rate mechanism. 
4.4. The insurance system 
Insurance markets provide another opportunity for risk 
sharing and insurance companies are very important insti-
tutional investors in any healthy financial system. At present, 
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there are only small signs, if any, of competitiveness of 
insurance companies. Although in insurance, there are ap-
parent economies of scale, there is no reason to believe that 
it would be of this extent. Before the war, there were almost 
50 insurance companies and countries of a similar size and 
population can support insurance companies in similar num-
bers. 
Privatization and increase in private entrepreneurship will 
certainly increase risk assumed in the economy but also in 
the life of families. This will increase demand for a variety 
of insurances giving ample opportunities for newly-incorpor-
ated insurance companies. 
Privatization of insurance companies and the encouragement 
of new entries preferably with foreign participation are pre-
conditions for competitiveness. Foreign participation will 
certainly bring in expertise and modern technology in this 
part of the financial system, too. 
Transparency is another important pre-condition for com-
petitiveness and efficiency. The regulations should enforce 
the disclosure of major information on policies and the 
use of comparability indicators helping the comparison of 
policies and insurers. 
Life insurance companies play a vital role in raising long-
term contractual savings and in long-term investment both 
being badly needed in Hungary. Insurance companies could 
also have a role to play in underwriting securities and in 
related activities. Increasing their activities on this market 
could limit the role commercial banks play in this regard 
and could lead to a more balanced capital market. 
Private pension funds are another important form of long-
term contractual savings. Although insurance companies 
offer some forms of private pension schemes, the share of 
this financial asset in household portfolios is negligible. Both 
forms of long-term contractual savings, together with any 
other form should be encouraged by tax regulations. 
The regulations of insurance markets should concentrate 
on increasing the degree of competitiveness. High level of 
concentration, similarly to banking, means high level of risk 
concentration. Concerning entries, the encouragement of 
new entries is of primary importance. However, it seems to 
be sensible to limit the activities of commercial banks in this 
respect, at least until a balanced structure of the financial 
system is achieved. 
Failures on insurance markets should play the same role as 
anywhere else, that is inefficient managements and the 
owners tolerating them should not be protected by regu-
lations or by State interventions. However, clients, similarly 
to banking, should be secured. 
5. Conclusions 
A healthy and competitive economy assumes a well-organ-
ized and competitive financial system. The degree of com-
petitiveness can and should be increased in several ways in 
the financial system. Privatization, encouragement of new 
entries and foreign participation, further integration of the 
system, financial deregulation, suitably designed tax prefer-
ences and a gradual opening up to international financial 
markets will certainly help. Competition leads to financial 
innovation producing a wider range of financial instruments 
meeting the changing demands of lenders and borrowers 
and providing them with portfolios of better quality. 
Stability is the other key word. In the Hungarian economy, 
a great amount of uncertainty has already been accumulated 
and a massive restructuring of the economy will certainly 
increase it further. Stability and efficiency are, however, not 
necessarily conflicting principles. Stability without efficiency 
implies enormously high costs and consequently can not 
be sustained in the long run. Reform programmes should 
seriously be concerned with stability especially in sequencing 
measures. Cautious but continuous and far reaching changes 
are needed. 
Institutional and regulatory changes will never solve prob-
lems if people have no entrepreneurship and expertise. Prop-
erly designed training programmes and appropriate changes 
in the educational system are needed to achieve them. Shake-
up changes in managements are also of primary importance 
in this respect. 
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1. Reform principles and policies from 
September 1989 
The focus of this paper is on budgetary policies since 
12 September 1989 when the present government assumed 
office. These policies form an important segment of the 
government's new reform programme. The budget is both 
influencing the other policies of that programme and is itself 
influenced by those policies. To highlight this relationship, 
it may be useful to note the key principles which guided the 
decision-makers and their advisers in preparing the policies 
and the key questions, the answers to which determined the 
contents of these policies. The principles which I would like 
to stress are as follows : 
(a) price stabilization and price liberalization, including in-
ternal convertibility of the zloty, must come first, before 
major structural reforms are initiated; 
(b) price stabilization must be based on the standard 
Dornbusch-Fischer-IMF approach, with the central role 
assigned to tough incomes policy, in addition to a bal-
anced budget, rather than based on a restrictive monetary 
policy alone; 
(c) structural reforms must involve both a radical increase 
in the number of independent enterprises, by breaking 
down large firms, and an ownership reform, with the 
dual aim of creating competitive markets and a large, 
ultimately dominant, private sector; 
(d) international assistance of the reform programme should 
include the recognition, both by private banks and 
governments, that radical reforms call for large sacrifices 
and that, therefore, a substantial part of the debt accumu-
lated until 12 September 1989 cannot be repaid nor ser-
viced without putting the programme at risk. In particu-
lar, the balance-of-payments considerations must be sec-
ondary in any stand-by agreement with the IMF for 
1990, and possibly for the next two years as well. 
The principles above represented the common ground within 
the inner 'reform group' of the Mazowiecki Government. 
These principles define what is usually termed the sequencing 
of the reforms. In that respect principle (a) is particularly 
crucial. The urgency to stabilize prices arose from the fact 
that a near-hyperinflation was ranging since the beginning 
of August 1989. However, it might have been and was argued 
that price liberalization should wait until big monopolies are 
dismantled. The problem with this argument was that proper 
de-monopolization would take a long time. In the meantime, 
given the poor quality of the price system, it would not 
have been possible to know which enterprises were really 
profitable and which were not. It was recognized that some 
price regulation could remain, but that the key price signals 
should be provided by markets as soon as possible, so that 
structural changes—involving the closure or restructuring of 
loss-making and really hopeless enterprises—can proceed 
already in spring 1990, and be conducted on a sound econ-
omic basis. But to reduce the impact of monopolized market 
structure, the convertibility became essential. In this respect, 
the experience with auctions and legalized free dollar market 
for households became helpful in providing information as 
to the appropriate level of the unified exchange rate. The 
convertibility was also very important in its own right : as a 
signal to enterprises and the public that this reform is differ-
ent from those in the past, and as an instrument to improve 
the mobility of resources between net exporters and net 
importers. 
The anti-inflationary programme did not involve any new 
economics. The principles of it were well known. But it did 
involve the necessity for the (statistical) real wages to drop 
sharply (see graph), something which can be implemented 
only by a strong government. A tough incomes policy was 
recommended because of the fear that a reliance on monetary 
policy alone may lead to excessive unemployment. 
Under (c), privatization, unemployment and competitive 
policies are the key reforms. Placing price liberalization 
before privatization is partly deliberate and partly inevitable. 
Principle (d) is based on the view that it could eventually be 
accepted by the Western creditors that the success of reforms 
in Eastern Europe is in their long-term interest, whether or 
not the debts are repaid. The debt and the large burden of 
their servicing payments have helped to expose the weak-
nesses of the centralized economic system, and have conse-
quently helped the reform process. In that respect they have 
already served an important purpose. 
However, answers to important specific questions could not 
have been derived from these four principles. The questions 
which I would like to list in particular are as follows (the 
list is not exhaustive) : 
(i) Is the timing of the 'big bang', meaning the introduc-
tion of new prices and other liberalization and stabili-
zation measures, to be the next day after taking office, 
1 November 1989 or 1 January 1990? 
(ii) After the 'big bang', were the exchange rates to be 
uniform, or one for the enterprise sector and another 
for the household sector? 
(iii) What was the exchange-rate policy to be: fixed rate 
with a legal obligation to defend, or a target rate 
(managed float)? 
(iv) How quickly were the prices of coal and other com-
modities to be increased to the world levels? 
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(v) 
(vi) 
How radical the income policy was to be after the 'big 
bang' : a wage freeze or a wage brake for some three 
to five months? 
How tough was the government to be in negotiations 
with private banks? 
(vii) How rapid the de-monopolization and, above all, the 
privatization are to be? 
(viii) How deep, if at all, the contraction of the economy 
was to be expected as a result of the 'big bang', and 
how to react to any such contraction? 
In addition to the four principles (a) to (d), the responses to 
these eight specific questions above defined what became 
known as the 'Balcerowicz Plan'. [As a footnote to the 
comparison table in Nuti's paper, it may be worth noting 
that all these responses, perhaps with the exception of (iv), 
have been different to the advice proposed by Professor Jeff 
Sachs, one of the advisers.] 1 January was selected on the 
grounds that the three months, October to December 1989, 
would be needed to conclude an agreement with the IMF, 
to prepare the necessary legislation for the 'big bang' and 
to reduce the shock to the economy by a gradual phasing-
in of the new policies on prices and the budget deficit. In 
response to question (ii), a freely floating exchange rate in 
the household sector has been maintained. The rate is a 
cheap safety valve in the foreign-exchange sector, providing a 
useful signal from the markets to policymakers (S. Gomulka, 
September 1989). A fixed exchange regime was defended as 
being necessary to dampen inflationary expectations. How-
ever, expectations are also formed by many other factors 
which jointly influence the credibility of the government's 
programme. Moreover, in view of the immense uncertainty 
under which decisions were taken immediately prior to the 
'big bang', a pre-commitment on the exchange rate could 
have endangered the whole programme if a wrong rate 
was chosen. Consequently, the policy of managed float was 
adopted. Large price increases under (iv) were important for 
the budget. But too high increases could produce too large 
shifts in relative prices, with potentially excessive, socially 
unacceptable contractionary consequences on the supply 
side. In the event, the price of coal to enterprises was revised 
fivefold (and sevenfold to households), to a level of about 
one-third of the world price. In response to (v), a fairly 
tough incomes policy was adopted, but not a wage freeze. 
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Any 'big bang' is a high risk venture. In Poland this risk has 
been and is particularly high because of the venture's dual 
objectives. Apart from reducing the general rise in prices, 
large shifts in relative prices have been introduced or allowed 
at the same time. These shifts and they alone are what are 
called in this paper 'the price shock' or the 'big bang'. The 
shock was necessary to create a right price environment for 
enterprises so that their performance can be monitored and 
correct decisions on closures and on restructuring taken. 
The risk arises, as mentioned already, from the possibly 
large contraction of output in response to such a shock, with 
obvious implications for the State budget and, indeed, the 
whole stabilization programme. 
2. Features of government budgets, 1983-89 
The size and composition of the State budget are key macro-
economic features of any economy; the former is a measure 
of the government sector and the latter reveals government 
priorities. In the Polish context, however, we must above all 
identify the sources of the large budget deficit in 1989 and 
the ways of substantially reducing that deficit in the year 
1990. Such a reduction, possibly complete elimination, is 
necessary (although not sufficient) if the Solidarity-led Co-
alition Government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
is to achieve its proclaimed central aim for the first six 
months in office, from September 1989 to March 1990: price 
stabilization. 
Table 1 gives some of the background to the budgetary 
developments in 1989. In the years 1983-89 government 
expenditure, including the so-called extra-budgetary funds, 
was near the level of 50 % of the gross domestic product 
(GDP). The official budget deficit was fairly low and in 1988 
there was, in fact, a small budget surplus. Yet it was also in 
1988 that the annual inflation rate accelerated from a level 
in the range of 10 to 20 % in the earlier years to about 60 %. 
The relationship between budget deficit and inflation rate 
has been, in Poland, strongly influenced by a lax income 
policy, a tight labour market and a highly accommodating 
monetary policy, a combination which was, in fact, the main 
source of the inflationary flame. The effect of the budget 
deficit in 1989 was merely like adding fuel to an already 
large fire. 
Table 1 indicates that subsidies to consumer goods and 
services were, in the years 1983-89, very large, equal to about 
Table 1 
Gross domestic product, State (central and local) government budget and subsidies, 1982-89 
(106 million current zlotys unless otherwise stated) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
GDP growth, constant prices, (%) 
Government revenue 
3.1 including extra-budgetary 
Government expenditure 
4.1 including extra-budgetary 
Budget deficit ( - ) or surplus ( + ) 
5.1 Extended budget deficit 
Subsidies to the household sector 
Subsidies to the enterprise sector' 
Hidden interest subsidy 
1982 
5,55 
-4,8 
2,41 
2,80 
2,57 
2,94 
-0,16 
-0,14 
0,57 
0,57 
1983 
6,92 
5.6 
2,71 
3,32 
2,85 
3,38 
-0,14 
-0,06 
0,58 
0,56 
1984 
8,58 
5,6 
3,40 
4,22 
3,60 
4,26 
-0,19 
-0,04 
0,75 
0,74 
1985 
10,44 
3,6 
4,22 
5,18 
4,35 
5,17 
-0,12 
+ 0,01 
0,86 
0,86 
1986 
12,95 
4,2 
5,17 
6,56 
5,32 
6,60 
-0,14 
-0,04 
1,18 
0,93 
1987 
16,94 
2,0 
6,17 
8,14 
6,39 
8,27 
-0,22 
-0,14 
1,69 
1,43 
1988 
23,63 
4.1 
10,54 
14,52 
10,61 
14,18 
-0,07 
+ 0,34 
2,97 
3,38 
Jan.-June 
7,45 
10,73 
-3,28 
4,10 
8,42 
1989 
Jan.-Aug. 
11,53 
14,08 
2,4 
2,17 
June-Dec. 
80,03 
-4,0 3 
29,70 
39,36 
34,43 
45,36 
-4,73 
-6,00 
9,27 
11,08 
20-303 
1 These subsidies overlap to an extent of some 70% with the subsidies to the household sector. 
2 Author's estimate based on Tables 7 and 8 of the GoP's data package. October 1989. submitted to the IMF. 
1 Author's preliminary estimates. 
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10% of GDP or about 20% of the government's total 
expenditure. As such, they equalled the combined expendi-
ture on health services and all education. These and other 
officially reported subsidies accounted for about one-third 
of total government expenditure. This statistic for 1989 is, 
moreover, grossly biased downwards by the omission of 
implicit subsidies due to low interest rates on loans to enter-
prises. Generally, the household sector is the net saver and 
was, therefore, subsidizing the State sector, in particular 
State enterprises in 1989. We shall return to this important 
feature in Section 6. 
3. Provisions of the budget of 15 February 
1989 
The expenditure provisions of the Government of Poland 
(GoP) State budget are stated typically in terms of specific 
cash limits. This means that budget allocations are not 
inflation-indexed, but are based on a specific rate of inflation 
which the authorities assume will occur. Therefore the real 
magnitudes of these allocations are, ex post, hostage to the 
accuracy of that assumption. When the actual events prove 
the authorities wrong, as happened in 1989, a sequence of 
budget laws is the result. In 1989 there have been five 
such laws, of which the first, of 15 February, and the last, 
proposed on 18 October and approved on 1 November, span 
the whole year. 
The budget of 15 February was based on the assumption 
that prices during the year will have risen by 45%. The 
18 October budget assumes that the rise will be 558%. The 
cash levels of the two budgets are, as a result, much different. 
However, the two budgets can be compared in terms of the 
relative weight of (consumer and enterprise) subsidies and 
budget deficits in total expenditures. 
4. The scale and causes of the financial collapse, 
January to October 1989 
In the period January to October 1989 government spending 
was, in real terms, higher than expected but revenue lower 
than expected. In the first six months of the year the budget 
deficit accounted for 30,5% of the expenditure. If we take 
into account the payments from the budget due in that 
period but which were postponed, the financial gap was 
46,3%, or about 30% of GDP. 
The causes of what may quite correctly be called a macro-
economic gross mismanagement were of two categories: 
government initiatives and enterprise reactions to a more 
relaxed political climate. It may be instructive to list them 
and to discuss them briefly. 
Government initiatives 
(i) The law enacted on 31 January 1989 raised the average 
pay in the budget-financed institutions from 73,4% in 
1988 to 97% in 1989 of the average pay in the (essentially 
self-financed) material sector of the economy. This in-
itiative alone accounts, in the first half of 1989, for 
11,8% of the total budget expenditure, or more than the 
cost of the health service. 
(ii) A reform of corporate taxation (which went into effect 
on 1 January 1989) reduced profit tax and introduced 
an assets-related tax, called the dividend. The reform 
proved to be a revenue-loser for the budget. 
(iii) To keep inflation down, the relative price of coal and 
energy was allowed to decline. This decision swelled the 
subsidy for the coal sector from about 5% to as much 
as about 15% of the State budget's total expenditure. 
(iv) The automatic tax collection procedure, from enter-
prises' bank accounts, was suspended, inviting enter-
prises to delay tax payment. 
Table 2 
Subsidies and budget deficit in the first and the last budget for 1989 
15 February 
1 November 
Source .'Council of Ministers' 
1989. 
In % 
Subsidies 
30,9 
32,2 
of total expenditure 
Budget deficit 
5,5 
13,7 
budget proposal as submitted to Polish Parliament, 18 October 
Enterprise initiatives 
(i) In the relaxed political climate created by the collapse of 
the Messner-Sadowski Government in autumn 1988, by 
the round table discussions of February to April, parlia-
mentary elections of May-June and the formation of a 
new government in July-August, all in 1989, enterprise 
managements were giving in to wage pressures. The result 
was that wages were increasing much faster than prices 
in the fourth quarter of 1988 and the first three quarters 
of 1989, at the expense of larger subsidies or delayed tax 
payments (see Graph). During that period real wages 
were about 30 to 40% above economically sustainable 
levels; 
132 
Part III — Papers on Poland 
(ii) pressure from peasants forced the government to increase 
procurement prices in order to keep their incomes in line 
with the incomes of the non-agricultural population. 
The lifting of controls on food prices in August 1989 has 
nearly eliminated the food subsidies in real terms. It also 
accelerated the price and wage inflation to a level of some 
20 to 50% a month in the period from August to December 
1989. Although the budget deficit was financed largely by 
printing money, prices were increasing much faster than the 
stock of money in the hands of the population; both zloty 
and dollar denominated. The real value of that stock had 
consequently declined, by December 1989, to about one-
third of the level of January 1989. Thus the high inflation 
had at least the positive side-effect in that it eliminated 
the monetary overhang. By December 1989 the inflationary 
pressures were coming no longer from accumulated forced 
savings, but from excessive levels of wages and other incomes 
at the beginning of each month. 
5. Provisions of the Budget Law of 1 November 
1989 
The details of that budget are given in Tables 3 and 4. The 
novelty on the revenue side is the introduction of government 
bonds. Bonds No 1 are convertible into cash on presentation 
after six months from the date of issue. They were launched 
in October and the demand for them was high. The implicit 
(annual) interest rate is 104%, which is likely to be much 
less than the price inflation during the six months. Their sale 
in 1989 represented a source of revenue for that year, but a 
burden for the budget in 1990. Bonds No 2 are price-indexed 
and convertible into stock of the companies which the 
government intends to sell in 1990 and the following years. 
It is also noteworthy that the combined contribution to the 
budget from personal income taxes and the private sector is 
small. 
An interesting aspect of the budget was that it implied a 
virtual elimination of the budget deficit for November and 
December 1989. The actual developments proved this aspect 
of the budget to be fairly realistic. 
6. Budgetary implications of the 'big bang' of 
1 January 1990 
The 1 November budget assumed the consumer price index 
at the end of December to reach 6,58 times the level of a 
year earlier. The assumption proved to be somewhat optimis-
tic, as the index reached 7,4 times the level of December 
1988. 
As noted already in Section 1, on 1 January 1990 a series of 
measures were adopted with a view to obtaining immediately 
a proper price structure and to begin an attempt at price 
and monetary stabilization from February 1990. The distor-
tions in the price structure prior to this 'big bang' were 
Table 3 
Government expected revenue in 1989 by source 
The 1 November 1989 budget 
Source 
Total 
Material State sector 
Financial State sector 
Other State non-material 
services 
Private sector corporate taxes 
Taxes from the population 
Stamp duty 
Sale of bonds No 1 
Sale of bonds No 2 
Other 
lO'mlzl 
29,70 
27,47 
2,44 
0,96 
1,25 
0,45 
0,26 
0,42 
0,80 
0,42 
% of total 
100,0 
79,0 
8,2 
3,2 
4,2 
1,5 
0,9 
1,4 
2,7 
1.4 
Table 4 
The Government's budget 
Category 
Total 
Subsidies to enterprises for 
consumer goods 
Subsidies to enterprises 
Health services 
Education services 
Pensions and benefits 
Investment projects 
Local government 
Defence 
Law and order, and central 
administration 
Economic units and tasks 
Servicing foreign debt 
Payments to banks 
Higher education and research 
Other 
Source: Council of Ministers' budget proposal as 
1989. 
10»mlzl 
34,43 
7,26 
3,82 
3,59 
2,87 
2,90 
2,20 
2,19 
1,95 
1,75 
1,61 
1,15 
1,08 
0,86 
0,65 
% of total 
100,0 
21,1 
11,1 
10,4 
8,3 
8,4 
6.4 
6,4 
5,7 
5,1 
4,7 
3,3 
3,1 
2,5 
1,9 
submitted to Polish Parliament, 18 October 
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concentrated in three areas : interest rates, coal and energy, 
and the exchange rate. The base (interest) monthly rate was 
increased from about 8% in December to 36% in January 
and 20% in February. From February the rate is likely to 
become positive in real terms. Enterprises were allowed to 
capitalize 60% of the interest payments in January and 
40% in February, but are to pay all interest from 1 March 
onwards. Large devaluation of the zloty and the other price 
increases produced an inflation rate for January 1990 of 
about 70%. On the other hand, a tough incomes policy held 
nominal wage increases to about 25%, thus bringing real 
wages to a level consistent with price stability. 
There is obviously a risk that this combined government 
effort at marketization and stabilization will be met with 
massive strikes and fail. In this case the whole economic 
programme is in ruins. However, if the effort succeeds, it is 
useful to ask what will be the implications for the budget. 
The 1989 budget was, as we see from Table 4, dominated 
by subsidies. This domination was overpowering the State 
finances, especially when we take into account the massive 
interest-rate subsidies. In the months after March 1990 much 
of the existing subsidies should disappear. New subsidies 
may appear, however. The heavy industry, the construction 
activity and the investment goods producing sector have 
been hit hardest by the new price structure. The financial 
squeeze on the enterprise and the household sectors is shift-
ing demand from luxuries to more basic goods. The price 
and quantity adjustments are likely to be in four stages : 
(i) immediate price rises on the basis of a cost-plus prin-
ciple; 
(ii) downward quantity adjustments to the levels of demand; 
(iii) cost and price reductions to stimulate demand; and 
(iv) an attempt to shift resources and increase the supply of 
products for which there is a higher demand, both at 
home and abroad. 
The budget deficit of 8,1 % of the GDP for 1989 is proposed 
to be eliminated in part by a substantial increase of the 
income tax and dividends from the corporate sector. Thus 
the budget rests on the assumption that that sector, rather 
than the household sector, will continue to be the main 
provider of revenue to the government. The risk to the 
balanced budget is immediately clear : if there is a recession 
larger than the assumed 5% fall of the GDP, the revenue 
will fall and the expenditure will increase. 
This year the recipients of credit have benefited from massive 
implicit subsidies in the form of low interest payments. To 
illustrate this point, we may note that on 30 June 1989 the 
credits by all Polish banks amounted to 15,3 billion zlotys, 
of which 13,8 billion zlotys for the socialist economy (see 
the GoP data package for the IMF, Table 7). In the first 
half of 1989 the consumer price index increased by about 
60%, but interest rates to savers were kept low. Conse-
quently, interest payments represented only about 15% of 
the debt (see the GoP data package for the IMF, Table 8). 
We, of course, do not know what the market interest rate 
would have been, but if interest payments were price-
indexed, so that the real rate of interest was zero, the debtors 
would have paid additionally some 5 billion zlotys or about 
a half of the total State expenditure during that period. 
The 'Balcerowicz Plan' calls for a tight monetary policy. The 
policy is expected to result in interest rates exceeding the 
inflation rate. If this were to happen, the banking sector's 
income would be probably larger than assumed, and much 
of that income would have to be taxed away. Some enter-
prises will no doubt respond to high interest rates by reduc-
ing the debt, as they did already in January 1990, while 
many others would be forced out of business if not helped. 
In the latter case the gain is, in part, informational, as some 
of the hidden subsidies are turned into open subsidies. In 
any case, the policy of positive real interest rates is likely to 
place an additional burden on the corporate sector. 
In what follows we discuss the budgetary implications of 
these new circumstances. We begin by comparing, in Table 5, 
the major budgetary aggregates for 1990 as proposed by 
the government with the actual developments in the years 
1986-89. 
The substantial reduction of subsidies, from 14,2 to 6,2% 
of the GDP, is due in part to large rises in the prices of coal, 
by 400% to industrial users and 600% to households, and 
electricity prices by 300%. These prices are planned to be 
increased further, later in the year, in order to preserve their 
new relative levels. 
7. The policy implications and action-oriented 
recommendations 
The proposed State budget for 1990 is nearly balanced 
without large changes in the system of taxation as such. The 
system is to be changed in 1991-92. The deficit gap has been 
bridged by removing subsidies and tax reliefs. The new policy 
on interest rates will also remove a huge hidden subsidy to 
the corporate sector by the household sector. However, 
the main danger to the budget appears to come from a 
contractionary response of the economy to the price shock. 
In the first months of 1990 the enterprise sector may wish 
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Table 5 
Major budgetary aggregates 
(in % of GDP) 
1986 
A. State budget 
Revenue 39,9 
Turnover tax 11,6 
Income tax and dividends 11,0 
Wage tax 3,8 
Other 13,5 
Expenditure 41,0 
Purchases of goods and services and payment 
of wages 7,0 
Subsidies 16,3 
Other current expenditure ' 11,9 
Balance -1,1 
B. Total general government2 
Revenue 49,4 
Expenditure 49,7 
Balance - 0,3 
Financed by : 
Banking system — 
Other3 0,7 
1987 
34,2 
10,6 
11,0 
3,6 
9,0 
37,7 
6,6 
15,9 
9,6 
-3,5 
46,9 
47,7 
-0,8 
1,1 
0,1 
1988 
35,5 
10,8 
12,1 
3,5 
9,1 
37,0 
6,3 
16,0 
9,4 
-1,4 
48,0 
48,0 
— 
0,6 
-0,2 
Source: Compiled by the IMF using the IMF's definition from data provided by the Polish authorities. 
1 Includes transfers to extra-budgetary funds and to other units, payments to the Social Insurance Fund in respect of government employees, and spending 
2 Comprises the State budget plus extra-budgetary funds. 
3 Includes external financing, placement of bonds outside the banking system, and accumulation of domestic arrears in 1989 and their elimination in 1990. 
1989 
Estimate 
30,9 
9,9 
9,2 
4,0 
7,8 
39,0 
8,5 
14,2 
13,0 
-8,1 
40,8 
49,2 
-8,3 
5,2 
3,1 
on nationa 
1990 
Programme 
34,6 
9,3 
14,5 
3,4 
7,4 
35,4 
7,4 
6,2 
18,7 
-0,8 
45,9 
46,0 
-0,1 
-1,3 
1,4 
t defence and public security. 
to deploy a financial reserve in the form of its dollar deposits 
with the National Bank. These deposits amounted to some 
USD 2 to 2,5 million, or some 20 billion zlotys. Already in 
January, about a third of the reserve was used to finance 
current operations and to repay the debt. This financial 
capital, as long as it lasts, should reduce the contractionary 
impact. Judging from the British experience of 1979-83, it is 
quite possible that this impact will be much larger than the 
GoP has so far assumed. In this case there will be need to 
consider alternative policy measures. These measures may 
include the following : 
(i) using some of the foreign resources, e.g. the World 
Bank's SAL, to supplement the fund of the Restructur-
ing Agency; 
(ii) keeping the real interest rates at reasonable, not excess-
ively high levels; 
(iii) there may be a need, if unemployment is higher than 
expected, to use some of the foreign reserves to support 
the social safety net; 
(iv) the GoP may consider adopting forceful measures to 
attract foreign private capital, in particular through the 
sale of enterprises; 
(v) the buying of government securities should be made 
more attractive. 
In addition to the expected structural adjustment which will 
reduce outputs and increase welfare payments, there may 
also be a reduction of obviously needed output, such as coal 
and energy. Indeed the output of coal is expected to fall this 
year by some 20 million tonnes, forcing a reduction of other 
needed outputs, and thus placing an additional strain on the 
State budget. Enterprise managements in the State sector 
will also be under immense pressure from the workforce—to 
keep wages high, if necessary at the expense of payments to 
other enterprises and the State budget. It is by no means 
clear that the present institutions are capable of supplying 
the necessary countermeasures which would keep the press-
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ure in check. Some labour unemployment should help the (automatic collection both of taxes and inter-enterprise pay-
macroeconomic management of the government, but this ments), and the bankruptcy code, backed up by more ef-
unemployment is unlikely to become large before the second ficient commercial courts. This whole institutional set-up 
half of 1990. Some early enterprise closures should be at needs to be mobilized and probably upgraded to reduce the 
least well publicised. However, the main institutional effort risk of gross failure of the whole economic programme, of 
should go towards strict application of payments procedures which the budgetary reform is an important part. 
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1. Arguments for privatization 
Polish economists agree almost unanimously that a change 
in ownership structure is necessary for market-oriented re-
forms to succeed. This conviction has also become common 
knowledge in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and is gaining 
ground in the Soviet Union. Before the last wave of reforms 
in these countries the issue of property rights was consistently 
ignored and attempts were made to improve the performance 
of the system without questioning State ownership of the 
means of production : through increasing the autonomy of 
enterprises, perfecting the incentive system, liberalizing pri-
ces, etc. Some reforms were partial, others comprehensive. 
None of these really succeeded. The relative successes of the 
Hungarian economy are generally attributed to the expan-
sion of the private sector, while attempts to make the State 
sector efficient and competitive have largely failed. Today, 
the failure of previous reforms is often explained by the lack 
of property rights transformation and to exclusive concern 
with market socialism type solutions. 
This does not mean that the possibilities of amelioration of 
the system of regulation and management of State-owned 
enterprises in Poland have been exhausted. On the contrary, 
it can be easily shown that these enterprises are so far from 
a production possibility frontier that there is a lot of room 
for improvement (through deregulation, déconcentration, 
etc.). However, it is generally believed that the fundamental 
barrier to increased efficiency lies in the fact that the State 
sector strongly dominates the economy and there are no 
proven means to motivate producers to behave competitively 
under State resource ownership. 
What are the reasons for this shift and what is the argument 
in favour of private property? Before we develop this argu-
ment, let us name the permanent and structural diseases of 
the Polish economy: inefficient allocation of resources 
among sectors, wasteful use of resources by firms, shortages, 
lack of motivation to minimize costs, to care about the net 
value of assets, to seek new profit opportunities and to 
innovate. To be sure, in 1989 there are also hyperinflation 
and the huge budgetary deficit, but these are newcomers to 
the list and deserve a separate treatment. Moreover, the 
last two phenomena may be considered as the result of 
mismanagement that consisted in liberalizing the economy 
without fundamentally changing its institutions. The reas-
signment of property rights is seen as an essential part of 
institutional reform. 
Although private property is sometimes advocated with a 
neophytic zeal (which is understandable after a 40-year per-
iod of domination of State ownership and the overwhelming 
evidence of the failure of the State economy), and although 
the reasons for changing the ownership structure are not 
always convincingly exposed, the general claim seems to be 
legitimate. In a pragmatic and non-ideological perspective 
it may be upheld by referring both to a theoretical argument 
and empirical evidence. 
In classical economic theory there is no formal argument in 
favour of private enterprise but it may be advocated in a 
number of informal ways. First, it is supposed to stimulate 
efficiency; second, it is supposed to stimulate the search for 
efficient organization. 
Other arguments have been sometimes used in favour of 
privatization: it is supposed to improve public finance, re-
duce trade union power, democratize ownership, help to 
liquidate loss-making enterprises in order to reduce fiscal 
pressure, and to redistribute wealth. We take, however, 
the generally accepted view that these aims may be better 
achieved by other means and that privatization should be 
defended and judged on its contribution to economic ef-
ficiency. 
Private enterprise provides better incentives to strive for 
efficiency, both productive (i.e. supplying of goods and ser-
vices at minimum cost) and allocative (i.e. supplying of 
goods and services that people actually desire). Productive 
efficiency is increased (even if there is separation of owner-
ship and control in the private sector) because shareholders 
have stronger incentives to exercise adequate pressure on 
non-value maximizing management of private firms than 
government does on the management of public firms : they 
bear more directly a major share of the wealth effects of the 
managerial decisions. In other words, private principals have 
stronger incentives to deal effectively with moral hazard 
than public principals, although none of them can avoid the 
problem of assymetric information. If internal control fails 
and shareholders cannot design a compensation contract to 
provide incentives for value maximizing, takeover helps to 
reassert the interests of shareholders. All imperfections of 
capital market and market for corporate control notwith-
standing, they still seem to be the key elements of the market 
environment which East Europeans are looking for. 
Private enterprise not only increases incentives to seek pro-
ductive efficiency, but also reduces barriers to attain it: 
privatization of public enterprises limits the scope for politi-
cal interference (this is how managers of privatized enter-
prises explain improvements in profits) and increases finan-
cial discipline (destroying the expectation of direct financial 
support from the government, which protects them against 
the threat of bankruptcy or takeover). 
The fundamental claim about the benefits of private market 
economy for allocative efficiency refers to the old argument 
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of von Mises: the prices arising out of free competitive 
markets are the essential element of any decent economic 
system. In other words, to have resources allocated ef-
ficiently we need prices representing efficient evaluation of 
relative rates of return which can be determined only on 
capital markets, where owners compete in seeking to put 
capital to its highest value. The importance of this mechan-
ism for Soviet-type economies cannot be overestimated. The 
allocation of resources (and particularly of investment) has 
been until now subjugated much more to bargaining between 
different sectoral lobbies than to rational industrial policy 
considerations. 
Several East European and Western economists, who ac-
knowledged the importance of capital markets for pro-
ductive and allocative efficiencies debated the question of 
whether it could be possible to reproduce capital market 
without private ownership of the means of production. It 
should be stressed, however, that what we are looking for is 
not only informational strength of the capital market but the 
combination of motivational and informational capacities 
which exist in a private market economy (private owners 
have very strong incentives to accept the risk and to move 
resources from a less productive to more productive uses). 
Simulating the information generating mechanism and omit-
ting the motivational aspect (supposing that economic agents 
will follow some Optimal' rules of the game) would result 
in a poor counterpart of the private capital market. 
It has often been argued—particularly in the context of the 
privatization debate in the West, but also in reference to 
Eastern Europe—that privatization may fail to achieve allo-
cative efficiency if the enterprise has considerable monopoly 
power; that it is competition, not ownership, which is import-
ant; that private monopolies are not better than public 
monopolies and the overall impact of privatization on econ-
omic efficiency will depend on a trade-off between market 
failure and deficiencies in governmental monitoring and 
control of public firms. The recent wave of privatization 
offered an opportunity to assess the performance of na-
tionalized versus privatized firms. This experience seems to 
imply that privatization proved to be a satisfactory cure to 
the inefficiency of public enterprises if there were no import-
ant market failures; in the case of monopoly, the effects of 
the changes of ownership depended heavily on the degree of 
product market competition and the effectiveness of regulat-
ory policy. 
This seems unquestionable and particularly relevant in the 
case of the highly monopolized Polish economy. Privatiza-
tion of the State enterprises should be preceded by breaking 
up monopolies (which are administrative and not economic 
ones; consequently breaking them up would not dampen the 
incentives for other firms to engage in significant inno-
vation), and then accompanied by liberalization (favouring 
competition and removing market restrictions) and by regu-
lation (preventing anticompetitive behaviour). 
However, the relevance of Western lessons of privatization 
for Eastern Europe is limited. It must be strongly emphasized 
that if Western economists are mitigated in their evaluation 
of the efficiency effect of privatization, they refer to the 
process that takes place at the margin. In no countries which 
have participated in the privatization experience has the 
share of public sector output in the GDP approached that 
in Eastern Europe (it varied from 1 % in Guatemala, through 
15% in Austria, to 38% in Zambia; in Poland it is over 
80%). In other words, the empirical evidence is based on 
the comparison between the performance of public and 
private firms in the framework of a market system with 
private property of the means of production. In such an 
environment we can proceed to a careful assessment of the 
arguments pro and contra privatization. 
But if there is no market environment, the case for privatiza-
tion is precisely the case for market environment. How can 
we have it with all its blessings, maintaining State property of 
the means of production in the major part of the economy? 
Competition cannot be decreed or organized. It must be the 
result of the natural behaviour of self-interested owners 
sensitive and responsive to unforseen changes. If such a 
'real' market, based on private ownership, dominates the 
economy, then its logic can spill over into the non-market 
sector and benefit public enterprises. 
Another powerful argument in favour of private enterprise 
is provided by the evolutionary theory of economic change 
which puts emphasis not on the resource allocation mechan-
ism but on the dynamic aspect of the search for efficient 
organization. Private market economy is considered as offer-
ing a continuous evaluation of the firms' assets by the capital 
market and favouring the selection of organizations which 
have the best combination of trial-generation and error-
elimination capacities (i.e. equivalent of Schumpeterian cre-
ative destruction). In such a dynamic perspective what is 
important is not only static efficiency of existing economic 
structure but the capacities of institutions to stimulate tech-
nological innovations and to allow for a permanent restruc-
turing. The rigidity and inertia of East European economic 
organizations give strong evidence of the failure of insti-
tutional change entrusted exclusively to the State. 
2. The Polish debate on the reassignment of 
property rights 
In Poland, it is generally admitted that legal, institutional 
and fiscal conditions should be created to allow for the 
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expansion of the private sector. However, it is argued that 
the private sector remains too small to expect that it will 
develop spontaneously to such an extent that it will modify 
fundamentally the environment of the firms. Such a 'natural' 
evolution would be too slow to be relied upon and it would 
not force the large State enterprises to restructure them-
selves. Therefore, some kind of 'privatization from above' 
(as it is sometimes called) is considered necessary if real 
efficiency breakthrough should occur. 
During the last two years a wide range of solutions have 
been proposed. It goes from the transformation of State 
enterprise into a joint stock company belonging to different 
State institutions and organizations, to transferring the prop-
erty rights to the employees of an enterprise (as a group or 
issuing separate shares), and finally to the real privatization 
of State assets by issuing shares and selling them on the 
market. Let us present briefly the major alternatives : 
2.1. Personification of State ownership: the institutional 
capital market 
State enterprises would be converted into joint stock com-
panies with shares sold to different financial institutions: 
banks, holdings, pension funds, or other enterprises. Individ-
uals would be allowed to buy only a very limited number of' 
shares. The key role in this scenario would be played by 
holdings, i.e. special State financial institutions which are 
supposed to behave like normal shareholders and to maxim-
ize profit from their capital and the market value of their 
assets. The authors of this proposal (one of the most promi-
nent among them is Marcin Swicicki, Minister for Foreign 
Trade)1 argue that, although in the first stage of the process 
public ownership would dominate, the capital1 market could 
be set up from the very beginning, in other words, that it 
is possible to have capital market, maintaining the 'social 
character of the means of production'. 
Indeed, in this version, although property rights are neither 
individual nor exclusive, they might be transferable from 
one institutional owner to another and a capital market 
could come into being. However, the perverse effects of such 
a mechanism are easily predictable. 
See Maciej Iwanek and Marcin Swicicki, 'Handlowac kapitalem w socja-
lizmie', Polityka, 16.6.1987; and Marcin Swicicki, 'Reforma wlasno-
sciowa', in : Propozycje przeksztalcen polskiej gospodarki, Zeszyty nau-
kowe PTE, Warszawa, 1989. A similar proposal was formulated by 
Marton Tardos for Hungary. Mario Nuti's ingenious idea of 'socialist 
takeover' belongs to the same category. Staszek Gomulka proposed that 
the capital of all State enterprises be distributed equally in the form of 
shares among commercial banks that will become de facto owners; 
formally, the shares will belong to the State. Then the shares might be 
traded between banks. 
The main criticism of such an 'institutional game' refers to 
the motivation of the holdings' (or banks') directors who 
cannot be expected to behave as if they were owners. 
Strongly dependent on the Treasury, they will be submitted 
to all kinds of pressure from different interest groups. Even 
if they share profit, their main objective will be to stay 
in office, which guarantees power and revenues. Thus as 
principals, they will be very weakly motivated and strongly 
influenced by political interference. Moreover, such an insti-
tutional rearrangement will not be perceived by the popu-
lation as a dramatic, historical change. And such perception 
is badly needed if inevitable hardship is to be accepted. 
The advocates of this solution often refer to Western capital 
markets in which various institutional investors operate in 
a successful way. However, the value of the argument is 
limited. First, behind most Western institutional investors 
there are individuals who decide to entrust them with their 
savings. Although dispersed and unable to control investors, 
they are the real principals and they may always choose 
exit. Secondly, and again, there is the problem of market 
environment. Indeed, if the logic of the market prevails, 
institutional investors may play a very positive role in the 
economy. But if the number of real, private owners is negli-
gible and the institutional 'owners' are not constrained by 
the competitive market, their behaviour would be deter-
mined more by a bureaucratic logic than by a market one. 
2.2. Group ownership 
The idea is to transfer the ownership of the enterprises from 
the State to some group : cooperatives, municipalities, trade 
unions, social and political organizations, associations, or, 
last but not least, employees of a given enterprise. The 
economic meaning of this form of ownership is similar to 
the previous one in so far as property is not exclusive; in 
addition, in this version, notably in the case of employee 
group ownership, it is also non-transferable. The motiv-
ational weakness of this form of ownership is clear even for 
its advocates who often consider it as an intermediary step 
in the way towards true privatization. Also, the empirical 
evidence suggests, and particularly the analysis of the Yugos-
lav experience, that the absence of transferable property 
rights proved to be a powerful disincentive for enterprises 
to care about the net worth of assets. 
Still, this form of ownership is defended as politically more 
acceptable for the population. It gives an appropriate owner-
ship basis for workers' self-management and does not imply 
the reappearance of inequalities due to different endowments 
in capital assets. But its impact on productivity might be 
very limited and its contribution to the development of the 
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environment favouring 'creative destruction'—nil or 
negative. 
2.3. Employee shareholding 
This is an East European version of employees' stock owner­
ship. It is proposed that the State enterprises be converted 
into joint stock companies whose shareholders will be the 
employees of the enterprises. Their shares would be individ­
ual and exclusive but they could be traded only (or mostly) 
among themselves. Another limitation (in comparison with 
a classical joint stock company) concerns the vote of share­
holders: independently of the number of shares each of them 
would dispose of only one vote. 
This solution seems to be preferred by workers in big enter­
prises and may be chosen if spontaneous transformation of 
property rights is allowed for. Its shortcomings are partly 
the same as in the case of employee group ownership: 
the employee­owners might choose immediate consumption 
instead of investment and innovation because they are 
owners as long as they remain employees.1 
Two ways of transferring ownership to employees have been 
considered : free distribution or sale of shares. The preference 
for the first one is usually justified by the difficulties linked 
with the second one : the financial assets of the population 
are estimated at about 11 to 12% of the book value of State 
assets (but it does not take into account foreign currency 
reserves); and there is no reliable valuation of the enterprises' 
assets. So the 'give away' method expresses concern with the 
speed of the process (and sometimes expresses ideological 
reserve). Another way of dealing with the problem of the 
lack of financial assets in the hands of the population is the 
temporary leasing of the enterprise to its employees; the 
progressive buy­out will take place during the next several 
years. Thus, the main advantage of the sale of shares—its 
anti­inflationary effect—would be partly preserved. 
Employee shareholding would not stimulate the develop­
ment of the capital market. To overcome this obvious failure, 
it is sometimes proposed to offer a certain number of shares 
to outsiders (this has been recommended by the present 
deputy Minister for Finance, Marek Dbrowski, one of 
the most outspoken partisans of the employee shareholding 
solution).2 These shares freely exchanged on the capital 
market could provide an evaluation of 'immobilized' shares. 
In order to guarantee control of the enterprise by the em­
ployees, the ordinary, freely traded shares would be held 
without the right of vote. But one may expect that such 
mutilated shares might not be attractive enough for potential 
buyers. Moreover, the capital market would not be able to 
fulfil its usual function : the takeover of the firm would not 
be allowed. If restriction tying ownership to employment is 
removed and the sale of shares to outsiders is allowed for, 
then we move toward the last option with some priority 
maintained for the employees in the first step of privatiza­
tion. 
2.4. Privatization : redistribution of State property among 
individuals 
This is the most radical version of property rights transform­
ation. It proposes a conversion of State enterprises into 
joint stock companies whose shareholders would be private 
individuals. Contrary to those who recommend employee 
shareholding as an intermediary step towards full privatiza­
tion, in this section we present two versions of direct privati­
zation : the sale of shares and the free distribution of share 
certificates. 
The first one (advocated by the present General Director of 
the Ministry of Finance, Stefan Kawalec)3 refers basically 
to Western experience and recommends a progressive sale 
of State enterprises which could eventually lead, in 15 to 
20 years, to the privatization of two­thirds of the Polish 
economy. For example, 20% of the total value of shares 
corresponding to the book value of an enterprise's assets 
would be sold on auction to individuals, Polish private firms 
or foreign investors : this would provide information about 
the expected price of shares on the stock exchange. Then, 
70 % of shares would be sold at the price definitely lower 
than the expected market price. Finally, 10% of shares 
would be reserved for the employees of the enterprise at the 
reduced price (e.g. 50% of the expected equilibrium price).4 
In order to recreate employees' economic interest in the development of 
the enterprises, Paweî Roman, 'A moze pracownicze', Zycie Gospodarcze, 
12.4.1987, proposed maintaining their right to participate in profits for 
several years after they leave the enterprises. But the efficiency of this 
measure would be weakened by the fact that the right of vote remains 
tied to employment. 
See Marek Dabrowski, 'Spóïki pracownicze', Zycie Gospodarcze, 
19.7.1987, and 'WÎasnosc grupowa jako jedna ζ dróg przeksztaîcenia 
wîasnosci panstwowej', in : Propozycje przeksztalcen polskiej gospodarki, 
Zeszyty Naukowe PTE, Warszawa, 1989. 
See Stefan Kawalec, 'Zarys programu prywatyzacji polskiej gospodarki', 
in : Propozycje przeksztalcen polskiej gospodarki. Zeszyty Naukowe PTE, 
Warszawa, 1989: 'WÎasnosc pracownicza i wlasnosc skarbu panstwa ­
wátpliwe rozwiázania', April 1989, mimeo; and Stefan Kawalec and 
Waldemar Kuczynski, 'Jak sprzedac gospodark', Tygodnik Solidarnosc, 
No 14(51), 1.9.1989. 
This could offer an incentive to management and to workers of firms 
waiting for privatization to increase the market value of their firms. So 
the process of privatization may lead to increased efficiency not only in 
already privatized firms but also in those that expect to be privatized. 
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When all shares have been sold, it would be possible to 
exchange them freely on the stock market. 
The ultimate goal of such privatization is to increase the 
efficiency of enterprises through transferring their control 
to shareholders. But in the short term it is supposed to have 
a strongly anti-inflationary effect and to contribute to the 
reduction of the budget deficit. The main weakness of this 
proposal is the limited amount of financial assets of the 
population which would inevitably slow down the whole 
process. To accelerate the process, it has been proposed to 
leave, for example, two-thirds of all shares in the hand of 
the Treasury but depriving them of voting rights; if the 
shares were sold to the private sector they would regain such 
rights. 
The second strategy of privatization consists of distributing 
freely, among all adult citizens, bonds (entitlements) that 
could be subsequently exchanged for shares of privatized 
enterprises.1 The main argument used in favour of this 
version of privatization refers to its mobilization capacity : 
distributing shares widely would create strong opposition 
against renationalization. On the other hand, given the lim-
ited financial assets of the population, the sale of shares 
would take years and would not be perceived by the popu-
lation as a real breakthrough. This free transfer of property 
could be supplemented by the sale of shares within the limits 
of the capital available. As in the previous version the 
employees of privatized enterprises would be entitled to buy 
preference shares in their enterprises. On the other hand, in 
order to avoid the risk of renationalization, limits would be 
imposed on State institutions buying shares. 
From an economic efficiency point of view, and the dis-
cussion in the first section of this paper, the most desirable 
solutions would be those that allow for individual, exclusive 
and freely transferable property rights with capital market 
and market for corporate control assuring market valuation 
of the firms' assets and selection of the fittest. This would 
create high incentives for risk-taking and stimulate capital 
flow between different productive activities. Such a possi-
bility is fully envisaged only in the privatization option. In 
the institutional capital market version there is room for a 
mechanism of resource reallocation by takeovers and mer-
gers (but this solution can have important motivational 
shortcomings).The employee ownership would allow in-
creased popular participation in the ownership of national 
assets, but efficiency being the fundamental aim, it should 
be better if people owned equity in enterprises other than 
their own. 
1 See Janusz Lewandowski and Jan Szomburg, 'Uwîaszczenie jako funda-
ment reformy spoîeczno-gospodarczej', in: Propozycje przeksztalcen pol-
skiej gospodarki, Zeszyty Naukowe PTE, Warszawa, 1989. 
3. Is privatization feasible? 
Until September 1989 the debate on different forms of own-
ership was more an intellectual exercise than a conscious 
effort at designing an actual transformation path. But since 
the Mazowiecki Government was charged with the responsi-
bility of economic recovery, different ideas on reassignment 
of property rights must be evaluated not only in terms of 
their desirability but also from the point of view of their 
economic and/or political feasibility. 
It is clear that none of the privatization scenarios will have 
a chance to succeed without adequate macrostabilization 
and legal and institutional frameworks necessary for the 
development of capital market and other financial interme-
diation. The lack of market environment, which is a strong 
argument for privatization, appears at the same time as an 
obstacle to privatization. In Western industrial countries the 
private sector dominates the economy and privatized firms 
are plunged into an established and well understood legal 
and regulatory framework, with a necessary financial infra-
structure. These is also a reasonable degree of competition. 
In Poland, and other East European countries, these el-
ements are lacking and must be created. The sequence will 
be important and must be carefully designed. The warranty 
of private property, a rudimentary financial market and a 
decent fiscal system are clearly preconditions of the process, 
but they will be necessarily exposed to progressive sophisti-
cation throughout its development. Also, pro-competitive 
regulation and breaking up of administrative monopolies 
should precede any privatization move. This should include 
dividing big enterprises (when technology allows it), liquidat-
ing all 'founding organs' and intermediary levels of manage-
ment and allowing the State enterprises to initiate some 
restructuring. 
Those that recommend the sale of assets will have to deal 
with the problem of the population's poor financial assets. 
Free distribution of entitlements (exchangeable for shares) 
or sale of shares on credit, all its weaknesses notwithstand-
ing, may prove to be a second best solution with clear 
political advantages and the virtue of rapidity. If chosen, 
this version of the reassignment of property rights should 
be carefully elaborated; it would necessitate a prompt estab-
lishment of secondary market and would come up against 
the lack of understanding of the actual functioning of a 
capital market. More importantly, the inequalities and ten-
sions resulting from ill-informed investment (due to the lack 
of reliable information about the prospects for different 
firms and the inevitable bankruptcy of some of them) may 
prove to be unbearable. This poses the question of the 
valuation of industrial capital. In the case of the sale of 
shares, auction may help; if free distribution is chosen, prior 
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to such a move, the government should provide some basic 
information allowing to perceive the difference between fu-
ture winners and permanent losers. In any case, such a 
preliminary appraisal allowing the ranking of State enter-
prises according to their actual and potential profitability 
would be necessary. 
Until recently, political feasibility was determined mainly by 
ideological considerations of the power elite. Today, with 
the government dominated by the liberal wing of Solidarity 
and the ex-Communist Party having become the Social-
Democratic Party, weakened and looking for a new identity, 
ideological constraints have disappeared. To be sure, there 
are those politicians who prefer liberal solutions and those 
who still long for some version of market socialism (although 
today they seem to be in a minority : there are rather more 
radically liberal (Beksiak)1 and less radically liberal (Bal-
cerowicz) options). But there is no taboo any more and all 
forms of ownership are openly discussed. So, in order to 
evaluate political feasibility of a given proposal we should 
turn to public attitudes and opinions about privatization. A 
particular alternative should be acceptable for the popu-
lation, but it should also strike social imagination and help' 
to overcome the entropy of social energy (obvious to any-
body with an insider view of the Polish economy). The 
institutional game between State enterprises, banks or hold-
ings may be accepted but hardly exciting. Also, its economic 
effects may be very limited, although capital market could 
develop. Different forms of employee shareholding have a 
good reputation among workers and sometimes are spon-
taneously adopted. However, the difference between owner-
ship profit-sharing and control is not always well under-
stood : the employee group ownership advocated by the self-
management lobby, and employee shareholding preached by 
an increasing number of enterprises,2 are often defended for 
the same reason : the basic concern is that the workers should 
have the right to control enterprises. It may be feared that 
this new powerful lobby will not favour the reallocation of 
property rights in conformity with the fundamental objec-
tive : increased efficiency and the creation of the environment 
which stimulates the selection of the best organizational 
forms. 
3.1. Public attitudes and opinions on privatization 
According to one of the main arguments against privatiza-
tion, the population is not ready to accept, after 40 years of 
socialism, a massive transfer of property rights from the 
State to individuals. The results of public opinion polls do 
not support this thesis. Before we present them briefly, let 
us note that such polls cannot give us reliable information 
about future behaviour in the situation of massive privatiza-
tion. They are, rather, the expression of a refusal of the 
existing system and not necessarily of the acceptance of an 
economic system which has not existed in Poland for the 
last two generations. 
The polls taken in March and April 1989 by the Centre for 
the Study of Public Opinion show a clear increase in the 
degree of acceptance of privatization in comparison with 
polls taken in 1987.3 While in 1987 a majority (of both 
workers and managers) supported the extension of the pri-
vate sector only in handicrafts and retail trade, in 1989 a 
majority supports privatization in all sectors of the economy. 
An overwhelming majority supports free private enterprise 
in handicrafts (97,9% of workers and 99,2% of managers), 
in retail trade (respectively 95,7 and 99,2%), in wholesale 
trade (88,7 and 92,7%), in small industrial enterprises (93,8 
and 97,8%), in medium-sized enterprises (83,4 and 92,3%), 
in foreign trade (78,9 and 84,7%) and in banking (75,4 
and 81,9%). Privatization of big industrial enterprises is 
supported less enthusiastically: by 58,9% of workers and 
56,6% of managers. 
We can see that the differences in attitudes of workers and 
managers are very small, the managers being only slightly 
more favourable than workers to the privatization of par-
ticular sectors. It is interesting to note that attitudes towards 
particular forms of ownership change if, instead of asking 
about general opinion, the question concerns the transform-
ation in the enterprise in which responders are employed: 
64,6% of workers and 77,4% of managers think that the 
transformation of State enterprises into companies owned 
by employees may have a positive impact on the performance 
of the economy; in the case of their own enterprise, the 
acceptance of workers rises to 71,1% and the support of 
managers declines to 68,3%. 
On the request of the Solidarity parliamentary group (OKP), Janusz 
Beksiak and a group of economists (Gruszecki, Jdraszczyk, Winiecki) 
presented an Outline of the stabilization programme and of systemic 
changes' (see Gazeta Wyborcza, 10.10.1989). The chapter on privatization 
stresses the preference for the individual and not for institutional or 
group ownership. 
Recently, several big State enterprises (Ursus, FSO) joined the newly 
created Employee Ownership Association. Luis Kelso, president of the 
American ESOP Association, became honorary president of the Associ-
ation, See Gazeta Wyborcza, 18.1.1990. 
The creation of joint ventures of Polish companies with the 
participation of foreign capital is considered as positive for 
the economy by 58,8% of workers and 64,6% of managers 
2 299 workers and 247 managers from 381 State industrial enterprises 
employing more then 500 persons have been interviewed. See 'Prywatna 
gospodarka', Prawo i zycie. 24.6.1989, and 'Opinia publiczna o prywa-
tyzacji', Gazeta Bankowa. 31.7.1989 to 6.8.1989. 
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(compared with the 1987 poll, there is an increase of about 
14% in both groups). 
Selling shares to persons who are not employees of the 
enterprise does not have such strong support : according to 
other polls, it is accepted by 35% of managers and 17% of 
workers.1 But this may be the result of the lack of experience 
with capital market and of the weak understanding of its 
functioning. 
4. Spontaneous transformation of the owner-
ship structure 
The debate about the reassignment of property rights in the 
Polish economy started several years ago. It contributed 
unquestionably to the change of attitudes towards private 
property. It resulted in new liberal laws on private enterprise, 
limited liability companies, and joint stock companies which 
stimulated the development of the private sector.2 This new 
climate and legal environment contributed also to progress-
ive, spontaneous and partly pathological transformation of 
the State sector. 
According to the November 1987 law, existing State enter-
prises could become limited liability companies or joint stock 
companies (spoîki). They could merge with other State 
enterprises or transform themselves into companies with the 
participation of the Treasury, or other institutional share-
holders (for instance, banks or local self-management 
councils) and/or of employees. The tax regime of such com-
panies was much more advantageous than that of State 
enterprises. Even more attractive was the possibility of flex-
ible determination of workers' and managers' wages. 
Two kinds of such transformations will be discussed here: 
the phenomenon of appropriation of public property by 
nomenklatura people, and, briefly, the transfermation of the 
State enterprise, initiated by the employees, into joint stock 
(or limited liability) companies based on employee share-
holding. 
4.1. Appropriation of public property by the nomenklatura 
This is a very complex and often confusing phenomenon. 
We will present its main forms but hard information in 
terms of numbers seems difficult to obtain. Most of the 
information comes from newspapers that publicize the most 
spectacular and revolting cases. 
Three scenarios may be distinguished : 
1. The director of a State enterprise becomes at the same 
time director of a company which he founded with the 
managerial staff of the enterprise or with nomenklatura 
people from outside the enterprise. Taking advantage of 
their position of power and their specific knowledge about 
idle productive capacities (due to the shortage of labour and 
the lack of raw materials or intermediate goods), they seize 
the most profitable orders of the State enterprise on behalf 
of the company. These orders are executed using capital 
assets and labour of the State enterprise.3 Leasing is informal 
and usually free, or its price is symbolic, but the employees 
are much better paid than for the same type of work in the 
State enterprise (where their wages are strongly regulated). 
An additional degree of flexibility is due to the fact that 
companies may purchase foreign currency on the free market 
and use it for importing necessary inputs. 
2. The most profitable department of State enterprise is 
liquidated, and in its place a company is set up which, from 
a technological and organizational point of view, plays the 
same role as the dissolved department (it may be the depart-
ment of sale, of maintenance, etc.). But now the enterprise 
has to pay a high price for the corresponding services; 
moreover, all the enterprise's clients are strongly advised to 
use the services offered by the company. Here, again, the 
employees of the State enterprise can earn much more; 
although there are many reports stressing that they judge 
such practices as blameworthy, the possibility of increasing 
their wages is highly appreciated.4 
3. Joint stock companies are created mixing different types 
of shareholders : Treasury, State enterprises, their directorial 
staff and, possibly, their employees, political and social 
organizations. The emergence of these hybrid organizations 
may be explained in terms of the search for self-protection 
against regulatory policy of the State (limitation of employ-
ment, wages, investment, foreign trade, etc.) Such a company 
See Bohdan Cichomski and Witold Morawski, 'Co to znaczy sprawiedli-
wie', Zycie Gospodarcze, 25.6.1989. 
There are no employment limits for private enterprises and no limits on 
the participation of foreign capital. In 1989 employment in the private 
sector rose by 27%. 
Director of the Institute of Food Industry Machinery in Warsaw, its 
deputy director (and at the same time first party secretary), chief account-
ant, director of the experimental institute and an engineer set up a private 
company. Using their position in the Institute they could pass on all 
attractive orders to the company. In order to fulfil these orders the 
company used State machines, warehouses, rationed spare parts and 
labour. See Andrzej Maîachowski, 'Akcjonariat pracowniczy — alterna-
tywa dia tzw. spoîek nomenklaturowych', Katolik, 10.9.1989. 
In Warynski factory in Warsaw there are 17 companies of this type and 
more than a dozen in the naval shipyard in Gdynia (see Staniszkis J., 
'The dynamics of the breakthrough in Eastern Europe, the Polish case : 
1988-89', book manuscript. 
147 
Prospects for privatization in Poland 
seizes the State enterprise assets at a very low price (usually 
through artificial bankruptcy).1 Quite often the director of 
the enterprise buys shares which, combined with those of 
the Treasury, give him the control of the firm. 
takeovers of State enterprises took place legally : the necess-
ary acceptance of enterprise councils was easily obtained 
because the perspective of higher gains for employees was 
an irresistible argument. 
Private companies set up by former high-level bureaucrats 
often took the place of State foreign trade offices as brokers 
in exports to Western markets. Due to their privileged pos-
ition, their contacts and information they had better access 
to markets and foreign investors. If they formed a joint 
venture with foreign capital they could keep up to 85% of 
hard currency gains (while, according to tax regulation, until 
last October Polish exporters could only keep up to 30% of 
their hard currency gains; this limit has been fixed at 50% 
since then). 
Although such new forms of ownership based on ill-defined 
property rights may contribute to a better utilization of 
human and capital assets, and may inject some flexibility 
into the State sector, their overall effect seems to be negative. 
They fuel inflation and increase the budget deficit : using in 
a parasitical way State enterprises which are often heavily 
subsidized, they capture profit generated in the State sector, 
shift some costs—of transport or employees' insurance—to 
the State enterprises, consequently requiring them to ask for 
even greater State subsidies than before; the nomenklatura 
companies are often made responsible for the sudden 
worsening of the economic performance of the State sectoi 
last year. Competition is not stimulated; on the contrary, 
these companies reinforce monopolistic tendencies and cre-
ate segmented markets. Moreover, this 'wild' privatization, 
being based on incomplete property rights, does not incite 
the owners to care about net value of the companies' assets. 
To students of the second economy in the East European 
countries this parasitical coexistence of a corrupted market 
with the State sector is familiar. But this time the defacto 
1 The 'Igloopol' story is best known : the biggest agro-industrial enterprise 
in Poland, Igloopol, has been liquidated and the agricultural, industrial 
and trade joint stock company Igloopol was formed. The capital assets 
of Igloopol enterprise, estimated at 55 billion zloty, were leased to spòlka 
Igloopol — shortly before the whole operation the assets were estimated 
at 145 billion zloty. The board of directors of the company remained the 
same as before (the managing director was the Deputy Minister for 
Agriculture responsible for environmental protection). Fifteen percent of 
shares have been sold to individuals, the rest of them to different firms, 
cooperatives and organizations dominated by the Communist Party and 
youth organization activists. All shares are nominal and their trading is 
subjected to the consent of the board of directors. The verdict of the 
expert's report commissioned by the Ministry of Finance was clear: 
the liquidation of the enterprise Igloopol was illegal and economically 
unjustified. But experts asked by the Ministry of Agriculture approved 
the liquidation procedure (See Zbigniew Zuzelski, 'Igloogate', Gazeta 
Bankowa, 29.5.1989 to 4.6.1989, and Grzegorz Górny, 'Igloobomba!', 
Gazeta Wyborcza, 30.8.1989. 
One year ago nomenklatura companies were still defended 
even by economists from the opposition because they were 
supposed to help overcome the resistance of the power 
elite to profound market-orientated transformation of the 
economy. The idea was to give them a market position 
instead of power. But today, after the last few months of an 
extraordinary acceleration of political changes, such a pre-
emptive offer seems unnecessary. Moreover, all pathological 
aspects of the process are now clearly perceived. In addition, 
given its rationale which relies strongly on its coexistence 
with the over- or sometimes mis-regulated State sector, it is 
to be feared that nomenklatura people will resist further 
ownership transformation of the State enterprises. In other 
words, that instead of contributing to the evolution of indus-
trial organization, their behaviour will petrify the present 
system. It will also perpetuate the selection which is typical 
for the traditional system: profit-orientated behaviour will 
be strongly permeated with nepotism and corruption. 
Some observers of the Polish scene see the expansion of 
nomenklatura business (sometimes called 'red capitalism' or 
'political capitalism) as a conscious attempt of the previous 
communist government to secure privileged economic pos-
itions for political losers. Be that as it may, it is clear that 
the brakes could be put on the expansion of nomenklatura 
companies if obvious policy measures were applied : regular-
ization of tax regulations for State enterprises and for com-
panies, cutting back subsidies, liberalization of wage policy, 
careful regulation of the liquidation procedure. Some de-
cisions of this nature have already been taken by the Soli-
darity-led government. A special parliamentary commission 
has been created in order to investigate irregular takeovers 
of State enterprises.2 A new regulation forbids directors of 
State enterprises to own shares in a joint stock company. 
Since the beginning of 1990 the foreign trade liberalization 
has neutralized one of the incentives to create companies : 
at present any firm can buy foreign currency and use it for 
importing necessary inputs. Also, the wage regulation and 
taxes have been standardized for State and private com-
panies which eliminates the powerful stimulus for collusion 
by the workers' council. Still, some deputies expressed con-
cern with possible adverse effects of anti-company legal 
A recent control done by the office of the Attorney General shows that 
10% (i.e. 1 593) companies are nomenklatura ones. They employ 700 
directors, 580 chairmen of cooperatives, 9 voivodes, and 80 high-level 
bureaucrats of political organizations. (See Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 and 
21.1.1990). 
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regulation: the dilemma is how to regulate their activities 
without jeopardizing the desirable process of transformation 
of the ownership structure. 
100% of shares. The Diora example is often quoted as a 
negative one because the control of the company has been 
granted to the Treasury. 
4.2. Transformation of State enterprise initiated by the 
employees 
Spectacular development of wild appropriation of State as-
sets contributed to the deterioration of the general atmos-
phere surrounding the discussed privatization process: it 
enforced distrust of the process of ownership transform-
ation. The awareness of the necessity of change is wide-
spread, but the workers seem to be more and more convinced 
that instead of managers taking the control of enterprises 
they should do it themselves. 
Employee shareholding is sometimes proposed explicitly as 
an alternative to appropriation of State assets by nomenkla-
tura. Such an argument was used in the case of the Piast 
coal-mine. But other arguments were probably more import-
ant : the search for better efficiency through, totally absent, 
cost-minimizing behaviour, the need of the employees to 
liberate themselves from economic, technological and organ-
izational absurdities to which they were condemned for 
years.' 
One of the most widely publicized transformations of the 
State enterprises, initiated by its employees, concerned the 
radio-manufacturing State enterprise Diora in Dzierzoniow : 
it has been converted into joint stock company Diora be-
cause the sale of shares was considered as the best way of 
financing investment necessary to start the production of 
video cassette recorders. Bank credit appeared as exceedingly 
expensive. The Diora story showed that the legal basis for 
the ownership transformation was not clear enough, which 
left room for negotiations and pressures. Eventually the 
employees could buy 35% of shares, the remaining shares 
went to the Treasury. A certain number of shares were sold 
on credit; the price of shares sold to persons from outside 
the firm was four times higher than the normal price. It has 
been announced that at the beginning of 1990 a special 
exchange office for Diora shares will be created in Warsaw.2 
Meanwhile, the working out of the bill on privatization is 
accompanied by a growing pressure of workers' councils 
which demand that the employees be able to buy up to 
5. Recent developments, conclusions and policy 
implications 
The transformation of the ownership structure seems to 
be a high priority objective on the agenda of the Polish 
Government. The general, declared aim is the transform-
ation of the Polish economy into a Western-type market 
economy; privatization of an important part of the State 
sector is viewed as a necessary step in this transition. 
In the last version of the government programme presented 
in January 1990 the open auction of shares is envisaged with 
special purchase rights (up to 20%) reserved for workers 
and managers. It is emphasized that such an auction would 
allow for the sale of shares at an equilibrium price, i.e. that 
shares may be sold below the book value of assets.3 In 
December 1989 the government began selling State treasury 
bonds which could be converted into ownership shares when 
State enterprises are privatized.4 The so-called 'small privati-
zation', i.e. sale or lease of shops, appartments, land, small 
enterprises, etc., has already started, but is not progressing 
fast enough. According to the first version of the hotly 
discussed bill on privatization all State enterprises had to 
be transformed into companies with 100% of the shares 
belonging first, during a transitory period, to the Treasury; 
next the shares had to be sold progressively to the public, 
with a certain number of shares being reserved for the 
employees on preferential terms. This project met strong 
resistance: the basic argument used against it stressed the 
arbitrary character of such institutional change. A new, 
softer version supposes that the transformation of a State-
owned enterprise into a joint stock company should be 
initiated by the enterprise itself; to become effective, it must 
See Irena Dryll, 'Czy kopalnia moze bye nasza', Zycie Gospodarcze, 
25.6.1989. 
See Zbigniew Grzegorzewski, 'Kroki we mgle', Zycie Gospodarcze, 
2.7.1989, '"Diora" w caîosci spéîka akcyjna', Stowo Polskie, 10.8.1989, 
and 'Statut wzorcowy czy bezprawny', Zycie Gospodarcze, 5.11.1989. 
It is not clear, however, whether a minimum price would be fixed, or, if 
not, what would happen in the case where the demand for shares is very 
low. But this problem may be limited by the fact that the government 
intends to sell only profitable firms. An important difficulty with the 
proposed method of privatization concerns the participation of foreign 
investors: they will not be treated on an equal footing with the Polish 
investors and a compromise must be found between the need for their 
capital and experience and the fear of selling national assets too cheaply. 
High demand for these bonds in December 1989 declined sharply in 
January 1990. This may be explained by a radical squeeze of the financial 
assets of the population—due to the price explosion combined with wage 
control and a high interest rate—and to the fact that the privatization 
process has not been started : the list of 70 enterprises which, according 
to the government announcement, could be privatized in 1990 is not yet 
available. 
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be accepted by the director of a special Privatization Agency 
(sometimes the director may choose himself the firms to be 
privatized). The project of the law provides that, during two 
years following the registration of a company, the majority 
of shares should be sold; the remaining Treasury shares 
would be controlled by banks. 
But this modified version of the project is still under strong 
attack. Firstly, there is a legal controversy concerning the 
current status of State firms (does the State have full owner-
ship rights or are workers' councils entitled to a part of 
the enterprise's assets?) Secondly, there is a confrontation 
between the idea of employee ownership defended by· wor-
kers and several economists—members of the Economic 
Council, non-governmental body advising the Prime Minis-
ter, and the idea of 'citizen ownership' advocated by the 
Government and notably the Minister for Privatization. 
The determination with which the Polish advocate the 
change in the allocation of property rights may be surprising 
for Western economists but represents a real conceptual 
breakthrough in reform thinking and can be legitimated by 
theoretical argument and empirical evidence. It is important 
to create such institutions that allow for continuous drawing 
and redrawing of the line between public and private. Today 
the Polish society may be inclined to squeeze strongly the 
public sector. But in the future this may change. 
Privatization is desirable and should be supported. It may 
be a long process, but it should be started immediately. 
Transparency and widely distributed information would be 
important elements of it, helping to reduce resistance and to 
avoid uninformed pressure. Objectives, costs and benefits of 
privatization should all be clarified. 
Privatization may help the stabilization programme by in-
creasing production, absorbing a part of the financial assets 
of the population and by partly compensating for the lower-
ing of wages by dividend payments. But these are secondary 
aims. The fundamental objectives should be constantly kept 
in mind: what is at stake is increased efficiency, and the 
flexible selection and adaptation of organizational struc-
tures. These need market environment and competition. 
And to have that, capital market and market for corporate 
control are necessary. But they would not be effective with-
out private owners. Hence the case for privatization in a 
large part of the Polish economy, large enough to make its 
logic spill over into the non-market sector. 
Western aid to this process may be orientated along two 
lines: firstly, contributing to the creation of a necessary 
environment by providing legal, technical and organizational 
know-how; secondly, supporting and co-financing the devel-
opment of the traditional private sector and of newly privati-
zed firms. 
Some specific actions may be recommended : 
(i) help in designing the financial market infrastructure: 
banking system, stock exchange, insurance industry, 
network of consulting firms; also the tax system must 
be reinvented and Western experience based on inter-
national comparisons would be very useful; 
(ii) encouraging the setting-up of Western banks in Poland : 
the demand for banking services is growing rapidly. 
Although the previous monolithic banking system was 
broken up it is unable to meet this growing demand. The 
newly created firms come up against the impossibility 
of simply opening a bank account. The privatization 
process will contribute to further congestion of the 
banking system; 
(iii) sponsoring the know-how programme both in Poland 
and in the West : sending Western consultants to Poland 
and organizing training programmes in modern ac-
counting and financial techniques for Polish bankers 
and managers; the fundamentals of stock exchange and 
modern financial systems should be taught : it might be 
useful to have a short film for the general public explain-
ing the functioning of the financial market; 
(iv) Western knowledge and experience of privatization 
would be precious : it may be useful to set up a Western 
think-tank from several European countries with ex-
perience in privatization to serve as consultants to the 
Polish Government. There are several empirical puzzles 
which must be solved: How to choose the first enter-
prises to be privatized (it is extremely important, for 
economic and political reasons, that the operation pro-
ves to be successful; the Polish Government is ready to 
sell profitable enterprises which eliminates one of the 
usual obstacles to privatization in developing 
countries)? How to evaluate the capital assets of State 
enterprises when there is no capital market? Which 
privatization techniques should be applied? 
(v) co-financing the creation of a telecommunications net-
work: telephones, fax, computers—the existing one is 
very rudimentary; 
(vi) a Western agency should be created to serve as an 
intermediary between Western investors and Polish 
firms: in fostering foreign investment such an agency 
should favour and stimulate joint ventures with non-
State firms, particularly with genuinely private com-
panies; 
(vii) direct support for Western investment in Poland would 
be needed. 
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1. General background 
Issues of policy affecting the energy sector and the environ-
ment in Poland are closely interlinked because the major 
source of environmental pollution is the energy sector, so 
that steps designed to bring about a more efficient use of 
energy can also make a significant contribution to reduce the 
current burden of emissions into the air and into waterways. 
By comparison with other countries Poland has an extraordi-
narily high consumption of primary energy relative to its 
GNP. Taking figures for 1987 from the 1989 World Develop-
ment Report for GNP in USD (US dollars) per person and 
primary energy consumption per person, Poland's use of 
energy amounts to 1,75 kg of oil-equivalent (koe) per USD 
of GNP. Excluding the oil-producing countries and small 
countries with populations of less than five million, because 
of the erratic effects of oil refineries and similar factors, the 
only country with a higher use of energy relative to GNP is 
China on 1,81 koe per USD. Very few countries exceed a 
value of 1,0 koe per USD; these include Hungary on 1,37 
and South Africa on 1,30. Even countries such as Egypt, 
Mexico and Venezuela, which are usually regarded as heavy 
consumers of energy because of the relatively low domestic 
prices for petroleum products, have energy consumption to 
GNP ratios in the range 0,7 to 0,9 koe per USD. 
Poland's climate is, of course, harsher than that of most 
developing countries, which pushes up its energy consump-
tion relative to GNP. However, the Republic of Korea and 
Turkey suffer from equally severe winter weather but their 
energy consumption to GNP ratios are 0,55 and 0,63 koe 
per USD respectively. These latter ratios lie between the 
average ratios of 0,72 and 0,51 koe per USD for lower and 
upper middle income developing countries respectively. The 
dividing line between these two categories is a per capita 
GNP of USD 2 000 p.a. and Poland with an estimated level 
of GNP per capita of USD 1 930 p.a. in 1987 comes right at 
the top of the lower middle income group. This comparison 
suggests that Poland's economy is between two and a half 
and three times more energy intensive than that of compar-
able developing countries. An alternative perspective on the 
energy intensity of the Polish economy may be obtained by 
noting that primary energy consumption per person in Po-
land and Austria are very similar whereas Austria's GNP 
per person is over six times that of Poland's. 
In addition to the high energy intensity of the Polish econ-
omy, the country is much more dependent upon coal as its 
primary source of energy than other countries with compar-
able income levels and industrial structures. In 1985 coal 
accounted for 82% of Poland's primary energy use. The 
only countries with a higher dependence upon coal were 
South Africa and North Korea which both had a coal share 
of 86% while the coal share for China is very close to that 
in Poland. The share of coal in primary energy use was less 
than 25% in most OECD countries and even Australia, 
which exports more than three times as much coal as Poland, 
depended upon coal for only 46% of its primary energy use. 
In general, heavy dependence on coal is a feature of centrally 
planned economies since South Africa and Ipdia 
(67%)—both countries with a strong tradition of autarchic 
trade policies—are the only non-centrally planned econom-
ies with coal shares greater than 50%. Among the centrally 
planned economies the German Democratic Republic 
(75%), Vietnam (68%), Czechoslovakia (66%) and Mongo-
lia (65%) join China, North Korea and Poland in the group 
of countries whose coal share exceeds 50%. 
The composition of the group of countries which are heavily 
dependent on coal as a source of primary energy suggests 
that the simple abundance of coal in Poland is not a sufficient 
explanation for the economy's high degree of dependence 
upon a single fuel for its primary energy use. Among the 
market economies, only Australia and South Africa are in 
a similar position to that of Poland in having abundant 
reserves of coal whose production can either be exported or 
used domestically as the prime source of energy. However, 
the Netherlands and Norway may also be included in the 
comparison as they have abundant reserves of gas and/or 
oil. The Netherlands exports gas and is a net importer of 
both coal and oil so that gas accounts for only 43% of total 
primary energy use. Norway exports both gas and oil and 
imports coal, so that there are substantial differences be-
tween the shares of these fuels in energy production and use. 
On the other hand, Romania, which produces coal, oil and 
gas (especially the latter), has a pattern of domestic energy 
use which closely follows the composition of its production 
with gas accounting for 57% of production and 54% of 
consumption. 
The hypothesis which seems to emerge from these compari-
sons is that a high level of dependence upon coal in primary 
energy consumption is the result of autarchic trading poli-
cies. These attach a high priority to reliance upon domestic 
sources of energy and tend to neglect the possible benefits 
of exporting one fuel in order to import other fuels which 
might be more efficiently used in particular industries or 
sectors of the economy. This pattern is particularly evident 
in the relatively small shares of gas in primary energy use in 
countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratic Republic and Poland when compared with 
countries in Western Europe. The distortions associated with 
currency inconvertibility and the bilateral trading arrange-
ments of the CMEA have held down the level of gas imports 
from the Soviet Union, while the countries have been unwill-
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ing to invest in pipeline links which would enable them to 
import from the Western European market. Since gas is a 
flexible and relatively clean fuel, the costs of autarchy are 
manifested in the form of additional handling costs and 
lower fuel efficiency borne by enterprises and households 
and of environmental damage which affects the whole popu-
lation. 
Comparisons between the composition of fuel use by indus-
try in Poland and a range of West European countries shows 
that thè high dependence of the Polish economy on coal as 
a fuel is the result of policies which affect specific sectors 
and fuels rather than of a uniformly larger share of coal in 
fuel use across the economy as a whole. Coal accounts for 
93% of energy inputs into electricity production, which is 
much higher than in any other European country. Using the 
UK as a guide suggests that a coal share of 70 to 80% might 
be an appropriate medium-term target for the electricity 
sector. This would involve the conversion or replacement of 
15 to 20% of existing generating capacity to burn either 
gas or oil combined with a more balanced programme of 
investment over the next decade. 
The most striking difference between Poland and West Euro-
pean countries concerns the commercial and residential sec-
tor (which are aggregated in Polish statistics). Coal accounts 
for almost 80% of fuel use in this sector in Poland whereas 
the equivalent share is less than 15% in all West European 
countries. Even in the UK in 1970, which was then much 
more orientated to the use of coal than now, the share of 
coal was only 30%. The main fuels used in the commercial 
and residential sector in West European countries are oil 
and gas with electricity taking a substantial share in the 
warmer Mediterranean countries. 
If we assume that deregulation of energy markets in Poland 
will tend to narrow the gap between patterns of fuel use 
in Poland and in the Western European countries, these 
comparisons imply that the impact of the changes will be 
focused on a limited number of sectors. The general pattern 
will be of a shift from the use of coal and electricity towards 
oil and gas. More importantly, the main changes will occur 
in sectors which are often neglected in energy analyses that 
concentrate on the most energy-intensive industries. Since 
the world market for coal is far from perfect and transport 
costs are significant, there are likely to be significant differ-
ences between the export and import parity prices for coal 
in Europe, so that it may be quite reasonable to continue to 
rely upon use of coal in the most energy-intensive sectors of 
the economy. This argument is much weaker in other sectors 
for which the efficiency, flexibility, handling and environ-
mental costs of alternative fuels are much more important 
than even quite substantial price differentials. 
On the environmental side, parts of Poland, notably Upper 
Silesia and the neighbouring Krakow district in the south, 
are among the most polluted areas in Europe. Poland has 
the misfortune to be located downwind and downriver of 
two countries—Czechoslovakia and the GDR—which have 
appalling records with respect to dealing with environmental 
pollution. The Poles claim, with some exaggeration, that 
40% of their air pollution is imported from these two 
countries and that the Oder River is substantially affected 
by saline water and effluent dumped into the river in 
Czechoslovakia. This claim is somewhat misleading because 
the major transboundary pollutant is acid rain, associated 
with S02 and NOx emissions, while the most severe effects 
of air pollution at present are those associated with local 
emissions of particulates and sulphur. In addition, Poland 
exports much of its acid rain to the Soviet Union, so that it 
is a relatively small net importer of air pollutants. 
The Vistula River, which runs from Upper Silesia through 
Krakow and Warsaw into the Baltic near Gdansk, is an 
environmental disaster. Its problems are caused by: 
(a) the discharge of saline water from coal mines into the 
river and its tributaries; and 
(b) the discharge of untreated or partially treated sewage 
into the river by the various towns and cities through 
which it passes. Untreated sewage is also discharged into 
the Baltic and associated inlets from Elblag, Gdansk and 
Szczecin with the result that beaches and coastal waters 
are severely affected by pollution. 
Some combination of the profligate use of energy, an excess-
ive reliance upon coal as a fuel, and high levels of environ-
mental damage are characteristic of most centrally planned 
economies, e.g. see Gomulka and Rostowski, 1988. There 
seem to be two fundamental sources of the biases which lead 
to investment decisions and other policies which lead to this 
outcome : 
(a) strongly autarchic trade policies which discourage the 
use of imported fuels, usually oil and gas. These have 
been reinforced by the Byzantine nature of the agree-
ments for the export of gas and oil from the Soviet Union 
to its East European satellites, so that no one—including 
those who negotiated the arrangements—is able to com-
pare the opportunity cost of these fuel imports with the 
potential cost of fuels bought on the world market; 
(b) a systematic underpricing of all fuels, but especially of 
coal, and of natural resources in general. This reinforces 
institutional forces which incline enterprises towards ex-
cessive use of energy and provides no incentive for them 
to invest in reducing or eliminating their emissions of 
pollutants. 
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2. Economic structure and resource use 
It has been argued that the high level of energy intensity of 
the Eastern European economies is partly, or even largely, 
to be explained by their patterns of final demand which lead 
to an excessive emphasis on industrial production, especially 
from heavy industries such as iron and steel, chemicals, and 
machinery and equipment. If this argument is correct, then 
economic reform and the gradual integration of Poland and 
other East European economies into the world economy will 
lead to a decline in both energy intensity and pollution 
output. The structure of domestic demand might be expected 
to shift away from investment and government consumption 
towards private consumption with the service sectors taking 
a larger share at the expense of material production. On the 
trade side the evidence does not suggest that these economies 
will have a comparative advantage in the production and 
export of heavy industrial goods. The overall levels of im­
ports and exports will probably increase but the bizarre 
structure of incentives associated with intra-CMEA trade 
means that it is difficult to predict how the composition of 
both imports and exports will change. 
To test whether such structural changes in the composition 
will reduce energy intensity and pollution output I have 
constructed a simple model based on an input-output matrix 
and a pollution-output matrix for Poland in 1984.' This 
allows one to examine the impact of changing the structure 
of final demand on the aggregate demand for energy and 
the emissions of various pollutants. The basic input-output 
balance equations may be written in matrix notation as : 
demand for the sector's output. Thus, equation (1) may be 
rewritten as : 
X + P + I = AX + Y (1) 
where X is the vector of gross outputs, Ρ is the 'foreign 
profile' vector, I is the vector of imports, A is the input-
output matrix, and Y is the vector of total final demands 
which is the sum of private and government consumption, 
investment, increases in stocks, and exports. The 'foreign 
profile' arises because enterprises classified under a particu­
lar sector may produce and sell goods which are classified 
under a different sector. Note that this excludes all items 
which are produced as intermediate inputs into the sector's 
normal output. The vector of 'foreign profiles' represents 
the net balance of such production for each sector, so that 
its elements sum to zero. Assume that the 'foreign profile' 
of a sector is proportional to its gross output and that 
imports for a sector do not compete with domestic pro­
duction but depend upon the level of intermediate and final 
The input-output table, which comprised 49 sectors, was constructed by 
J. Cofala and his colleagues for a study of energy pricing in Poland. It 
was developed from the standard 42-sector table by disaggregating the 
energy, chemicals and food-processing sectors in order to provide more 
detail concerning the pattern of energy use in the economy. Details of 
the method of disaggregation are given in Cofala et ai, 1988. 
Χ + HX + LAX + MY = AX + Y (2) 
where H, L and M are diagonal matrices of'foreign profile', 
intermediate import and final demand import coefficients. 
Solving this equation for X yields : 
X = [I + H + LA - A]"'[I - M] Y (3) 
Suppose that we identify a set of pollutants whose emissions 
are partly determined by the level of production in each 
industry. Let E be the matrix of emission coefficients, so 
that the gross output of the pollutants is determined by : 
Ζ = EX + Zh (4) 
where Zh is the vector of emissions from the household and 
non-material sector. 
The hypothetical effects of structural change in the compo­
sition of final demand are examined by replacing the actual 
final demand vector by alternative final demand vectors 
based on data for Spain and Portugal. The first was chosen 
because Spain is the country in Western Europe which is 
most similar to Poland in population and industrial struc­
ture, though its income per capita is about three times that 
of Poland. In particular, it has a substantial output of 
heavy industrial goods and relies upon coal for a significant 
fraction of its energy use. By contrast, Portugal's income 
per capita is only 50% higher than Poland's but its industrial 
sector is much more orientated to the production of light 
industrial goods. 
The alternative final demand vectors are normalized so that 
the sum of final demands is the same as the actual sum of 
final demands for Poland in 1984. There are, however, three 
problems in deriving the alternative final demand vectors 
which must be addressed: 
(a) The Polish input-output table relates to the material 
sphere of the economy only, so that it is not possible to 
take account of differences in final demand for services 
not associated with material production. The treatment 
of housing and associated services, which constitute the 
'housing-communal' sector in the Polish input-output 
table, also differs substantially from that in Western 
European input-output tables. Thus, the alternative final 
demand vectors were based on the final demands for 
material output in Spain and Portugal, while the level of 
final demand for the housing-communal sector was left 
unchanged. 
(b) The future of Poland's coal exports is very uncertain. If 
energy demand continues to grow even quite slowly, the 
country's exportable surplus of coal will disappear unless 
there is a considerable shift from coal to oil and gas in 
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the composition of energy consumption. On the other 
hand, if policies to achieve higher levels of energy ef­
ficiency were successful, exports of coal might be sus­
tained or even grow. From the point of view of pro­
duction costs there is a good case on both environmental 
and economic grounds for reducing coal production since 
the marginal cost of coal with high ash content from 
some old mines or those operating in difficult geological 
conditions is very high. These considerations suggest that 
it is useful to examine scenarios in which coal exports 
continue at their present level and others in which there 
are no coal exports with an appropriate reduction in coal 
production. 
(c) The structure of final demands in the Polish input-output 
table is calculated at domestic prices, so that a part of 
the differences between Poland and Spain or Portugal 
may simply be the result of price distortions. The results 
of Phase III of the UN International Comparisons Pro­
ject—see Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1982—suggest a 
reasonably high degree of price similarity between Spain 
and Poland in 1975. The major distortions concern the 
prices of energy products and, to a lesser extent, of 
raw materials, both of which tend to be substantially 
underpriced in Poland. This bias may be corrected either 
by repricing the output of those sectors most severely 
affected or by excluding them from the adjustments in 
final demands. 
The last two issues were dealt with by examining two scen­
arios for the composition of private consumption, invest­
ment and exports: variant A in which the energy sectors are 
excluded from the changes in final demand, and variant Β 
in which the changes in final demand extend to the energy 
sector so that coal exports disappear. Combining these with 
different assumptions about changes in the relative import­
ance of aggregate components of final demand, i.e. private 
consumption, government consumption, investment, stock 
changes and exports, gives four types of structural changes 
which have been investigated for each of the comparison 
countries: 
(i) Assume that the aggregate components of final demand 
are adjusted to the Spanish or Portuguese shares of final 
demand but that the composition of expenditure within 
each aggregate remains as in Poland. For the Spanish 
pattern this implies reductions in the levels of exports, 
stock accumulation and investment offset by a large 
increase in private consumption and a smaller increase 
in government consumption. On the other hand, the 
Portuguese pattern brings increases in exports and 
government consumption accompanied by a decline in 
investment. 
(ii) Assume that the aggregate components of final demand 
remain as in Poland while the composition of private 
consumption, investment and exports are adjusted to 
the Spanish/Portuguese pattern under variant A. For 
the Spanish pattern, car manufacturing, light chemicals, 
paper, transport and communications and distribution 
are the sectors which experience large increases in final 
demand, while miscellaneous machinery, other transport 
equipment, food products and construction are the main 
losers. The Portuguese pattern is fairly similar but with 
large increases in final demand for textiles and clothing 
and a much smaller increase for the distribution sector. 
(iii) As (ii) but for variant B. The major difference between 
(ii) and (iii) for both Spain and Portugal is a large 
reduction in final demand for coal—primarily in the 
form of a reduction in coal exports—offset by an in­
crease in final demand for petroleum products and gas. 
(iv) The combination of (i) and (ii), i.e. with changes in both 
the aggregate components of final demand and in their 
composition. The sectoral patterns of changes in final 
demand are similar to those for (ii) above. 
The estimated changes in energy demands for the various 
alternative demand structures are shown in Table 1. The 
crucial result is that, except for direct reductions in the final 
demand for coal due to a change in the composition of 
exports, the alternative demand structures do not lead to 
any substantial decrease in the demand for energy. The shift 
from exports towards consumption in the Spanish pattern 
does reduce total demand for coal, but a shift from invest­
ment towards exports with a smaller increase in consumption 
in the Portuguese pattern implies a significant increase in 
coal demand accompanied by smaller increases in demand 
for other energy sources. Changes in the internal compo­
sition of consumption, investment and exports towards 
either the Spanish or the Portuguese pattern imply little 
change or an increase in the total energy demands. 
The clear implication of this analysis is that the very high 
level of energy consumption relative to GDP cannot be 
explained in terms of the aggregate structure of final demand 
or the sectoral composition of final demand. The crucial 
observation is that, on average, exports are relatively energy-
intensive. Thus, an increase in the share of final demand 
represented by exports, even accompanied by a shift in the 
composition of exports towards light industrial goods as in 
Portugal, has the effect of increasing energy demand. Thus, 
there is little reason to expect that an opening-up of the 
Polish economy to greater trade will decrease its energy 
intensity unless there is a substantial improvement in energy 
efficiency. The usual assumption for centrally planned econ­
omies that investment represents a high share of final de­
mand and is biased towards energy-intensive goods did not 
seem to apply to Poland in the mid-1980s. 
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Table 1 
Energy use for alternative structures of final demand 
Alternative demand 
structure' 
% increase in energy demand2 relative 
to base level for: 
Oil and 
gas 
Electricity 
and heat 
(i) Change in aggregate final demands 
Spain 
Portugal 
(ii) Change in composition of final demands, A 
Spain 
Portugal 
(iii) Change in composition of Final demands, Β 
Spain 
Portugal 
(iv) Change in aggregate final demands and in 
their composition, A 
Spain 
Portugal 
- 7 
13 
3 
0 
-28 
-35 
- 5 
10 
2 
6 
7 
0 
74 
28 
8 
5 
1 
6 
4 
1 
16 
4 
4 
6 
1 See text for full details of the assumptions about alternative structures of linai demand. 
2 The demand for separate energy products is aggregated at current prices. 
Analysis of the impact of alternative demand structures 
on the emission of major pollutants tells a similar story. 
Emissions of fly ash, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and. 
solid waste are primarily linked to the production and use 
of coal with non-ferrous mining and quarrying generating 
large quantities of solid wastes. Metallic dusts originate from 
the metallurgical industries, especially iron and steel, while 
food processing, paper and textiles constitute the major 
sources of BOD discharges. Overall, a shift in the structure 
of final demand towards either the Spanish or the Portuguese 
pattern would bring reductions in the emission of metallic 
dust and solid waste but at the cost of a significant increase 
in water pollution and some increase in the emission of other 
pollutants. 
The link between coal consumption and emissions of solid 
waste and of air pollutants other than metallic dust implies 
that any shift in final demand towards exports tends to 
worsen problems of air pollution. Changes in the compo­
sition of consumption and exports lead to an increase in 
both air and water pollution due to the shift towards cars, 
chemical products, paper and transport. The large increase 
in BOD discharges for the Portuguese composition of final 
demand is due to the substantial increase in gross output of 
the paper, textile and clothing sectors, though this is some­
what alleviated by a reduction in the gross output of the 
food-processing sectors. 
The detailed results of any analysis of the effects of structural 
change as a result of economic reform must, of course, 
depend upon the precise nature of the changes envisaged. 
However, there are sufficient differences between the Spanish 
and Portuguese structures of final demand for a general 
conclusion to be drawn from this investigation. This is that 
the energy and environmental problems of the Polish econ­
omy cannot be blamed upon the structure of production 
and final demand. Structural changes in output and demand 
are more likely to increase the demand for energy and the 
emission of most pollutants than to reduce them. It follows 
that policy must be directed towards the goal of achieving 
higher levels of energy efficiency and lower emissions of 
pollution for all sectors of industry and the economy. In 
particular, it is misleading to put the primary blame for the 
wasteful use of energy and the discharge of pollutants on 
specific industries such as the metallurgical sectors or heavy 
industry more generally. These are, indeed, major sources 
of individual forms of pollution, but a switch from heavy to 
light industry will simply shift the burden of emissions from 
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Table 2 
Pollution emissions for alternative structures of final demand 
structure ' 
(i) Change in aggregate final demands 
Spain 
Portugal 
(ii) Change in composition of final demands, A 
Spain 
Portugal 
(iii) Change in composition of final demands, Β 
Spain 
Portugal 
(iv) Change in aggregate final demands and in 
their composition, A 
Spain 
Portugal 
Metal 
dust 
- 8 
7 
13 
-12 
14 
-12 
- 5 
-22 
Fly 
ash 
- 2 
6 
6 
5 
11 
5 
3 
9 
% 
so2 
0 
5 
4 
1 
12 
4 
2 
4 
increase in emissions relative 
to base level for: 
NOj 
0 
4 
4 
1 
7 
1 
3 
3 
Solide 
waste 
- 6 
10 
6 
3 
- 3 
16 
- 5 
- 3 
BOD2 
5 
4 
13 
27 
11 
29 
13 
36 
Waste 
water3 
0 
5 
5 
3 
11 
5 
3 
6 
1 See text for full details of the assumptions about alternative structures of final demand. 
2 Biological oxygen demand, i.e. organic matter discharged into rivers and groundwater. 
3 Waste water of all kinds from all sources including cooling water from power stations. 
air pollutants to water pollutants. Unfortunately, this implies 
that the process of achieving lower levels of energy demand 
and of pollution is likely to be a slow and difficult one. 
3. Energy policy 
The central question for energy policy concerns the manner 
and speed of adjustments to remove the gross distortions in 
current energy prices. The magnitude of these distortions 
and the perceived impact of energy price increases on the 
general price level mean that the political costs of rapid 
adjustment are high. During the second half of 1989 rises in 
energy prices lagged behind the general level of inflation, so 
that the large increases which were implemented at the 
beginning of 1990 simply represented a return to the pattern 
of domestic energy prices relative to border prices that had 
prevailed earlier in the year. Petroleum products, notably 
gasoline and diesel fuel, are an exception to this pattern in 
that the gap between domestic and border prices has now 
been eliminated and the government has removed all con­
trols from their prices. However, the main concern focuses 
on coal, electricity and district heat prices, which are still 
estimated to be set at about one-third of the comparable 
border prices (or long-run marginal cost in the cases of 
electricity and district heat). The pricing of gas also presents 
difficulties for the future because of the move towards hard 
currency pricing of gas imports from the Soviet Union in 
1991. We must, therefore, examine both the medium-term 
goals of energy pricing policy and the implications of alterna­
tive measures designed to cope with the immediate problems. 
Even before the inflation which started in 1988 the domestic 
prices of all important fuels were much lower than their 
comparable border prices at any plausible exchange rate. In 
addition, the ratios of border to domestic prices differ greatly 
between fuels. In 1987 the ratios of border to domestic prices 
for industrial purchasers were approximately 3 for coal and 
electricity, 2 for gas and 1,5 for petrolum products when 
calculated using a conservative estimate of the shadow ex­
change rate for that period. For commercial and residential 
users the equivalent ratios of border to domestic prices were 
4,2 for coal, 13,3 for electricity, 8,7 for gas, 1,3 for heating 
oil and 9,6 for district heat. These figures reveal massive 
distortions in the relative prices of different fuels across the 
different categories of users. 
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The elimination of these price distortions must be the central 
objective of pricing policy in the medium term if the govern-
ment wishes to provide appropriate incentives for achieving 
higher efficiency in the use of energy and a more appropriate 
balance between different fuels. However, it is important to 
realize that the initial response by both industrial and other 
users to changes in energy prices will be quite small. Esti-
mates of the short-run price elasticities of industrial and 
residential demand for different fuels in the OECD countries 
are subject to substantial uncertainty, but a value of 
- 0,2 may reasonably be taken as a typical value, while long-
run elasticities tend to be at least four times the equivalent 
short-run elasticity. 
Energy saving in the short run tends to be a matter of good 
housekeeping, so that it is likely that short-run elasticities 
decrease with the size of the increase in energy prices. The 
existing rigidities and distortions in the Polish economy 
inevitably mean that the short-run response will be much 
smaller than in the West. Eventually, of course, a policy of 
much higher energy prices will lead to a reduction in energy 
consumption per USD of GDP but the speed of this decline 
will depend upon: 
(a) the nature of the incentives and constraints facing the 
managers of enterprises including the extent of their 
discretion to utilize investment resources; 
(b) competition between domestic and foreign suppliers of 
energy-saving equipment and technologies; 
(c) the relaxation of network and other supply constraints, 
especially on the availability of gas and petroleum prod-
ucts. 
In order to establish the possible magnitude of the response 
of industrial users to sharp increases in energy prices over 
a two to three-year time horizon J. Cofala (of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences) and I organized a survey of energy-
intensive enterprises including some power stations—see 
Hughes and Cofala, 1989. The anticipated improvements in 
energy efficiency following a move to border pricing of fuels 
were very small. For several sectors the level of energy 
efficiency was affected more by the availability of comp-
lementary inputs than by the level of fuel prices. This result 
supports the hypothesis of 'fixed energy inputs' which has 
been propounded by some observers of Eastern European 
economies. The large shifts in the relative prices of coal and 
electricity vis-à-vis gas and petroleum products seemed to 
have little effect on the anticipated composition of fuel 
use. Even those improvements in fuel efficiency that were 
envisaged by the enterprise managers involved substantial 
investments in modernizing plants or installing new boilers 
and similar equipment. From the perspective of energy con-
servation alone the additional costs of capital and other 
inputs outweighed the benefits achieved by reducing fuel 
inputs, so that the justification of the capital expenditure 
rested on the extra output which could be produced rather 
than on higher levels of energy efficiency. 
These results contrast strongly with the experience of West-
ern companies following the oil price shocks of 1974 and 
1980 when energy conservation measures were judged to 
have very short payback periods. Our conclusion, therefore, 
was that improvements in fuel efficiency are simply one 
aspect of the general changes in the structure and operation 
of Polish industry that will be required over the next five to 
ten years. Changes in energy prices are a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for progress towards reducing the 
energy intensity of Polish industry. Price changes must be 
accompanied by a hardening of the budget constraints under 
which enterprises operate, by the introduction of real compe-
tition in markets for both output and inputs, by changes in 
quality of and incentives facing managements, and by a shift 
away from a focus on investment as the means of improving 
efficiency towards learning by doing and an emphasis on 
continuous disembodied technical progress rather than large 
technical leaps. 
As an illustration of this last point, there is a substantial 
lobby in the Polish energy sector for investment in fluidized 
bed boilers as a method of achieving higher energy efficiency 
plus a reduction in sulphur emissions. This is a new tech-
nology—actively promoted by a number of large Western 
companies—which has not been fully developed for the 
range of thermal capacities required in Poland and which 
will probably not be available until the mid- or late-1990s. 
On the other hand, relatively small sums spent on improving 
the handling of coal and ash, on enhancing and maintaining 
dust removal systems, and on other aspect of heating and 
power systems could produce a significant increase in aggre-
gate energy efficiency as a result of many small changes. 
One method of stimulating such improvements is to offer 
energy managers or consultants contracts under which their 
remuneration is calculated as a fraction of the net reduction 
in energy costs or in total costs over a fixed period. There 
are well-known difficulties of devising and monitoring such 
contracts but the satisfactory arrangements can be estab-
lished. The development of such contracts would be an 
excellent use of the technical assistance funds provided by 
various OECD governments. 
While the medium-term objective of bringing energy prices 
paid by industrial enterprises and other domestic fuel users 
into line with border prices is clear, this analysis of the 
probable response of energy consumers to price changes 
suggests that the immediate efficiency gains from a rapid 
change in relative prices may be quite small. Thus, it would 
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be quite reasonable to phase the move to border pricing over 
a number of years provided that the short-term changes are 
consistent with the target adjustments in the real level of 
energy prices and the relative prices of different fuels. Since 
the relative prices paid by households and other small-scale 
energy users are so distorted, there is a strong case for 
adjusting these more rapidly than the average real price of 
energy in order to provide an unambiguous signal concern-
ing the pattern of relative prices which will prevail in future 
and to encourage shifts in the composition of fuel use where 
this is possible. 
Inevitably there will be resistance to any large increases in 
the fuel prices paid by industry and households on the 
grounds that it was the attempt to raise the real prices of 
coal and other fuels in early 1988 which initiated the current 
round of inflation. These fears have some substance but the 
implicit analysis of the cause of the inflation focuses on the 
wrong target. We examined the prospective impact of the 
1988 price increases on the rest of the economy in mid-1988 
and found that the key element in predicting the inflationary 
consequences of raising energy prices was the extent to which 
wages and the exchange rate were adjusted to compensate 
for the change in the cost of living—see Cofala et al., 1988. 
The fundamental point is simple: the magnitude of the 
changes in absolute prices required to achieve a given change 
in the real prices of energy products is increased if the 
entire burden of relative price adjustment is thrown onto the 
relative prices of goods alone because the real levels of wages 
and other incomes are protected. 
We calculated that without any wages compensation or 
change in the exchange rate the early 1988 energy price 
increases should have led to an increase in the cost of 
living of approximately 9%. Assuming full compensation in 
nominal wage levels and the surpluses of enterprises for 
changes in the cost of living resulted in an increase in the 
cost of living of 20% rather than the initial 9%. Finally, 
allowing for depreciation in the exchange to maintain a 
constant level of wages in dollar terms led to a further 
doubling in the increase in the cost of living if full income 
compensation was assumed. These results illustrate the im-
portance of consequential adjustments in nominal wages and 
the exchange rate in determining the impact of energy price 
changes on the price level. Note, also, that a little under 
one-half of the increase in the price level due to the 1988 
changes was due to the approximate doubling of coal prices 
that was implemented—allowing for any cost-based in-
creases in electricity and district heat prices—and the remain-
der was due to the changes in other fuel prices. 
This analysis demonstrates that it was the subsequent in-
creases in nominal wages and then the depreciation in the 
exchange rate which were the real sources of the inflationary 
spiral that started in 1988. This was exacerbated by the 
manner in which most enterprises are able to pass on in-
creases in their costs, including wage costs, via the cost-plus 
pricing mechanism, which makes any attempt to correct 
relative prices very expensive in terms of the resulting rise 
in the consumer price index. The conclusion, therefore, is 
that any major price reform in the energy sector must be 
accompanied by fundamental changes in the manner in 
which prices are set in the rest of the economy, so that 
enterprises come under immediate pressure to respond to 
higher real energy prices by achieving greater energy ef-
ficiency. 
This question of price-setting behaviour and the response to 
increases in real energy prices is critically important because 
of the wide gap that still remains between domestic and 
border prices for coal and other forms of energy. The pricing 
impact model referred to above implies that a 200% increase 
in coal prices accompanied by an increase in electricity prices 
of 100% (to compensate for the higher cost of fuel inputs) 
would lead to a 20% increase in the general level of consumer 
prices on the assumption that wages are fully adjusted for 
changes in the cost of living. If we allow for larger increases 
in the prices of electricity, district heat and gas—especially 
for household consumers—to eliminate all differences be-
tween domestic and border prices, then the increase in the 
general level of consumer prices would lie in the range of 
30 to 35%, again assuming full wages compensation. If, in 
addition, the exchange rate were depreciated in order to 
maintain a constant level of wages in dollar terms, the 
ultimate rise in the general level of consumer prices as a 
result of bringing domestic energy prices into line with bor-
der prices would be in the range of 80 to 90%. 
These increases in the cost of living are large enough for 
the government to be concerned about the possibility of 
restarting the inflationary spiral if the adjustments in the 
relative price of energy are implemented too quickly, es-
pecially if the government wishes to prevent an implicit 
appreciation of the zloty as a result of the price increases. 
The changes will be more easily absorbed if the increases in 
the real prices of energy are phased over a period of two to 
three years. Even so, it is desirable to dampen the impact of 
these relative price changes by discouraging enterprises from 
fully passing on any additional costs which they face. On 
the assumption of very limited energy conservation—an 
aggregate price elasticity of —0,15 for energy demand—and 
some inter-fuel substitution, the general price increases pre-
dicted by the pricing impact model are approximately 0,8 
times the figures quoted above. The greater the response of 
energy demand to the increases in the real prices of coal, 
electricity and the other fuels, the less will be the impact of 
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these prices on the general price level and thus the lower the 
chances of a recurrence of the inflationary spiral initiated 
by the fuel price changes implemented in early 1988. 
There is no likelihood that competition will provide any real 
discipline in the short term on the prices charged by many 
industrial enterprises, so that price controls may prove to 
be the only effective method of ensuring that profits are 
squeezed as energy prices rise. This is an unpalatable sugges-
tion because most economists favour as rapid a removal of 
government regulation of markets as is feasible and naturally 
there must be fears that price controls will simply generate 
more price distortions. On the other hand, the purpose of 
adjusting the relative prices of energy and other factors of 
production will be undermined if large enterprises are able 
to pass on any extra costs in the form of higher prices 
without any effect on their profits. 
As in the energy sector, the long-run objective for an efficient 
pricing policy should be border pricing of traded goods 
combined with the determination of the prices of non-traded 
items on the basis of their long-run marginal cost evaluated 
at border prices. Import liberalization combined with a 
unified and reasonably predictable exchange rate will go a 
long way towards meeting this objective for traded items. 
For non-traded items and for traded items during the tran-
sitional period any regime of price controls should be de-
signed to influence changes in the average level of prices 
charged by enterprises. It should permit changes in relative 
prices in response to changes in relative costs of production, 
especially as a consequence of the projected increases in the 
real prices of different forms of energy. 
Sophisticated mechanisms for controlling prices are difficult 
to devise and even more difficult to implement given the 
information available to the government. Furthermore, one 
concern should be to reduce the extent of bureaucratic inter-
ference in the operation of enterprises so that detailed price 
controls would not be appropriate. An approach worth 
considering is based on the idea of 'yardstick competition'. 
As a prior condition it is desirable to break up large enter-
prises as far as is possible and then to define sectors or sub-
sectors over which the comparisons operate. All of the firms 
in a sector are required to report the average increase in their 
costs over the previous period. Each firm is then permitted to 
increase the average price of its output by the average of the 
cost increases experienced by all firms in the sector excluding 
itself. Provided that firms do not collude, this gives every 
firm an incentive to reduce its costs and thus exerts down-
ward pressure on the extent of price increases. The effects 
of collusion may be reduced by modifying the yardstick rule 
so that in sectors where the average increase in costs exceeds 
the increase in the GDP deflator (or some similar index) the 
allowable increase in prices is equal to the yardstick value 
less some fraction (perhaps 20%) of the difference between 
the average cost increase and the increase in the GDP defla-
tor. This will discourage any tendency for costs and margins 
to rise in sectors dominated by a small number of enterprises. 
Under pressure of competition from imported goods or as 
a result of the price control regime a number of energy-
intensive enterprises may find that they are unable to make 
a surplus as energy prices are increased. The sectors that are 
most likely to be affected in this way are iron and steel, 
heavy chemicals and paper. Note that these industries have 
severe environmental problems so that increases in emission 
fees and fines will reinforce the impact of higher energy 
prices on their finances. The building materials and ceramics 
sectors will also experience large increases in their energy 
costs but they are protected to some degree by the high costs 
of transporting their outputs. The government must resist 
giving subsidies to such enterprises in order to enable them 
to continue to operate as before, so that, if necessary, they 
should be allowed to go bankrupt. However, it may be 
possible to justify investment in such enterprises designed to 
achieve higher levels of fuel efficiency, in which case they 
might be allowed to bid against each other for a limited pool 
of transitional assistance which would have to be repaid 
over a five-year period. 
This discussion has concentrated so far on the purchaser 
prices of energy paid by industrial enterprises and house-
holds. We must now turn to the prices received by producers 
and the role of indirect taxes and subsidies in determining 
the wedge between producer and purchaser prices. The case 
for using border prices as the basis for pricing policy applies 
equally to producer prices, which implies that indirect tax-
ation should take the form of a value-added tax or, at least, 
a uniform ad valorem tax applied to all energy products. 
However, there are powerful arguments for setting producer 
prices on the basis of border prices now even though this 
move will only occur over a transitional period for pur-
chasers. This would mean that producers would receive a 
subsidy equal to the difference between border prices and 
the average price paid by purchasers, so that the question 
of how to finance such a subsidy must be considered. 
The key sector in this context is, of course, the coal-mining 
industry. From January to October 1989 the producer price 
of coal paid to the Hard Coal Board (WWK) was set equal 
to the dollar price converted at the official exchange rate. 
This price was much higher than the average purchaser price 
received by WWK so that the government has been paying 
increasingly large subsidies to WWK. These subsidies had 
reached an unacceptably high level—nearly 10% of the total 
budget deficit in September—and had to be increased every 
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time the zloty was devalued against the dollar. So, with 
effect from the beginning of November 1989, the government 
decided to revert to a system of cost-based producer prices 
for coal. 
The improvement in the government budget as a result of 
these changes is largely illusory except to the extent that 
households find themselves paying higher prices for coal, 
electricity and district heat. The rest of the burden of the 
price changes has the effect of reducing the surpluses of 
enterprises (including WWK) or increasing their deficits and 
those of local authorities and other public bodies. Since the 
government is the residual claimant/payer for these surpluses 
and deficits, the price changes simply redistribute parts of 
the overall coal sector deficit—i.e. the difference between 
the prices paid by purchasers and the cost of producing 
coal—from one branch of the public sector to other 
branches. There will, of course, be some real effects since 
WWK may have been able to use some of its previous large 
surplus to pay higher wages or provide better social benefits 
for its employees. A reduction in the WWK surplus may 
thus put pressure on the management of mines to achieve 
higher levels of efficiency but there are better methods of 
accomplishing this objective. 
By reverting to a system of cost-based prices the government 
will slow down the fundamental changes that are required 
in the structure and operation of the coal mining industry. 
These must involve the break-up of the Hard Coal Board 
and the introduction of competition into the production and 
distribution of coal. The purpose of such steps would be to 
encourage investment in efficient low-cost mines and to force 
the closure of high-cost mines, where, it must be emphasized, 
costs should include environmental fees and fines set at an 
appropriate level to reflect the social costs of saline water 
emissions and other mining wastes. This is clearly not com-
patible with the operation of cost-based producer prices 
either for WWK as a whole or for individual mines. 
It is crucial, therefore, to move to a system of uniform 
producer prices for all coal-mines. It is also desirable to set 
these producer prices equal to border prices in order to 
identify the margin between profitable and unprofitable 
mines. However, it may reasonably be argued that as long 
as the general level of prices in the economy has not adjusted 
to border pricing for energy and other items coal-mines 
receiving border prices for their output will earn windfall 
profits which will overstate their long-term profitability. One 
response would be to levy a transitional tax on all coal 
production, which would be reduced in line with the increase 
in the average purchaser price of coal. Alternatively, a tem-
porary profits tax could be imposed which would be phased 
out in the same manner as the coal production tax. Either 
of these taxes would offset a (large) part of the cost of 
subsidies required to set producer prices equal to border 
prices. 
One important consequence of a competitive coal market 
would be the establishment of market-determined price dif-
ferentials between coals of different quality. This would, in 
turn, provide an appropriate basis for deciding upon the 
scale of investment in coal cleaning, so long as coal con-
sumers are required to pay environmental charges which 
reflect the social costs of burning coals of different quality. 
Turning briefly to other fuels, it would also be fairly straight-
forward to break up the existing monopoly over the distri-
bution of petroleum products. However, the network 
fuels—electricity and gas—present much greater problems 
in this respect and it would not be sensible to give high 
priority to introducing complicated institutional changes for 
these fuels in the next few years. Instead, greater priority 
should be given to ensuring effective inter-fuel competition, 
which means investment in the expansion of the gas network 
as well as the removal of artificial barriers to the use of oil 
and gas in competition with coal and electricity. 
The pricing of gas is obscured by the complex nature of the 
arrangement under which Poland buys gas from the Soviet 
Union. This hides the true economic cost of gas to the 
country and distorts decisions on investment in new domestic 
gas production. It is inevitable that Poland will depend 
substantially upon imports of gas, especially if demand for 
gas grows in response to relative price changes. This means 
that the producer price of gas should be set equal to the 
border price based on the average price of gas imported into 
Western Europe from the Soviet Union. 
4. Environmental policies 
In principle, the system of environmental control in Poland 
has many desirable characteristics. Enterprises are required 
to pay environmental fees to reflect the social costs of emis-
sions up to emission standards, while a much higher set of 
fines come into effect if they exceed these standards. The 
emission standards are set nationally, but enforcement is the 
responsibility of the district (voivodship) authorities, so that 
both fees and fines can be adjusted to reflect local circum-
stances and environmental costs. In addition, environmental 
laws have established quasi-property rights so that individ-
uals, enterprises and other organizations can sue for compen-
sation for direct losses resulting from emissions in excess of 
the prescribed standards. 
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Unfortunately, in practice, the system of fees and fines is 
effectively nullified by the low levels of the payments in-
volved and by the lack of adequate monitoring capacity. 
Many enterprises seem to ignore the environmental regu-
lations altogether, while the remainder prefer to pay the 
fines and to continue with gross violations of the emission 
standards. 
The obvious first step would thus be to increase the fines to 
a level that would encourage enterprises to reduce emissions. 
The revenue generated by these fines during the adjustment 
period could be used to provide an investment fund for 
environmental improvements. For some industries and dis-
tricts this approach would be feasible, but if rigorously 
enforced it could lead to the closure of a substantial pro-
portion of the enterprises in the Katowice and Krakow 
districts so that an alternative approach may be required 
in these heavily polluted areas. In addition, environmental 
pricing will only work if enterprises face hard budget con-
straints and a substantial proportion of the most damaging 
emissions are the responsibility of agents who are not co-
vered by the existing systems of fees and fines. 
Public discussion and environmental pressure groups in Po-
land tend to focus on heavy industry, mining and power 
generation as the major sources of both air and water pol-
lution. This perception is accurate for the damage due to 
the discharge of saline water pumped out of mines into the 
Vistula and Oder river basins, but the situation is much 
more complex for air pollution and BOD (organic material) 
discharges into waterways and the sea. 
The major source of BOD discharges is untreated sewage 
discharged by municipalities which lack adequate waste-
water treatment facilities. There is also an increasingly 
serious problem of rural groundwater contamination which 
has arisen because the number of rural households with 
access to piped water supplies has grown much more rapidly 
than the capacity to treat the resulting waste water. For both 
sources of pollution the only remedy is investment in proper 
treatment facilities, but this is likely to be rather expensive 
and to require a considerable period of time. 
In order to ensure that investment resources are used ef-
ficiently in reducing water pollution it is important to estab-
lish an institutional framework that takes account of interde-
pendencies between discharges and water use in river systems 
as a whole. The first priority must therefore be the creation 
of water-basin authorities for the Vistula and the Oder 
with overall responsibility for planning new investment and 
granting discharge licences. Under such authorities it will be 
possible to develop investment plans for reducing the dam-
age done by discharges—subject to the proviso that a signifi-
cant fraction of pollution in the Oder is the responsibility of 
Czechoslovakia. The major benefit of such approach is that 
it would reduce the large investments that are currently being 
contemplated on collecting and transporting water from 
unpolluted sources at a considerable distance from the users 
because more convenient sources are polluted. 
There are proposals to install desalinization plants in a small 
number of mines in order to deal with their saline water 
discharges. The capital and operating costs of these plants 
are high, so that there are considerable doubts about whether 
this is the best method of mitigating the problems caused by 
saline water discharges. Alternatives include managing the 
discharges to control salinity levels and/or piping the saline 
water to minimize its effects, perhaps to the Baltic. There 
have been no serious cost-benefit studies of the alternatives; 
such an investigation must be carried out before any large-
scale commitment of resources to desalinization. 
With respect to air pollution the most serious problems are 
associated with the emission of particulates due to the burn-
ing of coal in small boilers without pollution control equip-
ment as used for district heating plants, medium- and small-
scale industry, and the commercial/residential sector. Indi-
vidual coalfires used for heating apartments and houses are 
an important source of pollution in areas such as the old 
central area of Krakow. Some of these emissions could be 
mitigated by ensuring an improvement in the quality of coal 
supplied to these users, but they are already supposed to use 
coal with a low ash content. It would be very difficult to 
implement any system of environmental charges designed to 
encourage them to reduce their emissions because of the 
monitoring costs that would be involved and because most 
of them do not face hard budget constraints. The only 
practical solution is likely to be to encourage conversion 
to burning either gas or fuel oil, which have substantial 
advantages in terms of handling and maintenance costs. For 
district heating there should be a gradual shift to reliance 
upon combined heat and power plants (CHP) together with 
the installation of pollution control equipment in the biggest 
plants, though this is often not possible because of space 
limitations. 
Finally, there is the question of how best to deal with acid 
rain, particularly that associated with sulphur emissions. In 
the long run the solution must involve the installation of 
flue gas desulphurization equipment in all new coal-fired 
power plants. The costs and benefits of retrofitting existing 
plants are much more complex. In some cases this is simply 
impossible because of the layout of the plants or the space 
available. For other plants the problem is simply one of cost, 
since retrofitting is usually very expensive by comparison 
with installation when a plant is designed to incorporate 
such equipment. There is a powerful lobby in Poland for 
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the development of fluidized bed boilers as an alternative 
solution. This is only a proven technology for small boilers 
such as those used in industrial or small district heating 
plants and even then there are problems in handling the 
limestone which must be injected into the boiler and the ash 
that is left over after combustion. It is possible that fluidized 
bed boilers will offer the best solution in the long run, but 
it would be most unwise to rely upon the technology at this 
stage. 
It will probably be very difficult and expensive for Poland 
to achieve the target of a 30% reduction in sulphur emissions 
by the end of the century. Considerable work is required to 
identify a least-cost strategy for meeting this target. This 
should go beyond investment decisions in the electricity 
sector, since it is possible that a major effort to improve 
energy efficiency throughout the economy by pricing and 
other incentives could have a sufficient impact on the long-
run demand for electricity and coal to reduce sulphur emis-
sions by retiring old generating capacity and switching to 
newer capacity which can be fitted with desulphurization 
equipment. 
Little thought has been given to the problems of NO x and 
carbon dioxide emissions and these are likely to remain low 
on the list of priorities for many years. Any effective policies 
which improve the general level of energy efficiency of the 
Polish economy and which lead to a shift away from reliance 
upon coal to other fuels will make a substantial contribution 
to the reduction of carbon emissions. Similarly, the most 
obvious way of reducing NO x emissions in the short term 
will be to encourage a higher level of fuel efficiency in the 
vehicle fleet by ensuring that the prices of gasoline and other 
transport fuels are kept high. 
5. Agenda for action 
The analysis in the previous sections has suggested that the 
following points should form the basis for formulating policy 
in the fields of energy and the environment in Poland. 
5.1. Energy 
(a) The general level of energy prices is too low relative to 
border prices and relative prices of different fuels paid 
by different sectors are seriously distorted. The funda-
mental objective of pricing policy must be to eliminate 
these distortions. 
(b) In the short and medium term one cannot expect sub-
stantial improvements in energy efficiency as a direct 
result of price changes since such improvements will 
depend upon more general changes in the environment 
governing the operations of enterprises and on invest-
ment in the distribution and use of gas and petroleum 
products. 
(c) This means that little will be gained by attempting to 
remove all distortions within the next year. Price reforms 
may be staged over the next two or three years provided 
that: 
(i) emphasis is given to adjusting the relative prices of 
fuels more rapidly than the absolute price level for 
all fuels; and 
(ii) a schedule for increasing the average real price of 
energy to each sector should be announced soon 
and should be given official or even legal status. 
(d) The basis of this schedule of price adjustments might be 
as follows : for each sector calculate an index of energy 
prices at domestic prices and at border prices—or long-
run marginal costs where border prices cannot be 
obtained—using the current exchange rate. Adjust real 
domestic energy prices at six-monthly intervals so that 
by 1 January 1991 the domestic price indices reach 60% 
of the border price indices. Thereafter, adjust real dom-
estic energy prices to 80% of the border price index in 
January 1992 and 100% in January 1993. 
(e) Given the targets for the sector aggregate fuel price 
indices the main price increases should be imposed on 
those fuels with the lowest ratios of domestic to border 
prices. A relatively simple approach would be to specify 
the price adjustment for each fuel as a linear function 
of the difference between its domestic-border price ratio 
and the maximum value of the domestic-border price 
ratios for all fuels. The objective should be to complete 
the process of adjusting relative fuel prices within each 
sector by January 1992, so that fuel users face appropri-
ate signals concerning their choice of fuel. This will also 
eliminate the main discrepancies between the fuel prices 
charged to different groups of users and thus will avoid 
the problems of attempting to sustain price discrimi-
nation as the economy becomes more market-oriented. 
(0 Under present institutional arrangements enterprises 
will tend to pass on any increases in their costs by relying 
upon a cost-plus pricing mechanism. The long-run sol-
ution to this problem must be a combination of compe-
tition and hard budget constraints. In the short run 
some form of price regulation may be unavoidable. It 
is important that such regulation should not prevent 
firms from adjusting the relative prices of items whose 
relative costs of production have changed as a result of 
changes in relative fuel prices. This means that price 
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regulation should concentrate on the average revenue 
per unit sold rather than the prices of individual items 
and should, as far as possible, be based on the principle 
of price adjustment towards border prices phased over 
the same period as for fuel prices. The introduction of 
a unified exchange rate combined with general liberal-
ization of the import regime would impose effective 
constraints on the prices charged by producers of traded 
goods, so that the main focus of price regulation would 
be non-traded goods and services. 
(g) One purpose of phasing the adjustment of fuel prices to 
border price levels is to give enterprises a reasonable 
period to respond to change in relative prices. At the 
same time the system of price regulation is intended to 
limit the exercise of monopoly power by enterprises. 
Within these constraints any enterprise which is unable 
to earn an adequate return upon capital by the end of 
the adjustment period should be allowed to go bankrupt. 
An investment fund, perhaps calculated as a fraction of 
the revenue raised by increasing fuel prices, should be 
established to meet the investment needs of enterprises 
wishing to adapt to the future pattern of fuel prices. 
Subject to scrutiny of their business plans—to avoid the 
accumulation of debts which could never be 
repaid—enterprises should be allowed to bid for capital 
to invest in energy conservation and funds should be 
allocated at a price which balances supply and demand 
for these resources. Of course, there would be no point 
in operating such an arrangement if a general reform of 
investment finance can be implemented very quickly. 
(h) Major institutional reforms in the coal sector must be 
the second priority after the reform of energy pricing. 
The objective of these reforms should be to introduce 
competition into the production and distribution of 
coal. Specifically, the following measures are required : 
(1) Each coal-mine must be established as a separate 
financial and managerial entity which can, if necess-
ary, go bankrupt. Investments, taxation and other 
decisions should be based on the financial circum-
stances of the mine rather than of groups of mines 
or the whole industry. 
(2) Set the prices received by mines for coal with low 
ash content equal to the export parity price for 
comparable coal and encourage the emergence of 
market-determined quality differentials for other 
grades of coal. This means that all cross-subsidies 
between mines should be eliminated with, at most, 
transitional arrangements for the next two financial 
years. 
(3) The Hard Coal Board is engaged in a variety of 
service activities such as construction, the manufac-
ture of building materials, etc. As far as possible 
these should be established as independent enter-
prises selling their services to the separate mines 
and with the discretion to redeploy their resources 
towards more profitable activities. 
(4) Abolish the existing monopoly over the distribution 
of coal. This involves setting a uniform system of 
tariffs for the transport of coal by rail and allowing 
coal-mines and others to establish coal-trading en-
terprises. During this process the Central Coal Sup-
ply Office (CZW) should be required to publish and 
abide by a price schedule for its sales of coal which 
might reasonably include volume discounts. Some 
form of regulatory arrangements will be required to 
prevent the exercise of monopoly power by CZW 
and the trading subsidiaries of coal-mines including 
the possible emergence of restrictive practices or a 
cartel. 
(i) The promotion of competition for fuels other than coal 
will also be required. In the short term, however, the 
priority must be to eliminate price distortions for gas 
and electricity, especially between the prices paid by 
households and industrial consumers. When this had 
been done, investments in network capacity will be 
required in order to meet the new pattern of demand. 
It will also be necessary to invest in additional capacity 
either for refining crude oil or for the import of pet-
roleum products as well as in the distribution system, 
since the relative price changes signal a shift away from 
coal towards gas and oil in both industrial and house-
hold consumption. 
5.2. The environment 
(j) Levels of environmental fees and fines should be raised 
substantially over the next two years until they reflect 
more closely the marginal social costs of damage caused 
by different types of emissions. These fees and fines 
must also be rigorously enforced which means that some 
investment will be required to fund the establishment of 
appropriate monitoring facilities. This investment might 
be funded by donor governments and repaid out of the 
additional revenue that will be collected. 
(k) The system of fees and fines must also be extended to 
cover mining, local government and service activities in 
order to deal with the problems of BOD and saline 
water discharges into the major river basins. This implies 
that primary responsibility for the implementation and 
enforcement of environmental charges should be trans-
ferred from local government to some form of environ-
mental protection agency, though there should still be 
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a significant role for local government in establishing (o) 
the levels of fees and fines for industries operating in 
their localities. 
(1) The revenue raised from higher environmental charges 
could be used to establish an investment fund to finance 
the clean-up of severely polluted areas and to reduce 
emissions. As with the reform of energy prices, the full 
impact of environmental pricing will only be felt when 
enterprises face hard budget constraints within a more 
competitive market structure. The system will be ineffec-
tive unless it leads to the closure of some enterprises in 
the Katowice and Krakow districts, but the aim should 
be to reduce emissions by good housekeeping and expen- (p) 
diture on environmental controls rather than by bank-
ruptcies. 
(m) With respect to air quality, the immediate objective of 
policy should be to reduce emissions from low stacks, 
i.e. resulting from the burning of coal in small boilers (q) 
without pollution control equipment, or by households. 
This means that all such users—district heating plants, 
small-scale industrial heating and power plants, cooper-
atives—should either pay a premium per tonne of coal· 
consumed unless they can demonstrate that they can 
meet specific emission standards or they should be sub-
ject to the same kind of emission fees and fines as larger 
industrial enterprises. Such premiums or charges will 
only be effective if district heating plants and cooperat-
ives are subjected to the same kind of hard budget 
constraints required for industrial enterprises. 
(n) Effective control of emissions from small-scale heating (r) 
sources must involve a switch towards 'smokeless' solid 
fuels, which means that the premiums and, thus, price 
differentials are sufficient to encourage investment in 
producing such fuels. There will also be a shift from the 
burning of coal towards gas and oil, which is, in any 
case, signalled by the changes in relative fuel prices 
discussed above. Investment in the extension of the gas 
network is crucial for environmental reasons as well as 
to achieve a more efficient use of energy. 
In the immediate future the reduction of particulate 
emissions associated with coal burning should have pri-
ority over the reduction of sulphur emissions since the 
health and other costs of particulate emissions are the 
largest component of the social costs of air pollution. 
This implies that investment in desulphurization should 
concentrate on new generating capacity and on power 
stations burning lignite. At the same time, the emergence 
of market-determined quality differentials in coal prices 
combined with appropriate environmental charges will 
encourage investment in coal-washing which will have 
a significant impact on sulphur emissions. 
With respect to water quality, the key step must be the 
establishment of river basin authorities with powers to 
monitor and enforce emissions standards and charges 
which take account of the cumulative impact of dis-
charges on river systems as a whole. 
Specific priority in reducing water pollution should be 
given to the treatment of sewage and waste water dis-
charged into rivers by local authorities. This will involve 
the introduction of a proper system of environmental 
charges for such emissions together with a general re-
form of local authority finance which gives more discre-
tion to individual local authorities including responsi-
bility for raising local taxes. In advance of such a reform 
local authorities could be required to operate separate 
accounts for their water and sewerage operations which 
should be financed by separate water charges for house-
hold and industrial users of water. 
Mines should similarly be subject to environmental 
charges reflecting the social costs of saline water dis-
charges. In the short run it is likely to be too expensive 
to reduce the discharges by investment in desalination 
facilities, so that better management of the discharges 
is the best that can be hoped for. Still, appropriate 
emission charges will penalize mines with particularly 
serious saline water problems and will stimulate longer 
changes in mining techniques to reduce the extent of the 
problem. 
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1. Open and repressed monetary imbalance 
The Polish economic crisis of the last 10 years has been 
characterized by monetary imbalance, under the guise of 
unplanned and sustained inflationary pressures, whether 
open or repressed, and by cumulatively rising external in-
debtedness. While in the 1970s open inflation was low (one 
digit) and shortages might have been regarded as an intermit-
tent and partial phenomenon, the 1980s brought about per-
sistent generalized shortages and/or much faster open in-
flation. The cumulative effect of inflationary gaps over the 
years led in 1980 to the official recognition of a large in-
flationary overhang, which then from time to time was 
reduced or eliminated by bursts of major price increases, 
only to be rebuilt by compensatory and overcompensatory 
wage settlements, budget deficits and monetary expansion. 
The rate of inflation was 60% in 1988 (see Table 1 for a 
breakdown and for information about earlier years), though 
recent recalculations put it within the range 74 to 80%. In 
the first half of 1989 inflation accelerated to about 8% per 
month, corresponding to a yearly rate of 150 %. The monthly 
rate rose to 40% in August; by the end of August, with 
respect to July average prices, meat was up seven times, 
meat products five and a half times, cheese five times, butter, 
animal fats and bread and flour four times; a shortage of 
banknotes developed. In September 1989 the rate officially 
recorded in socialized trade was 34,4%, with an increase 
over December 1988 of 231,6 % (44,5 % for food, up 403,5 % 
over the same period). In the last quarter of 1989 inflation 
slowed down slightly as a result of reductions in budgetary 
expenditure and the issue of bonds, resulting in an annual 
rate for 1989 of 740 % instead of the 800 to 1 000 % projected 
in September. When an economy experiences this kind of 
extreme monetary instability any inflationary overhang that 
might have been inherited from the past is rapidly nullified 
by hyperinflation; however, even hyperinfiationary con-
ditions are consistent with persistent shortages if the in-
flationary gap in reconstituted by monetary demand growing 
faster than prices, by more than allowed by real supply 
growth. This is what happened in Poland, where '... the gap 
between earnings and prices increased 17,8% in the first 
quarter and by a further 33,3% in the second quarter' 
(WEFA CPE Outlook, October 1989; see also Table 2); in the 
second half of 1989 this gap was reduced but not eliminated. 
Thus, in the course of the year, there were renewed indeed 
sometimes increasing shortages, with the ensuing diversion 
of work time to search for goods and decline in labour 
discipline and effort supply. 
The money interest rate, kept at around 5 % for most of the 
1980s, was raised significantly in 1988 (18 % on time deposits 
in March, then raised to 45 % with higher marginal borrow-
ing rates of 25 then 66%) and 1989 (86% on one-year 
government bonds issued in September, a rate which on 16 
October was granted also on PKO deposits), while falling 
further in real terms to negative rates large in absolute 
terms; a higher expected rate was obtainable on indexed 
government bonds convertible into shares in State companies 
at a future date, but these were associated with higher 
uncertainty and illiquidity. The rise in interest rates led 
enterprises (which in 1988 financed directely about 35 to 
37 % of their total investment) to switch from new projects 
to modernization and to the quick-yielding completion of 
Table 1 
Retail price indices of goods and services 
(percentage change from previous year) 
Cons, goods and services 
Goods 
Foodstuffs 
Alcohol and beverages 
Non-food 
Services 
Non-cons, goods and serv. 
Goods 
Services 
Total 
1980 
9,4 
9,6 
12,8 
5,7 
8,4 
8,2 
5,2 
3,9 
8,4 
8,9 
1981 
21,2 
22,1 
22,5 
47,6 
13,1 
15,3 
21,2 
18,6 
27,1 
21,2 
1982 
100,8 
106,8 
136,3 
97,9 
85,5 
62,9 
128,1 
136,1 
102,1 
100,8 
1983 
22,1 
21 
11,9 
42,5 
22,5 
31,5 
16,8 
14,2 
26,3 
22,1 
1984 
15,1 
14,7 
16,8 
5,8 
16,1 
17,2 
13,5 
10,9 
21,3 
15 
1985 
15 
14 
14,9 
3,9 
16,7 
22,6 
14,4 
12,3 
20,7 
15,1 
1986 
17,7 
17,5 
14,6 
17,3 
20,1 
19,4 
16,2 
16,7 
14,8 
17,7 
1987 
25,2 
24,3 
21,7 
28,3 
25,5 
30,9 
26 
28,8 
17,9 
25,2 
1988 
60 
59,5 
50,1 
64,8 
65,7 
62,9 
67,1 
71,6 
55 
60 
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projects already undertaken, resulting in a reduction of 'en-
gaged' investment outlays, i.e. the total residual expenditures 
necessary for the completion of projects already begun. In 
1988-89 there was a process of 'verification' of pending 
projects, many of which were frozen or abandoned. In the 
autumn of 1989 higher money interest rates, in the face 
of volatile returns on foreign currency holdings have also 
strengthened the zloty in the free foreign exchange market 
(legalized at the end of February 1989; see below and 
Graph 1). 
Against this background the new Solidarity-led government 
coalition which took power in mid-September 1989 adopted 
a drastic stabilization programme backed by an IMF stand-
by agreement and other sources of international finance. An 
assessment of this programme, effective from 1 January 1990 
and still under implementation, requires a discussion of 
the sources and implications of domestic and international 
monetary imbalance. 
2. The roots of hyperinflation 
The 1989 hyperinflation was the result of several causes: 
(i) a prices and incomes manoeuvre attempted in February 
1988, followed by strikes and successful wage claims 
which ended up raising by about 10% the theoretical 
real purchasing power of wages instead of reducing it; 
wage overcompensation was due to a combination of a 
diffused egalitarian commitment and a high level of 
perceived minimum consumption threshold; 
(ii) successive zloty devaluations (see Table 3); 
(iii) a substantial reduction of product subsidies, especially 
on foodstuffs (abolished on 1 August by the Rakowski 
government); 
(iv) further wage/price rounds following devaluations and 
reductions of subsidies; in the first six months of 1989 
average earnings grew 120% while prices grew 76% 
(WEFA; see also Table 2); 
(v) the introduction—at the round table agreement of 
5 April—of indexation of actual earnings (with an 80% 
coverage of price increases, later raised to 100% in the 
31 July law on indexation, then recently reduced by the 
extent of negotiated wage increases); 
(vi) the acceleration of investment growth to 6% in 1988, 
instead of the earlier deceleration and a planned con-
stant growth rate of 4%; 
(vii) an accommodating monetary policy (see Table 3) and 
the expansion of credit to enterprises and households 
(whose increase in net indebtedness amounted to about 
12% of national income in 1988). 
The State budget, traditionally in surplus in the Soviet-type 
centrally planned economy, in the 1980s had recorded a 
deficit fluctuating between 0,3 and 2,5 of GDP (2,5 to 4,3 if 
unpaid interest on external debt is included; see Table 4). In 
1989 the deficit reached 6%, although it was not as large 
as anticipated earlier thanks to the modification of wage 
indexation provisions. The local budgets, on the contrary, 
in 1988 were in surplus following the devolution to local 
authorities of tax revenue from a number of State enter-
prises. However, the budget deficit is systematically under-
recorded, the most important omission being the (State) 
banking sector deficit. 
Often, also in the approach of international organizations, 
the very presence of a negative real interest rate is regarded 
as part of the banking sector deficit and as a real transfer 
to the enterprise sector (see for instance Gomulka's paper 
on Polish budgetary policy). However, it seems more appro-
priate to regard the banking sector surplus/deficit as the 
difference between lending and borrowing interest rates, 
weighed by the respective volumes of lending and borrowing, 
minus the cost of banking services including the writing 
down or off of bad loans. In 1982-87 in Poland the average 
gross margin between lending and borrowing rates had been 
at best extremely narrow, at worst negative (between 1 and 
— 1 %; interest subsidies should but are not included in the 
Polish State budget). In addition, there has been cross-
subsidization between enterprises and households : the bank-
ing sector would borrow from and lend to enterprises at 
rates lower than the rate paid to private depositors. A major 
loss of the banking sector, of unknown but presumably large 
order of magnitude, is made up of bad loans automatically 
renewed and enlarged to cover any interest that might have 
to be capitalized (in Yugoslavia bad loans have been revealed 
recently to be of the order of USD 10 billion, rising to USD 
18 billion when guarantees are also considered; Polish figures 
are bound to be lower in view of the large scope for direct 
subsidization, but not of negligible order). 
3. Underlying real trends 
Real output over the last 10 years has stagnated: after the 
drastic fall of 1980-82 the levels formerly achieved have been 
recovered fairly rapidly. In the last two to three years, 
especially in 1988, there has been some restructuring of 
output, investment and employment, from the traditional 
sectors of mining, metallurgy and chemicals to food process-
ing, light industry and services; from State to private activi-
ties, with private employment growing at about 12% and 
State employment falling at about 1 % (falling much faster 
in State industry). 
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Table 2 
Monetary incomes and expenditures of the population, 1988-89 
1988 
Actual 
1987 = 100 
1988 
Plan 
1987 = 100 
1988 
Sept. 
bnzl. 
1988 
Sept. 
1988 = 100 
1989 
Jan.-Sept. 
bnzl. 
1989 
Jan.-Sept. 
1988 = 100 
1989 
Plan 
1988 = 100 
Global money incomes 
of which: 
— labour remuneration 
— social welfare 
— credits granted 
— agricultural sales 
Global money expend. 
of which: 
— goods 
— services 
— taxes and payments 
— credit repaid 
Money balances increase 
of which: 
— saving deposits 
— cash 
183,1 148,7 6 992,8 437,1 32 167,9 264,7 165,7 
172,5 
178,3 
197,9 
195,9 
168,4 
167,2 
168,8 
172,1 
177,3 
434,9 
300,6 
831,9 
142,2 
159,4 
146 
148,2 
149,6 
150,4 
150,4 
147,3 
153,6 
234,5 
106 
218,7 
2 790,9 
1 375,6 
229,2 
902,2 
5 519,7 
4 392 
487,9 
331,6 
152,5 
1 473,1 
520,1 
953 
453,3 
562,6 
383 
387,5 
374,8 
396,4 
283 
310 
365,8 
— 
— 
13 851,3 
4 809,1 
1 391,9 
3 985,4 
26 418,4 
20 511,7 
2 660,1 
1 676,2 
660,2 
5 749,5 
2 413,3 
3 336,2 
269,1 
242,3 
275,8 
237,1 
250,1 
250,8 
211,9 
262,4 
316,2 
361,7 
318,5 
401,2 
158,5 
167,6 
171,6 
141,7 
173,9 
175,5 
175,5 
168,6 
154,8 
111,8 
135,4 
85,3 
e average zloty/USD rate of exchange in 1989 
12400 
10 350 (15 September) 
January February March August September 
173 
Internal and international aspects of monetary disequilibrium in Poland 
Table 3 
Changes in the money supply, 1982-88 
Billion zlotys 
As % of GDP 
1982 
468 
8,4 
1983 
174 
2,5 
1984 
254 
2,9 
1985 
498 
4.8 
1986 
549 
4,2 
1987 
787 
4,6 
1988 
1 963 
6,7 
Consumption per head over the last 10 years has fallen by 
about 10%, due to the negative impact of population 
growth, and of the slower growth of distributed relative to 
produced income, being only partially offset by the reduction 
in the share of investment over the period. 
Exports have increased quickly, beyond the most optimistic 
expectations, but the economy has failed to generate growing 
net exports. In the last five years the hard currency trade 
surplus of about USD 1 billion plus remittances from abroad 
of about USD 1,5 billion have been insufficient to service a 
net debt in convertible currencies standing at USD 39,2 
billion at the end of 1988 (USD 41 billion including non-
convertible currencies debt), with most interest being unpaid 
and capitalized through rescheduling agreements or defacto. 
By June 1989 Poland's hard currency debt had increased by 
USD 1,2 billion capitalized interest but also fallen by USD 
200 million repayment of gross debt and—most import-
antly—by USD 2,9 billion due to the rise in the value of the 
dollar reducing non-dollar gross debt; since then this effect 
has been reversed and total debt at the end of 1989 exceeded 
USD 40 billion. In secondary financial markets Polish debt 
was retraded at the end of 1989 at under 18 cents in the 
dollar (down from 55 to 60% in July 1985; 50 to 53% in 
January 1986; 41 to 44% in January 1987; 40 to 42% at the 
end of 1988; see Graph 2). 
An important structural feature of the Polish economy is 
the large size of hard currency holdings in the hands of the 
population, of the order of about USD 5 billion in deposits 
with State banks and an unknown amount in dollar bank-
notes estimated at between USD 4 billion and 8 billion; until 
the end of 1989 the free market dollar rate was a multiple 
of the official rate, subject to broad fluctuations (see Table 
3). On 1 January 1990 the official rate of exchange of hard 
currencies was raised to the free rate level. 
Table 4 
Government budget, 1982-88 
(billion current zlotys) 
1986 1988 
Total revenue 
Tax revenue 
Other 
Total expenditure 
Current expenditure 
subsidies 
to the population 
to enterprises 
Investment expenditure 
Other 
Unpaid int. on ext. debt 
GDP 
Deficit as % of GDP 
Interest on ext. debt as % of GDP 
2 804 
2 163 
641 
2 941 
2 300 
1 146 
573 
573 
269 
372 
102 
5 564 
2.5 
4.3 
4215 
3 131 
1084 
4 259 
3 143 
1487 
749 
738 
452 
664 
169 
8 576 
0.5 
2.5 
6 555 
4 856 
1699 
6 597 
4 556 
1 721 
1 183 
538 
760 
1281 
278 
12 953 
0.3 
2.5 
8 137 
4 953 
3 184 
8 274 
5 446 
2 687 
1691 
996 
943 
1 885 
556 
16 940 
0.8 
4.1 
14 133 
9 209 
4 924 
14 058 
9 023 
4 369 
2 961 
1408 
1 578 
3 457 
922 
28 900 
0.3 
2.9 
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ΊPH 2 : Secondary market prices 
Source: Dillon, Read 
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By mid-1989 there was a deterioration of economic trends, 
which became visible by comparing not the last 12 months 
with the previous 12 but each month in 1989 with the same 
month in 1988, or if we look at monthly rates. Thus in 
September 1989, with respect to September 1988, industrial 
output was down 5,9%, food processing down 16,7%, 
grain procurement down 28,1%, meat procurement down 
34%. By March 1989 shops had inventories corresponding 
to 50 days sales (from an average of 55 days in 1988), falling 
further to 49 days in June, 42 days in August and 34 days 
in September; food inventories fell faster. 
In the 12 months ending September 1989 imports from 
capitalist countries were up 19%, following rising imports 
of consumption goods to reduce excess demand and fairly 
speculative leads and lags, while exports to the same area 
were down 6,1 %, the respective figures for trade within 
CMEA were - 18,2 and - 11,1 %. A hard currency trade 
balance of USD 1 021 million in 1987 and USD 921 million 
in 1988 was predicted to fall to near zero in 1989 but in the 
end stabilized at around half a billion (final data are not yet 
available). Clearly these trends are danger signals of a poss­
ible drastic decline similar to that of 1982-84, brought about 
by a combination of import dependence and foreign ex­
change scarcity, disruption of traditional output patterns 
and supply lines, absenteeism and conflicts. Predictions of 
mass unemployment—which in September 1989 Minister 
Witold Trzeciakowski put at 20 to 30% by next year as a 
result of restructuring and liberalization, would have been 
grossly exaggerated in the light of existing trends, especially 
given the rapid growth of the private sector; nevertheless, 
after the adoption of the stabilization programme unemploy­
ment will be unavoidable, regionally and sectorally concen­
trated and therefore politically dangerous. Such trends obvi­
ously strengthen the case for external aid, in order to ease 
the hardship of transition to a new political and economic 
system. 
4. Economic reform trends 
Since 1981 the Polish economy has introduced various meas­
ures of economic reform—a process which after the initial 
reversal continued even under martial law. Among the 
achievements of the old government one can list: the disman­
tling of central planning procedures (i.e. individualized plans 
aggregated at central level then checked through disaggre­
gation and reaggregation); the abolition of branch minis­
teries, now merged into a single Ministry of Industry; the 
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granting of workers' self-management; the broadening of 
the scope of contractual prices (though subject to cost-
verification and authorization for price increases, and to 
the extensive use of government contracts with guaranteed 
supplies); the substantial retention of foreign currency earn-
ing by exporters, to finance imports or for free resale; the 
legalization of private foreign exchange transactions; the 
establishment of hard currency auctions, which by 1989 
together with export retentions financed 20% of Polish 
imports; the promotion of joint and private enterprises, 
including some privatization of State capital. A reform rad-
icaliza tion occurred with the so-called 'second stage' of econ-
omic reform of 1987-88, with the adoption of several new 
laws at the end of 1988. 
Two new radical laws, respectively 'on economic activity', 
and 'on economic activity with the participation of foreign 
subjects', were approved by parliament on 23 December 
1988 and effective from 1 January 1989; they were distributed 
as an annex to Try buna Ludu under the heading 'Freedom, 
equality, competition—for those who know how to succeed'. 
All types of enterprises (private, cooperative, joint, State) 
are supposed to be on equal footing; State enterprises can 
now broaden their production profile; all enterprise funds 
have been unified into a single fund and a capital tax—im-
properly called a 'dividend' on past State investment—was 
introduced at a rate of 44 % of the book value of enterprise 
own capital (subject to a ceiling of 25 % of after-tax profit; 
in practice exemptions abounded and the average rate of tax 
was 2% in 1989). Experiments with new reorganizations 
include agency contracts ('Ajencia') and leasings ('Dzier-
zawa', equivalent to the Soviet-type 'Arenda'). A new im-
petus to entrepreneurship and investment, structurally sound 
and profit orientated, is bound to come from the newly 
established joint stock companies, hundreds of thousands 
in production (especially in building, housing, materials, 
computer hardware and software, small-scale investments), 
services (consulting, programming, etc.), including intersec-
toral ventures (e.g. between State universities and enterprises 
both private and public). They include small innovative 
enterprises (500 to 600 workers) introducing new processes 
or products. A centralized fund of structural change, run by 
the central planning office with the Ministry of Industry, 
deals with larger scale companies. 
Three additional laws revamped money and finance : namely 
the law on the National Bank of Poland, the law on banking 
and the law on foreign currency. The National Bank of 
Poland is now the bank of banks, credit is separated from 
central banking, there are nine local banks; there can be 
cooperative and mixed State-cooperative banks, also in the 
form of joint stock companies; enterprises choose their own 
banks (i.e. their accounts are no longer domiciled). The 
central bank fixes the minimum interest rate. The formerly 
illegal free market for foreign currencies has been legalized; 
initially this led to a significant drop in the free exchange 
rate of the dollar, which, however, subsequently resumed its 
upward trend under the impact of higher open and repressed 
inflation (an excellent new financial weekly, Gazeta Ban-
kowa, can be usefully consulted on all financial and business 
matters). The room for monetary policy manoeuvre was 
severely restricted by the introduction of wage indexation 
(see above) but this constraint was removed with the latest 
stabilization programme. 
By the end of 1989 several drawbacks remained, such as: 
(i) the maintenance of direct central control over State 
enterprises, through so-called 'founding organs' (sec-
toral ministry and/or functional ministries, local auth-
orities, central bank), through government contracts, 
priority allocations, appointments, careers and salaries, 
formal and informal pressure; 
(ii) the persistence of shortages, as a structural and fre-
quently a macroeconomic phenomenon. A government 
document of March 1989 reported a state of imbalance 
greater than ever before in the last 40 years; 
(iii) the persistence of enterprise-specific subsidies and penal-
ties, on an ad hoc and ex-post basis. According to 
Schaffer, 1989, for the 411 manufacturing enterprises 
(excluding Polmos) included in the list of the top 500 
for 1983-86 published by Zarzadzanie, the correlation 
coefficient of original and final profitability of enterpri-
ses—which is rightly regarded as a good index of enter-
prise financial autonomy—had been falling steadily over 
the period, from 0,49 in 1983 to 0,46 in 1984, 0,35 in 
1985 and 0,28 in 1986. Moreover, loss makers exhibited 
a significant and negative correlation, i.e. they ended up 
with the highest final profitability, which is a particularly 
perverse result. Evidence of Kornai-type 'soft budgets' 
is provided by changes in losses from year to year being 
matched by offsetting changes in subsidies. Subsidies 
rose faster than prices and the value of output, and this 
was one of the factors improving the financial position 
of enterprises. This redistributive function of the State 
budget across State enterprises, officially regarded as 
having been attenuated in earlier years, unfortunately 
was revamped in 1988. So-called 'object' subsidies on 
goods and services rose by 105,6% to 2 400 billion 
zlotys. The share of subsidies in the State budget rose 
from 30,6 to 33 % in 1988; 
(iv) the persistence of two- or many-tier pricing, the most 
pernicious case being the dual exchange rate regime, 
with a grossly overvalued official rate and a grossly 
undervalued free rate, in spite of 10 devaluations in the 
last quarter of 1989; 
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(v) lack of competition in price/output enterprise decisions 
due to defacto monopolies, excessively large enterprises 
(by technical and comparative standards) and persist-
ence of industry-wide enterprise associations; 
(vi) appropriation of State property by enterprise managers 
and party officials ('samo-uwlaszczenie nomenklatury') 
within the current process of privatization, through ex-
ceptionally favourable terms in sales, leases or licences, 
neither competitive nor publicized. 
Most of these drawbacks are connected with monetary dis-
equilibrium. At the end of 1989 a spate of new legislation 
was passed strengthening further economic reform and rais-
ing fiscal pressure; namely, on tariffs, employment, the re-
valuation of enterprise own capital, the retroactive raising 
of interest rates on old loans, taxation of above-norm wage 
payments (equivalent to a marginal rate of five-sixths). 
5. Aspects of monetary disequilibrium 
Monetary disequilibrium has had important internal and 
external implications for the Polish economy, its recovery 
and the implementation of reform plans. 
Internally, shortages impede the operation of markets lead-
ing to either random access to goods or administrative 
allocation; shortages and/or inflation encourage unproduc-
tive hoardings; dollarization gives seigniorage to the US; 
wealth and income redistribution through either shortages or 
inflation are not necessarily socially desirable or efficiency-
oriented. 
Externally, inflationary pressures spill over into the free 
market for foreign exchange widening the gap with the free 
rate, distorting trade patterns; maintain a high domestic 
absorption which frustrates devaluations of the official rate 
and prevents the achievement of the higher trade surpluses 
necessary to the servicing of debt. 
A discussion of the causes and cures of Polish monetary 
imbalance must start from the strict connection between 
wages/prices policy, budgetary deficit and monetary policy. 
Any increase in real wages leads to a deterioration of the cash 
flow of State enterprises which either is financed through 
automatic bank credit or leads to an increase of the State-
consolidated budget deficit. A government deficit, given, 
until recently, the low interest rate and narrow scope for 
government bond financing, is necessarily instantly moneta-
rized. Of course, there may be an excess of budgetary expen-
ditures due to reasons other than real wage trends, and credit 
expansion for other reasons, but offsetting surplus items or 
monetary contractions are unlikely. 
Earlier attempts at breaking these links have not been very 
successful: progressive taxation on excess wages—an excel-
lent measure, through the so-called FAZ and PPWW 
levies—has been nullified by ad hoc negotiated formulas and 
parameters and by widespread exemptions. The restrictive 
character of credit policy, planned on the basis of a postu-
lated price increase much lower than the actual rate, in early 
1988 led to what a government report called 'uncontrolled 
inter-enterprise mutual credit', i.e. expansion of a kind of 
quasi-money consisting of the cumulation of arrears in inter-
enterprise payments, encouraged by penal interest rates on 
late payments being a fraction of current rates (this is a 
phenomenon recently reported also in Hungary at times 
of monetary squeeze). The amount of unsettled balances 
outstanding grew very considerably in the first half of 1988, 
and was reduced in the second half after additional (above-
plan) expansion of bank short-term credit. 
Apart from the continued necessity of wages/prices policies 
(weakening current wage indexation provisions), and of ad-
ditional tax revenue and expenditure cuts, the breaking of 
these links might be easier to obtain by financing the govern-
ment deficit through a wider range of instruments. Tradition-
ally a positive real interest rate is regarded as a precondition 
of successful funding of government debt but the recent 
success of a one-year government bond issue at 86 % interest 
(i.e. vastly negative in real terms) challenges this conven-
tional wisdom—which moreover has shaky theoretical foun-
dations and damaging implications for the burden of govern-
ment debt service. The issue was successful because—apart 
from attracting patriotic investors—it offered the popu-
lation—whose alleged lack of experience with portfolio selec-
tion has obviously been overplayed—a safe monetary return 
more attractive than that of foreign currency holdings, 
higher over time but extremely volatile in the short run. The 
drastic falls in the dollar free rate in March and September 
made a safe money return of 86 % attractive enough, and 
led to a further fall of the dollar in the free market; from 
13 000 zlotys in the first 20 days of September 1989 the 
dollar fell to 10 700 zlotys in the last 10 days of the month, 
down to 9 000 zlotys at the end of October. Such occasional 
reversals in the free exchange rate are absolutely essential 
for the success of domestic interest rate policy. 
There is another myth—shared by Jeffrey Sachs and some 
international organizations—that Polish money supply is 
uncontrollable because of the population's holdings of dol-
lars and foreign exchange which, at the free market rate of 
exchange, amount to 70 to 80 % of the monetary base. It is 
true that this limits the government's ability both to reduce 
liquidity and to collect an inflation tax. However the Polish 
experience—as we have seen above—shows that the govern-
ment does have the possibility to reduce liquidity through 
the interest rate; at the same time the narrow domestic 
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monetary base, while making inflation a steeply rising func-
tion of the State budget deficit, is actually a precondition of 
monetary stabilization. In any case, an increase in private 
dollar holdings would add to potential supply more than to 
potential demand and thus contribute to the success of 
stabilization. A problem arises not from dollar holdings 
but from the existence of dollar credits by households and 
enterprises towards the government not backed by appropri-
ate dollar reserves: these credits cannot be sterilized by 
dollar sales or imports and are therefore inflationary beyond 
control. 
6. 1989 plans for Poland : Soros, Sachs, 
Balcerowicz 
Since mid-1989 a number of alternative plans have been 
put forward for Polish economic stabilization and reform 
completion. The most significant ones are the Soros plan, 
announced in mid-June· at a press conference in London 
held by Georges Soros (the Hungarian-born American 
millionaire and fund manager) and Solidarity spokesman 
Geremek; the plan prepared by Jeffrey Sachs for Solidarity 
and also sponsored by Soros; the plan put forward at the 
IMF Assembly in Washington in September 1989 by Leszek 
Balcerowicz, Minister for Finance in the new coalition 
government. The basic ingredients were the same, but the 
approaches as well as the emphasis varied significantly. 
The Soros plan was a shock therapy, 'big bang' or 'cold 
turkey' approach, consisting in the instantaneous and simul-
taneous implementation of price liberalization, zloty con-
vertibility, transformation of State enterprises into joint 
stock companies and their privatization through share distri-
bution and sales in a new stock market, debt for equity 
swaps, debt relief and other forms of Western assistance. 
The Sachs plan differed from Soros' because it was gradual 
over three years (though without specific sequencing of pol-
icy measures), it stressed the importance of prior fiscal and 
monetary discipline, suggested modest increases for the price 
of necessities, and the need for some wage indexation; put 
more emphasis on the need for a unified exchange rate 
system. Also, Sachs advocated initial privatization of hous-
ing followed by gradual privatization of enterprise assets, 
with only a minor role, if any, assigned to debt for equity 
swaps; external assistance was specifically geared to foreign 
exchange liberalization, and on a scale large enough to 
reverse the current net resource outflow, if necessary through 
unilateral suspension of interest payments. A social pact 
was deemed necessary to implement the necessary austerity 
measures, involving reduction of real wages. In the longer 
run, debt relief was expected through the Brady plan. 
The Balcerowicz plan of September 1989 was very close to 
the Sachs plan, on which it might have been modelled, but 
the emphasis was slightly different and policy measures were 
clearly sequential. The necessity of a positive real interest 
rate was recognized; subsidy cuts sounded more drastic and 
less gradual than in the Sachs plan, and wage indexation 
was regarded with greater caution (in the intervening period, 
of course, the government had changed and political feasi-
bility of policy measures had altered). There is no mention 
of debt for equity swaps and instead there is emphasis on 
workers' ownership; expectations of international financial 
assistance are more moderate (IMF stand-by plus World 
Bank structural loans plus USD 1 billion for foreign ex-
change stabilization; earlier Lech Walesa and Witold Trze-
ciakowski had spoken of the need for a USD 10 billion aid 
and loans package). There is more emphasis on the urgency 
of redeploying resources and restructuring ailing enterprises 
and sectors. 
A full evaluation of these early plans would need a specific 
quantitative indication of the parameters and scale of the 
proposed stabilization, which are missing from the plans. 
However, their qualitative recommendations call for some 
comment. 
It seems extremely dangerous to call for a 'shock therapy' 
approach, which might well heal and kill the patient at the 
same time; there is no historical precedent nor economic 
theory of the sudden simultaneous opening of markets for 
goods, factors, financial assets and foreign exchange, more-
over starting from an overall imbalance. Known liberaliz-
ations have affected one market at a time and started from 
uniform, market clearing prices. The result of a primeval 
'big bang' is just as likely to be paralysis and stagnation as 
it is to be efficiency and growth; as in the recent Argentinian 
hyperinflation, shops might simply be 'closed for lack of 
prices' ('cerrado por falta de precios'). It is significant that 
for the Soviet economy Georges Soros and Wassily Leontief 
have advocated a gradual approach, through the growth of 
an initially small 'open sector'. Without prior stabilization 
foreign exchange will be overpriced (as in the recent Soviet 
auctions of foreign exchange) while illiquid assets will be 
underpriced. The result of debt-equity swaps will be indeter-
minate without defining a monetary and an exchange-rate 
policy. 
Sachs seems also to advocate shock therapy ('You do not 
cross a chasm in two leaps') but really stresses the need to 
operate on a wide front at the same time, rather than do 
everything at once. Like Soros, he neglects the need for 
stabilization prior to both foreign exchange liberalization 
(lest the excess demand for goods spills over the demand for 
foreign exchange to the point of causing a hyperinflationary 
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Plans 
Duration 
Timing 
Budgetary cuts 
Monetary discipline 
Price liberalization 
Wage indexation 
Exchange-rate unification 
Zloty convertibility 
Transformation of State ent. in share comp. 
Privatization 
Stock exchange 
Debt for equity swaps 
External aid 
Interest rescheduling 
Debt relief 
Social pact 
Restructuring 
Quantification 
Soros 
June 1989 
instantaneous 
'cold turkey' 
simultaneous 
budgetary surplus 
yes 
implicity 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
major 
yes 
3-year 
moratorium 
some 
missing 
Sachs 
July 1989 
3 years 
parallel 
yes 
yes 
gradual 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
housing labour 
yes 
minor 
forex stab, net inflow 
yes 
unilateral 
Brady plan 
yes 
w<p 
missing 
Balcerowicz 
September 1989 
3 years 
sequential 
2 yes 
no subsid. 
4 yes 
i >p 
2 yes 
1 reduced 
3 yes 
3 yes 
2 yes 
2 yes 
own. 
2 yes 
none 
1 yes 
IMF + WB + USD 1 billion 
1 yes 
1 Brady plan 
5 yes 
w<p 
6 yes 
missing 
devaluation) and State assets privatization. An early turn-
around of the current net resource outflow is unlikely to be 
allowed by extant and potential lenders, because it would 
imply by definition a worsening of the balance of payments 
current account, i.e. Poland's failure to service any of its 
present debt; any unilateral action, moreover, is bound to 
be counterproductive. 
The Balcerowicz plan of September 1989 is exposed to most 
of the reservations which can be raised against the Sachs 
plan, since its proposed sequencing does not resolve them. 
7. Stabilization and reform sequencing 
A more appropriate sequencing for stabilization would seem 
the following: 
(i) first, as in the Sachs and Balcerowicz plans, the adoption 
of a rigid and preannounced budgetary and monetary 
stance, in order to defuse hyperinflationary trends and 
expectations; 
(ii) the reduction of current excess demand (if any) or de-
mands (undoubtedly there) through aid, taxation, wage 
restraint and higher prices. The interest rate on existing 
loans, which until 1988 averaged 4 to 6%, and the penal 
rate on late loan repayment, may well have to be raised 
by law, or a tax may have to be introduced on the capital 
gain (in this case a liability loss) due to increase in 
current interest rates. Contrary, for instance, to Sachs 
proposal it is inadvisable to use privatization 'to mop 
up purchasing power', because in a situation of shortages 
or hyperinflation assets would be particularly difficult 
to evaluate and would probably be grossly underpriced; 
an issue of bonds carrying the option of unrestricted 
conversion into privatized assets at the future prevailing 
price of those assets, on the contrary, should be less 
costly and more attractive than an ordinary bond. There 
would be no need to actually reduce real consumption, 
even if it were politically possible, which it is most 
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unlikely to be; it should be sufficient to stabilize current 
consumption by reducing the theoretical real wages (i.e. 
their official purchasing power) to the level of the actual 
consumption which they command; 
(iii) the unification of the price system at market clearing 
levels, and in particular of the exchange rate, whose 
current dual regime is the largest single source of price 
distortion and the cause of much low-value-added or 
even negative-value-added export, especially in tourism 
' and in energy-intensive products. Substantial loans may 
be necessary to introduce this uniform rate; convert-
ibility would have to be restricted initially and probably 
for quite some time to current transactions excluding the 
taking and repayment of investment loans by enterprises 
(i.e. falling short of the IMF article 8 definition). This 
is contrary to the recent practice of allowing State enter-
prises to borrow freely in foreign exchange, which has 
been a source of strain in the Polish balance of payments 
in the last year; 
(iv) the inter-industry and inter-enterprise redeployment of 
existing productive assets, through competitive bids for 
the evaluation of those assets, and the financial restruc-
turing of enterprises in view of their transformation into 
joint stock companies whose shares would be initially 
held by a number of State holding companies (not a 
single State Property Fund as envisaged in the Polish 
reform project); 
(v) the privatization preferably of the management but if 
necessary also of the ownership of State assets and of 
the shares representing them, in either case exclusively 
on competitive terms, whithout giving managers or em-
ployees particularly privileged access. There should be 
a massive credit expansion for the purpose of financing 
the purchase and the lease of assets by the population, 
as long as sale proceeds are used (as in Thatcher's 
Britain) to retire government debt (including, in the 
Polish case, actual cash). Not only would this credit 
expansion ensure competitive and realistic pricing of 
State assets, but also it would get the population into 
debt thus creating a buffer against future possible mon-
etary imbalances, which could then be cured by encour-
aging the earlier repayment of that debt. Any privatiza-
tion of domestic assets open to nationals would have to 
stipulate a rate of exchange for the comparison of exter-
nal and internal bids; such a rate of exchange would 
have to be dictated by government policy vis-à-vis debt-
for-equity swaps. It seems unlikely that such a policy 
might be acceptable to the Polish Government without 
the leverage of substantial debt relief; more precisely, 
commercial debt-for-equity swaps might be acceptable 
for substantial relief of official debt, or of interest on 
official debt (which amounts to the same thing but seems 
more palatable). 
8. The actual stabilization plan of 1 January 
1990 
Following discussions with the IMF, a stabilization plan 
was adopted at the end of December with effect from 
1 January 1990, consisting of the measures illustrated in the 
following table : 
one year, to be revised after five 
months; 
simultaneous stabilization package to 
be followed by a further round of pol-
icy measures; 
1. abolition of subsidies and re-
duction of deficit to 1% of GNP, 
financed by bonds not cash; 
duration 
timing 
budgetary cuts 
monetary discipline 1. 
price liberalization 1 
wage indexation 
exchange rate 
unification 
reduction of real money supply by 
an undisclosed percentage, prob-
ably of the order of 13%; increase 
of the real interest rate towards 
non-negative values; based on a 
discount rate of 36% for January 
and an actual cost of credit of 40 
to 45%; on old [sic] as well as new 
credit contracts; 
almost complete, except for a very 
small group of goods (e.g. energy, 
pharmaceuticals and fertilizers); in-
flation in January took place at the 
monthly rate of 75%; it has been 
decelerating and is expected to fall 
to single digit rates within March; 
1. extremely mild (30% of inflation 
in January to February 1990; 20% 
in March to April; 60% in May 
to December; money wages are a 
nominal anchor, fixed on an ex-
pected monthly inflation of 45% 
in January; real wages have been 
falling in January by the full am-
ount expected for the whole of 
1990; 
1. yes, through a devaluation of 32%, 
the eleventh under the new govern-
ment, down to a rate of USD 1 = 
9 500 zlotys equivalent to the free 
rate; to be maintained at least until 
May 1990, i.e. the nominal ex-
change rate is another nominal 
anchor; the real exchange rate has 
been appreciating and will 
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zloty convertibility 
transformation of 
State ent. in share 
comp. 
privatization 
stock exchange 
debt for equity 
swaps 
external aid 
interest rescheduling 
debt relief 
social pact 
restructuring 
continue to appreciate by the ex-
tent of hyperinflation, i.e. more 
than anticipated; 
1. yes, for current transactions; 
2. under discussion; 
2. yes, under discussion; including 
housing and with provisions for 
workers ownership; 
1. defacto secondary retrading, 
2. not yet large-scale organized 
market; 
no 
1. IMF stand-by USD 725 billion + 
World Bank structural loan + 
USD 1 billion stabilization fund + 
Phare financial aid; 
1. negotiated; 
2. within Brady plan; 
1. implicit in Solidarity leading role 
in the government; 
2. 
In short, inflation has flared and exceeded plans in January 
but the new (devalued) nominal exchange rate is being 
maintained. There are signs of overshooting in the im-
plementation of the Polish stabilization programme intro-
duced on 1 January 1990, both in the fall of real wages and 
in the effects of high interest rates on enterprise solvency. 
This creates some room for manoeuvre but at the same time 
generates political problems of society's acceptance of high 
austerity. 
A reduction of output—and therefore some unemployment 
—may result from the combination of higher fiscal pressure 
and the larger interest rate (raised from 7 to over 40% 
monthly, though still negative in real terms). 
Untypically—and probably unconstitutionally—the interest 
rate has been raised on old [sic] as well as on new credit 
contracts, i.e. amounting to a tax. Households and enter-
prises formerly borrowing at, say 6% a year have suddenly 
had to fund, say, 40% per month. The new interest charges 
have been partly subsidized by the State budget (20%) and 
partly can be capitalized on request (60%). There have been 
queues of people trying to repay debt before maturity. No 
credit contract stipulates the interest rate for more than the 
current month, which makes investment planning and even 
the financing of working capital a considerable problem. 
Enterprise capital has been revalued in January by an aver-
age of 14 times; amortization on the new value of capital 
is likely to exercise inflationary pressure on costs (as has 
happened in Yugoslavia with a similar recent exercise). 
Fiscal pressure includes a tax on enterprise own capital at 
the rate of 36% per year, levied on the 14-times capital 
revaluation (the so-called 'dividend' mentioned above). This 
kind of tax should be levied not on an accounting convention 
but on the market value of enterprise capital, i.e. after 
writing off old, bad investments. A capital gains tax—at 
present limited to real capital gains—should clearly be levied 
on all monetary capital gains (actual on realization and not 
national on an accrual basis). 
Interest rates will probably be lowered to under 20% per 
month in February due to fears of recession. The nominal 
rate of exchange—9 500 zlotys per USD—is holding well. 
The real rate of exchange is appreciating rapidly due to 
hyperinflation, which is good for holding down inflation but 
not so justifiable under any trade policy. 
Arguably the 'real anchors' of the stabilization programme 
should have been—instead of real money supply and real 
interest rates—real wages (lower but indexed more fully, say 
at 80% of inflation) and real rate of exchange (geared 
to trade policy). In an economy with a developed market 
tradition and with responsive private enterprises the choice 
of a fixed nominal rate of exchange as anchor (as in Bolivia) 
may be an important policy signal validated by trade flows 
tending to bring down inflation to the international level. In 
the recent Israeli stabilization attempt, anchoring the nomi-
nal rate of exchange had been followed by a statutory freeze 
of the new price level. In Poland today the choice of a 
fixed nominal exchange rate in presence of uncontrolled 
hyperinflation makes no sense at all. The choice of real wages 
and a real exchange rate as anchor would have softened the 
blow and protected employment, but might have prolonged 
the fight against inflation. 
The Poles (and the IMF) have put the end of inflation as 
their primary and only concern for the first four to five 
months of 1990. If the population will accept the related 
sacrifices without bringing down the government (or just the 
Minister for Finance) the gamble will have paid off. If not, 
an unnecessarily high price will have been paid for a failure 
which can only make further attempts all that much harder 
and less credible. 
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9. Implications for Western assistance 
A number of conclusions for the role of Western assistance 
can be drawn from these reflections on the nature, causes 
and possible cures of Polish imbalances : 
(i) that besides the very strong political case for aid, to 
reduce the probability of a regress in political reform, 
there is a double economic case for aid—especially in 
the form of food and necessities. The case rests on the 
risk of an accelerating decline of output and living 
standards (similar to that of 1982-84); and on the need 
to attenuate the socially undesirable effects of imbalance 
and stabilization on income distribution, given that their 
attenuation through internal redistribution would con-
flict with the incentive structure of a reformed economy. 
This aid would have to be specifically targeted to the 
poor and the needy, either directly or through the ad-
ditional revenue from sales of aid being used to fund 
income subsidies targeted to the poor. There is no need 
to attach conditions to this kind of aid, except perhaps 
the request that any privatization programme should be 
public and competitive, in order to stop the dissipation 
of State resources which otherwise might have been used 
instead of external aid; 
(ii) that the zloty counterpart funds of Western aid—apart 
for possible consumption redistribution—should not be 
recycled within the Polish economy; at most these funds 
may be regarded as a possible source of finance for 
equity swaps in a future privatization; 
(iii) that there is a strong economic case for Western loan 
capital to assist in a programme for exchange-rate unifi-
cation and limited convertibility; on condition, however, 
of a credible programme for prior stabilization and 
further reform; 
(iv) that, although there is no case for large-scale assistance 
other than those mentioned above (aid for the needy, 
insurance against further decline and finance for ex-
change-rate stabilization, beside the political case for 
supporting a fragile new democratic government), credi-
tor governments should consider the possibility of grant-
ing at least some interest relief, in recognition of past 
Polish commitment not to repudiate any part of the 
debt even vis-à-vis hostile governments imposing trade 
sanctions, and in view of the current discount at which 
Polish debt is traded in secondary markets (Paris Club 
debt is not traded in such markets but it could be argued 
that if it were to be traded it would warrant an even 
larger discount than commercial debt—which is privi-
leged in attracting interest payments). The difficulties 
with debt relief are primarily the fear of other countries 
lining up to claim the same treatment, the expectation 
(falsified by historical evidence) that negotiated debt 
relief might impede further access to international capi-
tal markets, and the unequal country exposure which 
makes harder a collective international approach. But 
suppose that the European Community (or indeed any 
well-intentioned donor) granted a substantial amount 
of aid to Poland, say of the order of several billion US 
dollars, for the exclusive purpose of repurchasing Polish 
debt with EC commercial banks at the going discount 
in secondary markets—within an indefinite period but 
conditionally onto the progress of economic stabiliza-
tion and reform implementation, or even conditional on 
real wage restraint, say matching for a number of years 
the sacrifices accepted by Polish workers in a credible 
social pact. The effect would be identical to debt relief 
but none of the objections rehearsed above would apply. 
The attraction of this kind of debt relief is that it is 
virtually costless (or at any rate cheap), spectacular 
because of its multiplier effect in reducing the overall 
Polish debt, and effective because it would clear the way 
for the normalization of Polish international financial 
relations and access to new credits; this is why this 
possibility deserves further consideration. 
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Introduction 
The economic reform programme of the Solidarity Govern­
ment envisions a return to a Western-type market economy 
with an end to the predominance of State ownership. Never­
theless, government policy on State-owned enterprises1 is of 
extreme importance for a number of reasons. State-owned 
enterprises dominate the Polish economy; in 1988, for exam­
ple, 96% of sales in industry, and 86% of all State budget 
revenue, were accounted for by State-owned enterprises.2 
Unless privatization of these enterprises progresses at light­
ening speed (which at the moment appears unlikely), State-
owned enterprises will continue to play a central role in 
the Polish economy for some years to come. Government 
restructuring of State enterprises and of the economic en­
vironment in which they operate will have an important 
influence on both the privatization of the State sector and 
on the prospects for the expansion of the existing private 
sector. 
The paper is organized into two parts: the first covers 
taxation and subsidization of State enterprises; the second, 
competition policy, and the regulation and control of State 
enterprises. Both parts begin with an empirical analysis of 
the system inherited by the Solidarity Government and then 
move on to a description and assessment of the Solidarity 
Government's programme as of January 1990. 
The empirical analysis will draw heavily on the results of an 
analysis of the 500 largest State-owned enterprises in Polish 
industry, the 'Lista 500'. The publication of the Lista 500 
data has meant that for the first time Western analysts have, 
had access to detailed enterprise-level data for a socialist 
economy.3 The description of the empirical analysis is there­
fore careful and detailed. 
industry, and the industrial coverage is extensive (with the 
notable omission of coal mining). The data available include 
not only measures of inputs (employment, capital stock), 
but more importantly for our purposes in this paper, figures 
on profits, taxes and subsidies. The data extend back to 
1983, not long after the first stage of the Polish economic 
reform began in 1982. In this paper I will use results for the 
years 1983-88. 
The tax and subsidy information in the Lista 500 are exten­
sive but not complete. Some taxes and subsidies get lumped 
together, and some definitions have changed over time. We 
have used the following definitions. 
1. Sales - costs = profit 1 
'Profit Γ in Polish terminology is called 'accumulation'. 
We will sometimes also call it 'original profit'. 
2. Profit 1 — turnover tax = profit 2 
Turnover tax is essentially a product-specific sales tax. 
3. Profit 2 + subsidy 1 = profit 3 
'Profit 3' in Polish terminology is called 'financial result'. 
4. Profit tax owed = 65% of profit 3 
'Profit tax' in Polish terminology is called 'income tax'. 
The basic rate has since been lowered (see below). 
5. Subsidy 2 = profit tax owed — profit tax paid 
The profit tax was originally intended to be a linear tax, 
but in practice many exemptions from this tax were 
available. 
6. Profit 3 - profit tax paid = profit 4 
'Profit 4' will sometimes be called 'final profit'. 
7. Profit rate = profit/real fixed-capital stock. 
1. Tax/subsidy reform 
1.1. The Lista 500 data 
The Lista 500 contains information on the 500 largest enter­
prises (by sales) in Polish industry. The Lista 500 enterprises 
typically account for over half of nationwide value added in 
By State-owned enterprises I mean all socialized enterprises, including 
both State enterprises proper and the so-called cooperative enterprises. 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1989, pp. 100 and 223. 
Research on the Lista 500 was carried out by this author and Dr Stanislaw 
Gomulka of the London School of Economics. For more detailed analy­
ses of the Lista 500 data, see Schaffer (1989a, 1990). 
The focus of our analysis will be the redistribution process 
that begins with original profit (profit 1, accumulation) and 
ends with final profit (profit 4). The Lista 500 tax and 
subsidy data is unfortunately not complete; some taxes are 
included in costs, and some are paid out of final profit. 
Nevertheless, the two taxes for which we have data are the 
two most important sources of tax revenue for the State 
budget. Turnover tax and profit tax together typically ac­
counted for over 70% of tax revenue from the socialized 
sector of the economy. There is an anomaly here, however, 
which has an important effect on our analysis, namely the 
taxation of alcohol. In 1988, for example, turnover tax 
revenue from all enterprises was 3 434,2 billion zlotys, and 
from industrial enterprises 2 588,4 billion zlotys. Of this 
revenue, 1 066,4 billion zlotys was turnover tax revenue from 
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alcohol sales, all of it generated by one firm, Polmos.1 For 
this reason we omit Polmos from the analysis of the Lista 
500 when appropriate. 
What we call subsidy 1 contains most of the subsidies paid to 
State enterprises.2 It includes product subsidies, the 'foreign 
trade compensation' subsidy, the 'unfavourable difference 
in prices' subsidy, and 'other balancing of negative profit' 
subsidies. In particular, food subsidies are included in sub-
sidy 1 (they are paid to enterprises in the food-processing 
sector and therefore figure in the Lista 500 data). 
rate of profit 1 as (profit 1 — profit 4)/profit 1. Table 2 
shows net taxation rates for the Lista 500 as a whole and 
by profitability categories, for the period 1983-88. Although 
the net taxation rate for the sample as a whole was rather 
high, it declined substantially over 1983-88, from nearly 70% 
to about 50% of pre-tax/subsidy profits. The pattern by 
profitability category shows a clearly progressive effective 
net tax. Loss-makers received on average a subsidy greater 
than the losses incurred (this is the meaning of a tax rate on 
losses exceeding 100%). The net tax rate for profit-makers 
was on average increasing with original profitability. 
Subsidy 2 (profit tax exemptions) was available to enterprises 
on the grounds of export sales, economical use of fuel and 
energy, and production of high-quality goods. In practice 
these exemptions at the economy-wide level typically lowered 
the effective tax rate from 65% to under 50%. Most of the 
enterprises in the Lista 500 benefited (to varying degrees) 
from these tax exemptions. 
1.2. Taxation and subsidization of State-owned 
enterprises 
1. The Lista 500 set of industrial enterprises in the period 
1983-88 was, in aggregate and at the industrial branch level, 
profitable before taxes and subsidies, even when the hugely 
profitable Polmos is excluded (see Table 1 for 1988 results). 
Roughly the same pattern holds when we look at all State-
owned industrial enterprises.3 It is important to note that 
the observed branch profitability patterns were heavily influ-
enced by government price controls. Observed pre-tax/sub-
sidy profitability in this period is not a good guide to what 
profitability would have been at market-set prices. If energy 
and food prices had risen to market-clearing levels, for 
example, the observed profitability patterns would have 
changed markedly. 
2. Polish industry was on the whole a significant generator 
of net tax revenue; considerably more was collected via taxes 
than was paid out via subsidies, even when tax revenue 
from alcoholic spirits is excluded. Put another way, the net 
taxation rate of profit 1 was high. Define the net taxation 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1989, p. 117, and Lista 500, 1988. 
By definition, subsidy 1 = financial result — accumulation + turnover 
tax. If we calculate subsidy 1 for 1987 using aggregate figures for all 
State-owned enterprises we obtain the figure of 2 055,2 billion zjotys; all 
State subsidies in 1987 amounted to 2 527,2 billion zjotys. Data from the 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1988, pp. 99 and 113. 
With the differences that the food branch minus alcohol would not be 
profitable, and the coal branch is not profitable. See, for example, the 
Rocznik Statystyczny Przemys/u. 1988, pp. 114 to 121. 
3. The ranking of industrial branches by original profita-
bility is much different from the ranking by final profita-
bility. That is, the cumulative impact of taxation and subsidi-
zation on industrial branch profitability is severe. Table 1 
shows the effects of the stages of profit redistribution on 
profit rates by industry and by profitability category for 
1988. Table 1 also demonstrates the selective impact of 
turnover tax and subsidy 1 according to original profita-
bility. The incidence of turnover tax is borne largely by those 
enterprises whose original profitability is high; the change 
in profitability moving from column 1 to column 2 is very 
large for this category and quite small for the other three 
categories. Subsidy 1 mostly benefits loss-makers. Profit tax, 
by contrast, is not so selectively targeted by profitability. 
4. Table 3 presents the distribution by industrial branch for 
those enterprises in the 1988 Lista 500 that were loss-makers 
before taxes and subsidies (i.e. according to profit 1). Several 
points regarding loss-making enterprises are worth noting. 
First of all, the number of loss-makers is not large, only 
about 11 % of the sample. Second, most of these loss-makers 
are in the food-processing sector; the rest are largely enter-
prises producing agricultural inputs. During this period both 
food products and agricultural inputs were highly subsidized 
and sold at State-controlled prices that were set very low. 
Third, none of these loss-makers were loss-makers at the end 
of the tax/subsidy process; all received a subsidy sufficient to 
cover their losses. These three features, with minor vari-
ations, form a consistent pattern in the Lista 500 data over 
the entire period 1983-88.4 
This pattern in loss-making enterprises by industry, and the 
selective application of turnover tax and subsidy 1, reflect 
the use of turnover tax and product subsidies as tools in 
product-pricing policy. Turnover tax was used to raise tax 
It is worth noting the two main gaps in the Lista 500 data regarding loss-
makers : the coal branch (deliberately excluded from the data), and the 
milk products branch (whose individual enterprises were too small to 
make the Lista 500, but whose combined subsidy in 1988 was nearly as 
large as the official Polish defence budget). 
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Table 1 
Profit redistribution and profitability, 1988 
Sample of 499 enterprises 
Profit rate = profit per real fixed capital 
(%) 
Profit rate according to profit definition 
Entire sample 
By industry 
Fuel and energy 
Metallurgy 
Electro-machinery 
Chemicals 
Building materials, etc. 
Wood and paper 
Light industry 
Food industry 
By original profitability 
Loss-makers 
Low profitability 
Medium profitability 
High profitability 
By final profitability 
Low profitability 
Medium profitability 
High profitability 
1 
12,1 
33,7 
8,0 
16,4 
10,0 
6,2 
9,1 
27,4 
-8,5 
-26,4 
2,8 
13,7 
48,8 
2,8 
15,2 
29,4 
2 
7,5 
6,5 
7,9 
13,2 
8,5 
4,4 
7,9 
16,1 
-15,5 
-26,4 
2,6 
12,0 
24,4 
2,2 
8,5 
22,3 
3 
11,5 
7,1 
8,6 
14,1 
11,3 
5,2 
8,6 
17,1 
12,9 
8,6 
4,0 
12,9 
25,1 
3,6 
12,8 
34,5 
4 
5,6 
3,0 
3,7 
7,4 
5,5 
2,6 
4,6 
7,4 
6,7 
4,9 
1,9 
6,3 
12,1 
1,7 
6,1 
18,2 
SB: Alcoholic beverages are excluded from the food branch; data for the coal branch is not available. 
Table 2 
Net tax rate on original profit 
(%) 
1985 1988 
All enterprises 
By original profitability 
Loss-makers 
Profit-makers 
of which: 
Low 
Medium 
High 
68,4 64,1 64,0 57,6 50,0 53,5 
122,5 
76,1 
32,6 
63,0 
87,8 
131,3 
71,4 
27,1 
56,3 
84,2 
127,0 
71,4 
36,5 
59,0 
83,4 
130,0 
68,3 
34,2 
57,6 
80,0 
129,0 
58,9 -
25,4 
49,0 
71,4 
118,6 
63,8 
31,4 
54,1 
75,2 
NB: Net tax rate - (profit 1 - profit 4)/profit 1. 
Rates are for the entire Lista 500 sample, except the alcohol producer Polmos which is excluded. 
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Table 3 
Loss-making enterprises in 1988 
Sample of 500 largest State-owned industrial enterprises 
Total number of loss-makers 
of which: 
A. Food processing 
of which: 
meat products 
food-oil products 
poultry products 
grain products 
sugar products 
B. Other industry 
of which: 
fodder production 
fertilizer production 
56 
NB: Coal-mining excluded. 
Table 4 
1988 cross-tabulation matrix 
Final profitability 
Loss-
maker 
Low Medium High 
0-3,2% 3,2-10,5% > 10,5% 
Column 
total 
0 
0,0 
75 286 
15,0 57,3 
Row 
total 
43 
23 
5 
5 
3 
13 
6 
1 
Original 
profitability 
Loss-maker 
Low profitability 
0-6,8% 
Medium profitability 
6,8-22,7% 
High profitabilitity 
> 22,7% 
0 
0,0 
0 
0,0 
0 
0,0 
0 
0,0 
9 
16,1 
48 
70,6 
16 
8,4 
2 
1,1 
35 
62,5 
19 
27,9 
156 
81,7 
76 
41,3 
12 
21,4 
1 
1,5 
19 
9,9 
106 
57,6 
56 
11,2 
68 
13.6 
191 
38,3 
184 
36,9 
138 499 
27,7 100,0 
NB: The first figure in each box gives the number of enterprises which started out in the left-
hand category and ended up in the upper category; the second figure is the percentage of 
all enterprises in the left-hand category that ended up in the upper category. 
revenue via those products that, at a given level of aggregate 
supply, would command a high price relative to production 
costs. Product subsidies were"used where central policy dic-
tated a price which was insufficient to cover production 
costs. State control of prices thus had a very strong influence 
on profitability, both at the sector and enterprise level. A 
by-product of this policy is that (aside from some obvious 
cases) it is very difficult to identify which are the efficient, 
truly profitable sectors, and which are not. The problem is 
even worse at the enterprise level; only with market-clearing 
prices would it be possible.to identify the truly unprofitable 
enterprises. 
5. The Polish enterprise tax/subsidy system during this per-
iod can be described as progressive, with most of the devi-
ation from linearity taking place in the treatment of loss-
makers. Two ways of demonstrating this are to use cross-
tabulations and to calculate correlation coefficients. 
any given firm would remain unchanged.' A cross-tabulation 
matrix for an economy which introduced such a tax system 
would in fact be an identity matrix, with ones down the 
diagonal and zeros everywhere else. This means we have 
a useful benchmark: deviations from the identity matrix 
measure deviation from a perfectly impartial linear tax/ 
subsidy system. 
Table 4 gives the profitability cross-tabulation matrix for 
1988. Matrices for other years were similar. The cross-tabu-
lation matrix shows that the enterprise tax/subsidy system 
was progressive rather than linear. The most marked devi-
ation from linearity was in the treatment of loss-makers; not 
only were they all bailed out, but most had a final profita-
bility which was either medium or high. Deviations from 
linearity were much less for profit-making enterprises. 
To construct a cross-tabulation according to profitability, 
we took categories for original profitability (with some modi-
fications) from a study of Hungarian manufacturing enter-
prises by Kornai and Matits and reported in Kornai, 1986. 
The categories for final profitability were chosen so that if 
a hypothetical, revenue-neutral tax reform were introduced 
such that the profits of all firms were taxed at the same 
uniform rate (and the losses of all loss-makers were subsi-
dized at this same rate), the categorization by profitability of 
6. The sample correlation coefficient between original and 
final profitability, ï, gives a similar picture. It has the useful 
property that if taxes on enterprise profits and subsidies on 
enterprise losses were based on a single linear rate with no 
' To obtain the cut-off points for the different final profitability categories, 
we simply multiply the original profitability cut-offs by ( I — the aggre-
gate net tax rate on original profit), i.e. we multiply by the aggregate 
rate of retention of original profit. 
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exemptions, the correlation coefficient between original and 
final profitability would be unity.1 
Table 5 summarizes the correlation between original and 
final profitability for the years 1983-88. Correlations for 
all enterprises taken together and for the subcategories of 
enterprises by profitability are given. The definitions and 
data are the same as those used in constructing the cross-
tabulation matrix, with the exception that here we used the 
subset of 393 enterprises for which we have data in all six 
years.2 This means the changes in the correlation coefficients 
are not affected by changes in the sample of enterprises. 
The correlation coefficient is therefore related to our cross-tabulation 
matrix, with the difference that it provides a single measure which does 
not depend on arbitrary categorizations of profitability. 
Here the omission of the alcohol producer Polmos is particularly import-
ant. Because of the tax revenue generated by alcoholic beverages, Polmos 
has an original profitability which is enormous and a final profitability 
which is unexceptional. When Polmos is included in the sample, the 
overall correlation coefficient drops to about 0,20, and changes in the 
taxes paid by Polmos completely swamp the changes in the taxes/subsidies 
of the other enterprises as reflected in the correlation coefficient. 
According to Table 5, there was a steady overall decline in 
1983-86 in the linearity (neutrality, unbiasedness) of the 
enterprise tax/subsidy system, as measured by 'r'. This oc-
curred at the same time as a steady decline in the net taxation 
rate of profits (see above). A possible explanation would be 
an increase in tax exemptions and ad hoc subsidies over 
this period; further evidence is needed here. The apparent 
increase in the linearity of the tax/subsidy system in 
1987-88 is slightly encouraging. 
The treatment of firms whose original profit was negative, 
i.e. loss-makers, was particularly perverse. The significant 
and negative correlation indicates that of the loss-making 
enterprises, those with the lowest original profitability on 
average ended up with the highest final profitability. Tax/ 
subsidy treatment of profit-making firms also deviated sig-
nificantly from linearity, but to a much lesser degree; original 
and final profitability were usually still related. 
7. The evidence above demonstrates that the State tax/ 
subsidy system is at least very interventionist and steeply 
progressive; but in fact the situation is much worse than just 
Table 5 
Correlation of original and final profitability 
Six-year sample, 1983-88 (393 enterprises) 
1983 1984 
All enterprises 
By original profitability 
Loss-makers 
Profit-makers 
of which: 
Low 
Medium 
High 
0,482 0,452 0,332 0,282 0.402 0,472 
-0,552 
0,512 
0,362 
0,392 
0,322 
-0,602 
0,482 
0,25' 
0,21' 
0,292 
-0,552 
0,412 
0,29' 
0,362 
0,12 
-0,61 2 
0,442 
0,20 
0.382 
0,15 
-0,572 
0,522 
0,28' 
0,402 
0.242 
-0 .41 2 
0.682 
-0,10 
0,512 
0,672 
1 Indicates significantly different Trom zero in a two-tailed test at the 5% level. 
2 Indicates significantly different from zero ¡n a two-tailed test at the I % level. 
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that. Econometric analysis of the Lista 500 data lends strong 
support to the view that the tax/subsidy system is manipu-
lated at the enterprise level on an ad hoc, ex post basis. 
Polish State-owned enterprises face a State policy which is 
paternalistic (other terms often used in this context are 
patronage, tutelage, etc.). A State policy of rescues/bail-outs 
operates (in Kornai's terminology, enterprises have 'soft 
budget constraints'). 
A full description of the econometric analysis of the allo-
cation of subsidies is given in Schaffer, 1990. The results can 
be summarized as follows. The Polish budget distinguishes 
between two types of subsidy. Some of the subsidies are 
product-specific; others are enterprise-specific.' The former 
are supposed to compensate enterprises for unfavourable 
output or input prices; for example, many food-processing 
enterprises had to sell their output at State-set prices which 
were very low. The latter might be paid, for example, to 
enterprises with old equipment and therefore high operating 
costs. According to Polish statistics, only a tiny fraction of 
subsidies are supposed to be enterprise-specific.2 
There is, however, anecdotal evidence that nearly all these 
subsidies were allocated according to a number of informal, 
enterprise-specific criteria, in particular profitability. An en-
terprise with a serious liquidity problem might, for example, 
be granted an extra subsidy which, though in reality enter-
prise-specific, appears in the books as a product-specific 
subsidy. Econometric analysis of the Lista 500 data for 
1983-88 confirms this very clearly. In particular, subsidy 1 
responded to changes in pre-subsidy enterprise profit. For 
loss-makers, a change in subsidy 1 is explained almost com-
pletely by a change in pre-subsidy profits, and is nearly one-
to-one—i.e. an increase in pre-subsidy losses was very nearly 
and very predictably matched by an increase in subsidy 1. 
Profit-makers that receive subsidy 1 were also compensated 
in this way, but on a much smaller scale, i.e. about 15% to 
30% of a decrease in profit 1 would be covered by an 
increase in subsidy 1. 
The effects of the existing tax/subsidy system on enterprise 
incentives are of course serious. A loss-making enterprise 
has little reason to try to cut costs or increase sales if 
these gains largely disappear in the form of a decrease in 
subsidy. A highly progressive and arbitrary tax system has 
detrimental effects on the incentives of profitable firms as 
well. Competition among all firms is blunted when it is 
common knowledge that the ultimate punishment for 
inefficiency—bankruptcy—does not exist. 
8. The tax/subsidy system is our main concern here, but we 
must also mention the related subject of soft credits for 
enterprises. (Unfortunately, the Lista 500 does not include 
data on enterprise borrowing.) There is anecdotal evidence 
that bank credits were used to rescue enterprises that were 
in financial difficulties. 
Furthermore, enterprise credits were granted at negative real 
interest rates, and the very high inflation in 1989 meant this 
interest-rate subsidy was quite large; rough calculations (see 
the paper by Stanislaw Gomulka) suggest the interest-rate 
subsidy was of the same order of magnitude as the budgetary 
subsidies. The analysis and recommendations which follow 
apply to the use of soft credit for enterprises as well as to 
the tax/subsidy system. 
1.3. Tax/subsidy reform 
Most of the goals of any Polish tax/subsidy reform are fairly 
obvious. One would definitely include: (1) major simplifi-
cation and reduction in numbers of the various types of 
taxes and subsidies; (2) an end to ad hoc, ex post adjustment 
of taxes and subsidies for individual enterprises; (3) an end 
to the use of subsidies to rescue loss-makers and an introduc-
tion of effective bankruptcy procedures for illiquid enter-
prises. The actual programme of the Solidarity Government 
will be discussed later in this paper. 
It is not enough, however, simply to list goals. One must 
also specify effective means, and in order to do this one 
must be clear about the causes of the dysfunctional charac-
teristics of the socialist tax/subsidy system. To take the 
example of implementing bankruptcies: the history of the 
socialist economies presents numerous examples of laws, 
regulations and official statements of policy to the effect 
that State enterprises would henceforward be allowed to go 
bankrupt, followed by failures to implement such policies. 
Good intentions are not enough. 
The features of the Polish economic system which, in this 
author's opinion, gave rise to the tax/subsidy system de-
scribed above are as follows: 
Product-specific subsidies are called dotacje przedmiotowe. Objective sub-
sidies'; enterprise-specific subsidies are called dotacje podmiotowe, 'subjec-
tive subsidies'. 
In 1988, for example, total subsidies to enterprises amounted to 4 197 
billion zlotys, of which only 46 billion were officially enterprise-specific. 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1989, p. 103. 
1. Concern by the State with economic outcomes at the 
enterprise level, notably a desire to avoid unemployment, 
economic dislocation, and employee discontent.3 This is not 
In Kornai's terminology, the socialist State has 'paternalistic' preferences. 
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to say that these goals are in themselves either bad or peculiar 
to socialist States; most governments do not welcome such 
events. 
2. Imperfect knowledge by the State of the exact circum-
stances facing enterprises. The State lacked the information, 
for example, to tell whether a loss-maker was minimizing its 
losses or not. The result was slack at the enterprise level, as 
enterprises tried to appear to be deserving of State aid. 
The single largest impediment to proper State evaluation of 
enterprise efficiency was the absence of rational, market 
clearing prices: it is hard to refuse a subsidy to enterprise 
which can justifiably blame the State for forcing it to sell its 
output at a price set by the State below cost. 
3. Excessive powers by the centre to intervene in the finan-
cial affairs of individual enterprises, and an inability by the 
centre to prevent itself from engaging such interference (the 
'credible commitment' problem). The point is that the centre 
could not, for example, prevent itself from rescuing an insol-
vent enterprise, since the consequences (bankruptcy and 
unemployment) were too unpalatable and there were no 
effective restrictions on the State which prevent such a res-
cue. Loss-making enterprises knew this was the case and did 
not expend much effort towards decreasing their losses. The 
centre could threaten not to rescue enterprises, and indeed 
could pass a law preventing rescues, but this did not amount 
to a credible threat; enterprises knew that, in the end, the 
necessary subsidies would be forthcoming, even if the law 
had to be circumvented. More generally, the centre was 
unable to prevent itself from interfering arbitrarily in econ-
omic events at the enterprise level.1 
4. While in one sense the centre had excessive powers to 
intervene in enterprise affairs, at the same time these powers 
were not great enough. The centre could not, for example, 
punish the manager of the enterprise arbitrarily severely, 
especially if enterprises were formally supposed to be auton-
omous, the manager had good political connections, etc. 
Instead of simply sending down orders to the enterprise 
which were then executed, the centre bargained with the 
enterprise over what was to be done. Ironically, the gradual 
process of economic de-Stalinization and partial decentrali-
zation which took place in Poland since the 1950s probably 
contributed adversely to the existing state of affairs. Under 
a classical Stalinist system, the centre has a considerable 
range of powers of intervention; and when abuses are 
discovered, the enterprise can be disciplined (e.g. the man-
ager can be fired). In a reformed socialist system such as 
1 For a formal model illustrating these and other points, see Schaffer, 
1989b. 
Poland's, the centre's power to discipline enterprises was 
limited but its power to rescue was not, the effect being a 
likely increase in the amount of bargaining and the degree 
of enterprise slack. 
In this writer's opinion, any attempt to reform the tax/ 
subsidy system for State enterprises must be built around 
large-scale legal and organizational reforms. These reforms 
should be directed at two general goals: the establishment 
of a sensible body of economic laws and regulations; and 
the establishment of the rule of (economic) law. 
The task facing the Polish authorities in establishing a 
Western-style tax and subsidy system is considerable. It 
means not only the design of tax and subsidy rates but their 
legal implementation: the drafting and dissemination of tax 
regulations, training of tax collectors whose first duty is to 
collect taxes specified by the law (rather than to bargain 
over how much is due), an appeal's system for enterprises 
and individuals who believe their tax bill is higher than that 
required under law, etc. 
However, it is simply not enough just to pass laws; establish-
ing the rule of economic law is just as important, if not 
more so. Again the bankruptcy problem provides a good 
illustration of this: there have been a number of attempts in 
different socialist economies to implement effective bank-
ruptcy procedures, and none succeeded. The relevant regu-
lations were often drawn up and passed into law but bank-
ruptcies were still practically unheard of. In practice, the 
establishment of the rule of economic law means a system 
of collecting taxes and dispensing subsidies which functions 
according to clearly set rules, and a legal/judicial system 
which enforces economic laws. If an enterprise cannot pay 
its taxes, it goes into receivership; if an enterprise evades 
taxes illegally, the people responsible are punished; if an 
official grants an illegal or unauthorized subsidy or illegally 
increases the taxes which a particular enterprise must pay, 
the official is disciplined and the money returned. 
At the time of writing (February 1990) it is still too early 
to assess the success of the Polish reform programme in 
addressing the problems outlined above; but there have 
clearly been considerable achievements. The government has 
drafted a considerable amount of economic legislation, with 
much more planned, and parliament has been playing an 
active role in the legislative process leading to the enactment 
of these laws. The credibility problem which dogged previous 
communist governments has so far not been a problem 
for the Solidarity Government. Indeed, the success of the 
government (so far) in implementing a set of severe austerity 
measures has enhanced its credibility. 
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1.4. The government's programme: tax and 
subsidy reform 
The Solidarity Government's economic programme, first 
outlined by Finance Minister Balcerowicz in September 1989 
and further developed and elaborated in the programme 
announced by the Council of Ministers in October, called 
for two types of action. The first was a fairly specific package 
of measures aimed at stabilizing the economy and in particu-
lar at defeating inflation. The second was a broader and 
more general plan to transform the economic system into a 
Western-type market economy. 
The programme called for the following changes in tax, 
subsidy, and price policy:1 
(1) rapid and complete freeing of most State-controlled 
prices; 
(2) rapid reduction in the size and number of subsidies and 
tax exemptions; 
(3) a fully reformed tax system starting from 1991. The three 
main ingredients would be a value-added tax (VAT), 
an enterprise income (profit) tax, and a comprehensive 
personal income tax; 
(4) rationalization of turnover tax prior to its replacement 
by VAT in 1991; 
(5) an enterprise income tax (i.e. profit tax) which is uniform 
for all businesses; 
(6) application of stricter financial discipline towards State-
owned enterprises and the elimination of enterprise-
specific tax exemptions and subsidies. Adoption of a 
stricter credit policy towards enterprises; a positive real 
interest rate. 
A brief word on sequencing is in order here. As noted above, 
it is difficult for the centre to refuse a subsidy to a loss-
making enterprise when it lacks detailed information about 
the enterprise's costs and the enterprise can justifiably claim 
that centrally-set prices caused it to make losses. For this 
reason, measure (1) (freeing prices from central control) is 
an essential prerequisite to achieving measure (2) (cutting 
subsidies) and measure (6) (not bailing out enterprises), and 
must either precede or accompany them. This was in fact 
the strategy followed by the Polish reformers; after an initial 
preparatory period and phasing in of some measures, most 
prices were freed and many subsidies and tax exemptions 
cut in the Polish 'big bang' of January 1990. 
In the view of this author, the measures listed above meet 
the basic requirements for a proper reform of the tax/subsidy 
system, and should they be carried out the tax/subsidy re-
form ought to be judged a success. Considerable progress in 
implementing these changes has in fact been made in the 
months since the statement of the programme. The bulk of 
the short-run measures and preparations were in place by 
January 1990. The situation as of January 1990 can be 
summarized as follows : 
(1) Less than 10% of all output is sold at prices controlled 
or regulated by the State. The comparable figure for 
1989 was 50%. The remaining State-administered prices 
are principally those for energy, rents, transportation 
and public utilities. Nearly all food prices have been 
freed, the exception being a small number of food prod-
ucts which are part of the social safety net. The relative 
prices of different forms of energy were raised consider-
ably, but remain below world market prices. 
(2) The scope and size of subsidies have been radically 
reduced. Subsidies in 1989 were about 14% of GDP and 
took up about 29% of State budget expenditures. The 
corresponding figures for the planned 1990 budget are 
about 6% of GDP and about 14% of budgetary expendi-
ture. A comparison with some Western countries is il-
luminating here. State aids (calculated by DG IV of the 
European Commission) as a percent of GDP ranged 
from a low of 1,3% in Denmark to a high of 6% in 
Luxembourg, with an EC 10 average of 3%. State aids 
as a percent of public expenditure ranged from 3% in 
Denmark to 19% in Luxembourg.2 The change in Po-
land is clearly a large step towards achieving a level of 
State aid consistent with the goal of becoming a Western-
type market economy. It should be noted, however, that 
the figures given above for Poland underestimate the 
extent of remaining State aid because they do not include 
tax exemptions. 
The single most important product which remains subsi-
dized in Poland is coal, but the subsidy has been reduced 
in conjunction with the increase in the State-set coal 
price. 
(3) Previously, subsidy rates on products were enterprise-
specific, so that bargaining took place between the centre 
and the enterprise over the subsidy rate. The intention 
now is to set truly product-specific subsidy rates, so that 
all enterprises producing the same product receive the 
same subsidy. 
1 See the programme adopted by the Council of Ministers on 9 October 
1989; published in Rzeczpospolita, 12 October 1989. 
'First survey on State aids in the European Community', 1989, pp. 10 
and 19. Figures are averages for 1981-86. 
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(4) The refinancing rate on credit was raised by the central 
bank from 140% per year to 36% per month for January. 
The plan is for the rate to be adjusted at least monthly, 
with a positive real interest rate once inflation subsides. 
(5) Relatively little progress has been made in preparation 
for the introduction of VAT. The draft outline of the 
personal income tax is nearly complete. 
(6) Tax exemptions have been severely curtailed, amounting 
to a planned increase in tax revenue of something like 
8% in 1990. The number of different turnover tax rates 
has been reduced and the basic rate of turnover tax 
raised from 15% to 20%. The basic rate of profit tax is 
40%. 
(7) The tax on wage bill increases has been retained, with 
some modifications. It is one of the major tools of the 
government's anti-inflation programme (see the papers 
by Gomulka and Nuti). The flat-rate tax on wages has 
also been retained, but the scope of exemptions sharply 
reduced. 
(8) The amortization tax has been abolished. This tax essen-
tially required a portion of calculated depreciation of an 
enterprise's capital stock to be paid to the State budget. 
(9) The dividend tax has, however, been retained. This tax 
was first introduced in 1989 and requires enterprises to 
pay to the State a fixed percentage of a portion of their 
capital stock. The portion of their capital stock thus 
taxed is in essence that portion which was funded cen-
trally (rather than out of the enterprises' retained pro-
fits). The tax is expected on average to require payment 
of about 10% of pre-profit tax profits.1 It is intended to 
abolish this tax eventually; it was retained only because 
of the pressure of time. 
The progress made by the Polish authorities in the reform 
of the tax/subsidy system in the short period since the state-
ment of the reform programme is very impressive. The 
success of the authorities in maintaining these changes and 
pushing ahead with others remains to be seen. There will 
likely be strong pressure for increased subsidies and tax 
exemptions as the government's stabilization programme 
begins to bite in the early months of 1990; it is to be hoped 
that these pressures will be resisted. 
The only major criticism/suggestion of this author regarding 
tax/subsidy reform concerns the dividend tax. The tax will 
be at a rate of 36% on an enterprise's centrally funded net 
real fixed capital as of 1 January 1990. In a change from 
1989, there is no upper limit on the size of the tax payment; 
even loss-making enterprises will have to pay. The tax will 
be paid in monthly instalments, starting in February. A 
revaluation of all enterprise fixed capital in preparation for 
the tax was ordered in January; it is anticipated that another 
capital revaluation will be needed in mid-1990. 
This tax has certain advantages in the eyes of some pro-
ponents. In particular, it will enable the Ministry of Finance 
to keep track of illiquid enterprises; enterprises which are 
unable to pay this tax go into a kind of preliminary state 
of insolvency.2 The incidence of the tax may vary widely, 
depending on the proportion of an enterprise's capital stock 
that was funded centrally. As it turns out, those sectors 
with the highest proportion of centrally funded fixed capital 
appear to coincide to some extent with those sectors which 
were in any case expected to contain a significant number 
of ailing enterprises (i.e. heavy industry). 
The long-run problems with this tax are fairly obvious and 
do not need listing. A short-run problem, and a solution, 
also exist. The problem arises from the fact that the tax is 
assessed on a nominal amount which is fixed on 1 January 
1990. If the government's tough anti-inflation programme 
is successful, then inflation will come down, but at a likely 
cost of a large increase in unemployment and enterprise 
insolvencies. But if inflation is low, then the dividend tax 
payments will be high in real terms, since the tax base 
(enterprise fixed capital as measured on 1 January) will not 
decrease much in real terms. The result will be an even 
heavier tax burden on enterprises. 
Conversely, if the anti-inflation programme is unsuccessful, 
the burden of dividend taxes on enterprises will be low 
because the tax base will shrink rapidly. In sum, the tax 
accentuates rather than dampens fluctuations in the business 
cycle. The short-run solution is of course to index dividend 
tax payments to the inflation rate; this would also make the 
planned mid-1990 revaluation of capital unnecessary. (The 
long-run solution is to replace the tax entirely.) 
1.5. The government's programme: restructuring ailing 
enterprises 
The combination of the freeing of most prices, the increase 
in the relative price of energy, the drastic cuts in subsidies, 
and the changes in turnover tax rates, have meant a very 
large shift in relative prices in Poland in a very short period 
1 That is, revenues from the dividend tax plus the profit tax will amount 
to about 50% of profits after subsidies and turnover tax. This is compar-
able to the revenue raised out of enterprise profit by the profit tax (after 
exemptions) in 1988 and earlier, before the dividend tax was introduced. Postepowania Naprawcza, lit. 'state of improvement'. 
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of time. But as prices move to market-clearing levels, and 
as the government's tight fiscal and monetary policies begin 
to bite, many State enterprises will suddenly find themselves 
insolvent. Already in January reports were coming in of 
enterprises shutting down and of jumps in the number of 
registered unemployed. Indeed, the government's October 
programme anticipated enterprise bankruptcies, and in Jan-
uary 1990 the bankruptcy legislation was amended to allow 
any creditor whose obligations were not met on time to 
initiate bankruptcy proceedings against an enterprise. 
For some enterprises these difficulties will be temporary 
and should disappear once relative prices stabilize and the 
enterprises re-establish sales outlets and input supplies; the 
chronically inefficient enterprises, on the other hand, will 
require major reorganization and possible closure. The prob-
lem is that past price distortions means past profitability 
bears little relationship to efficiency. It will therefore typi-
cally not be possible to say in advance which enterprises will 
be the ones which require major reorganization (aside from 
certain obvious cases); and it will often be difficult to dis-
tinguish between efficient enterprises that require only minor 
restructuring or short-term aid or credit and the inefficient 
enterprises that require radical reorganization or liquidation. 
In the absence of specific plans to deal with illiquid/insolvent 
enterprises, there would be a strong temptation to support 
them with ad hoc subsidies or easy credit i.e. through the 
use of the policy instruments of the old system. 
mainly from the staff of existing consulting firms, former 
State enterprise managers, and private entrepreneurs. The 
creation of this profession in Poland will be facilitated by a 
large and rapid training programme; the first training course 
began in late January 1990. 
The potential advantages of this scheme are clear. It avoids 
the pitfalls of restructuring from above; it brings market 
forces and competition to the restructuring process; it will 
lead to the privatization of some State-owned assets; it will 
assist in the process of déconcentration of Polish industry 
(more about which below); it will provide State enterprises 
that are not in difficulties with an added incentive to avoid 
bankruptcy. 
The main problem with the scheme is its start-up date. 
Before the BRE is ready to begin operations it is likely that 
a number, perhaps a large number, of State enterprises will 
become insolvent and ask to be rescued. The government's 
short-run plan to deal with insolvent enterprises while the 
BRE is being set up can be roughly summarized as 'just say 
no'. How successful it will be in refusing to hand out subsid-
ies, and in containing the pressure on the Polish commercial 
banks to lend to these enterprises, is not clear. 
2. Competition policy 
At the time of writing (early February) the government's 
medium-run plan (approved at the ministerial level) is two-
fold: first, to set up a 'Bank for restructuring the economy' 
(BRE); and second, to establish a profession of 'company 
doctors' who will perform the actual restructuring of insol-
vent enterprises. 
It is hoped to have the BRE running by May 1990, though 
delays are possible. The BRE will be established by parlia-
ment and will be independent of the government. It will 
initially be funded by a loan of some USD 150-300 million 
from the State budget. The BRE will be able to lend funds 
to or buy shares in State enterprises that are in financial 
difficulties. It will also be able to finance the purchase by 
other public or private enterprises of parts of, or entire, 
ailing enterprises. 
The BRE will not restructure enterprises directly, but instead 
will hire 'company doctors' or 'turn-around managers' to 
perform the restructuring. These company doctors will be 
independent consultants and not employees of the BRE. 
There will be many company doctors, who will compete 
amongst each other for restructuring contracts with the 
BRE. These company doctors will be recruited domestically, 
2.1. Concentration and collusion in Polish industry 
The Lista 500 data include both enterprise sales and enter-
prise three-digit industrial classifications. This combined 
with aggregate data for sales by socialized industry at the 
economy-wide level allows calculation of market shares for 
the Lista 500 enterprises and concentration ratios for much 
of Polish industry. There are about 170 industrial categories 
at this level of aggregation; we have data for over 90 of 
these. Our market shares and concentration ratios will be 
overestimates to some extent, since enterprise output can 
include sales of products in more than one three-digit cate-
gory. 
Table 6 presents three-digit market shares for 1987. Polish 
industry is not dominated by a small number of giant mon-
opolies: only 13 enterprises in the Lista 500 have a market 
share in excess of 50%, and two-thirds have a market share 
of 10% or less. These are of course the market shares of the 
500 largest Polish industrial enterprises; the total number of 
State-owned industrial enterprises is over 5 000. 
The concentration ratios in Table 7 show Polish industry to 
be oligopolistic in structure, with a minority of industries 
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Table 6 
1987 market share by three-digit industrial classification 
Va share of sales 
of all State industry 
0,00-0,05 
0,05-0,10 
0,10-0,15 
0,15-0,20 
0,20-0,25 
0,25-0,30 
0,30-0,35 
0,35-0,40 
0,40-0,45 
0,45-0,50 
0,50-0,55 
0,55-0,60 
0,60-0,65 
0,65-0,70 
0,70-0,75 
0,75-0,80 
0,80-0,85 
0,85-0,90 
0,90-0,95 
> 0,95 
Number 
of State enterprises 
185 
144 
58 
39 
22 
16 
5 
4 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
3 
2 
0 
1 
0 
3 
Total 489 
completely dominated by a few enterprises. Note that most 
of the four-firm ratios for which data is not available would 
be lower than the ratios which do appear in the table, 
because the missing enterprises had sales which were not 
large enough to put them in the Lista 500. 
Although useful, this data is likely to understate the degree 
of concentration in Polish industry, for three reasons. First, 
data at the three-digit level is really too aggregate for gauging 
the monopoly problem. The apparent absence of monopolies 
at the three-digit level conceals specialization among enter-
prises within the three-digit level. This is reportedly true for 
a large number of products, though data is hard to come 
by. Second, many enterprises have effective monopolies 
within their regional market. Again, more data is needed. 
Third and most important, excessive concentration in State-
owned industry is evidenced not by the presence of large 
monopolies but rather by the presence of oligopoly and the 
absence of small enterprises. Thus in 1988, the average State-
owned industrial enterprise had over 700 employees and 
about six separate factories; of the 5 823 enterprises in social-
ized industry, only 17% had 100 or fewer employees and 
their combined sales accounted for only about 1 % of total 
sales and total employment of State-owned enterprises.1 
There is considerable potential for collusive behaviour by 
State enterprises. Formal and informal ties between enter-
prises are likely to persist. Enterprises until now had gener-
ally been encouraged by the centre to coordinate their activi-
ties, and they have had ample time and opportunities to 
develop some expertise at this. One of the legacies of the 
nomenklatura system is a large number of enterprise directors 
with Party connections who are quite accustomed to infor-
mal economic coordination. 
2.2. Competition policy in Poland as of January 1990 
The Solidarity Government's economic reform programme 
of October 1989 called for the following measures to pro-
mote domestic competition: 
(1) the pursuit of an active antimonopoly policy, including 
the dismantling of monopolistic structures and demon-
opolization of concentrated industries; 
(2) the passage of a new competition law which would both 
outline illegal anticompetitive practices and establish a 
new antimonopoly office; 
(3) changes in legal requirements so as to enable freer entry 
by new (private) enterprises; 
(4) introduction of a convertible zloty, which would allow 
for increased domestic competition via imports; 
(5) greater autonomy for State enterprises. 
Since October a number of enterprises have been broken up; 
this process is continuing. The cooperative unions (these so-
called cooperatives are really just another form of State 
enterprise; they dominate trade and distribution) are cur-
rently being dissolved.2 In January 1990 the bureaucratic 
obstacles to starting a new private enterprise were reduced. 
No major formal restrictions now remain on private sector 
economic activity. Passage of the new competition law is 
expected in February 1990. 
In the remainder of this section we will discuss in some detail 
current competition policy and the direction it is likely to 
take under the new antimonopoly law. We then cover briefly 
the problem of enterprise autonomy and the selection of 
enterprise managers. 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1989, p. 255. Average number of factories (zaklady) 
from 1986 data in Ma/y Rocznik Statystyczny, 1988, p. 164; more recent 
data is not available. 
The industrial associations (loose grouping of enterprises producing 
similar goods), which had been made voluntary in 1986, have also been 
eliminated. 
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Table 7 
One-firm, two-firm and four-firm concentration ratios, 1987 
Ratios are based on shares of sales of State-owned enterprises only 
Industry Industry 
code 
One-firm 
ratio 
Two-firm 
ratio 
Four-firm 
ratio 
Chemicals (coke) 
Mining of copper ore 
Alcoholic beverages (spirits) 
Tractors 
Sulphur mining 
Plastics 
Glazed earthenware, misc. quality ceramics 
Power machinery 
Copper metallurgy 
Tools (metal) 
Motorcycles and bicycles 
Mining and extraction machinery 
Refinery industry 
Textiles (non-woven) 
Other industrial chemicals 
Building machinery 
Limestone and gypsum 
Rail rolling stock 
Textile small wares (haberdashery, etc.) 
Misc. chemical agents 
Bearings 
Textile chemicals 
Automatic precision machinery 
Food concentrates 
Tobacco products 
Wine 
Oil and fat 
Precision machinery (calculators) 
Coke 
Electric cable 
Potato products 
Metallurgical and casting machinery 
Telecommunications equipment 
Fats and household chemicals 
Finished paper products 
Shipbuilding, etc. 
Machinery and equipment for light industry 
Motor vehicles 
Fruit and vegetable products 
Glass products for building 
Organic chemicals 
Other glass products 
Rubber products 
Chemical fertilizer 
Inorganic chemicals 
Ferrous metallurgy 
Felt and technical fabrics 
Glass containers 
Fish products 
Sugar and sugar products 
Wood pulp, cellulose, etc. 
General use metal products 
Measurement and laboratory instruments 
129 
52 
244 
103 
138 
126 
163 . 
71 
54 
64 
104 
72 
24 
206 
128 
81 
143 
101 
196 
133 
63 
127 
91 
252 
255 
247 
249 
92 
21 
112 
245 
73 
116 
132 
182 
105 
77 
102 
246 
151 
124 
152 
137 
123 
122 
42 
202 
154 
234 
243 
181 
67 
94 
1,000 
1,000 
0,975 
0,900 
0,799 
0,798 
0,741 
0,722 
0,704 
0,697 
0,694 
0,689 
0,657 
0,450 
0,439 
0,402 
0,363 
0,359 
0,359 
0,345 
0,341 
0,320 
0,312 
0,310 
0,299 
0,297 
0,284 
0,279 
0,277 
0,276 
0,270 
0,263 
0,262 
0,255 
0,249 
0,243 
0,238 
0,234 
0,234 
0,229 
0,222 
0,222 
0,219 
0,218 
0,216 
0,212 
0,208 
0,204 
0,199 
0,191 
0,190 
0,188 
0,177 
n.a. 
0,955 
0,986 
0,966 
n.a. 
0,852 
0,917 
0,825 
n.a. 
0,839 
0,816 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,768 
n.a. 
0,561 
n.a. 
0,578 
0,641 
0,585 
0,432 
0,473 
0,554 
0,450 
0,413 
0,554 
0,433 
0,530 
n.a. 
0,514 
0,449 
0,354 
n.a. 
0,432 
0,420 
0,459 
0,311 
n.a. 
0,422 
n.a. 
0,414 
0,434 
0,373 
0,420 
0,398 
n.a. 
0,395 
0,304 
0,334 
0,278 
0,299 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,000' 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1,054 
1,000 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,921 
1,000' 
1,000' 
0,863 
n.a. 
0,800 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,936 
0,832 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,862 
n.a. 
0,662 
0,943 
1,000' 
0,830 
n.a. 
0,908 
n.a. 
0,537 
n.a. 
0,743 
n.a. 
0,637 
0,404 
n.a. 
0,676 
n.a. 
0,559 
0,731 
0,657 
0,562 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,758 
0,507 
0,482 
0,427 
n.a. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
One-firm, two-firm and four-firm concentration ratios, 1987 
Ratios are based on shares of sales of State-owned enterprises only 
Industry Industry 
code 
One-firm 
ratio 
Two-firm 
ratio 
Four-firm 
ratio 
Paint and varnish 
Chemical processing equipment 
Cement 
Machinery service and repair 
Joinery and woodwork (building) 
Confectionery products 
Farming and equipment machinery 
Metal construction products 
Pharmaceutical products 
Silk and silk substitute products 
Fireproof materials 
Building insulation 
Fodder 
Textile fibres 
Electro-technical manufactures 
Building ceramics 
Meat products 
Lifting and transporting equipment 
Decorating fabrics 
Board and plywood 
Beer 
Metal casting 
Plastic products 
Sawmills 
Shoe industry 
Metal manufactures for industry 
Machine tools 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 
Flour milling products and pasta 
Electronics 
Electrical energy equipment 
Transport equipment service and repair 
Eggs and poultry 
Leather tanning 
Cotton textiles 
Wool textiles 
Hosiery 
Natural gas 
Clothing 
Furniture 
Milk and milk products 
131 
75 
142 
88 
173 
251 
82 
62 
134 
194 
147 
146 
261 
193 
113 
144 
231 
85 
195 
172 
248 
61 
136 
171 
222 
65 
74 
53 
241 
115 
111 
108 
233 
221 
191 
192 
201 
22 
211 
174 
235 
0,176 
0,168 
0,162 
0,160 
0,158 
0,157 
0,151 
0,147 
0,147 
0,146 
0,146 
0,145 
0,139 
0,130 
0,128 
0,125 
0,121 
0,120 
0,111 
0,111 
0,109 
0,106 
0,105 
0,104 
0,102 
0,102 
0,092 
0,091 
0,087 
0,084 
0,082 
0,079 
0,078 
0,077 
0,068 
0,068 
0,060 
0,046 
0,036 
0,035 
0,018 
0,325 
n.a. 
0,277 
0,208 
n.a. 
0,294 
0,228 
0,293 
0,283 
0,288 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,263 
0,216 
0,219 
n.a. 
0,206 
0,199 
0,212 
n.a. 
0,186 
0,174 
0,181 
0,187 
0,189 
0,185 
0,179 
0,157 
0,138 
0,166 
0,154 
0,123 
0,149 
n.a. 
0,133 
0,133 
0,099 
0,090 
0,072 
0,068 
n.a. 
0,578 
n.a. 
0,446 
0,294 
n.a. 
0,460 
0,354 
n.a. 
0,472 
0,545 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0,508 
0,369 
0,348 
n.a. 
0,341 
n.a. 
0,376 
n.a. 
0,335 
0,262 
0,305 
0,289 
0,354 
0,284 
0,339 
n.a. 
0,237 
0,309 
0,249 
0,202 
0,283 
n.a. 
0,254 
n.a. 
0,172 
0,169 
0,130 
0,130 
n.a. 
n.a. » not available. 
1 Indicates a figure derived from the number of enterprises reported in the Rocznik Statystyczny Przemyslu, 1988, pp. 344-8. 
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The antimonopoly law which was passed in January 1987 
established a small antimonopoly department in the Ministry 
of Finance (the staffcurrently numbers 13). This office began 
operation on 1 January 1988 but was rather ineffective until 
the Solidarity Government assumed office in September 
1989, since when it has been quite active. The strategy of 
the antimonopoly department has been to concentrate its 
initial efforts on the monopolies and monopsonies which 
obstruct the route from farmer to consumer. To this end it 
has successfully broken up enterprises in the meat-processing 
and agricultural-machinery branches. In January 1990 it was 
working on the sugar-processing branch; the focus this year 
will be on trade and distribution. 
Relatively few central price controls are aimed at existing 
monopolies, and these are administered not by the antimon-
opoly department but rather by the relevant ministries. The 
current approach of the antimonopoly department is to wait 
for anticompetitive actions (including price fixing) to be 
reported or detected, and then to act. The very rapid changes 
in relative prices and high inflation now taking place, it is 
argued, make this the best practical approach available. 
The government's October programme states that privatiz-
ation and other ownership transformations should be ac-
companied by déconcentration. Furthermore, déconcen-
tration is seen as an important policy aim in itself and not 
merely as a prerequisite for privatization. At the time of 
writing, this is still the government's strategy on sequencing. 
The general view in both the antimonopoly office and in the 
ownership changes office (also currently a part of the Fi-
nance Ministry) is that déconcentration and the introduction 
of competition should precede privatization. Déconcen-
tration has been proceeding independently of (and faster 
than) privatization. 
It appears that the technical obstacles to demonopolization 
are not as great as one might fear (the progress of the 
antimonopoly office thus far supports this). Typical account-
ing practice is for separate factories in a single enterprise to 
keep separate accounts; even loans and debts are usually 
held separately. Apparently little debt is held centrally by 
the conglomerate enterprise. This makes division of a con-
glomerate enterprise fairly straightforward from an account-
ing point of view. Only the very large enterprises have only 
centrally located accountants who handle the accounts for 
the separate factories; breaking up these enterprises will be 
made even more difficult by their political influence. 
In January 1990 the scope of the licensing requirements for 
many imports was reduced, and the import tariff system has 
been simplified to some extent. The zloty was also made 
essentially freely convertible domestically at this time. One 
of the intended effects of these changes was to stimulate 
competition by having importers compete with domestic 
producers. At the time of writing it is too early to say how 
much competition, these measures have generated in the 
domestic market. 
The new competition law is modelled roughly on the compe-
tition law of 1987. Like the law it will replace, the new 
law will serve two purposes: it will prohibit anticompetitive 
practices, and it will establish a new, expanded antimonopoly 
agency. Anticompetitive enterprise practices to be prohibited 
include a number of specific monopolistic practices, monop-
olistic agreements between enterprises, and abuse of domi-
nant position. The law details how complaints will be pur-
sued in the courts, how appeals will be heard, what fines or 
other punishments can be administered and what compen-
sation for injured parties is possible. 
The new antimonopoly agency will be part of the govern-
ment but separate from the Ministry of Finance (the original 
intention was to have the agency responsible directly to 
parliament). The head of the agency will be nominated by the 
Prime Minister/Council of Ministers. It will be considerably 
larger than the existing antimonopoly office, with a staff of 
about 100 (50 to 60 in the main office, the rest in six to eight 
regional offices around the country). The new agency will 
be able to initiate competition complaints itself; it will also 
be able to act on complaints reported to it by individuals or 
firms. The agency will be empowered to order enterprises to 
cease anticompetitive practices, and to fine such enterprises 
or their personnel. Mergers of State enterprises will have to 
be reported to the agency; the agency will be able to block 
mergers that would yield firms with dominant positions. 
The agency will also be able to break up enterprises with 
dominant positions, even if they have not engaged in directly 
anticompetitive behaviour. This last power is extremely im-
portant given the high concentration of Polish industry and 
the necessity of pursuing a déconcentration policy. 
The draft law as it stands has its drawbacks. The list of 
prohibited activities overlap to some extent. It would have 
been preferable to follow the original plan and make the 
agency more independent and responsible directly to parlia-
ment.1 The law applies to all economic activity. Eventually 
it is intended to have separate competition laws for different 
sectors of the economy (the banking sector, the various 
natural monopolies, etc.) but legal changes of this scale 
take time. Nevertheless, passage of the new law will be a 
significant step in the right direction. 
1 Legal complications regarding parliamentary agencies apparently meant 
it was simpler and faster to take the route actually chosen. 
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In the opinion of this writer, the government's strategy 
on competition policy has considerable merit. Particularly 
important is the acknowledgement that déconcentration is 
a prerequisite for privatization. It is to be hoped that the 
government will resist the temptation of 'easy' privatizations 
by converting State-owned monopolies and oligopolies into 
privately-owned ones. Any such mistakes will be much 
harder for the antimonopoly agency to correct once such 
enterprises pass into private ownership; indeed, the possi-
bility of such action in the future by the agency would 
depress the selling price of shares in such enterprises. Only 
by ensuring that markets are competitive will Poland be 
able to enjoy the advantages of a Western-type free-market 
economy. 
The strategy of pursuing déconcentration as an end in itself, 
and not simply as a prerequisite for ownership transform-
ation, is, in our view, also correct. As noted above, privatiza-
tion is likely to take a long time; in the meantime, déconcen-
tration should yield immediate benefits via increased compe-
tition. A word of caution is in order here, however. As 
economists we have a good idea how economies dominated 
by private ownership operate, both with a high degree and 
with a low degree of monopoly. We also have a fairly good 
idea (from the Hungarian, Yugoslav and Polish experiences) 
how market socialist economies operate with a high degree 
of monopoly. We do not, however, have experience with 
how an economy would operate when dominated by State 
ownership but with a low degree of monopoly and a high 
degree of competition. Should déconcentration proceed fas-
ter than privatization, which at the time of writing appears 
likely in Poland, this latter type of economy is likely to be 
the form that the Polish transition from socialism will take. 
In the view of this writer, a transition via a competitive 
market socialist economy is preferable to a transition via a 
Hungarian-type monopolistic market socialist economy (the 
final goal—a competitive free-market economy with pre-
dominantly private ownership—is of course preferable to 
both these transition states). Nevertheless, it must be admit-
ted that direct evidence supporting this preference is not 
abundant. 
A final remark on déconcentration is in order. Wages in a 
conglomerate enterprise are apparently usually set centrally 
and do not vary among the different factories which make 
up the enterprise. Factories are however likely to differ 
substantially in their level of efficiency. It is likely, therefore, 
that cross-subsidization often takes place between the factor-
ies which make up an enterprise. This suggests that an active 
antimonopoly policy would have the added benefit of aiding 
the restructuring process: an inefficient factory which had 
been subsidized by the rest of the enterprise would, after the 
enterprise is broken up, no longer be able to avoid the 
required restructuring. 
2.3. The appointment of directors of State-owned 
enterprises 
In a system with no detailed central planning and day-to-day 
operational autonomy for State enterprises, the objectives of 
managers and thus the behaviour of enterprises will depend 
crucially on how enterprise directors are selected. At the 
moment in Poland, it seems that enterprise workers' councils 
have the largest say in the selection of enterprise managers, 
making the Polish economy, apparently, the largest labour-
managed economic system in the world. The legal status of 
State property and how it is managed is now being con-
sidered by parliament, however, and the managerial selection 
process is likely to be affected. In this section we will briefly 
consider four possibilities that have received some attention. 
A policy that can immediately be rejected is turning over 
State enterprises to local governments. This is so regardless 
of when and whether local government is reformed.1 
Government interference in enterprise activities is one of the 
hallmarks of the old system, and devolving this ability to 
interfere to local governments would be a serious mistake. 
It is important that a repeat of the Yugoslav experience is 
avoided. 
Second, State enterprises may be turned into self-managed 
cooperatives that choose their own managers. This is prob-
ably a feasible policy if carried out on a limited scale and if 
used to create small cooperatives, but only if at the same time 
the enterprises are sold (or at least ownership transferred) to 
their workforces. Public ownership of an enterprise's capital 
combined with independent management would lead to in-
soluble incentive conflicts. One option is to create cooperat-
ives as part of the déconcentration programme, i.e. when 
an enterprise is broken up some or all of the component 
establishments could be sold to their respective workforces. 
A third possibility is the 'national enterprise board' scheme; 
some form of this option will probably be used, at least in 
the short run. The NEB would be a body subordinate to 
parliament which appointed enterprise directors and which 
had very limited powers to intervene in the running of 
enterprises on a day-to-day basis. Such a body would never-
theless be in a position to wield considerable economic 
power; and so this scheme would probably work best as a 
short-term measure in conjunction with gradual but compre-
hensive privatization. As enterprises arc privatized, control 
would pass from the NEB to the new private owners, and 
the powers initially concentrated in the NEB would be dif-
1 At the time of writing, communist structures are still strong at the level 
of local government; local elections, scheduled for April, should change 
this. 
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fused. The danger is that the progress of the privatization 
programme may be slowed or even stopped for a variety of 
reasons; and it is likely that the longer the NEB is in exist-
ence, the less effective it will be. There is also the further 
problem of how such a centralized agency would cope with 
many thousands of managerial appointments. A variant on 
this scheme is D. M. Nuti's suggestion to set up a number 
of State holding companies instead of a single NEB; this 
would have the advantages of diffusing economic power 
immediately, and allowing for a moderately decentralized 
and free-market form of managerial selection (the State 
holding companies would compete in hiring managers). 
The fourth option is Stanislaw Gomulka's investment bank 
scheme (for a full account see Gomulka, 1989). The Go-
mulka scheme in brief is as follows. The State sets up a 
number of State-owned investment banks. Ownership of 
State enterprises would be transferred to these banks by 
distributing enterprise shares among them. The banks would 
act as owners/shareholders in a standard sense : they would 
buy and sell shares, be entitled to share dividends, and as 
shareholders they would choose the directors of enterprises. 
Eventually the banks would be privatized, thus privatizing 
the enterprises as well. This scheme has two advantages over 
the NEB scheme. First, control over enterprises would be 
diffused instead of concentrated in a single body; and second, 
it would facilitate the eventual privatization of enterprises. 
3. General recommendations for possible EC 
initiatives 
1. The Polish economic reform programme, quite under-
standably, is suffering from what might be called 'legislative 
lag'. A huge amount of new economic legislation is required, 
and the authorities are starting with an existing set of laws 
which is entirely inadequate. The legal process of economic 
reform is therefore slow and painful. An illustration of the 
problem is given by the 'co-op unions' mentioned above. 
These umbrella organizations (essentially cartels) should be 
abolished shortly. But in response the individual co-op mem-
bers are apparently merging—a very large cooperative is not 
in and of itself illegal. It will be up to the new antimonopoly 
agency to deal with this particular problem. 
The goal of the government's programme is to establish a 
Western-type economy, and it is therefore interested in exist-
ing Western law on taxation, competition, etc. The legislative 
task facing the authorities would be considerably eased if 
they had ready access both to documentation on Western 
economic law and to Western experts who could advise them 
on the drafting and implementation of the new legislation. 
The European Commission has considerable experience with 
the numerous different systems of economic law in use inside 
and outside the European Community, and is particularly 
well placed to offer guidance. Several possibilities are : estab-
lishing an EC economic legislation documentation centre; 
seconding EC officials from the various Directorates-Gen-
eral for periods of, say, several months, to advise the Polish 
authorities on an operational level; putting the various Polish 
government offices and agencies on the relevant EC mailing 
lists; etc. 
2. The Community, and individual Community countries, 
will be active in new lending to Poland, and specifically in 
lending to private individuals and enterprises. The private 
sector is expected to play an important role in both the 
restructuring of ailing State enterprises, and the déconcen-
tration of monopolistic State enterprises, as well as in the 
privatization process per se. The private sector in Poland 
is however very small and underdeveloped. It is crucial, 
therefore, that the minimum amount that can be borrowed 
by a Polish private entrepreneur or enterprise is set low. A 
minimum for a single loan of USD 2 000 to USD 3 000 is 
appropriate. If the minimum is set too high, at, say, USD 
100 000, there will be hardly any private takers. The extra 
transaction costs incurred by setting a low minimum amount 
are insignificant compared to the benefits of getting the 
private sector going and building a proper capital market. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper was to consider whether the 
experience of five major industrialized countries in financing 
industry suggested issues of policy concern in the design of 
financial, particularly banking, systems. Since the paper was 
written in the context of discussions of structural change in 
Hungary and Poland it became necessary to consider the 
question of whether and how the experience of industrial-
ized, capitalist countries could be applied to countries in 
transition from socialism. Although the question of applica-
bility is not the main focus of the paper it may, nevertheless, 
be helpful to begin with a brief discussion of the main points 
of the debate on financial reform in socialist economies in 
order to clarify the connection between two rather different 
research objectives. 
It has been noted (Sokil, 1989, Bacskai, 1989, Nuti, 1989) 
that the role of banks and the financial system generally had 
not been addressed in great detail by theorists of full social-
ism or market socialism and that the bank in many socialist 
countries had initially been seen as a passive institution 
with purely accounting functions. Repeated reforms in many 
socialist and market socialist countries have allowed the 
development of banking systems with more complex, and 
often incompatible, functions, but there has still been rela-
tively little close analysis of the role a banking system is 
expected to perform (Nuti, 1989, p. 87). 
To a surprising degree the same observation applies to 
analysis of the role of banking and financial systems in 
capitalist economies and the paper returns to this subject 
below. In the case of the socialist economies, however, the 
difficulty of pinpointing the role of a banking system has 
contributed to the sense of confusion in the debate on 
financial reform. Setting aside the problems of monetary 
policy and control of the money supply under the present 
banking arrangements in most socialist countries (Collier 
and Gunning, 1989, Nuti, 1990) much of the debate which 
has gone under the name of financial reform has in fact been 
about enterprise reform. In particular the debate about the 
need for non-intermediated, direct capital markets (e.g. 
equity and bond markets) has become closely bound up with 
arguments over the ownership structure of enterprises (the 
privatization discussion) and has tended to conflate several 
functions of financial systems. This approach focuses heavily 
on the role of external capital markets in 'improving' entre-
preneurship and managerial performance and in reallocating 
assets to their most productive use through the takeover 
mechanism. 
This is not to suggest that the problem of introducing com-
petitive pressures on enterprises and of improving their per-
formance is unimportant. On the contrary it is possibly the 
most important aspect of structural reform in the transition 
from socialism. But the role of the financial system in achiev-
ing this is not simple and should not be exaggerated. There 
may be considerable danger in moving from.a system in 
which finance passively adjusted to real behaviour to one 
in which the main responsibility for imposing competitive 
pressure on firms is supposed to be taken over by the 
financial system. It is, of course, obvious that something 
like competitive behaviour in goods (and perhaps labour 
markets) and a functioning price system is of equal, if not 
greater, importance for enterprise reform. 
It has proved to be a quite difficult task to establish the link 
between financial systems and industrial performance even 
in the relatively well-researched case of major capitalist 
countries. In theoretical terms there is, as yet, no widely 
accepted model of the connection between financial structure 
and real behaviour of firms or the industrial performance 
of an economy. The Modigliani-Miller irrelevance pro-
position has yet to be dislodged from its central place in the 
finance literature. The new developments in theory (see 
Edwards, 1987) have incorporated principal-agent and infor-
mation problems and have concentrated on the way financial 
contracts may control the behaviour of managers. There is 
in this literature then a justification for the close linking of 
financial and enterprise reform debates but there is also a 
caution. There is not yet a model of the optimal financial 
contract or corporate financial structure which ensures good 
management. Hellwig, 1990, notes that the old debate about 
whether a high degree of dependence on bank finance is a 
sign of backwardness in corporate development or the re-
verse is not made easier to resolve by the new theories. 
This paper, then, presents some basic date on the structure 
of corporate finance in five industrialized countries and 
describes the roles of the banking systems in providing 
finance for industry. Much of the paper emphasizes the 
role that banks can play in monitoring and controlling the 
behaviour of managers and in reallocating assets through 
corporate restructuring. This emphasis arises for two 
reasons. First, the empirical and institutional data suggest 
that these activities by banks are particularly striking in 
countries with strong industrial performance (notably Japan) 
and, further, that the alternative of takeovers through equity 
markets operates in rather few countries and generally those 
with poorer industrial performance. Second, in the light 
of the debate on enterprise reform in socialist economies 
described above it seemed useful to point out that neither the 
empirical evidence nor what theory we have unambiguously 
supports the view that arm's-length, non-intermediated capi-
tal markets are the best way to finance industry or to 
reallocate its assets. Importantly, it is this point which makes 
the case for the relevance of the experience of industrialized, 
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capitalist countries to the economies in transition. In many 
cases creditors are willing to undertake functions which in 
theory are the functions of equity owners. This behaviour 
does not apparently require equity ownership rights and 
arises from the fact that creditors, particularly those with a 
long-term relationship (whether contractual or not), have at 
least as great an interest in keeping good companies alive as 
do shareholders. 
This last point in particular raises some serious questions 
about the need for 'free capital markets', particularly equity 
markets, as a mechanism for managerial control and corpor-
ate reorganization. It appears that these functions of stock 
markets could equally be ensured by incentives for managers 
(and workers) to maximize profits and by a leading role for 
creditors in the reorganization of firms. The drawbacks of 
such a system are suggested by the World Bank (1989) 
observations that some banking systems have been bad at 
this task and have continued to roll over bad debts rather 
than take losses and demand liquidation of hopeless cases. 
Bank supervision which enforces good financial practice is 
clearly an important part of the system. In addition, some 
checks may well be needed to prevent banks acquiring excess-
ive power over borrowers, and it may be that this is the key 
role played by the capital markets. That is, capital markets 
are chiefly important not as a conduit for finance but as a 
competitive check on managers and on the banks (see Franks 
and Mayer, 1990, for further discussion of the relationship 
between different methods of corporate restructuring). 
The first part of the paper suggests that the theoretical 
literature on capitalist banking has stressed certain features 
of the role of banks and non-bank financial institutions 
while placing too little emphasis on others. As a result, policy 
discussion (particularly with respect to developing countries) 
has been focused perhaps too narrowly on the idea that the 
introduction of financial intermediaries and the removal of 
interest rate controls will improve the supply of credit with-
out full discussion of the enduring difficulty of allocating 
credit in the most efficient way (and correcting mistakes). 
With this in mind the paper sets out what seem to be the 
key functions of a banking system with respect to providing 
industrial finance. 
The second part of the paper looks at some evidence from 
international comparisons of industrial financing patterns 
to suggest that : 
(i) there is a dominant role for retentions and bank finance 
compared to market types of finance. Bank finance has 
not necessarily been long term; 
(ii) external capital markets therefore are not essential in 
the provision of industrial finance; 
(iii) there may be a 'life-cycle' pattern in industrial develop-
ment which is linked to the role of capital markets; 
(iv) the role of banks (or other senior creditors) can be 
very important in reorganization and restructuring of 
companies. This suggests that what may be critical for 
the design of a mechanism for efficient corporate restruc-
turing is a means of ranking credit claims and of ensuring 
that senior creditors have both monitoring functions and 
incentives to reorganize poorly performing borrowers; 
(v) the role of government has two aspects which arise out 
of the two aspects of financial systems raised in part 1. 
Policy relating to financial systems should be concerned 
with both the total amount of credit available and its 
allocation. The experience of some countries suggests 
that the presence of large government financial insti-
tutions and a 'low-interest policy' may not necessarily 
be harmful (Japan and Korea). It may be that the good 
allocation effects achieved in these countries outweighed 
the costs of financial repression and/or that some of the 
costs of repression can be offset by other policies, such 
as those which increase the incentive to save, and which 
ensure price and macroeconomic stability so that the 
supply of credit is increased. 
The survey of financing patterns in part 2 of the paper gives 
rise to a suggested check-list of features of a financial system 
which seem either to be common to all systems (and we 
presume therefore necessary), or to be particularly effective 
means of solving the basic problems which confront all 
systems. 
1. To aid in the screening and monitoring process: 
(i) Financial disclosure—some minimum standards and 
timeliness of corporate reporting must be observed and 
data must be available to creditors. Company level infor-
mation needs to be supplemented by industrial averages 
for comparison purposes. (Schaffer, 1989, indicates that 
the data on profitability of Polish enterprises may be 
difficult to interpret because of the intervention of the 
tax and subsidy system). However, the necessary stan-
dards of disclosure are not unrealistically high. In Ger-
many, for example, a rather small proportion of firms 
make public disclosures of their accounts; 
(ii) Within the banking sector some expertise in analysing 
corporate data and assessing risks. Even in systems 
where the number of actual bankruptcies is low, there 
is a need to be able to interpret warning signs when 
enterprises are in financial distress. This is particularly 
important in view of the corporate control function that 
creditors may be called upon to exercise. It seems to be 
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particularly difficult in systems where the tax and sub-
sidy system may obscure the financial health of enter-
prises; 
(iii) Good knowledge of the enterprises. A close relationship 
between lenders and borrowers improves information 
flows and is not necessarily incompatible with inter-
vention and control. In order to facilitate close relations 
of this kind there may be a rationale for delaying the 
development of markets in which debt claims can be 
traded. 
2. To aid in the corporate restructuring function : 
(i) Enforceability of debt contracts. If the financial system 
is to have anything more than a purely symbolic func-
tion, debt contracts must be enforceable. This will mean 
creditors will need to be ranked by seniority and should 
expect some payment out of disposal of assets of bank-
rupt debtors; 
(ii) A bank supervisory system which ensures banks must 
adhere to standards of financial responsibility (to en-
courage banks to act early enough to prevent the ac-
cumulation of losses); 
(iii) The ability to require extra information from enterprises 
if financial conditions worsen; 
(iv) A mechanism for creditors and firms to agree on a 
reorganization plan for the enterprise (which could also 
involve government planners or require their consent); 
(v) As a last resort a mechanism for replacing managers in 
firms where poor performance is the result of poor 
management; 
(vi) A mechanism for disposing of the assets of bankrupt 
companies. As stated above, a mechanism for compen-
sation to creditors should be considered. There must be 
some way to price industrial assets, but how to do so is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
1. What should a banking system do? 
There is considerable literature already on why banks and 
other financial institutions exist. The focus of much of it is 
on the increase in efficiency which comes from interme-
diation. This literature points out that financial institutions 
are needed because there are market imperfections which 
mean lenders and borrowers cannot get together without 
intermediaries (e.g. transactions costs which limit the possi-
bilities for risk spreading by small savers). This literature 
stands in puzzling juxtaposition with most literature on what 
banks and non-banks financial institutions (nbfi) do after 
they've come into existence, which typically assumes that 
they operate as a perfectly competitive industry in perfect 
capital markets (see Hellwig, 1990, for further discussion of 
different views of the role of banks). 
As a result, the descriptions of the function of banks focus 
on their role in : 
(i) facilitating the separation of timing of production and 
consumption; 
(ii) converting illiquid assets (particularly loans to industry) 
into liquid liabilities (demand deposits); 
(iii) allowing risk diversification as a result of a type of 
economy of scale (combining small deposits and making 
a range of loans with different risks). 
These functions increase efficiency in the economy and re-
duce the cost of providing funds for real investment since 
smaller illiquidity and risk premiums are demanded by the 
ultimate lenders. 
The contradiction is that most literature treats the banks 
and other financial institutions as having no other impact 
on the cost of providing funds to industry. ' 
Partly because of this style of theoretical literature the em-
pirical literature on banking sytems, particularly in develop-
ing countries and 'repressed' financial systems, has concen-
trated on the level of intermediation and on the effect and 
cost of interest-rate regulation. International evidence sug-
gests that differences in levels of intermediation can be fairly 
wide between countries and over time for a single country 
(Cho, 1989). The differences will probably be accounted for 
by differences in the level of savings, government regulations, 
and the existence of informal capital markets. It is difficult, 
however, to link differences in levels of formal interme-
diation per se to growth or industrial performance. (The 
World Bank (1989) does report a link between positive real 
rates of interest, financial depth (ratios of monetary assets 
to GNP) and rates of GNP growth, but notes that causality 
is difficult to infer. The underlying causes, such as differences 
in savings levels, are likely to be as important.) 
Banks are assumed to transfer depositors' funds to borrowers, setting 
interest rates of both sides in response either to market conditions or to 
government regulations. Deposit rates of interest will be either demand 
determined (i.e. by the overall level of savings and the structure of 
substitutes and complements in depositors' portfolios) or determined by 
government regulations. Loan rates will be determined by demand and 
supply of loans but the bank's supply schedule for loans will be simply 
derived from the balance sheet constraint and its level of deposits. 
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In systems with controlled interest rates (ceilings, etc.), the 
fear is that policies aimed at improving the provision of 
credit may in fact have the reverse effect. Total amounts of 
credit may be reduced because incentives to save are low 
and because financial institutions' margins are squeezed.' 
Credit rationing will result and, depending on the mechan-
isms for allocating credit, so too may misallocations and 
socially or politically unacceptable discrimination between 
borrowers. 
Both problems, low levels of intermediation and inefficient 
credit rationing, are interrelated and are not trivial. But it 
has become clear from the developing countries' experience 
that improving levels of intermediation and removing 
interest-rate regulations do not solve all the problems of 
financial markets. 
A separate strand of literature has focused on different 
problems faced by banks. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, drew 
attention to the fact that banks have to make allocative 
decisions between borrowers without full information.2 The 
result is that in equilibrium some borrowers will be arbi-
trarily refused credit. The model demonstrates the import-
ance of the banks' ability to screen customers. If the banks 
cannot adequately distinguish good from bad customers, 
credit rationing can result even when interest rates are com-
pletely free to move. The macroeconomic implication is 
that there is 'no presumption that the market equilibrium 
allocates credit to those for whom the expected return on 
their investments is highest'.3 Nor will an increase in interest 
rates necessarily increase the supply of credit. 
The discussion introduced by Stiglitz and Weiss focuses 
attention on a previously implicit assumption of much bank-
ing literature: that a market-determined interest rate and a 
financial system which is free from government restrictions 
will solve the problem of allocating credit without difficulty. 
This question is further discussed below. 
1.1. Policy issues 
The literature, therefore, has focused predominantly on the 
two policy issues of levels of intermediation and costs of 
repression in designing financial and banking systems. 
Considering only these aspects of the role of a banking 
system, there are four practical points in response to the 
question of what it should provide: 
(i) safety and reasonable return to savers, i.e. it should 
encourage intermediation by savers. It is, as noted 
above, a separate question whether this will actually 
raise the level of saving and it is certain that if savings 
rates are too low other policies, together with sustained 
growth in incomes, will also be needed to raise them; 
(ii) efficient intermediation, i.e. funds should be provided 
at the lowest possible cost to borrowers. The banks 
themselves must be low-cost providers of financial ser-
vices and the margin between savers' rates of return and 
the cost to borrowers as low as possible. It may be 
necessary to promote competition between financial in-
stitutions to ensure this and the difficulty in a small 
financial market is to achieve the right balance between 
competition and economies of scale; 
(iii) efficient allocation between borrowers, i.e. banks must 
be able to choose the right borrowers and/or projects 
(those with the highest expected rate of return to their 
investments taking into account the risk of default); 
(iv) reduction of the risk associated with industrial invest-
ment. 
If (i) to (iii) are operating, then some measure of (iv) will be 
achieved automatically, but there may be other ways in 
which banks can contribute to reduced risk. The literature 
survey above suggests that (i) and (ii) have been emphasized 
(see World Bank, 1989), but that the third point has received 
much less attention. The World Development Report, for 
example, comments only: 'Provided that intermediaries are 
good at selecting viable projects, greater intermediation will 
ensure that the better investments are financed and will 
thereby increase the average productivity of investment'.4 
This is a big proviso. Furthermore, although some measure 
of risk reduction of type (iv) is likely to be achieved automati-
cally through the achievement of (i) and (ii), further risk 
reductions will result from achievement of (iii). These risk 
reductions should be reflected in both the macroeconomic 
productivity of investment and in the microeconomic ef-
ficiency of the banks as transactions costs and risk premiums 
reductions reduce the margins necessary. 
World Bank, 1989, however, suggests that there is little evidence that 
higher real rates of interest have increased savings rates. 
In the face of lack of knowledge about the quality of borrowers and 
default risks the bank's best strategy will be to ration credit rather than 
raise interest rates when the demand for loans is greater than the supply. 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, p. 401. World Bank, 1989, p. 31. 
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The remainder of this paper will focus on items (iii) and (iv). 
Item (i) is chiefly a matter of the design of bank supervision 
practice, capital adequacy requirements, reserve require-
ments and deposit insurances systems. Supervision systems 
which control the management of banks are, in a sense, the 
equivalent of the control of enterprise managements by the 
financial system (and it is interesting to note that there is no 
system which leaves the control of banks to market forces). 
The rationale for supervision in most countries is that it 
provides some protection against the spread of financial 
crises if there are serious financial failures amongst banks' 
client firms. A well-functioning supervisory system (and 
there have been some notable failures in recent years) should 
ensure that banks are not themselves too vulnerable to 
collapse. This is usually seen as most important in systems 
where commercial banks are deposit-taking institutions 
(since the aim is to prevent knock-on effects), but is not 
apparently closely connected with the banks' role in provid-
ing finance for industry. However, there is a somewhat 
different supervisory problem in systems where banks are 
both equity owners and creditors. Supervising banks as 
creditors involves making sure they make sound loans, ad-
equately collateralized and well monitored. Supervising 
banks which hold equity may be much more difficult since 
the bank itself may have conflicting interests as shareholder 
and creditor. A bank which holds equity in an ailing firm 
has different interests as creditor and owner. As owner the 
bank wants to see more loans extended to rescue the firm, 
while as creditor it wants to see new equity capital raised to 
improve the firm's ability to repay. If the case is hopeless 
the bank may be able to claim some collateral against its 
loans but will probably lose all its equity investment which 
potentially magnifies the extent of the crisis. If the case is 
marginal the bank is virtually trapped since selling its equity 
is likely to signal the markets, triggering a situation in which 
its role as rescuer-creditor is more difficult. In most countries 
which permit banks to own equity (Japan and some conti-
nental European countries) there are upper limits on the 
share of any company which can be owned and sometimes 
limits on the proportion of bank assets which may be held 
as equity. These considerations should not be overlooked 
when considering proposals for financial reform which cast 
the banks as major equity owners. 
Item (ii) is likely to be a matter of experiment and practice. 
There is some literature on the extent of economies of scale 
and scope in banking (see Yoshioka and Nakajima, 1987, 
Tachibanaki et ai, 1990) which may provide guidance on 
the type of bank which performs well but the range of 
international differences in the structure of banking systems 
(from universal banks to highly segmented systems) suggests 
that there is no model which outperforms others. 
Part 2 of the paper focuses on what the study of industrial 
financing experience, in industrialized countries suggests are 
the key elements of (iii) and (iv). 
2. International experience in corporate finance 
International comparisons1 of corporate financing patterns 
have brought out interesting features which challenge some 
preconceptions about how industry is financed. Tables 1 and 
2 show the gross and net proportions of different sources of 
finance in five industrialized countries.2 
(i) in all countries the major source of industrial finance has 
been retained earnings. This is particularly noticeable in 
the 'net' sources of finance where companies' holdings 
of financial assets have been subtracted from the match-
ing liability category; 
(ii) the largest source of external finance in all countries 
has been bank lending. Bank lending has not necessarily 
been long-term lending even in those countries which 
are regarded as having banking sectors particularly 
supportive of industry (Japan and Germany). Data 
from the UK, Germany and Japan suggest, somewhat 
surprisingly, that small firms have relied more on exter-
nal financing, particularly banks, than large firms which 
tend to be internally financed; 
(iii) a very small role is played by securities' markets in 
general and the equity market in particular. 
New views of corporate finance suggest why this might be 
so and focus attention on roles of banks which are precisely 
those that appear to be neglected by the more familiar 
approach to financial markets described in part 1. These 
views stress information and principal-agent problems which 
arise in cases where managers have better information than 
investors and lenders to firms or where they have conflicting 
objectives. One reason why banks may be better able to 
finance industry in these circumstances than arm's-length 
markets is that a long-term relationship with an element of 
confidentiality may provide a framework for an exchange 
of information which is otherwise difficult. 
The role of banks in gathering and disseminating infor-
mation is likely to be particularly important for smaller firms 
which are not well known in the market and in developing 
financial systems where relevant information may not be 
easily available, or where there is little experience in inter-
preting it. 
1 CEPR—An international study of the financing of industry. 
2 For further discussion, see Mayer, 1989. 
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Table 1 
Gross sources of finance, 1970-85 
(% of total funds raised') 
Retentions 
Capital transfer 
Short-term securities 
Loans 
Trade credit 
Bonds 
Shares 
Other 
Statistical adjustment 
us 
68,5 
NA 
1,8 
24,1 
8,3 
9,6 
-1,1 
-6,8 
-4,4 
UK 
74,0 
2,0 
2,4 
18,5 
2,4 
0 
6,0 
2,5 
-7,7 
Japan 
41,3 
NA 
NA 
35,4 
16,4 
2,8 
3,1 
1,2 
0 
Germany 
58,8 
NA 
NA 
20,1 
NA 
0,7 
2,0 
18.62 
NA 
France 
43,0 
1,5 
0 
40,7 
4,3 
2,2 
12,3 
0 
-4 ,1 
Total 100,0 100,1 100,2 100,2 99,9 
Sources: US, UK, France, from OECD, Financial Statistics (flow of funds). 
Japan, from Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts. 
Germany, from Deutsche Bundesbank, Capital Finance Accounts. 
1 Calculated as the 16-year sum of each source as a percentage of the 16-year sum of funds raised. 
2 Includes insurance (1,4%), government transfers (6.5%) and foreign trade credit (2,5%). 
Table 2 
Net sources of finance,1 1970-85 
(% of physical investment) 
us UK Japan Germany 
Retentions 
Capital transfer 
Short-term securities 
Loans 
Trade credit 
Bonds 
Shares 
Other 
Statistical adjustment 
87,9 
NA 
0,9 
25,2 
-1,4 
11,6 
-1,5 
17,1 
-5,6 
106,3 
2,9 
2,7 
3,0 
-1,7 
-2,1 
-3,6 
3,5 
-11,0 
70,4 
NA 
NA 
33,8 
-9,2 
1,9 
3,0 
0,2 
0 
75,0 
NA 
NA 
11,9 
NA 
-0,2 
0,1 
13,42 
0 
62,1 
2,2 
-0 ,3 
37,7 
-0 ,6 
1,0 
5,2 
-1 ,5 
-6,0 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,1 100,2 99,8 
Sources: US, UK, France, from OECD, Financial Statistics (flow of funds). 
Japan, from Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts. 
Germany, from Deutsche Bundesbank, Capital Finance Accounts. 
1 Net sources are the gross sources of finance less acquisitions of the same type of financial asset, e.g. bonds issued less bonds purchased (including own bonds retired). They arc shown as a 
percentage of physical investment which is equal to net financial sources (gross sources - gross financial uses). 
2 Includes insurance (0,7%), government transfers (8,3%) and foreign trade credit ( - 1,5%). 
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Information collecting and monitoring of the behaviour of 
firms is, however, not the only function which banks seem 
to perform. In some countries in the international study 
banks are closely involved in reorganizations of borrowers 
who get into financial difficulty. We will argue below that 
these roles of the financial (particularly banking) system can 
contribute significantly to the achievement of the third and 
fourth type of efficiency gains outlined in Part I. 
The international comparison of industrial finance therefore 
shifts the policy discussion towards two questions which are 
rather different from those addressed in most policy debate 
to date. These questions are first, what can a banking system 
provide which helps to solve the information and principal-
agent problems identified by the new finance literature, and 
second what role is played by securities markets? 
The short answers to these questions are that banks provide 
screening, monitoring and control (in ascending order of 
importance), and that securities markets provide very little 
except for certain types of industry, or size of firm. These 
remarks clearly need some amplification. 
If banks are to be able to provide the efficient allocation 
mechanism (choosing between borrowers and projects), 
which has been suggested as necessary, they will need to 
be able to screen and monitor borrowers effectively. The 
comparison of international practices in these areas suggests 
that there is relatively little difference between the ways in 
which bankers in most countries do this. They all rely on 
accounting data provided by firms and most are looking for 
evidence of a reasonably steady and reliable profit outlook 
(so they may also need a view of industry prospects and 
macroeconomic trends). The accounting data are likely to 
be supplemented with some information on who the manage-
ment of a firm are (their credentials and experience) and 
who are the firm's clients and suppliers. In different countries 
there may be different weight put on different types of 
financial ratios, but what is striking is the similarity of 
approach by banks even when the structure of banking 
systems is quite different and when the amount and reliability 
of published accounting data vary. In Japan, for example, 
companies not listed on public stock exchanges are not 
required to submit accounts to an independent, external 
audit, while in Germany a rather small number of firms are 
legally required to publish company accounts. One differ-
ence, the importance of which will become clear, is how 
much attention is paid to the value of a company in liqui-
dation relative to its value as an ongoing firm. 
Monitoring functions of banks depends on being able to 
check similar accounting data on a regular and timely basis. 
The insight of the new theoretical literature is that the ability 
to control the behaviour of agents will be an important 
factor in how efficiently financial systems can work. What 
emerges from the empirical study is that in systems where 
firms are able to raise more external finance banks play a 
very large role in providing it. In countries which are typi-
cally regarded as 'arm's-length' type financial systems (the 
US and the UK), firms have relied much more heavily on 
internal financing. This seems to suggest that banks may 
have the edge over external capital markets in providing the 
kind of control which is needed to encourage the use and 
availability of external finance (see Hellwig, 1990, for a view 
on the role of banks in stages of development). In at least 
one country of the study, Japan, this role of the banks is 
quite clear in the case of companies facing financial difficulty 
as a result of managerial failures (see Corbett, 1987). In the 
case of Germany, where banks are typically thought to 
exercise considerable control, research suggests (see Fischer, 
1989) that in practice the relationship between banks and 
clients is less close than the stereotype and the smaller use 
of bank loans as a source of finance is consistent with this 
view. 
Both Germany and Japan are examples of systems where 
there has been to date virtually no 'market' for corporate 
control (i.e. practically no hostile takeovers through the 
equity markets) and this observation helps to clarify what 
type of control is important. We are here talking about the 
control of ongoing firms. Involvement by banks in bank-
ruptcy procedures is only part of this story for that process 
is mostly about the control over the ownership of the physi-
cal assets of the firm. It is clearly desirable to have a fairly 
quick and efficient mechanism for disposing of assets once 
a firm is beyond redemption. What is more important is the 
process of rescuing a firm which could continue to be viable 
under new management. It is the ability of banks to replace 
poorly performing managers in a potentially viable firm 
which gives them the sort of credible threat which is essential 
to the type of control referred to here. 
Policymakers may well ask at this stage what characteristics 
of banking systems enable them to carry out these roles. 
Research results are at present only suggestive but certain 
features seem helpful : 
(i) a means of collecting company and industry infor-
mation and keeping it up to date. Some degree of 
financial disclosure is necessary although, as noted, 
there are considerable international differences; 
(ii) ability of some sections of the bank to analyse the data 
in a consistent though not necessarily very sophisticated 
way (e.g. a central credit assessment division). If there 
is a chronic shortage of such skill there may be a 
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role for external credit assessment agencies, but it is 
noticeable that in the more bank-orientated financial 
systems such agencies play a smaller role than in the 
market-orientated countries; 
(iii) good knowledge of the borrower. Proximity to bor-
rowers will help and this seems to suggest that a branch 
structure with considerable involvement of branch man-
agers in lending to local firms will be useful. (In Japan 
banks and industry exchange personnel for training 
purposes); 
(iv) since there can be a problem of objectivity (and possibly 
of probity) once a loan officer becomes very closely 
involved with a particular account there may be a need 
to move officers around and/or to have a different 
section of the bank take over management of problem 
loans. 
2.1. The role of securities markets and private property 
rights 
The second feature of the empirical evidence is that it raises 
some serious questions about the role of securities markets 
in the provision of finance for industry. Clearly these markets 
have provided negligible amounts of new capital for finan-
cing industry in most countries. 
Theoretical literature assigns these markets two functions. 
One is to price risk. The other function is to provide a 
market in which the ownership and control of industrial 
assets can be transferred (and therefore to price the assets 
themselves). This should ensure that underperforming assets 
will be better managed as shareholders exercise control over 
their managers either through shareholders' meetings or by 
bringing in new management through a takeover or merger. 
Recent takeover activity in many markets raises doubts 
about whether this is the main motivation or effect of take-
overs (see Franks and Mayer, 1990). And it is a rare share-
holders' meeting which replaces its company's managers. 
As has been suggested above, however, in some financial 
systems it is the holders of corporate debt, not the owners 
of equity, who have effective control over managers and 
who can ensure that industrial assets are well used. Other 
papers (Corbett, 1987, Mayer, 1988, Mayer and Franks, 
1990) have suggested that it is misleading to confuse econ-
omic behaviour with the legal form of claims on a company. 
In certain systems creditors perform the roles normally as-
sumed for equity holders. 
This observation has a particular importance in the dis-
cussion of the design of systems for industrial finance in 
countries in transition from socialism (as it does also for 
developing countries). There is little in the experience of 
industrialized countries which suggests that the market in 
which legal ownership claims are exchanged has been closely 
linked with the provision of finance for industry. Therefore 
it seems likely that the experience of the industrialized 
countries in industrial finance is quite relevant for countries 
that may not for some time be able or willing to develop a 
significant market for equities. The survey of research on 
industrialized countries' financial systems presented in this 
paper has indicated that the allocation of finance to 'good' 
borrowers and the possibility of undoing 'mistakes', by 
transforming 'bad' borrowers into good, can take place 
independently of the ownership of the industrial assets. Hol-
ders of corporate debt can perform these functions appar-
ently as well as, or possibly in some cases even better than, 
the equity holders. 
Once a firm is beyond rescue then some mechanism must 
exist to redistribute its physical assets. The problem of how 
to do that and how to price the means of production has a 
long history and a large literature.' A well-functioning finan-
cial system might make some contribution to solving the 
problem but that is a subject which is beyong the scope of 
this paper. Whatever method is used to solve that problem, 
whether market or not, it is not obvious that it has an 
intimate connection with the ability of the financial system 
to provide finance for industry. What will be necessary is a 
(legal?) system which decides how to rank the claims of 
lenders and allocate the proceeds of the sale of assets between 
them, but this does not seem to require full private equity 
ownership of firms. To conclude, the transferability of the 
experience of industrialized capitalist countries in industrial 
finance does not seem to be seriously hampered by the 
differing forms of property ownership rights. As long as 
debt contracts are enforceable then the methods of corporate 
governance and control described here could be replicated. 
Furthermore, there are reasons to be cautious about a too 
sudden switch from a system in which finance passively 
adjusted to enterprise and plan objectives, to one in which 
arm's-length financial markets are expected to drive entre-
preneurial behaviour. 
' See Brus and Laski, 1989, for a survey of the debate and a discussion of 
property rights in market socialist economies. 
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